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GENERAL SIR GEORGE STANGER

Portrait by Sir J. Wilson





THE GREAT VIEW OF THE GREAT EASTERN BAY










Engraving by R. Smith

1666 THE GLOBE

For a List of the new edition

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FORTIFICATIONS OF B. MESSINA



sailors and marines in the boats, who were well supplied with Minié muskets, kept up a galling fire of small-arms against the shore when the inhabitants or infantry directed musketry upon them. Commander Osborn hoisted his flag on board the *Vesuvius*. His first exploit was at Genitschi. He sent Lieutenant Hewett in the *Beagle* to examine the connection between the Spit of Arabat and that place. Early on the 3rd this reconnaissance was effected, and immediately after the communication between the spit and the town of Genitschi was cut off.

Along the Spit of Arabat the Russians had formed a military road, of the existence of which the allies had only recently become aware. To reach this road with supplies, an immense floating-bridge was placed between "the spit" and Genitschi. By this road the corn could be brought from the richest corn districts of southern Russia, as long as the floating-bridge could be defended. The boat expedition sent against it silenced the defence; the bridge was destroyed, and Genitschi itself afterwards reduced to ashes. This was a further blow to Sebastopol, struck from a distance, but not less sure. It added 120 miles of road—over dreary steppes, covered in winter with snow, in spring and autumn with mud, and in summer only passable with any ease—to the distance which supplies were to be carried, when carts and cattle could be procured to carry them to Sebastopol. The despatches concerning this exploit are so full that no details are required. Admiral Lyons thus wrote on the 10th of July, off Sebastopol, to the lords of the Admiralty:—

"Their lordships will have great pleasure in learning that Commander Osborn, of the *Vesuvius*, mentions in favourable terms a letter he had received from Lieutenant W. N. W. Hewett, the commander of the *Beagle*, reporting the destruction of the floating-bridge in the Straits of Genitschi.

"I have now the honour to enclose a copy of that letter, and to draw their lordship's attention to the excellent arrangements made by Lieutenant Hewett, as well as to the gallant and able way in which his orders were executed by Mr. Martin Tracey, midshipman of the *Vesuvius*, Mr. John Hayles, acting gunner of the *Beagle*, and the boats' crews, one of whom, Joseph Trewavas, ordinary seaman, lent from the *Agamemnon*, was wounded, and is particularly mentioned as having cut the hawsers."

Mr. Hewett's report to Commander Osborn was as follows, bearing date the 4th of July, from the *Beagle*, off Genitschi:—

"I have the honour to inform you that on

my arrival off this place I immediately proceeded to minutely examine the communication between the town and Arabat Spit, and, on so doing, found it to be by means of a ferry of two large flats and hawsers, which I determined to destroy, if possible. Accordingly, on the forenoon of yesterday I dispatched my gig, under Mr. John Hayles, acting-gunner of this ship, and paddlebox-boat, under Mr. Martin Tracey, midshipman of the *Vesuvius*. I have much pleasure in reporting that they succeeded entirely in destroying it by cutting the hawsers and casting the boats adrift, which was done under a very heavy fire of musketry at about eighty yards, the troops completely lining the beach, and the adjacent houses being filled with riflemen. Great credit is due to Mr. Hayles for his activity and zeal in destroying the same, and to Mr. Martin Tracey for the effectual fire he kept up in covering his retreat, the firing from the ship and paddlebox-boat at the same time causing great confusion and loss among the enemy as they retired from their exposed position. Mr. Hayles speaks in the highest terms of the boat's crew, especially of Joseph Trewavas, ordinary seaman, lent from the *Agamemnon*, who cut the hawsers.

"I enclose a list of casualties, which, I am happy to say, is very small, although the gig and paddlebox-boat were riddled with musket-balls."

Very severe weather, such as is unusual in the Sea of Azoff during the month of July, compelled Commander Osborn to lie under shelter for a portion of the early part of the month. Heavy squalls broke over the sea from the north, which was dangerous to the larger ships in those shallow waters. Meanwhile, the gun-boats "crept along shore," burning and destroying the enemy's granaries and fisheries, sparing, as much as possible, private property, but consuming all government stores, of whatever kind, as well as nets and boats. On several parts of the Spit of Arabat, barracks and rude buildings which appeared like post-houses were burned. From the middle of the spit to the mouth of the Salghir, there was a floating-bridge, which was cut away. Osborn in person sailed to Berdiansk, where vast stores of corn were collected, short as was the time which had elapsed since the firebrands of the squadron had been busy there before. This vast collection of food supplies was given to the fire, and with it very valuable stores of forage. There was a formidable work, hastily but cleverly constructed by the enemy, between Berdiansk and Mariopol, called Fort Petrovskoi; upon this the vessels opened a cannonade, by which the batteries were dismounted, and the gun-

ners slain or driven away. Shells and rockets were thrown, by which stores of dry grain were ignited, and, as at Genitschi, large quantities of carefully-collected forage were consumed. Scarcely a building was left in the neighbourhood. Thence he proceeded to the estuary of the Don, and laid waste the buildings and stores at Taganrog: the forage for horses, skilfully piled at that place, was burned almost as soon as the fire of the boats was opened. Throughout the month of July, Osborn kept the people of these coasts in a state of alarm, burning and destroying everything which could be made serviceable to the enemy. Every effort was made to spare private property, and by this means much grain, forage, and fish escaped destruction; while the owners, who were thus treated with such lenity, in many cases fired upon the boats with musketry as they retired, and, in several cases, whole boats' crews narrowly escaped destruction. The male inhabitants of these towns should, in most cases, have been treated as combatants, which to all intents and purposes they were. A consideration was shown to Russia all through the war, especially by our superior officers, who acted under the orders of their governments, which was not appreciated by the Russian cabinet nor by the people. The government spread reports all over Europe that the English consumed the property of unresisting inhabitants, and shot them down at their doors; the fact being that, both in the Baltic and in the Sea of Azoff, our men, after sparing the inhabitants, were fired upon by the men they treated with forbearance and kindness. Our men were not infrequently smitten by the bullets of the inhabitants, who concealed their arms from the landing-parties, and fired upon them as they retired. The saying of the older Napoleon was realised on the part of the English—"I will make war upon my brother Alexander with courteous arms."

The following despatches give all necessary details of the operations of the month.

Admiral Lyons wrote to the Admiralty, July 30th, as follows:—

"In continuation of the proceedings of the steam squadron in the Sea of Azoff, under the orders of Commander Sherard Osborn, of the *Vesurius*, I beg leave to enclose, for the information of the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, copies of two letters from that officer, together with the several inclosures, reporting the steps taken to deprive the enemy of the new harvest, and to cripple his resources of all kinds, since the proceedings which were communicated in my letter of the 7th instant. During the time the squadron was detained from stress of weather under Berutch Spit,

near Genitschi, the vessels were, at every break of the weather, employed in destroying extensive fishing establishments which supplied the army in the Crimea with fish, as well as guard-houses, barracks, stores of forage, and provisions, on the Isthmus of Arabat; and the pontoon, or only means of communication between Arabat Spit and the Crimea, at the entrance of the Kara-su River, was burnt by Commander Rowley Lambert, of the *Curlew*. The attack and destruction of Fort Petrovskoi, on the 16th instant, by the combined English and French squadrons named in Commander Osborn's letter, appear to have been accomplished with the usual skill and success which have attended the operations in the Sea of Azoff; and their lordships will observe that particular mention is made of Lieutenant Hubert Campion, senior lieutenant of the *Vesurius*, who commanded the landing-party, and rendered great service. I would particularly beg leave to call their lordship's attention to the high-minded conduct of Captain de Cintré, of his imperial majesty's steamer *Milan*, who, on seeing that the bulk of the squadron was under the orders of Commander Osborn, to whom he was senior, waived his right to plan the attack, and placed his ship, as well as the *Mouette*, in the positions pointed out by Commander Osborn. In the meantime, Lieutenant Hewett, in the *Beagle*, destroyed an extensive collection of fish-stores, and two large granaries full of corn in the neighbourhood of Berdiansk. After destroying Fort Petrovskoi, the squadron proceeded to Glofira, where some extensive corn and fish-stores were destroyed under the orders of Commander Rowley Lambert, of the *Curlew*; and a similar service was performed at the Crooked Spit, in the Gulf of Azoff, by vessels under the orders of Commander F. A. B. Craufurd, of the *Swallow*. In the meantime Commander Osborn reconnoitred various parts of the coast as far as Taganrog. The reports of Commander Osborn are so comprehensive, that I will only remark that the admirable manner in which he has carried out my instructions 'to clear the seaboard of all fish-stores, all fisheries, and mills, on a scale beyond the wants of the neighbouring population, and, indeed, of all things destined to contribute to the maintenance of the enemy's army in the Crimea,' fully corroborates the opinion I have before expressed, that he is an officer possessing a rare combination of high qualities, and I beg to recommend him to their lordships' most favourable consideration."

Commander Osborn's report to Admiral Lyons was dated July 17th, on board her majesty's ship *Vesurius*, Gulf of Azoff:—

"Heavy gales and much sea obliged the

squadron in this sea to take shelter under Berutch Spit for several days. Coaling, provisioning, and completing stores, were, however, proceeded with; and at every break in the weather the vessels were actively employed destroying some extensive fisheries upon Berutch Spit, as well as guard-houses, barracks, and stores of forage and provisions, to within an easy gunshot of Arabat Fort. The only portoon or means of communication between Arabat Spit and the Crimea, at the entrance of the Kara-su River, has been burnt by Commander Rowley Lambert, of her majesty's ship *Curler*, and we have now entire possession of the spit. A lull in the weather enabled me to put to sea upon the 13th of July for a sweep round the Sea of Azoff, the *Ardent*, *Weser*, and *Clinker* being left under the orders of Lieutenant Horton to harass Genitschi and Arabat, as well as to cut off all communication along the spit. Delayed by the weather, we did not reach Berdiansk until the 15th of July; a heavy sea was running, but, anxious to lose no time, the senior officer of the French squadron (Captain de Cintré, of the *Milan*) and myself determined to go at once and endeavour to burn the forage and corn-stacks upon the landward side of the hills overlooking the town. No inhabitants were to be seen, but the occasional glimpse of soldiers showed that a landing was expected, and that they were prepared for a street-fight. I hoisted a flag of truce, in order, if possible, to get the women and children removed from the town; but, as that met with no reply, and the surf rendered landing extremely hazardous, I hauled it down, and the squadron commenced to fire over the town at the forage and corn-stack behind it, and I soon had the satisfaction of seeing a fire break out exactly where it was wanted. The town was not touched, except by an occasional shell. The wheat and forage being fired, it became necessary to move into deeper water for the night; and from our distant anchorage the fires were seen burning throughout the night. On the 16th of July the allied squadron proceeded to Fort Petrowskoi, between Berdiansk and Mariopol. As I approached the place there were evident symptoms of an increase to the fortifications since the *Vesurius* silenced its fire three weeks ago. A redan, covering the curtain which faces the sea, showed seven new embrasures, and much new earth led me to expect some masked works. Captain de Cintré, commanding the French steamer *Milan*, although my senior, in the most handsome manner surrendered the right of planning the attack, and, keeping alone in view the good of the allied cause, gallantly took up the position I wished him to do, followed by Captain de l'Allemande in the *Mouette*. At 9-30 a.m., all arrangements being

made, the squadron* took up their positions, the light draught gun-boats taking up stations east and west of the fort, and enfilading the works in front and rear, while the heavier vessels formed a semi-circle round the front. The heavy nature of our ordnance crushed all attempts at resistance, and soon forced not only the garrison to retire from the trenches, but also kept at a respectful distance the reserve force, consisting of three strong battalions of infantry and two squadrons of cavalry. We then commenced to fire with carcasses, and, although partially successful, I was obliged to send the light boats of the squadron to complete the destruction of the fort and batteries—a duty I intrusted to Lieutenant Hubert Campion, of the *Vesurius*. In a short time I had the satisfaction of seeing all the cantonment, gun platforms, public buildings, corn and forage stores, on fire, and the embrasures of the earthwork seriously injured; and although the enemy, from an earthwork to the rear, opened a sharp fire on our men, Lieutenant Campion completed this service in the most able and perfect manner, without the loss of one man. Lieutenant Campion reports that the fort was fully as formidable a one as it appeared from the ships; the platforms were laid ready, but the guns either had not yet arrived, or had been withdrawn by the enemy. Leaving the *Swallow*, Commander Craufurd, to check any attempt of the enemy to re-occupy the fort and extinguish the fire until the destruction was complete, the rest of the squadron proceeded to destroy great quantities of forage and some most extensive fisheries, situated upon the White House Spit, and about the mouth of the river Berda. By dark the work was done, and thirty fisheries, numbers of heavy launches, and great store of salted fish, nets, and gear, as well as much forage, had fallen into our hands, in spite of considerable numbers of Cossack horse. Nothing could exceed the zeal and energy displayed by every officer and man throughout the day; and the skilful manner in which the various officers in command of her majesty's vessels took up their positions in the morning, the beautiful accuracy of the fire, and the care with which the squadron was handled in shallow water, deserve to be called to your favourable notice. The able and cheerful co-operation of the French throughout the day was beyond all praise."

The same officer reported to the admiral on the 21st of July, from the Gulf of Azoff, on board the *Vesurius*:—

* *Vesurius*, Commander Sherard Osborn; *Curler*, Commander Rowley Lambert; *Swallow*, Commander F. A. B. Craufurd; *Fancy*, Lieutenant C. G. Grylls; *Grinder*, Lieutenant F. Hamilton; *Boxer*, Lieutenant S. P. Townsend; *Cracker*, Lieutenant J. H. Morryat; *Wrangler*, Lieutenant H. Burgoyne; *Jasper*, Lieutenant J. S. Hudson; *Beagle*, Lieutenant W. N. Hewett.

"The day I closed my last report to you, the *Beagle*, Lieutenant Hewett, was detached to Berdiansk. Lieutenant Hewett rejoined me yesterday, and reports that one of the Russian sunken vessels was blown up. Lieutenant Hewett, the same evening, landed under cover of his vessel's guns, and destroyed an extensive collection of fish-stores and two large granaries full of corn. On the 17th of July, in consequence of information received of extensive depots of corn and forage existing at a town called Glofira, upon the Asiatic coast, near Gheisk, I proceeded there with the squadron, accompanied by the French steamers *Milan* and *Mouette*. The *Vesuvius* and *Swallow* were obliged to anchor some distance off shore; I therefore sent Commander Rowley Lambert (her majesty's ship *Curlew*) with these gun-boats—*Fancy*, *Grinder*, *Boxer*, *Cracker*, *Jasper*, *Wrangler*, boats of *Vesuvius* and *Swallow*—to reconnoitre in force, and if an opportunity occurred to destroy any stores of provisions or of forage, he was to do so. Commander Lambert found Glofira and its neighbourhood swarming with cavalry; the town an open straggling agricultural village, and no appearance of corn or forage in it; he therefore very properly confined his operations to destroying upon Glofira Spit some very extensive corn and fish stores, but spared the town. The skill with which this service was executed in the face of large bodies of cavalry reflects no small credit upon Commander Lambert; and he speaks most highly of the able assistance rendered him by the French officers and men under Captains de Cintré and l'Allemande. From Glofira I next proceeded to the Crooked Spit, in the Gulf of Azoff, the French squadron parting company to harass the enemy in the neighbourhood of Kamisheva and Obitotchna. The squadron reached the Crooked Spit the same day (the 18th of July), and I immediately ordered Commander Frederick Craufurd, in the *Swallow*, supported by the gun-boats *Grinder*, *Boxer*, and *Cracker*, and the boats of her majesty's ships *Vesuvius*, *Curlew*, and *Fancy*, under Lieutenants Grylls, Rowley, and Sullivan, to proceed and clear the spit of the cavalry and Cossacks of the enemy, and then land and destroy the great fishing establishments situated upon it. Commander Craufurd executed this service with great vigour, and his report I have the honour to inclose. The extraordinary quantity of nets and stores of fish and the scale of the works destroyed fully confirm the statements made by the work-people, that their occupation consisted in supplying food to the army in the Crimea, everything going to Simpheropol by the great northern steppe. While this service was being executed I reconnoitred the mouth of the river Mious, fifteen miles west of Taganrog, in her majesty's

ship *Jasper*, Lieutenant J. S. Hudson. The shallow nature of the coast would not allow us to approach within a mile and three-quarters of what in the chart is marked as Fort Temonos. The fortification was an earthwork of some extent, and ditched, but not pierced for guns. It was evidently of an old date; and as I could see no one within it, I again returned to the same place, accompanied by the boats of her majesty's ships *Vesuvius* and *Curlew*, and her majesty's gun-vessels *Cracker*, *Boxer*, and *Jasper*. Cavalry in large bodies, armed for the most part with carbines or rifles, were evidently much harassed by riding upon supposed points of attack; and when we got to Fort Temonos, and the usual Cossack picket had been driven off, I and Commander Lambert proceeded at once with the light boats into the river. When there, and immediately under Fort Temonos, which stands upon a steep escarpe of eighty feet, we found ourselves looked down upon by a large body of both horse and foot, lining the ditch and parapet of the work. Landing on the opposite bank, at a good rifle-shot distance, one boat's crew, under Lieutenant Rowley, was sent to destroy a collection of launches and a fishery, while a careful and steady fire of Minié rifles kept the Russians from advancing upon us. Assuring ourselves of the non-existence of any object worth hazarding so small a force any further, we returned to the vessels, passing within pistol-shot of the Russian ambuscade. The cool steadiness of the officers and men in the gigs, together with the wonderful precision of the fire from the covering vessels, distant as they were, doubtless kept the enemy in check, and prevented serious consequences. To Commander Lambert, Lieutenants Grylls and Rowley, and Mr. Tabuteau (mate), who were in the gigs, as well as to Lieutenants Marryat, Townsend, and Hudson, who commanded the gun-vessels, my best thanks are due. The gig of the *Grinder*, under Lieutenant Hamilton, had a narrow escape upon the same day from a similar ambuscade, at a place called Kirpe, ten miles east of Mariopol, the very proper humanity of Lieutenant Hamilton in not firing into an open defenceless town, as it appeared to him, having nigh entailed the loss of a boat's crew when he attempted to land and destroy a corn-store. A heavy fire of musketry at half-pistol shot providentially injured no one, and Lieutenant Hamilton appears to have most skilfully escaped. The 19th of July I reconnoitred Taganrog in the *Jasper* gun-boat. A new battery was being constructed upon the heights near the hospital, but, although two shots were thrown into it, it did not reply. Every part of the town showed signs of the injuries it had received when we visited it under the late Captain Edmund Lyons of the

Miranda. The long series of government stores burnt by the allied flotilla had not been repaired; and the only sign of any communication being now held by water with the Don was one large barge upon the beach. To put a stop, however, to all traffic of this nature, and to harass the enemy in this neighbourhood, I have ordered Commander Craufurd to remain in the Gulf of Azoff with two gun-vessels under his orders. That the squadron has not been idle I trust this report will show; and, without entering into more details than I have done, I can assure you, sir, that from Genitschi to Taganrog, and thence round to Kamisheva, we have kept the coast in a state of constant alarm, and their troops incessantly moving. The good service done by the gun-boats in this way has been very great. The total amount of provisions, corn, fisheries, forage, and boats destroyed has been something enormous. Nothing can exceed the zeal and activity of the officers or good conduct of the men constituting this squadron, and constant work does not, I am happy to say, appear as yet to impair their health."

Commander Craufurd reported to Commander Osborn, as senior officer, on the 15th of July, from her majesty's ship *Swallow*, off Crooked Spit, Sea of Azoff, as follows:—

"In compliance with your orders, I proceeded in her majesty's steam gun-boat *Grinder*, with *Cracker* and *Boxer* and boats of the squadron, to reconnoitre the Crooked Spit. Having cleared the spit of some mounted troops

who occupied it, I ordered a detachment of boats, with their respective officers, to land and destroy the immense fishing establishments and nets found upon the point of it. The country seemed swarming with cavalry; but by the able management of the officers in command of the gun-boats, and by their good fire, they were effectually driven off the spit some distance inland. Having reconnoitred as far into the land as we could see from the mast-head of the *Grinder*, all the boats were ordered to land and set fire to very large and extensive government stores upon the upper part of the spit, including large fishing establishments, an enormous quantity of nets, haystacks, and several large houses used as government stores. I learnt from a Russian fisherman that the fish caught on this spit and cured here was immediately forwarded to Simpheropol for the use of the Crimean army; and I conclude that a very severe blow has been inflicted upon the enemy by the amount of property which was destroyed, including spars, timber, fish, nets, and boats,—apparently the most extensive fishing establishment in the Sea of Azoff,—and, I am happy to say, without a casualty. My thanks are due to Lieutenants Hamilton, of the *Grinder*, and Townsend, of the *Boxer*; as also to Lieutenants Rowley, of the *Curlew*; Grylls, of the *Fancy*; Sullivan, of the *Vesuvius*; Mr. Aldrich, master of the *Swallow*; Mr. Deare, gunner of the *Curlew*; and Mr. Windsor, gunner of the *Swallow*, who, all and each, by their zeal and activity, rendered great service in destroying so large an accumulation of stores and houses in so short a space of time."

CHAPTER XCIV.

NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE BALTIC IN THE SUMMER OF 1855.—DESTRUCTION OF BARRACKS, STORES, AND OTHER RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT PROPERTY BY THE BRITISH STEAMERS AND GUN-BOATS.—CAPTURE OF COASTING-VESSELS.—SHELLING OF TROOPS ON THE RUSSIAN COASTS.—BOMBARDMENT OF SWEABORG.

"Britannia needs no bulwarks,
No towers along the steep;
Her path is o'er the mountain wave,
Her home is on the deep."—CAMPBELL.

In a previous chapter the operations in the Baltic were given to the end of June. At the opening of July, Captain Yelverton, one of the most skilful and gallant officers in the Baltic fleet, was sent on an expedition to the northern shores of the Gulf of Finland. He arrived at Lovisa on the 4th of July. The entrance to the Bay of Lovisa was commanded by a fort called Svartholm, which mounted 122 guns, and contained a casemated barracks for 1000 men. As soon as the British squadron was despatched, the fort was evacuated and its armament removed: Captain Yelverton blew up everything that remained. Next day the gallant

commander of the squadron took in the *Ruby*, with the boats of the *Arrogant* and *Magicienne*, to reconnoitre. The Cossacks gathered on the beach with field-pieces and musketry; but the fire from the English boats dispersed them, and the captain landed and demanded the presence of the authorities. He agreed with them to do no damage to the inhabitants of the place, and advised them to adopt precautions against fire while he burnt the government buildings. In spite of the care and the desire of the captain to spare the place it caught fire, either from the conflagration of the barracks or some separate cause. The authorities them-

selves attributed it to the occurrence of an accident, independent of the attack; but the Russian government, with that spirit of calumny which always characterised it, ascribed the injury inflicted to the vindictiveness of the English. The whole place perished in flames.

From the Bay of Lovisa the captain proceeded to the Bay of Kounda, on the south shores of the gulf, where there was a large encampment of Cossacks, who fled under a shower of shells and rockets from the squadron. The officers landed; but as there was no government property, they spared the place. Their landing and debarkation were acts of danger, as the enemy placed riflemen behind walls and hedges, who tried to pick off the captain himself.

The next morning he approached the mouth of the river Portsoiki, on the right bank of which there was a range of buildings, consisting of barracks and stables, occupied by Cossacks. These buildings were destroyed, the Cossacks, as usual, flying at the sight of the first rockets and shells. Thence Captain Yelverton sailed to Trangund, off Viborg, which was a considerable town. On the 14th of July he entered the bay, and to his surprise beheld a Russian war-steamer and two gun-boats, which, by their movements, indicated that their commander intended to give battle. The delight of the English seamen, when they witnessed the prospects of a fair encounter with ships, knew no bounds; but they were, after all, disappointed, for the vessels skulked away for protection to their batteries, when they caught the first few shots. Further up the bay another steamer and several gun-boats were seen lying under an island, protected by batteries; but the approach of the squadron was rendered impossible, as stakes had been driven into the channel, and other obstructions formed. While the captain endeavoured to ascertain whether the barrier could be removed, a masked battery on the shore was suddenly unmasked, and so near, that not only balls, but grape was directed upon them, and a musquetade directed from lines of infantry. So unexpected and severe was this fire, that the British were thrown into momentary confusion, rallying from which, they drew as close to the barrier as was possible, and returned the enemy's fire. This combat was sustained for an hour, but the enemy was too numerous, and his defences too solidly and ingeniously placed, to make any impression upon them. The appearance of their ships and boats, and the indications of a desire to accept battle, were only means of decoy to bring the British into such a position as the guns and musketry of the defence could most successfully assail. A shell burst in the cutter of the *Arrogant*, which swamped her, and killed Mr. Story, the midshipman in command. The crew were picked

up; but while this service was being performed, the boat drifted close to the battery, and was with difficulty saved from being made a trophy by the enemy. Lieutenants Haggard and Dowell volunteered, and a number of gallant sailors volunteered with them, to bring out the cutter from under the battery, which they accomplished. So skilfully did Captain Yelverton direct his little flotilla, and so skilfully were his orders executed by officers and men, that the English only sustained a loss of one killed and nine wounded; the number of the latter was slightly increased as the boats retired, for the enemy's rifles crowded the shores, and kept up a sharp fire for some time, but were driven inland, with loss, by shells from the boats. Captain Yelverton immediately directed his course to Stralsund.

On the 17th of July, Admirals Dundas, Penand, and Seymour, with the Hon. F. F. Pelham, captain of the fleet, went in the *Merlin* to reconnoitre Sweaborg. When yet more than 3000 yards from the batteries, several submarine explosive machines were sprung by galvanic wires from the shore. None of them were exploded at the right moment, and no damage was sustained. The admirals were of opinion that Sweaborg was assailable by gun-boats only. The next day they reconnoitred Revel, where they found miles of batteries most skilfully connected with one another, and not fewer than 400 guns, judiciously placed for protecting the approaches.

Meanwhile Captain Yelverton continued his activity in his separate mission, not allowing a Russian ship or boat to show itself within the scope of his operations. On the 20th he arrived before the fortress of Fredericksham, on the western shores of the Gulf of Finland, half-way between Viborg and Helsingfors. As the ships neared the place several ladies of the town were seen at a picnic in the fields, quite free, apparently, from any alarm; but when the first guns were opened against the fortress, the ladies became terror-stricken, and fled out of sight. The cannonade was hotly maintained for nearly an hour and a half, when the guns of the enemy were dismounted; the men fled from the embrasures, and the fort was "knocked about a good deal." The loss of life on the part of the enemy was very severe, especially among the troops on shore; one mounted officer was seen to be struck from his horse by a shell. The British loss was very little; two men belonging to the *Ruby* gun-boat were dangerously wounded, and one of the crew of the *Arrogant* slightly; both that ship and the *Magicienne* were repeatedly struck in their hulls and rigging by round-shot, and some damage was sustained. One of the suburbs of the town was burnt, Captain Yelverton having done his best to spare the place; for this the

Russian government was not thankful, but represented the houses of the inhabitants as being reduced to ashes by the vengeful spirit of the English.

On the morning of the 26th of July, the officer in command was reinforced by the *Cossack* and by a little flotilla of mortar-boats, consisting of the *Prompt*, *Pickle*, *Rocket*, and *Blazer*. With these he proceeded to the Island of Kotka, which was well fortified. He placed his mortar-vessels and two gun-boats beyond range, and, with the rest of his squadron, steered to the westward of the island, in order to destroy a bridge which connected it with the mainland, and thereby prevent reinforcements from arriving, and also cut off the retreat of the garrison. He committed this duty to Captain Vansittart, of the *Magicienne*. The Russians had abandoned the place when the marines landed, having been warned by the telegraphic communications along the coast that the squadron was at hand. A small amount of government stores was destroyed by the British, as well as the telegraph station, barracks, magazines, stables, and governor's residence; the village was nearly consumed, by the wind driving the flames against it from the burning buildings. Captain Yelverton left the island on the 27th, leaving the *Cossack* to watch it, and prevent the return of the garrison. Captain Yelverton next anchored off the mouth of the Kymene. The destruction of stores and buildings on the island was very annoying to the Russians, especially when Captain Yelverton's despatches made the people of Europe acquainted with the humiliation inflicted there, and generally by the expeditionary squadron under his command. The despatches of Admiral Dundas for July, inclosing the captain's reports, give the necessary details, and will be found below. From Nargen he wrote, on the 17th of July:—

"I transmit herewith, to be laid before my lords commissioners of the Admiralty, a report of the proceedings during the past week from Captain Yelverton, who rejoined me yesterday at this anchorage in her majesty's ship *Arrogant*, and who with the *Magicienne* and *Ruby* gun-boats in company, visited the south coast of the Gulf of Finland, and attacked some military posts of the enemy at Kounda Bay and in the river Portoiki. Returning afterwards to his former station in the Bay of Viborg, he proceeded with boats towards the town, and engaged with a superior force of the enemy, defended by batteries. I request you will express to their lordships my approbation of the conduct of this enterprising officer upon all occasions, and I would beg to recommend to their favourable notice the conduct of Captain Vansittart, of the *Magicienne*, and of

Lieutenant Haggard, of the *Arrogant*, and Lieutenant Dowell, of the Royal Marine Artillery, and the excellent behaviour of all the officers and men. Captain Yelverton has spoken favourably also of the conduct of Mr. Hale, mate, in command of the *Ruby*. I regret much to have to report the loss of Mr. Story, midshipman of the *Arrogant*, with nine others wounded in the boats of the two ships, of whom one is since dead."

This letter contained the following inclosure written by Captain Yelverton on board the *Arrogant* the 14th of July:—

"I have the honour to acquaint you with my proceedings during the week. The *Magicienne* rejoined me on Wednesday, and I proceeded direct to Kounda Bay, on the south coast, where I had reason to think that troops were concentrated. It turned out to be a large Cossack encampment, on a most commanding position, whence I dislodged them with shell and rockets from the *Ruby* and ships' boats. Some opposition was made to our landing, and shots fired from behind hedges, &c.; but I succeeded in examining the place, which I did not injure, as it only contained private property. The following morning I anchored at the mouth of the river Portoiki, and, landing on its right bank, destroyed a Cossack barrack and stables, driving the soldiers into the country. I then came on here. Having anchored the ships as close as I could to the island of Stralsund, I proceeded in the *Ruby*, accompanied by Captain Vansittart of the *Magicienne*, and Captain Lowder, Royal Marines, of this ship, the latter officer having under his command a strong detachment of marines. We towed with us the boats of the ship, under the command of Lieutenants Haggard and Woolcombe, and those of the *Magicienne*, under the command of Lieutenants King and Leady. Having opened the bay called Trangsund, we saw a Russian man-of-war steamer, with two large gun-boats in tow, not far off; this most novel and unexpected sight of a Russian man-of-war—for once clear of a stone wall, and to all appearance inclined to give us a fair and honest fight—created the greatest enthusiasm among the men and officers. I directed Mr. Hale, commanding the *Ruby*, to open fire on her at once, but she very soon retired out of range, having, I think, received some damage. We had now reached the entrance of the Sound; Viborg was in sight, and a fair prospect of attacking three large gun-boats, lying with another steamer under an island about one mile off. We were here brought up by a barrier, impeding the passage of the gun-boat and launches. At this moment a masked battery on the left bank, not more than 350 yards

off, opened on us a heavy fire of musketry, round and grape; this was instantly returned and kept in check by a rapid and well-directed fire from the *Ruby* and all the boats. The enemy's steamer and gun-boats then came from under the island and also opened fire on us. As it was impossible to get the *Ruby* through the barrier, I returned towards Stralsund, the enemy's riflemen following us along the banks, but driven from their positions as fast as they took them by the fire from the *Ruby* and boats. An explosion took place in one of the *Arrogant's* cutters, which swamped the boat; the men were saved, but I regret to say that Mr. Story, the midshipman in command of her, was killed. In endeavouring to save the crew, the boat drifted close to the battery, and would have fallen into the hands of the enemy, had not Lieutenant Haggard, of this ship, and Lieutenant Dowell, R.M.A., of the *Magicienne*, in the *Ruby's* gig, with a volunteer crew, towed her out under a very heavy fire. I cannot sufficiently praise the conduct of all the officers and men who were engaged in this affair, where their cool and determined courage enabled them to handle most severely, and keep in check for upwards of an hour the enemy, far superior in number, with the advantage of local knowledge and a good position."

The above was addressed to Admiral Dundas. The following is an extract of a letter from Rear-admiral the Hon. R. S. Dundas to the Secretary of the Admiralty, dated *Duke of Wellington*, at Nargen, July 23:—

"I have the satisfaction of transmitting a copy of a report which I have received from Captain Yelverton, detailing the circumstances under which, with the *Cossack*, *Magicienne*, and *Ruby* in company, he had again availed himself of an opportunity to attack, with good effect, a position occupied by troops of the enemy, assembled in considerable force, for the defence of Fredericksham; and I have much pleasure in transmitting to their lordship this additional proof of the zeal and gallantry of the officers and men under his orders, and of their good conduct, especially of Mr. H. G. Hale, mate, and the crew of the *Ruby* gun-boat."

The inclosure was dated off the Crops' Islands, July 22, on board the *Arrogant*:—

"I have the honour to inform you that on leaving the fleet I proceeded off the Island of Hogland, where I was joined by the *Cossack*, *Magicienne*, and *Ruby* gun-boat. Information having reached me that the enemy had sent 3000 troops to Fredericksham, and were making every possible exertion to put the place in a state of defence, I lost no time in getting there. I arrived on the afternoon

of the 20th, and would have attacked them that evening, but that the *Ruby* got on shore in examining the intricate channel leading to the town, and it was too late to take the ships in by the time she was off. Early the following morning I succeeded in getting the ships up to the town, and at 9-40 we opened fire. After an engagement of one hour, the enemy ceased fire, and abandoned their guns, some of which were dismounted. If I judge by the number of men we saw them carrying away on stretchers, they must have suffered severely. I am happy to say the injury on our side has been trifling, though our hull bears evidence of the precision with which they fired, but, generally speaking, their shot fell short. I regret to say that one man belonging to the *Ruby* was dangerously wounded by a round-shot. I must not allow this opportunity to pass without mentioning Mr. Hale, mate, commanding the *Ruby* gun-boat, who, together with his gallant crew, deserve the highest praise for the way in which they worked and fought their long gun, so close to this that I had an opportunity of observing the precision of their fire. One portion of a suburb caught fire, and was destroyed, but I am happy to say the town remained uninjured, owing to the strict observance of an order I gave to fire on the fort only."

At the end of July Admiral Dundas wrote to the Admiralty as follows:—

"I beg you will be pleased to acquaint the lords commissioners of the Admiralty that, having received on the 24th instant, from Captain Yelverton, of her majesty's ship *Arrogant*, information which appeared to render it desirable that he should again examine the south-western shores of the Island of Kotka, I took immediate measures to strengthen the squadron under his orders by the addition of four gun-boats, to be detached from off Cronstadt by Rear-admiral Baynes, together with the further addition of four mortar-vessels hence, which he had hoped to be able to employ. I have much satisfaction in transmitting for their lordship's information the inclosed report of proceedings of Captain Yelverton, who, with the squadron under his orders, has again succeeded in completing the destruction of buildings and military stores to a considerable extent on the Island of Kotka; and I beg once more to express my entire approbation of the manner in which he has executed the service intrusted to him, and of the conduct of the officers and men employed on the occasion. I am happy in having this opportunity to recommend to the favourable notice of their lordships the conduct of Mr. George Giles, master of the *Arrogant*, and Mr. Macfarlane, the master

of the *Magicienne*, who have now been constantly employed in those ships on the various services which I have recently had occasion to report."

The inclosure, written by Captain Yelverton, was dated July 28th, off the mouth of the Kymene:—

"I have the honour to inform you that very early on the morning of the 26th I was joined, off the Island of Hogland, by the *Cossack* and *Magicienne*, bringing with them the mortar-vessels *Prompt*, *Pickle*, *Rocket*, and *Blazer*. I stood immediately to the northward, leaving the *Ruby* to bring on the gun-boats, which were not then in sight. They joined at noon, and at 2 P.M. we all anchored off Fort Rotsensholm. As the safety of our expedition rested chiefly on our investing and holding the entire possession of the fortified Island of Kotka, I determined upon taking it at once. Accordingly, I anchored the mortar-vessels out of range, and, leaving two gun-boats to look after them, I proceeded with the rest of the vessels to the westward of Kotka for the purpose of destroying the bridge, so as to cut off the retreat of the garrison, and prevent their reinforcements from the mainland. Captain Vansittart, of the *Magicienne*, with his accustomed zeal and activity, threaded his way at once through the shoals, and destroyed the bridge. As soon as all the vessels had anchored, so as to command the great military road leading from the fort of Hogsfors Holm, and also the channel dividing the island from the main, I landed all the marines, under the command of Captain S. N. Lowder, R.M., with Lieutenants George D. Dowell, R.M.A., and Lieutenants H. C. Mudge and P. R. Holmes, R.M., who took possession without being opposed, as the garrison (no doubt apprised of our coming by the telegraphs along the coast) had very recently evacuated, leaving behind them a large amount of military stores, which have since been burnt. I beg to inclose a list* of all the crown property destroyed by Captain Lowder, including barracks, magazines, ordnance stores, store-houses, stables, guard-houses, and other government buildings, with an immense amount of timber, intended for building and other military purposes. The following morning I weighed, leaving Captain Fanshawe with the *Cossack* in charge of this most important point, which required the utmost care and attention, as the enemy on several occasions threw out reconnoitring parties, as if inclined to attempt the recovery of the island. I feel it due to Mr. George Giles, master of this ship, and Mr. George A.

* This list is omitted, being a mere inventory of the property destroyed, and therefore uninteresting to the general reader.

Macfarlane, master of the *Magicienne*, to mention the zeal and attention with which they have sounded and buoyed, night and day, the intricate channels of this coast, enabling me (without the assistance of pilots) to get into many places where our presence was least expected.

"P.S.—Owing to a change of wind to the eastward, I regret to say that the village unfortunately caught fire from some government buildings, and, I fear, much injury was done to it. It is, however, a source of congratulation to be able to add that the fine church on the island sustained no damage whatever, owing to the precautions that were immediately taken to save it."

The generous spirit of the British naval officer pervaded both the actions and despatches of Captain Yelverton.

The month of August opened more eventfully than that of July. Dundas had resolved to bombard Sweaborg, and accordingly, on the 6th of August, accompanied by Admiral Seymour, he left Nargen, and the same day anchored before Sweaborg, where the French fleet, under Admiral Penaud, formed a junction with the British.

The attack was contemplated for the 7th; but Admiral Penaud suggested that if a mortar-battery was constructed on the Island of Langorn, it would greatly promote the success of the operations, which were delayed until that work was effected. This the French undertook, and raised a sand-bag battery, on which they mounted four of the best English 13-inch mortars. This was a work of difficulty from various causes; but was completed on the 9th. During the 8th the imperial flag floated over the batteries of Sweaborg and the city of Helsingfors; it was rumoured that the emperor, the Grand-duke Constantine, or some other member of the imperial family, had visited the place, the intention of bombarding it, formed by the allies, becoming somehow known to the enemy. On the 9th the imperial standard disappeared; but crowds of persons from Helsingfors and the shores of Finland were upon the batteries, eagerly gazing upon the mighty fleet which covered the waters before them.

During the 8th the preparations of the allies were made complete; and on the 9th, at a quarter to seven o'clock, the signal from the flagship ordered, "Gun and mortar-vessels open fire with shell." It was, from some cause, three quarters of an hour before the first shell was thrown, and then the whole line promptly followed, and a blaze of fire begirt the granite defences of Sweaborg. The distance selected was 3600 yards; but the gun-boats ran in 500 yards nearer, discharged

their missiles, retired, wheeling round in a circle, and firing, somewhat in the way practised by the ships which bombarded Odessa. The perpetual motion of the gun and mortar-boats rendered it impossible for the batteries to keep a precise range, so that a galling fire was kept up against the enemy with impunity. Before noticing the details of the battle, some general remarks upon the bombardment are desirable.

Sweaborg defended the roads of Helsingfors, the new capital of Finland. The fortifications which went by the name of Sweaborg were erected on seven islands, the batteries being constructed in the granite rocks of which these islands are composed. So strong were these fortifications, that Sweaborg was called the *Gibraltar of the North*. No less than 800 guns of various calibre were mounted there, and 12,000 troops were in barrack. Sir Charles Napier subsequently pronounced Sweaborg, as well as Cronstadt, impregnable by sea or land. The capture of Sweaborg would be a serious blow to the power of Russia in the Baltic, but there was little probability of so auspicious a conquest. To land troops upon the islands as long as there were batteries unsilenced and infantry to point the rifle, in their occupancy, was next to impossible—perhaps impossible. The granite was cut perpendicularly fifty feet; the island batteries flanked one another; the channels between them were closed by sunken ships and immense piles of granite and disabled guns. To attain the islands, except by starving out the garrison, was therefore out of the question; and that could not have been done, for the city of Helsingfors, itself fortified, was behind, with a powerful body of troops, and supplies of all kind, "*quantum suff.*" Helsingfors itself could only be conquered from the sea; when Sweaborg would be occupied, and the channels cleared, even then a formidable resistance could be made, for the southern batteries, so strong the previous year, were made far more formidable. Helsingfors was the second arsenal of Russia upon the Baltic, and its conquest would be of great value to the allies. There were no ships there in 1855, as the Russians contrived, with that perseverance and industry which characterises all their military proceedings, to get the whole of the ships up to Cronstadt during the winter. What our navy accomplished at Sweaborg was very important; they made havoc by vertical firing among the troops, and thus caused a heavy loss to the Russian army; they both by a vertical and sweeping fire injured the cannon, broke the port-holes, and otherwise damaged the batteries; they demolished the splendid barracks, and all the destructible material of war contained upon the islands, and by the explosion of a magazine whole batteries and

their guns were blown into the air; and all this was effected without any loss of ship or life: about four officers and 110 men wounded was the computation of casualties. Our readers must not suppose, however, that Sweaborg might, in the result of such a bombardment, have fallen into the hands of the allies, or that the power of the garrison was so broken as that the fleet could approach its granite rocks with impunity. Had Admiral Dundas sent his line-of-battle ships within the range of the fortifications, he could not have brought them in safety away, some would have been sunk or blown up. Our readers must not, therefore, be the least astonished to hear that the Russians offered a *Te Deum* for the victory at Sweaborg. They treated it as a repulse of the allies, although the repulse of an attack from which the garrison suffered heavily. They set about repairing their disasters, which they accomplished, placing Sweaborg in a more formidable position than ever. From Helsingfors there was as free an ingress to Sweaborg as there was to Sebastopol from the steppe of the Crimea—from Simpheropol, Bagtché Serai, and Perekop. Provisions, ammunition, guns, stores, men, replaced whatever of all these was destroyed, and in such way as to resist a similar attack more effectually. In what, then, did the victory of the allies consist? In the destruction of men and materials of war with comparatively little cost. If Russia should place any great amount of stores there again, or erect new barracks, however constructed, with a view to resist a similar assault, the allies would bring new appliances of attack against them, and cause the occupation of the fortress to be so expensive in life and treasure to Russia as to assist in exhausting her resources. It did not matter where the allies compelled her to draw upon resources disproportionate to their own—they would by this means steadily and rapidly end the war; and Russia, without losing either Sweaborg or Sebastopol by arms, would be compelled to give in, because no longer able to supply these points of defence with the necessary means. Both places would fall from imperial exhaustion if the allies were richer in resources and greater in power. Russia was unquestionably inferior to either of the Western allies in these respects; and her only hope, therefore, was to hold on until some chance disagreement weakened the alliance, or Germany, from jealousy of that alliance, joined her. Even in the latter case the allies would be the ultimate victors if they remained united, for Germany, vulnerable on all points, would become the theatre of war, and her coasts be ravaged by the avenging fleets of her enemies, which she had neither ships nor fortresses to resist. Austrian Italy would be at once lost to the impe-

rial sceptre, and the liberty of Poland and of Hungary would be proclaimed. The people of those realms would rise in insurrection, and all Italy would arm against the Northern confederacy. It would be Russia and Germany against the world, and (humanly speaking) the world would win.

Returning from this general review of the bombardment, its importance and its consequences to the detail of operations, the first thing which presents itself as noticeable was the inability of the batteries to throw their shot so far as the boats by which they were bombarded. It has been already noticed that when the boats were within range their constant movement balked the aim of the Russian gunners; when the enemy perceived this, it could be seen that it produced upon them a most disquieting effect, and their fire, which was at first delivered with remarkable energy, began to slacken.

After about three hours' bombardment, fires gushed suddenly up from the principal island, and a large magazine exploded. Had the island itself exploded, torn from its granite base by some sudden convulsion, it could hardly be supposed that the noise would be more astounding; far over land and sea the loud report burst, so that the people on the neighbouring shores supposed that by some mighty simultaneous operation all the island batteries were blown up, the Russians themselves finding them untenable, and determined to blast them rather than allow them to fall into the possession of their foes. Although this explosion and the disheartening conviction that they could not obtain the range of their assailants caused the gunners to slacken the fire of the batteries for some hours, yet they suddenly renewed their efforts, as if inspired by some new hope, or animated by some freshly discovered expedient. They had not long recommenced this fierce cannonade, when another of their magazines was exploded, rolling the heavy thunder of its reports to remote distances. This took place about twelve o'clock. Balls, shells, arms, roofs of houses, and materials of war of almost every description used in fortresses, were flung into the air, the descending shower of which fell among the garrison, killing and wounding men, setting fire to combustible *matériel*, and causing minor explosions. These extended the like effects, until everything combustible was ignited, and the islands resembled a Pandemonium. The sailors in the line-of-battle ships crowded the yards, cheering heartily, their excitement reaching an unrestrainable degree, and their desire to join in the conflict expressed in the most impassioned energy. The view of burning barracks and magazines obtained from the masts of the fleet was most sublime; none who witnessed it

can ever forget it. The smaller war-steamers made efforts to near the sphere of battle. The *Cornwallis*, *Hastings*, and *Amphion* at the same instant poured forth their broadsides; the *Arrogant*, *Cruiser*, and *Cossack*, threw their fire upon one of the islands, where the troops of the garrison seemed to have been collected. The thunder of these larger ships added to the sublimity of the occasion, but it is doubtful whether they contributed much to the victory, their range being too distant: they fought with a policy too cautious to effect much. The cannonade was sustained until eight o'clock in the evening without the smallest abatement of energy on the part of the assailants; the guns of the defence were fitfully worked, sometimes with the energy of sudden hope or intense despair, and again languidly: confusion and terror appeared to pervade the garrison. There were a number of merchant ships, steam and sailing, which had been armed for the defence, also many gun-boats, and probably a few men-of-war (although it had been generally alleged that all these had been removed to Cronstadt). The shipping shared the destruction of magazines and batteries, and the marine partook of the confusion of the army on the islands. After eight o'clock the British mortar-vessels were drawn off, many of the mortars disabled by incessant firing, and no longer fit for use. At that hour the islands appeared like the craters of volcanoes, sending up their furious fires, and hurling up whatever came within the play of the previously pent up force. During the night the scene was therefore one of awful grandeur, striking every one who saw or performed a part in the terrible drama with the dread sublimity of war. The night of the 9th was comparatively quiet on the part of the assailants, their mortars being too hot for use. On the 10th the bombardment was renewed by a similar process, and with similar results. During the night the rocket-boats alone maintained the combat, arching the space between them and the batteries with streams of fire until the morning dawned. On the 11th for some time the fire was renewed, but the admiral had not a sufficient force of gun-boats or mortar-vessels, or, as Sir Charles Napier afterwards said in a speech in London, one stone of the batteries would not have been left upon another. To the shame of the British Admiralty, the admiral was without the means requisite to complete his work. Several of the mortars were split up, some splintered, others softened, and nearly all in a condition to render further use of them impracticable. During the two days and nights, and part of a third day, the English hurled 1000 tons of iron balls and shells into an area of about three square miles; 100 tons of gunpowder was consumed by them in doing so. The loss of the allies

was perhaps the most trivial ever sustained where so severe a chastisement was inflicted upon an enemy; they could not even rival in their despatches the reports of the Russians, who usually returned the loss of one man (nearly always an unfortunate Cossack) as the damage to human life in any encounters where there was a chance of concealing the real proportions of their loss. The French admiral contrived to get a Russian subject on the islands as a spy; he remained some days before he found an opportunity to return, when he reported that the entire of the dockyards, barracks, magazines, government buildings, and stores, were destroyed, twenty-three ships burned by the shells and rockets, and 1000 men put *hors de combat*. The testimony of a man of this description was very little to be relied upon. The Russian accounts of the results were very different as to the loss of men; they could not deny the destruction of buildings and *materiel*. According to one of these narratives, 111 men killed and about twice as many wounded, was the total loss. It was denied by these narrators that any vessels were wrecked or burned, except one, and only a few light craft were slightly injured. After the war terminated, an official report admitted the serious injury of several. The following extract of a letter from St. Petersburg, in 1856, after the peace, further illustrates this:—" *Apropos of Sweaborg, it may be mentioned that about five or six vessels have been lately proclaimed by the Russian Admiralty to be unseaworthy, in consequence of the injuries they received at the bombardment of Sweaborg. Hitherto it had always been affirmed that only one vessel had received any damage on that occasion. These half-dozen vessels will in future be employed in the harbour service.*"

A fine ship, a three-decker, had not been removed to Cronstadt with other large vessels of war during the winter of 1854 or early spring of 1855. This vessel was used when the bombardment began, at anchorage between Gustafsvaard and Bak-Holmen, to prevent the allies from forcing a passage between them. It suffered so much after the first day's shelling, that it was withdrawn in the night. She was brought into shallow water, and lay upon her side there when the allied fleet withdrew from before the islands.

After the bombardment terminated, great alarm was felt in Helsingfors, and an immense covering was placed over certain buildings, marked with the words "Lunatic Asylum." They had good reason to be alarmed, for the allies, however unable to destroy the batteries of Sweaborg, could have done considerable damage to the city. A difference on this subject was said to arise between the English and French admirals. Admiral Penaud was

anxious that something should be attempted against so important a town, observing, "There was much honour in burning Sweaborg, but there would be more satisfaction in destroying Helsingfors." Admiral Dundas demurred, on the ground that injury would be visited upon the inhabitants, and as "the batteries were under a beautiful cathedral," that building might suffer. The reluctance of Admiral Dundas, on such grounds, to attack that place, excited the astonishment of the fleet, and of the people at home. Yet it is wonderful that any surprise should be excited by a lord of the Aberdeen Admiralty sparing Russia, and especially where a Russian cathedral might receive any damage. Admiral Dundas knew the policy of the rulers of France and England better than Admiral Penaud did: as member of the English board of Admiralty, he had an opportunity of knowing how reluctant the French emperor was, and the ruling classes in England, really to humble the power of Russia; to compel a peace without humiliating her, or weakening the power of her conservative government as a counterpoise to the revolutionary ideas on the Continent, was their sole and united object in the war. Lord Palmerston desired more than this; but the members of his government generally were nearly as little disposed as the Peelites to curtail Russian power as long as Russia was conservative of high governmental, official, and aristocratic claims.

While the fleet remained in force before Sweaborg, the garrison exercised the utmost vigilance. A Mr. Hughes went in his yacht, the *War Pet*, from curiosity, to have a nearer look at the batteries than that obtained from the fleet; and as soon as he came within range, a shower of projectiles fell around him: his *War Pet* and its occupants escaped with difficulty. Thus ended the operations before Sweaborg, and on the 13th the fleets retired, the admirals occupying their old head-quarters at Nargen. The following despatch will throw additional light on the narrative. From the *Duke of Wellington*, before Sweaborg, August 13th, Admiral Dundas wrote:—

"I have the honour to report, for the information of the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, that after my arrival here on the 6th instant, with the squadron under my orders, I was joined the same evening by Rear-admiral Penaud, in the *Tourville*, and on the following day by the remainder of the French squadron, including, in addition to the ships of the line, five mortar-vessels and five gun-boats, with the store-ships and steam-vessels. On the 7th instant the *Amphion* arrived from Nargen, completing the British squadron, to the ships and vessels named in

the margin;* and the intention of Rear-admiral Penaud and myself being to commence operations against the fortress and arsenal of Sweaborg, no time was lost in making the necessary preparations.

"My former reports will have informed their lordships that during the past year, and in the course of the last five months, the enemy has been actively employed in strengthening the defences of the place, and completing the sea-defences, by erecting batteries on every advantageous position, and commanding every practicable approach to the harbour in this intricate navigation. It has, therefore, formed no part of my plan to attempt a general attack by the ships on the defences; and the operations contemplated by the rear-admiral and myself were limited to such destruction of the fortress and arsenal as could be accomplished by means of mortars. The intricate nature of the ground, from rocks awash and reefs under water, rendered it difficult to select positions for the mortar-vessels at proper range. In completing the arrangements for this purpose, I have derived the greatest advantage from the abilities of Captain Sullivan, of her majesty's ship *Merlin*; and the positions ultimately chosen were in a curved line on either side of the islet of Oterhall, with space in the centre reserved for the mortar-vessels of the French squadron, as concerted with Rear-admiral Penaud. The extremes of the line were limited, with reference to the extent of the range and the distance from the heavily-armed batteries of Bak-Holmen to the eastward, and of Stora Rantan to the westward of Sweaborg; and a most effective addition to the force of the allied squadrons consisted in a battery of four lighter mortars established by Admiral Penaud on an islet in advance of Oterhall. To carry these arrangements into effect, I directed Captain Ramsay, of her majesty's ship *Euryalus*, with Captain Glasse, of the *Vulture*, Captain Vansittart, of the *Magicienne*, and Captain Stewart, of the *Dragon*, to anchor to the southward of Oterhall; and the mortar-vessels, under the charge of Lieutenant the Honourable Augustus C. Hobart, of the *Duke of Wellington*, being distributed to the care of those officers, the whole were anchored on the evening of the 7th instant, in position, in readiness to warp into action; and hawsers for that purpose were

laid out before daylight. Much assistance in towing was rendered by the officers of the gun-boats, and great praise is due to all concerned for their active exertions.

"In the course of the same night, Rear-admiral Penaud had commenced the establishment of his battery with sand-bags on the rocks within Oterhall; but the active arrangements could not be completed before the morning of the 9th instant. During the whole of the previous day the royal standard of Russia was flying upon the citadel of Gustafsvaard, but was not afterwards observed. The success of our operations being dependent entirely on the state of the weather and the rapidity with which shells could be thrown, no time was lost in trying the ranges of the mortars, which proved to be accurate, and general firing commenced soon after seven o'clock. The direction of this service was confided to Captain T. M. Wemyss, of the royal marine artillery, assisted by Captain Lawrence and Captain Schomberg; and every exertion was used by these officers to press the fire of the mortars to the fullest extent which could be deemed proper. The gun-boats having been previously armed with additional guns of heavy calibre, removed temporarily from ships of the line, and the *Stork* and *Snapper* gun-boats being armed with Lancaster guns, I availed myself of the experience of Captain Hewlett to direct the fire of the two latter vessels to the greatest advantage; and his attention was specially directed to a three-decked ship of the line, moored to block the passage between Gustafsvaard and Bak-Holmen. Commander Preedy, of the ship bearing my flag, was directed to take the *Starling* and four other gun-boats under his orders, and to manœuvre and attack the batteries in front of the mortar-vessels towards the west extremity of the line. The remainder were distributed in a similar manner to stations assigned to them, with orders to engage the batteries and protect the mortar-vessels, under the general direction of Captain Ramsay, assisted by Captains Glasse, Vansittart, and Stewart.

"On the evening of the 8th instant, I had dispatched Captain Key, in her majesty's ship *Amphion*, to proceed off Stora Miolo, and to place himself under the orders of Captain Wellesley, of her majesty's ship *Cornwallis*; and I instructed the latter officer to employ the *Hastings* and the *Amphion*, and to take advantage of any proper opportunity to engage the enemy at the east end of the island of Sandhamn. Captain Yelverton, in her majesty's ship *Arrogant*, was detached to the westward, with the *Cossack* and *Cruiser* under his orders, and was directed to occupy the attention of troops which were observed to be posted on the island of Drumsio, and to watch the movements of small

* The *Duke of Wellington* (bearing my flag), *Exmouth* (bearing the flag of Rear-admiral Sir Michael Seymour), *Euryalus*, *Arrogant*, *Pembroke*, *Cornwallis*, *Cossack*, *Merlin*, *Vulture*, *Hastings*, *Edinburgh*, *Amphion*, *Magicienne*, *Dragon*, *Belleisle*, *Cruiser*, *Geyser*, *Locust*, *Lightning*, *Eolus*, *Princess Alice*, *Volcano* (arrived on the 10th). Gun-boats—*Starling*, *Lark*, *Thistle*, *Redcing*, *Maggie*, *Ladger*, *Pelter*, *Snap*, *Dopper*, *Weasel*, *Stork*, *Pineher*, *Gleemer*, *Biter*, *Skytark*, *Snapper*. Mortar-vessels—*Rocket*, *Surly*, *Pickle*, *Blazer*, *Mastiff*, *Manly*, *Drake*, *Porpoise*, *Prompt*, *Sinbad*, *Carron*, *Redbreast*, *Beacon*, *Grappler*, *Havock*, *Growler*.

vessels which had been noticed occasionally in creeks in that direction.

"Early in the day I observed that the detached squadrons in both directions had opened fire upon the enemy, and the action was general upon all points. A rapid fire of shot and shells was kept up from the fortress for the first few hours upon the gun-boats, and the range of the heavy batteries extended completely beyond the mortar-vessels; but the continued motion of the gun-boats, and the able manner in which they were conducted by the officers who commanded them, enabled them to return the fire with great spirit, and almost with impunity throughout the day. About ten o'clock in the forenoon, fires began first to be observed in the different buildings, and a heavy explosion took place on the island of Vargon, which was followed by a second about an hour afterwards; a third, and far more important explosion, occurred about noon on the island of Gustafsvaard, inflicting much damage upon the defences of the enemy, and tending greatly to slacken the fire from the guns in that direction. The advantage of the rapidity with which the fire from the mortars had been directed was apparent in the continued fresh conflagrations which spread extensively on the island of Vargon. The intricate nature of the reefs, on which the gun-boats had occasionally grounded, compelled me also to recall them before sunset, and the fire of the enemy was slack. The boats of the fleet were then ordered to be assembled with rockets before dark, and under the direction of Captain Caldwell, in command of the ship bearing my flag, they maintained a continuous fire for upwards of three hours, which was attended with considerable success, causing fresh fires and adding much to the general conflagration.

"At daylight on the morning of the 10th instant, the positions of several of the mortar-vessels had been advanced within easier range, and the gun-boats were again directed to engage. The three-decked ship which had been moored by the enemy to block and defend the channel between Gustafsvaard and Bak-Holmen had been withdrawn during the night to a more secure position, but the fire from the batteries was increased, and the engagement was renewed with activity on both sides; fires continued to burn without intermission within the fortress, and about noon a column of smoke, heavier and darker than any which had yet been observed, and succeeded by bright flames, gave signs that the shells had reached combustible materials in the direction of the arsenal; the exact situation was at first concealed from our view, but, the flames continuing to spread, it was soon evident that they extended beyond the island of Vargon, and that many buildings on the island of Swartoe were already in pro-

gress of destruction. By the judicious management of the officers of artillery, a steady fire was kept up during the whole of the following night. The rocket-boats in the evening were again assembled, when the gun-boats were recalled, and proceeded successively in separate divisions. The first, under the direction of Captain Seymour, of the *Pembroke*, made excellent practice, at a distance of about 2000 yards from the fortress; the second, under the direction of Captain Caldwell, at a later period of the night, succeeded also in adding to the fires already burning; but the glare of the flames exposing the boats to the view of the enemy, they maintained their ground under a smart fire of bursting shells with steady gallantry. Considering the extent of injury which had now been inflicted upon the enemy, and reflecting that few buildings of importance remained to be destroyed on the Island of Vargon, and that those still standing upon Swartoe were at the extreme extent of our range, and in positions where no shells had yet reached them, I was of opinion that no proportionate advantage was to be gained by continuing the fire during another day. I accordingly dispatched Captain Seymour, of her majesty's ship *Pembroke*, to communicate with Rear-admiral Penaud, and with the cordiality and ready concord which I have invariably experienced from that officer, arrangements were immediately concerted, and order given to cease fire after daylight. Little fire, except at the rocket-boats, had been returned by the enemy during the night, and it ceased almost entirely on his side before daylight, although the sea defences in general were little injured.

"It remains for me to transmit now for their lordships' information the inclosed reports of the proceedings of Captain Wellesley, of her majesty's ship *Cornwallis*, with the detached squadron to the eastward, on the 9th instant; and I beg you will inform their lordships that, the troops on Drumsio having offered no resistance to the ships under the orders of Captain Yelverton, he returned to his former anchorage the same evening. Inclosed are the lists of casualties* which have occurred in execution of the service which I have had the honour to detail; and I am thankful to say that they have been fewer than could possibly have been expected under the fire to which those who were engaged were repeatedly exposed. Some of the most severe injuries are those which unfortunately occurred from explosions of the rockets in the boats of the *Hastings* and *Future*.

"Their lordships will observe that I abstain entirely from reports on the proceedings of the squadron under the command of Rear-admiral Penaud, which will, no doubt, be fully and

* These lists are omitted, as not of sufficient importance to justify their insertion.

ably explained to his own government; but I may be permitted to acknowledge my deep sense of the valuable co-operation they have afforded, and to express my admiration of the gallant conduct of those under his orders, and my warmest thanks for the cordial support which I have received.

"I have much satisfaction in reporting in the most favourable manner on the conduct of the officers, seamen, and marines under my command; and I transmit, for their lordships' information, the lists of the officers and others who were employed on the various detached services which occurred during the operations.*

"My best thanks are due to Rear-admiral Sir Michael Seymour, who has at all times afforded me the most ready assistance. From commodore the Hon. Frederick Pelham, captain of the fleet, I have received the most valuable support, and the energy and ability with which he has performed the important duties of his station have tended greatly to further the execution of the service, and demand my warmest thanks. I am much indebted to Captain Ramsay, of her majesty's ship *Euryalus*, for his active and useful exertions, as well as to Captain Glasse, of the *Vulture*, and Captain Vansittart, of the *Magicienne*, and to none more than to Captain Stewart, of her majesty's ship *Dragon*, whose zeal and ready resource attracted my particular attention. The services allotted to Captain Wellesley, as well as those assigned to Captains Seymour, Hewlett, and Caldwell, were executed to my entire satisfaction; and my best thanks are due for the assistance rendered by Captain Hall, of her majesty's ship *Exmouth*, on several occasions. Late on the evening of the 10th instant, her majesty's ship *Merlin*, under the command of Captain Sullivan, struck upon an unknown rock on ground which he himself had repeatedly examined while conducting me along the line of the mortar-vessels. No blame whatever can attach to this officer on the occasion, and I gladly avail myself of the opportunity which is thus afforded me of calling the especial attention of their lordships to the unwearied activity of this valuable officer. It is to the singular ability and zeal with which his arduous duties have been performed that much of the success of the operations of the fleet may be attributed; and I trust that I may be permitted on this occasion to recommend to the especial notice of their lordships the services of Lieutenant R. B. Creyke, of that ship, whose conduct has been most favourably reported.

"My especial thanks are due to the officers and men of the Royal Marine Artillery for the manner in which their important duties have been performed. The cool and steady courage

with which they continued to conduct the duties of their stations deserves the highest praise; and I have much pleasure in calling their lordships' attention to the services of Captain Wemyss, as well as to those of Captains Lawrence and Schomberg, of that distinguished corps. Great praise is also due to the officers and crews of the mortar-vessels on the occasion. The admirable manner in which the officers in charge of gun-boats maintained their stations under fire, and the general activity of the crews of those vessels upon all occasions, are deserving of the favourable notice of their lordships; but in referring to the enclosed list of the officers employed, I am unwilling to particularise any, when all have been highly deserving of their lordships' favour, and the gallant conduct of the crews has been conspicuous."

Admiral Penaud's report, written from the *Tourville*, off Sweaborg, August 11, was as follows:—

"As I have had the honour to inform your excellency by my letter of the 7th, Admiral Dundas and I presented ourselves before Sweaborg with the combined squadron, with the intention of bombarding it. At half-past seven in the morning of the 8th, sixteen English bomb-vessels, each having one mortar; five French bomb-vessels having each two of these pieces; and a siege battery of four mortars of nearly ten-inch bore, which, during the six hours' darkness of the two previous nights I had established on the Islet Abraham, at 2200 metres from the place, opened fire against Sweaborg. I am happy to announce to you, Monsieur le Ministre, that this operation succeeded perfectly; it was not only a simple cannonade which the squadrons have made against Sweaborg, it was a real bombardment, the important results of which have exceeded my utmost hopes. In less than three hours after we had begun to throw shells, we could observe that they caused considerable damage in the fortress. Numerous fires rapidly broke out on several points at the same time, and we soon saw the flames rising above the dome of the church situated in the northern part of the island Est-Swartoe. That building, however, was not touched, and it may be said to be the only one on the islands Vargon and Swartoe which was respected by our projectiles. Terrible explosions were soon after heard, at four different times; the fire had reached the magazines filled with powder and shells. The last two explosions were particularly violent, and they must have caused the enemy enormous losses both in men and *matériel*. For several minutes the explosions of shells continued. The bombardment ceased this morning at half-past four; it consequently lasted for two days and two nights, during which time Sweaborg

* These lists we omit, being uninteresting to the general reader.

presented the appearance of a vast fiery furnace. The fire, which still continues its ravages, has destroyed nearly the whole place, and consumed storehouses, magazines, barracks, different government establishments, and a great quantity of stores for the arsenal. The fire of our mortars was so accurate that the enemy, fearing that the three-decker which was moored across the channel between Sweaborg and the island of Bak-Holmen would be destroyed, had her brought into the port during the night. The Russians have received a serious blow and losses, the more severe as, on the side of the allied squadron, the loss is confined to one English sailor killed and a few slightly wounded. The enemy's forts returned our fire very vigorously, and did not slacken it until the moment of the explosions above-mentioned; but the precision of our long-range guns gave us an incontestable superiority over those of the Russians. Every one in the division fulfilled his duty with ardour, devotion, and courage; the crews evinced admirable enthusiasm, and have deserved well of the emperor and of the country. I am perfectly satisfied with the means of action placed at my disposal. The mortar-vessels and gun-boats rendered immense services, and they fully realise everything that was expected from them. The siege battery produced very fine results; and it may be said that it was from

an enemy's island, on which we had hoisted the French flag, that the most destructive shots were fired. In this affair, as under every other circumstance which has taken place since our flags have been united, Rear-admiral Dundas and I have acted with common accord. The example of the perfect good understanding which exists between the chiefs has had the best effect on the spirit of the crews of the two squadrons, which in reality only form one in the moment of action. Every one has only one object—to rival each other in zeal, and cause the enemy the greatest possible mischief; and the success of a vessel of one of the two nations was applauded by the other with the same cries of enthusiasm as if it had been gained by its own flag. Doubtless, Monsieur le Ministre, the bombardment of Sweaborg will exercise considerable influence on the Russian people, who have now acquired the conviction that their fortified places and their arsenals are not completely sheltered from the attacks of the allied navies, which may and must hope to be able to deal destruction on the enemy's coast without suffering any very considerable injury themselves. In sending you, Monsieur le Ministre, a more circumstantial report of this affair, I shall have the honour to ask of you a reward for the officers, sailors, and soldiers who distinguished themselves most in the battle."

CHAPTER XCV.

THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL IN AUGUST TO THE BATTLE OF THE TCHERNAYA.—RETIREMENT OF GENERAL SIR RICHARD ENGLAND.—LOSS OF ENGLISH REGIMENTAL OFFICERS.—DISGRACEFUL STATE OF THE ENGLISH TRANSPORTS.—PREPARATIONS FOR THE FINAL ASSAULT.

"Bonne espérance et droit en avant."—*Device of the Nugents.*

BEFORE detailing the events of August, a general view of the operations of the allies, from the beginning of that month until the battle of the Tchernaya, will enable the reader to comprehend more clearly the value of each particular incident which may be necessary to record. The main object of the allied chiefs was to conduct the sap nearer to the Malakoff, which was at last regarded by the French, as it had been from the first by the British, as the key of the place. The trenches of the allies were repaired, strengthened, and enlarged. All the camp hospitals were cleared out, their occupants being sent to the Bosphorus, as it was foreseen that the coming assault would, whether successful or not, be at a cost of men unprecedented in any previous contest since the siege began. Medical stores of all descriptions, in quantities that were enormous, were deposited in connection with the camp hospitals. The materials for siege operations were

brought up to the front in such abundance, that it seemed as if the besiegers were about to begin *de novo*. The troops were kept perpetually on the alert, and councils of war by the allied chiefs were frequent. The fiery messengers of the Russian gunners sped into the lines of the allies, and from these also the flaming missionaries of death performed often and fatally their errand.

Along the Tchernaya Della Marmora, and the French General Morris (reputed to be an Irish officer in the service of our ally), reconnoitred the enemy, and strengthened their own positions. Nor were the Russians idle or unwatchful; within and without the city their vigilance was ever wakeful, and their industry incessant. Reinforcements arrived continually to the garrison. The officers of the allied navies could see through their telescopes from the mast-heads of the ships that preparations were making for a desperate resistance behind

the Malakoff and Redan, and that vigorous arrangements were in progress to take the offensive in the field. These indications were communicated to the allied generals, who took their measures accordingly; so that when the Russians brought on the battle of the Tchernaya, they were met by a well organised and effectual resistance.

Such was the general tenor of affairs during the first half of the month of August, to the incidents of which more particular attention is now invited.

It will be recollected that in the latter part of June, and throughout the whole of July, the allied armies, especially the British, were weakened by the decease or illness of officers of eminent station. August opened upon the English with a continuance of the same afflictions. Several excellent officers of inferior rank died or were invalided in the first week of the month; but the heaviest loss the army had as yet sustained since Lieutenant-general Sir de Lacy Evans was compelled by sickness to leave the scene of his glory, was entailed by the departure of Lieutenant-general Sir Richard England. After fifteen months of the most constant, vigilant, and useful services, the gallant chief was obliged to succumb to illness,—the result of fatigue, anxiety, and the effect of the climate,—and to return home, regretted by the whole army, and by none so much as by the noble soldiers of his own division, who were attached to him as a man, while they revered his authority, and were proudly confident of him as a general. As no memoir of this distinguished officer was introduced into our chapters on the "Leaders of the Host," this is the appropriate place for doing justice to his services.*

Sir Richard England, who is the son of one of the heroes of Bunker's Hill, was born at Detroit, in Canada, and entered the army, in 1808, at a very early age. He was engaged at Flushing in the following year, and belonged to the brigade of Graham, which bore the chief encounters with the French during that siege. Having suffered much from the climate of Walcheren, he was sent to the Mediterranean in 1810, and joined the army at Messina, then opposed to Murat in Calabria. In passing Gibraltar, however, the light company to which he belonged was actively employed for some weeks at Tarifa. The war being at an end, this officer, still in impaired health, served on the staff at Plymouth, but soon embarked for Ostend with his regiment, which was hastily dispatched, with other reinforcements, to join the Duke of Wellington's army after the battle

of Waterloo. In 1821 he was *alde-de-camp* to Sir Colquhoun Grant, in Dublin, and soon afterwards obtained the command of the 75th regiment, in succession to the present Duke of Cleveland. The records of this period point to the condition of this corps as remarkable for its order and smartness; and after an inspection by Lord Hill it was dispatched to the Cape. There Colonel England was appointed by Sir Lowry Cole to the active post of commandant of the eastern frontier, which included the charge of a brigade of troops scattered over a border territory of considerable extent, and where energy and judgment were alike demanded, to preserve the limits of the colony from the depredations and incursions of the restless Caffres. A war with this people took place in 1834, and Colonel England had many opportunities of gaining the approbation of the governors and others by his distinguished conduct in the management of many services with which he was entrusted. A most useful body of horse, organised by him out of the ranks of his regiment, did much duty as cavalry during this war; but the Whig ministry, which had just obtained political power, disapproved in such pointed terms of the acquisition of further territory in Caffreland, that the force which occupied the wide country between the "Kaiskamma" and the "Kei," under Colonel England, was ordered to abandon it; the field-works were destroyed, and our troops brought back. This service terminated the colonel's duties on this ground, much to his honour; and in 1839 he was removed to the command of the 41st regiment at Madras—a corps which had frequently changed its commanding officer. Sir Richard remained on service in that part of the world for a considerable time, obtaining the approbation of the superior authorities, civil and military. Having returned home under the influence of ill health, produced by the trying nature of the climate and his own constant exposure and varied services, he remained, then in the prime of life, unemployed for a long period, in accordance with the routine of the Horse Guards, which compelled officers to wait their turn for brevet promotion. In ten years, then, in the 61st year of his age, he was appointed to the command of a division in the army sent out to Turkey, when he served her majesty at the Alma in a manner recorded on a previous page of this History.

On the 27th of September, 1854, the division moved from the plains of Balaklava towards Sebastopol, and assisted at the first reconnaissance of that place, subsequently taking up various positions, until the left of the British line opposite the Dockyard was allotted to it, which it held to the end of the operations. Its place of encampment was selected by the general from its being concealed, though so

* The reader will find a reference at length to the services of this general in the Russian war, in vol. i. chap. xlv. pp. 603—605. The conduct of the general and his division on the memorable 18th of June will be found in vol. ii. chap. xc. pp. 356—360.

close to the enemy, owing to the rocks and quarries in its immediate front. It was three-quarters of a mile from the main parallel of "Green Hill," and within long range of the guns of Sebastopol—a point of less importance, owing to its partial concealment. Random shots not unfrequently proved the fact. A look-out was established in front, screened by a wall, where an officer and a few men, together with a boatswain's mate lent by Lord Lyons, were constantly on duty, to report the slightest movement in front. Sir Richard passed half his time there himself. A distinguished officer, an eye-witness, writes:—"And now the siege seriously began; sickness and daily casualties told severely upon the effective strength of the division. It had great peculiarities; for as our numbers diminished (and from the first we had but half men enough) vigilance became more and more essential. Everything depended on maintaining our parallels; for if they had been carried by the enemy the siege must have been suspended, if not raised. The officer commanding the third division had the enormous charge on his hands of guarding against such a calamity, and we now know with what slender means. But his constant application formed our only chance of success, notwithstanding that his reserves consisted only of the arrival of men who had been in the cold trenches the night before."

The details of the siege operations between the first establishment of the parallels and the battle of Inkerman, so far as they affected the third division, it is unnecessary here to recapitulate. In the action at Balaklava, and the very gallant repulse by Sir de Laey Evans of the desperate sortie of the 26th of October, 1854, Sir Richard and his division had no part. After the latter event Lord Raglan was induced to think that an assault might be attempted. Accordingly, on the night of the 4th of November, Sir Richard England and Sir George Cathcart were sent for by Lord Raglan to confer and receive orders as to storming the Redan; and after a long interview they returned together to their respective tents, with orders to meet Lord Raglan again on the 6th, which orders England alone lived to obey. Within, however, a very few hours of these generals' return, the 5th of November, the day of Inkerman, dawned; the part taken by Sir Richard on that occasion will be found in the pages devoted to the history of that battle. A few incidents not there noticed may here be brought under review. The general was enabled to bring a portion of his division into action, and to push forward some troops and two guns, which gave seasonable aid to General Codrington, whose division was now hotly engaged with the enemy. Having made

these dispositions, Sir Richard sought and attached himself to Codrington, upon whom had just devolved the command of the division. Codrington courteously, and according to military etiquette, at once offered the command to his senior officer, but England felt it was in able hands, and they acted together. It was now evident that further to the right his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge and the Guards were sorely pressed by the overwhelming masses of the enemy, whose murderous onslaught of fire and steel will probably never meet with parallel in the annals of war. Sir Richard grasped the only available means he had at command, and at once dispatched that support which the lion-hearted scion of royalty did not fail subsequently to acknowledge. During these events Sir Richard felt himself still responsible for the safety of those long lines through which the enemy might attempt to penetrate, extending over a space of some miles, including the trenches of the third division, and he rapidly revisited all the positions belonging to him on the left. The vigilance, however, of the officers left in charge of these positions, and in charge of the trenches, relieved him from much apprehension as to their safety. Mounting upon a fresh horse, the general galloped back, and placed himself opposite to the right of the enemy's real attack, finding that he could at that point best direct any movements in which the third division could be called upon to take part. He remained there until the close of the battle. Sir Richard England received the thanks of Lord Raglan for the "excellent disposition he made of his force," &c.

On the 16th of June it was the opinion of the engineers that the breaching of Sebastopol might be made sufficiently effective, by a steady bombardment for a few hours, to justify an assault. Moreover, it was known to be the wish of the English and French authorities at home that an attack should be made on the 18th of June, for it was believed that a combined success on the memorable anniversary of the battle of Waterloo would do more than anything else to obliterate any unkindly feelings which might exist in the French army. Accordingly, in pursuance of instructions issued by Lord Raglan on the 16th of June to Sir Richard England to co-operate with the rest of the army in storming Sebastopol on the 18th, Sir Richard England made the following disposition of the force under his command:—The first brigade, under Major-general Barnard, composed of the 4th, 14th, 39th, 50th, and 89th, regiments, was placed on the Woronzoff Road at two o'clock in the morning, to co-operate with the column of attack on his right in assaulting the Redan; at the same time the second brigade, under Major-general

Eyre, comprising the 9th, 28th, 38th, 18th, and 44th regiments, was formed in the ravine beyond the French picket-house, with orders to advance at the appointed moment towards the cemetery, so as to take advantage of any success gained by the troops on his right, and combine with them in an assault upon the "Russian Barrack Battery:" so far as circumstances would permit, Sir Richard England combining these columns by placing additional troops in the parallels, and in the Green Hill intrenchment, under the command of Colonel Cobbe, of the 4th foot, whose marksmen did much service in keeping up a rattling and harassing fire upon the embrasures of the Redan, and in covering the advance of General Eyre's brigade. The two brigades moved forward by signal at the same moment, and the first brigade was soon brought into co-operation with the general and combined attack on the right.

In briefly adverting to some facts and incidents relating to the third division during the periods of its most severe ordeal in the winter of 1854-5, it may be observed that England saw the necessity of concealing the suffering and real weakness of his division, and issued every precautionary instruction to prevent publicity, feeling that it was of the first importance to keep the enemy in ignorance of his limited means of guarding the Green Hill intrenchments and the left of the English line from assault. To have held this ground with anything like security, and effectually to have defended the trenches confided to the third and fourth divisions, would have demanded a force of at least 15,000 men; but there seldom were more at this period than three or four thousand really fit for duty in both, and the weather was of the most dreadful description. The frost-bitten soldiers were at this time in bad tents, ill-clothed, ill-fed, and without fuel, and, to add to their miseries, the scurvy broke out in the division as a staple disease; salt rations aggravated the disease, for it was sometimes impossible to supply the troops with fresh meat on more than three days out of twenty-five; and day by day, and night by night, as the means of holding their ground became less and less (for a night never passed without casualties), the stoutest hearts felt that there were periods during the whole of that fearful winter when the position might have been forced by superior numbers. When the enemy had so many alarming advantages, nothing but unrelaxing vigilance, and the assiduity and endurance, combined with the determined bravery of all ranks, saved the army from having its flank turned. In truth, so weak were the numbers in these trenches after the battle of Inkerman, that every superior officer thought, night after night, that the position would have

been forced. It is difficult to account for the absence of powerful sorties in this dangerous and exposed quarter, except by the fact that the Russians observed the vigilance and the preparations to receive them, and were ignorant of the real condition of the division. There was at this period no available support from the French, and at night especially the enemy might have penetrated our lines long before any aid could have been given, for the French were at a considerable distance, and there were no English regiments towards the rear. The obvious extremity of the case provoked extra vigilance: the efforts of the officers were immense; the determination of the men never could be shaken. It was supposed that the stimulus of three gills of rum a day enabled them physically to do that which might more fairly have been demanded from five times their number. The general's own uncommunicativeness on these matters, and the sedulous avoidance of those who appreciated his motives to render information which might have perilled the very existence of the division, concealed its real feebleness, and, in all probability, prevented the flank of the besieging army being overwhelmed. No pen, however, could have delineated the long train of suffering endured, or the undeviating devotion of this reduced little band, whose average loss by sickness and the sword was twenty-five men a day for many successive days. Officers were obliged to insist upon soldiers going to the hospital, who concealed their coming deaths rather than allow their jaded comrades to take their night's duty.

Sir Richard, with all his reserve of manner, lacked the power to conceal from those around him how keenly and affectingly he felt any act of kindness, or efforts made to alleviate the sufferings of his poor soldiers, and he has been known to speak of the meritorious exertions of Mr. Macdonald of the *Times*, and other philanthropists, with feelings of irrepressible gratitude. Every effort was made to secure a portion of rest, slight as it might be, to the men; and though the general was often roused up at night by alarming messages from the front, the battalions (half probably already in the trenches) were seldom allowed to be disturbed, or even to know they were threatened. No bugle was ever sounded in the camp until the general of the third division had ordered *his*, and until matters were well reconnoitred by himself and staff, all of whom were frequently on horseback twice or thrice during the same night, finding the way through the snow as they best might. Happily, after January, reinforcements began to arrive, and the duties became somewhat lighter; but of the nine senior officers of the third division who landed with it in the Crimea six, if

not seven, were killed or wounded, and the seeds of future disease were slowly but surely sown in the strong constitution of its commander.

During the siege the general naturally experienced an absence of mental repose, and it was indeed difficult enough for any one, even without cares and responsibilities, to have found bodily rest, "for," writes a competent authority, "the cannonade kept even those who were seeking a moment's rest on the alert, and it was calculated that two shots per minute gave that loud reverberation through the camp, and caused that concussion in the tents which prevented sleep." At length rheumatism insidiously assumed an inveterate and malignant form, and in its climax wholly disabled the general from continuing in the field. His stout frame gave way, and with grief he yielded to the warnings of his medical adviser, and, taking the step so earnestly pressed upon him, consented to return home, quitting the scene of strife five weeks only before the fall of that fortress, the siege operations of which had been so fatal to his companions; but he missed no service by this step, for the third division was not engaged at the final effort made on the 8th of September, 1855.

General Simpson, in his official report to Lord Panmure, thus alludes to the circumstance of Sir Richard's being invalided:—"It is with great regret that I have to communicate to your lordship that Lieutenant-general Sir Richard England, G.C.B., has been compelled, upon the recommendation of a medical board, to return to England. Sir Richard England is the last of the general officers who left the United Kingdom in command of a division. He has remained at his post throughout the trying heats of Bulgaria, and the severities and hardships of the winter campaign in the Crimea; and great credit is due to this officer for the constancy and untiring zeal he has exhibited in carrying out arduous and difficult duties on all occasions."

Sir Richard England now pursued his destiny, and in the end of August landed on his native shore, thankful to that Providence which had guarded his path, and had endued with that health which had enabled him to serve his country so uninterruptedly and so long—for he had *never for an hour* left his post, during the sixteen months of arduous and incessant service noticed in the foregoing narrative. The frequent approvals officially transmitted from the Crimea touching Sir Richard's command and management of the third division, under circumstances of trial and difficulty, were often heard of by his friends, who had also the satisfaction of knowing that these favourable opinions were acquiesced in by the highest authorities at home. The late com-

mander-in-chief, Lord Hardinge, often expressed his appreciation of those long and anxious services which entailed upon the general of the third division the necessity of retiring from its command. His lordship officially transmitted to him the high opinions entertained, "both professionally and socially," by Lord Raglan and General Simpson:—"Most attentive and trustworthy, all his mind bent on the good of the service, he never met them with a difficulty—his whole aim being always to meet their wishes and support them." Viscount Hardinge generously expressed his own concurrence in "such honourable testimonials to his professional character."

Thus terminated the active services of General England in connection with the war against Russia. He did not escape the tongue of slander, any more than others of the brave and good; but he had the rare satisfaction of securing the goodwill of those whom he obeyed, and whom he commanded; and in his friendships he was fortunate: he had less cause than most other eminent men to repeat the lamentation of the poet—

"Those you make friends,
And give your hearts to, when they once perceive
The least rub in your fortunes, fall away
Like water from ye, never found again
But when they mean to sink ye."

Sir Richard now returned to his residence in Bath, but, in compliance with medical recommendation, retired to a cottage in the healthy vicinity of Maidenhead, contemplating the probable necessity of retirement from all military employment. A short time, however, showed that his vigorous constitution was not broken, and he was soon reinstated in his wonted health and spirits. Although in seclusion he was not forgotten; the good opinion of Viscount Hardinge still clung to the retired general of the third division, and without solicitation on his part, he was appointed to the command of the camp at the Curragh of Kildare, in Ireland.

The following brief despatch shows how the army before Sebastopol continued to suffer by the loss of regimental officers above the rank of subalterns, during the early part of August:—

"Since the 5th instant nothing has occurred to form the subject of a despatch. I have the honour to inclose the list of casualties to the 5th instant. I regret to have to inform your lordship of the death of Colonel Cobbe, 4th regiment, which took place yesterday; he was an excellent officer, and is a serious loss to her majesty's service. Captain Layard, 38th regiment, deputy-assistant quartermaster-general, died this morning of diar-

rhœa, on board the steamer *Faith*, in Balaklava harbour, to which ship he had been removed in the hopes of benefiting his health."

Up to the date of this despatch, General Simpson received stores and reinforcements constantly. The condition in which the stores were sometimes brought to Balaklava was disgraceful to the transport service. The troops also suffered in consequence of the unclean state of those ships, which were generally splendid vessels. On board the *Cambria* the stench was so dreadful and the bugs so abundant that the officers, most of them very young, were obliged to abandon their berths and sleep under a blanket on deck. The result of this state of things was, that the young men landed in the Crimea fitter for the field hospitals than the trenches. Several laboured under pulmonary attacks, caused by sleeping on deck exposed to the heavy dews which fell while the vessel sailed up the Mediterranean; some were labouring under diarrhœa, the result of the filthy state of the ship; and others, who did not sleep on deck, were attacked with nervous and febrile disorders from loss of rest, which it was almost impossible to obtain because of the vermin, and the abominable odours which filled the cabins. The *Cambria* was so badly managed as to run foul in the Bosphorus, in broad daylight, in clear weather and a calm sea. Thus, at every stage of the progress of affairs, up to the capture of Southern Sebastopol, confusion, disorganisation, and neglect branded the conduct of public affairs with incompetency or dishonour.

The cholera, which had abated towards the end of July, burst out again in the beginning of August, and carried away many of the soldiers. The Highlanders, as usual, suffered much from it. A correspondent of the *Times*, who signed himself F. H., thus describes the influence of climate during the first week in August, and the general losses of the English in the trenches:—"The English loss in the trenches, at the present rate, may be estimated at about 1000 men a month. This includes every man *hors de combat*, for however short a time. As regards disease, I do not learn that there has been any particular variation since I last wrote. The weather has been fine and bright, usually very warm of a morning, cooler of an afternoon, with pleasant breezes sweeping over the heights. The heat here does not, to me, feel so relaxing as on the shores of the Bosphorus—ininitely less so than in that steam bath, Constantinople."

The English cavalry suffered most from illness; nearly half the number of the 10th Hussars were ill. The enemy lost many men, and many officers of distinction, from the same

diseases which ravaged the allied camps. They also experienced a succession of disasters, entailing loss of life, from accident. A small powder-magazine blew up in the works opposite the British left; a fire broke out in the rear of the Redan; one of the large buildings which had been shattered by the English shells, fell, crushing some infantry and artillerymen; and many of the Russian soldiers were carried from the trenches and batteries dying of cholera, brought on by the flooded state of the works from the incessant rains.

General Codrington began his command of the British light division by an active and vigilant inspection; General Eyre assumed the command of General England's division. Neither officers could find much to improve, after the experienced chiefs who had so long trained and disciplined them for the hard service these gallant bodies of men had undergone. Both these officers, placed in the responsible situations confided to them, were competent, although not as efficient as the veteran heroes who previously had charge. General Windham was appointed to command the second brigade of the second division. The first division was, with the accession of some other regiments, made into two divisions: one consisted of the Household Infantry, the "Old Buffs" (3rd), the "Young Buffs" (31st), and the 13th Light Infantry—a corps which attracted the attention of our Ottoman allies, especially the Egyptian contingent, by having the word "Egypt" on their breast-plates, which circumstance soon became known to the pasha's soldiers. The other new division consisted of the fine Highland regiments, and the 92nd, then expected out, was to be added to it, constituting the "Highland Division."

On the 3rd of August, Lieutenant Evans, of the 55th, was shot through the windpipe while on duty in the trenches. On the 7th Major M'Gowan, 93rd, was carried off by the Russians while on outpost duty.

The strength of the British army by the 10th was 29,000 men. French reinforcements, in small detachments, arrived nearly every day at Kamiesch during the first fortnight of August. The large reinforcements of the Russians, and their menacing manœuvres in the direction of the Tchernaya, rendered those accessions of strength desirable, large as was the allied force already in the Crimea.

The circumstance of a birth—or rather births—in the trenches became the subject of amusing gossip in both armies. A *cantinière*, who brought up wine for the French soldiers on duty, was suddenly taken with the pains of maternity, and delivered of twins. Both the mother and children were gallantly taken care of, every medical assistance being timely rendered and subsequently bestowed.

On the night of the 12th an attack was expected by the allies all along their lines, and preparations were made to repel it. A writer already quoted gives the following lively and picturesque description of the "turn out" of the British forces:—"There at last is some prospect of action, but not against the Malakoff, nor is it the allies who are expected to assume the offensive. Late last evening orders were given for the troops to be under arms by three in the morning. Of course Malakoff was immediately the word, and most persons supposed that the long talked of assault was to be made. This, however, was soon found not to be the case. An attack was expected to take place along the whole line. Without tap of drum, or sound of bugle, the camp was afoot at the prescribed hour, the troops forming up in profound silence. The entire army was out, including the cavalry and artillery from Balaklava. The first grey of morning found a number of officers and amateurs assembled on Cathcart's Hill, the best point of observation. There was unusually little firing yesterday and last night, and all expected that this tranquillity was quickly to be broken by the din of an engagement. The interest of the situation grew stronger as the morning advanced, and as the scarlet columns became visible, massed along the lines, motionless and expectant. Superior officers, with their staff, moved to and fro; aides-de-camp traversed the heights with orders; here and there, through the still imperfect light, which began to be tinged with the first red flush of sunrise, waved the penons of a Lancer escort. With broad day the brief excitement ended. Before the upper end of the sun's disc rose above the hills, the troops were marching briskly back to their tents. The morning was beautifully clear, and the spectacle was striking. In fine order, in serried columns, looking hardy, active, and cheerful, up to any work, the Crimean army regained its canvas quarters."

On the 12th and 13th the enemy received large reinforcements, and they took post on the heights beyond the Tchernaya. On the 13th General Marmora reconnoitred these forces, and made such dispositions in his own army as the observations he was able to make led him to suppose requisite. The Turks and French, stationed in the neighbourhood of Baidar, despoiled the houses of the Russian gentry. The Turks were only guilty in a few instances, but behaved very ungallantly and rudely in those. The French carried on a systematic plunder along the coast to Yalta. The Cossacks endeavoured to keep them in check, but were beaten off by the fire of grape from two French steamers, who moved along shore, co-operating, as it appeared, with the

marauding parties. British cavalry were stationed in positions which prevented English soldiers from taking any part in these predatory proceedings, and they, to some extent, checked the French also; but the latter persisted in their enterprises, and came back loaded with booty of every description—books, statues, pictures, embroidery, upholstery, furniture, ladies' dresses, trinkets, provisions, &c., in large quantities. These were brought to the French camp from the deserted mansions of the Russian gentry.

By this date the French sap had made great progress towards the Malakoff, and the expectation of its approaching storm excited the allied armies. It was evident, however, that a battle must first be fought in the open field; that a desperate attempt—the more desperate because, should it fail, it could in no likelihood be renewed—would be made upon the extreme right flank and rear of the allies. The positions on the Tchernaya were extended, and the enemy's forces were now so considerable, that he entertained the prospect of breaking through the line of the encampment by the river, and storming the right of Bosquet's *corps d'armée* upon the plateau before Sebastopol. The point of view from which General Simpson regarded matters will be seen from his despatch, dated the 14th:—

"During the last few days considerable activity has been exhibited in the movements of the enemy, both in the town and on the north side; and from the information we have received from the country, as well as the examination of deserters, I have reason to believe that the Russians may attempt to force us to raise the siege by a vigorous attack from without. Every precaution is taken on the part of the allies, and the ground occupied by the Sardinians above the village of Tchorgoum and in its front has been made very strong through the energy and skill of General della Marmora, who is unceasing in his precautions, and shows the utmost disposition to co-operate in the most agreeable manner with the allies. The fire has, if anything, been rather less during the day since my last despatch. At times, however, the enemy opens heavily for a short period, causing many casualties; and among them I regret to have to announce that of Brevet-major Hugh Drummond, Scots Fusilier Guards, who was killed yesterday afternoon by a fragment of a shell. His loss is deeply felt by all who knew him, and her majesty has lost the services of a most promising officer. The firing on our side has been directed in a great measure against the large barracks, dockyard buildings, and the town, all of which show visible signs of the admirable practice of the Royal Artillery. I further beg to inclose the

returns of casualties to the 12th instant. I have to apologise to your lordship for having omitted to inform you before, that I had dispatched the steamer *Indiana*, on the 8th instant, to Corfu, for the purpose of conveying the 82nd regiment from that island to the Crimea. Draughts for the light division and 71st regiment, to the number of 800 men, the remainder of the Carabinciers, and one squadron of the 1st Dragoon Guards, have arrived."

Such was the general aspect of affairs when

the memorable battle of the Tchernaya—called by our allies the battle of Traktar Bridge—was initiated by the Russians, and in which they received so decided a repulse that the authorities did not venture to conceal the fact from the Russian people. This was the first defeat which the Russians acknowledged since the invasion of the Crimea, probably because it was the first battle in which the British and Turkish soldiers took but little part, against whom the bitterness of the Russian army was intense.

CHAPTER XCVI.

THE BATTLE OF THE TCHERNAYA.

"By our camp fires rose a murmur
At the dawning of the day,
And the tread of many footsteps
Spoke the advent of the fray;
And as we took our places
Few and stern were our words,
While some were tightening horse-girths,
And some were girding swords."—*Ballads of Ireland.*

It will be recollected by our readers that the French and Sardinians occupied strong posts on the left bank of the Tchernaya River. The object for which the Russians initiated the battle, which is designated from the river, was to dislodge them from these posts, and, in case of success, to make a general attack along the whole of the allied positions, from Balaklava round to the Quarantine, driving the allies in every direction across the plateau upon Kamiesch.

For several weeks prior to the attack Prince Gortschakoff had been uneasy for his supplies, both of food and munitions of war; the horses and oxen by which they had been hitherto conveyed had to a great extent perished, and the resources of the provinces which supplied them did not allow of their being speedily replaced. Besides, the operations of the allied squadrons in the Sea of Azoff, in the latter end of May, the early part of June, and the whole of July, had greatly lessened the stores of fish and corn, upon which the garrison had drawn for its wants. Representations to this effect had been made by Prince Gortschakoff to the government of St. Petersburg, and in reply to them reinforcements were poured in with all possible rapidity, and orders were issued that with a force of between fifty and sixty thousand men an attack along the line of the Tchernaya should be made. Various representations have been given of the opinions of the Russian commander-in-chief as to the expediency of this experiment. The impression in well-informed military circles in England is that Gortschakoff was more anxious for supplies than reinforcements, although desirous

of both, and that he was by no means confident of the policy of forcing a battle upon the Tchernaya and its confluent streams. There is little doubt that Osten-Sacken disapproved of the enterprise, but that all the inferior generals were clamorous for the speedy accomplishment of the attempt, in concurrence with the desire of the government.

The plan of action in its general features and leading detail became known to the allies after the battle was over. General Read, a Russian officer, of Scottish parentage, being slain, the plan was found in the breast of his coat. It will throw a clearer light upon the actual progress of the battle to present the reader with this plan:—

"The following is a disposition of the *corps d'armée* of the right flank (General Aide-de-camp Read):—

"1. *Composition of troops.*—Seventh division of infantry, twelve battalions. 8th *artillery brigade.*—Battery of position, No. 3, twelve guns; battery of light, No. 3, six guns; battery of light, No. 4, eight guns; battery of light, No. 5, eight guns; three regiments of the twelfth division of infantry, twelve battalions. 14th *artillery brigade.*—Battery of position, No. 3, twelve guns; light, No. 3, six guns; light, No. 4, six guns; 2nd battalion of rifles, one battalion; 1st company of 2nd battalion of sappers, quarter of a battalion; one regiment of lancers, eight squadrons; horse-battery, No. 26, four guns; one regiment Don Cossacks, No. 37, six sotnias; total, twenty-five battalions and a quarter, eight squadrons, six sotnias, and sixty-two guns.

"2. On the 3rd (15th) of August, at night-fall, General Aide-de-camp Read will descend M'Kenzie Heights with all his troops, in the steps of Lieutenant-general Liprandi, and will form his two divisions into columns on the height of the new redoubt, near the high road, having to his left the seventeenth division, commanded by General Liprandi.

"3. He will leave all his baggage at the camp, and form a waggon-stand, where the infantry will deposit their sacks. In this waggon-camp large boilers for cooking, and brandy, are to be ready on the 4th (16th) of August; the men are to be provided with four days' rations, one pound of meat, their canteens full of water, and with the requisite camp utensils. Each regiment to be provided with a case of ammunition and two ambulance carts. The other ambulance carts to remain under the orders of General of brigade Zouroff, who is charged with the conveyance of the wounded. The cavalry and artillery are to take with them as much provender as possible, such provender to be placed on some suitable spot.

"4. The head-quarters for the day of the 3rd (15th) will be at M'Kenzie Heights. General Read having concentrated his troops on M'Kenzie Heights, will immediately send an officer to the commander-in-chief, to inform him of his arrival and of his arrangements. On the 4th (16th), during the attack, the commander-in-chief will take up a position on the slope of M'Kenzie Heights, near the new redoubt. At 4 A.M., at the same moment as the movement of the seventeenth division takes place at Telegraph Height, General Aide-de-camp Read will advance, form the seventh and twelfth divisions of infantry into order of battle beyond the enemy's range, and will place in the rear, as a reserve, the regiment of lancers, supported by Cossacks. He will combine his movement with that of General Liprandi, and will advance towards the Tchernaya in such manner as to be able to cannonade the enemy on the Heights of Fedukhine, when orders shall have been issued to that effect. With this view, detachments of sappers are to be attached to the seventh and twelfth infantry divisions, and also detachments of regiments accustomed to handle flying bridges, and to throw them promptly over the canal, so as to offer a road to the infantry and artillery.

"5. When the order of the commander-in-chief to advance on the Fedukhine Hills shall have been received, the troops are to cross the Tchernaya, to the right and left, by the means of passage prepared; the damage done by the artillery will be immediately repaired by the sappers. The bridges will be thrown over under the orders of superior officers commanding the detachments.

"6. Having occupied the hills to the left

and centre, General Read will form in order of battle there, with his front turned partially towards Mount Sapoune, partially towards the enemy, covering himself in both directions by his guns in position. As regards the hills on the right, having driven back the enemy, he will occupy them with troops of the first line.

"7. One of the principal cares of General Read will be to see that the irrigations of the Tchernaya are let out by the sappers, and that the bridges are thrown over as speedily as possible, to carry over with every possible speed the artillery and cavalry to the other side.

"8. After taking the Heights of Fedukhine, General Read will remain there, and await special orders from the commander-in-chief, in case an attack on the south side of Mount Gasforté should be thought absolutely necessary.

"9. After the battle General Read will take measures to fortify the Fedukhine Heights.

"Quartermaster-general,
"MAJOR-GENERAL GROTENFELD."

Such was the plan contemplated; and its early execution became desirable, as the Russian army in the field, especially when so largely increased by the recently-arrived reinforcements, was suffering from want of water. Had not the summer been one in which an unusual quantity of rain fell, the sufferings of the Russian soldiery would have been still greater, as the allies commanded the whole line of the Tchernaya (and to some small extent its tributaries). The topographical character of the ground occupied by the allied arms has been, generally, explained in former pages; the positions occupied on the day of battle require to be more minutely particularised.

The ground on each side of the river ascends in unequal and broken slopes to a range of hills or hillocks, on which plateaux are formed of very unequal dimensions, and at varied distances from each other. These ranges of heights approach nearer to one another, because nearer to the river in the vicinity of Inkerman, and they separate more and more widely as the distance from Inkerman increases. They are variously designated as hills, heights, and mountains, the last being the name given by the Russians. But their elevation is greatly inferior to the ranges of hills by which, looking from the plateau before Sebastopol, the scene is bounded. The high knolls which are formed on the opposite sides of the river on the acclivities from its banks are called by various names, such as plateaux, mamelons, knolls, heights, hillocks, &c. It is especially necessary to keep this in view in reading the

despatches and reports of the generals, to avoid confusion arising from this diversity of terms.

Descending from their extreme right on the plateau before Sebastopol, where Bosquet's forces were posted by Inkerman, the French occupied positions along the elevations on the left bank of the river to the Bridge of Traktar, at the other end of which, on the right bank, they formed a *tête de pont*, well defended, and detached their outposts upon the acclivities ascending from the vicinity of the bridge on the right bank.

Beyond the bridge, still farther up the river, the French line was extended, so that the bridge was opposite to their centre. Further to the right were posted the Sardinians, on the elevated grounds, with their advanced detachments thrown across the Tchernaya, occupying the banks of two tributary streams of inconsiderable size. Both the French and Sardinians were supported by cavalry, and guns of position occupied commanding points. On the Sardinian line a powerful English battery was planted.

Further still to the right, beyond the lines of the Sardinians, and somewhat in their rear, were placed the forces of Osman Pasha, who commanded the Turkish troops in the Crimea in the absence of Omar Pasha, who was perpetually sailing about between Balaklava and Eupatoria, Eupatoria and Kamiesch, and all these places and Constantinople, sulky and chagrined at the duties assigned to him in the arrangements of the allied generals. A considerable force of English cavalry were upon the extreme right, and in support.

This general view of the positions in which the allied troops were placed will prepare the reader for a detailed account.

From the Traktar Bridge, which was opposite the right centre of the French, an excellent road led to the McKenzie Heights, which was the head-quarters of the enemy. The Tchoulion Heights were opposite the right wing of the French, and their range extended in face of the Sardinian army. The stream of the Tchoulion rising in these hills, or at all events winding its course among them, descends to Tchorgoum, and there pours itself into the Tchernaya. The Sardinians crossed the river at this confluence, and occupied both banks of the stream. Farther to the right and to the rear, Generals Scarlett and d'Allonville occupied the entrance to the Valley of Baidar; the Turks were more to the rear—towards Balaklava—than the cavalry. The chief authority along the whole valley of the Tchernaya was in the hands of Pelissier, as his forces were numerically superior to those of the other allies. The command of the French lines was intrusted to General Herbillon, with the cavalry general, Morris, as second in command. General della Marmora commanded

the Sardinians. Osman Pasha was in communication with both Herbillon and Marmora. The lines were beyond the limits of Sir Colin Campbell's command; the English officer having chief authority was General Scarlett. Captain Mowbray, of the artillery, was the principal British officer having post within the lines. The forces of our French ally, with their arrangement, is given from an official authority; some slight discrepancies between it and the despatch of General Pelissier will be found, but the general-in-chief is, in such cases, to be corrected by this detail. It must be borne in mind that along the French front ran the aqueduct by which the Karabelnaia portion of Sebastopol was fed with water from the Tchernaya. This constituted an additional line of defence after the enemy should cross the river, and made the position extremely strong, rendering it exceedingly difficult for any large force to ascend, unbroken, with sufficient celerity the range of plateaux occupied by our ally.

"On the right of the ravine, and facing the Russian army, was encamped the first brigade of Fauchaux's division (2nd Zouaves and 19th battalion of Foot Chasseurs), with the 6th battalion of the 13th artillery. This hill is strongly commanded by the crest of the plateau of Tchoulion. On the second hill, much higher than the first, were on the right the second brigade of General Fauchaux's division (General Faily, with the 95th and 97th), two regiments of the first brigade of General Camou (50th and 3rd Zouaves), and the 3rd battery of the 2nd artillery. Lastly, at the extreme left, on the third hill, the rest of the division of General Camou (a regiment of African Rifles, 6th and 82nd), and Generals Wimpffen and Vergé with the first battery of the 13th regiment. Behind these hills, forming the reserve, was General Cler, with the 62nd and 73rd, and five mounted batteries, of which two were of the Guard.

"The first brigade of Herbillon's division (14th battalion of Foot Chasseurs, 47th and 53rd of the line) was placed midway on the plateau of Inkerman, under the telegraph, and near the Canrobert Redoubt.

"The division of cavalry commanded by General Morris (four regiments of African Chasseurs) bivouaced in the plain of Balaklava, behind the right of the Fedukhine* Mountains. The Turks occupied the mountainous ground of Balaklava, against which, however, there could be no occasion to apprehend an attack; for it is a broken region, that renders any manœuvre of masses totally impossible. Whatever the intention of the enemy, he could not, in any case, do more there than make false demonstrations.

"The positions we hold being very favour-

* The Russians gave this name to the heights which they attempted to storm by the Traktar Bridge.

able for the defensive,' said General Herbillon, in his instructions to the generals under his orders, 'we must not lose their advantages by too much precipitation. It is necessary to study the movements that the enemy may make, and to profit by the moment that may appear the most propitious to attack vigorously. The generals of division who are in positions of which they have a knowledge, will be in a measure able to judge of this opportunity. They will be supported by the general commanding the lines of the Tchernaya.'"

On the night of the 15th, the Russian army was moved down from the M'Kenzie Heights, and took post silently along the range of hills which confronted the French and Sardinian positions. In order to prevent any suspicion of such a movement, demonstrations had been made in the direction of the Baidar Valley, where General d'Allonville watched the lower part of that gorge. On the evening of the 15th, especially, d'Allonville was made anxious by these demonstrations, and telegraphed to General Herbillon accordingly. The telegraph was interrupted by the darkness, as the French used the semaphore system. Whether from this cause or some other, Herbillon does not appear to have used any extraordinary precautions, nor to have put Marmora on the *qui vive*, who was a very diligent and vigilant general.

Two divisions of the Russian army had arrived late on the evening of the 15th, and were only allowed a short time for rest and refreshment, when they were put in motion towards the intended points of attack. The emperor's orders to drive the allies from the Tchernaya was read at the head of every regiment, and his majesty's appeals to Russian patriotism and heroism produced an exciting effect upon the men. The general-in-chief did not, however, trust to this excitement alone—as usual, drunkenness was added to religious and national fanaticism, the men being largely supplied with alcohol. The stimulus of *rack* was only given to the infantry, in order to sustain their fury in the assault: the artillerymen who cannonaded the allied positions, and the cavalry who were held in reserve, were preserved in sobriety, as the part they were expected to perform required coolness in those to whom it was assigned.

On the morning of the 16th, before dawn, the attacking columns were put in motion: on their right, where the French were to be assailed, General Read commanded; on the left, against the Sardinians, the command devolved upon Liprandi. The morning was misty—a circumstance the advantage of which frequently fell to the Russians in their attacks, and on this occasion they made it available for a furtive advance upon the allies.

Liprandi's force descended the Tchoulion Heights upon Tehorgoun; the advanced post of the Sardinians was held by 200 men, who were stationed above the right bank of the stream, which fell into the Tchernaya there. These 200 men were supported by a rifle battalion, who took post on the left bank of the stream. The Sardinians did not expect an attack, and no preparations more than ordinary were made to receive one. The sentries beyond the outpost heard the tramp of a large body of men, and discharged their muskets. The picket advanced, and fired; and the 200 men who occupied the advanced position were instantly engaged with a large body of the advanced guard of the enemy. These 200 men fought with the coolest gallantry. They knew that the only way to prevent the main body from being surprised in the obscurity of the morning mist was by maintaining a prolonged contest, however unequal their force to that of the enemy. Nobly did they fulfil this duty, a fourth of the entire Sardinian loss being sustained by that small body of men. So steady was the fire of these companies, that the Russians were kept in check for many minutes. Nor did the little band retire as the enemy came on in increasing force; they, with intrepid resolution, crossed bayonets with the advancing ranks, and were engaged in a fierce hand-to-hand struggle when the rifle battalions in support arrived, and covered their retreat. This was effected with masterly skill, doing credit alike to the discipline and bravery of the Piedmontese. When the sharpshooters arrived, the Russians were leaping from the parapet of the epaumont—behind which the advanced companies were placed—among its gallant defenders, who made no movement in retreat until ordered by the commanding officer of the supports to do so. They crossed the stream, fighting as they retired; and, receiving further supports, fell slowly and securely back upon the main defence, which was, in consequence of the enemy having been kept so well at bay, ready for the coming assault. The flying batteries of the Russians discharged an eager fire on the retreating Savoyards; but so badly was that fire directed, that little loss was inflicted. The mist which rose from the river prevented the enemy from directing with effect the fire of his artillery; and the same cause, together with the smoke from the cannon and musketry, which hung densely over the scene of contest, rendered it difficult for the English and Piedmontese guns to find the range of the advancing foe.

While this was going on in front and on the flank of the Sardinians, the French were also attacked. Their first intimation of battle was the sound of musketry, opened by the Piedmontese advanced companies when they dis-

cerned the descending corps of the enemy. The French stood to their arms, but before they had time to muster, the balls from the Russian heights, which were crowned with artillery, scattered the dying watch-fires, and broke in among the tents. A moment after, the French advanced posts on the other side of the Tchernaya were assailed. They did not hold their positions with as much tenacity as their Piedmontese brothers-in-arms; they retired quickly, but with that address so peculiar to the French, rapidly followed by the enemy, who manifested at once resolution and activity.

It was on the extreme left of the French, below the Traktar Bridge, that the Russians first gained access to the left bank of the river. The defence was commanded by General Camou. He was fiercely assailed by probably the whole of the seventh division. His skirmishers were swept back after a brief and desultory resistance, the enemy dashing into the water, and forcing the passage manfully. The officer in command was the first to leap into the flood, and was

"Bravely followed by his grenadiers,
Tho' bullets flew like hail about their ears,"

The left bank was gained almost instantaneously, and, with a celerity for which Russian troops had not the credit, they formed, and ascended the slopes. The French poured a deadly fire from the margin of the aqueduct; but the Russians crossed that line of defence also, undismayed by the increasing roll of musketry, and gained the summit of the plateau, where the main body of Camou's division rested, and whence his artillery played with murderous effect upon the advancing host. Here, before there was time for the assailing column to deploy, the 50th regiment of the line and the 3rd Zouaves poured in a close volley, beneath which it was broken. Before any attempt at formation could be made,—the assailing force being, properly, neither in line nor in column, but confused and crowded on the upper portion of the acclivity,—the two French corps charged with the bayonet, and rolled the disorderly mass of troops into the aqueduct beneath. The conduct of the Russian officers was worthy of all praise. They endeavoured to rally and re-form their men at the aqueduct, but the 82nd regiment of the line charged them in flank, and they were hurled down upon the Tchernaya. As they passed through the river, and clambered up the opposite banks, the French batteries played upon them with grape and canister, strewing the water's brink and the hill-side with the slain.

Thus, the attack on the extreme left of the allied line was signally repulsed; and on the extreme right the obstinacy and skill of

the Sardinian outpost and supports rendering a surprise impossible, caused the enemy to hesitate upon the expediency of attacking so strong a position, manned by soldiers so resolute. Liprandi ordered a heavy cannonade, which was answered with superior skill and spirit by the Sardinians; while loud above all the booming of the battle the English battery of heavy guns could be heard, as by its sure and terrible fire Liprandi's artillery was shattered, and lanes swept through the columns of his infantry.

While the Sardinians were contesting the banks of the Tchoulion, and General Camou so effectually defended the Lower Tchernaya, General Read, in person, precipitated himself upon the French centre, by way of the Traktar Bridge. After the battle, Gortschakoff accounted for his defeat by alleging that these movements on the allied left and centre were premature—that Read was ordered first to ascertain the success of Liprandi at the wooden bridge of Tchorgoum before either the stone bridge of Traktar was stormed, or the Tchernaya below the bridge was crossed. The directions found on the person of General Read do not bear out that criticism, which seems to have been an after-thought on the part of the prince; besides, Liprandi acted in the early part of the combat as if his part were only a feint, and that the key of the allied positions was the Traktar Bridge. Liprandi pushed down his troops in pursuit of the retiring Piedmontese until they reached the wooden bridge which crosses the Tchernaya above the junction of the Tchoulion, but there the defence of the gallant mountain-men was so tenacious, that if he designed anything more than a diversion for Read, his conduct was pusillanimous, or utterly unaccountable. If there were blame to be cast anywhere for the defeat, it should be upon the living Liprandi, or Gortschakoff himself, and not upon the slain Read; in fact, the Russians came on in the same way as at Inkerman, were defeated pretty much in the same way, and endeavoured by a similar pretext—the slander of a fallen general—to account for their repulse.

Whatever might have been the orders given to Read as to making his attack dependent upon the success of Liprandi, he did not wait for a result, of which the conduct of that general gave no promise, but launched his seventh division against Camou, and was beaten back signally, as we have seen, while he personally superintended the charge upon the Traktar Bridge. The French fled across the bridge and the river after a feeble resistance: in some ambuscades on the bank a show of determination was made, but they were soon driven out. Crossing the bridge, and at various portions of the river, where, despising the pontoons which

they brought for the occasion, the Muscovites boldly rushed through the water, wading to their middle, and gained the bank and the gorges which opened from the bridge with the most daring courage and dashing celerity. Such prompt action on the part of Russian infantry had not before been witnessed by the French, and was not supposed to be characteristic of the troops of that nation.

The twelfth Russian division, supported by the fifth, made good the passage of the bridge, and of the river above the bridge, in spite of the skilful dispositions and intrepid fighting of General of brigade de Failly. To the left and right of the bridge were the batteries of Captains Vautré and Sully, and these made havoc among such of the enemy as used the planks and flying bridges. Those who rushed into the water were beneath the range of shot, and were more concealed by the mist. The flying bridges and heavy planks were struck by the cannon-balls, and broken, or thrown into the river, and many of the assailants perished in that manner; but on so many points was a passage sought, and by methods so independent of one another, that the arrangements of De Failly proved utterly inadequate, and the Russians swarmed up the slopes. The French literally ran up the heights, and had no time to spare in their efforts to escape their determined pursuers. Although (as already remarked) the width between the heights above the Tchernaya increases up the river from Inkerman, yet where the action was fought was an exception, so that the enemy had a steep ascent. The regiments intended to act in support arrived opportunely, as the heavy masses of the enemy directed their surging advance against De Failly to their right, and Herbillon to their left. A battalion of the 73rd regiment of the line strengthened the position of De Failly; while General Cler debouched with three battalions—one of that regiment, and two of the 62nd—upon the hill, to the right of the Traktar gorge. There a terrible contest had made progress before the supports were fairly brought into action.

General Fauchaux, aided by Commanders Darbois and Algoe, at the head of two battalions of Zouaves, and one of Chasseurs, had withstood a host. Both commanders had fallen, and 400 of their brave soldiers lay around them, when Cler arrested the impetuosity of the enemy by a volley discharged at once into their compact mass. At this moment the Zouaves had given way; but falling into line with Cler's battalions, they joined in a bloody bayonet charge, which swept the enemy more rapidly down than he had ascended, until the river for a moment impeded his course. The French, halting, opened a steady and deliberate fusilade upon the defeated soldiers as they

pushed through the stream, and struggled up the opposite banks. Here they found the ladders which they had cast away in their advance of use to them in a mode they little calculated when they carried them into action as accessories of their attack.

De Failly's reinforcement proved equally efficient. This intrepid officer advanced before his men, his sword gleaming in the light, which now began to conquer the morning mist. He was gallantly followed; the brigade delivered one volley, and a bayonet charge, after the manner of the British, which sent the enemy in flight back upon the Tchernaya. These brilliant charges very much resembled that executed at Busaco by Colonel Wallace, when, with four companies of the Connaught Rangers, he precipitated a French column down from the heights, just as they were about to deploy, and attack in flank the Hon. Colonel King and his Fusiliers (the 5th).

The Russians, baffled and repulsed at all points, did not yet despair of victory. The seventeenth division, which was with Liprandi on the heights above the Tchouliou, was pushed down against the French right under Fauchaux; the twelfth and fifth divisions immediately re-forming, divided themselves into three columns, and once more assaulted the Bridge of Traktar.

At this juncture the mist entirely cleared away, and the appearance of the attack was beautiful as seen from the Fedukhine Heights; the glittering helmets of the Russians, and the sheen of their bayonets seemed like waves succeeding waves, rolling onward as they reflected the sun's rays. They did not advance like troops which had experienced defeat. The seventeenth division had not been in very severe action, although for some time previously they had been kept in check above Tchorgoum by a Turkish column, moved over by General Marmora, and some companies of his *Bersaglieri* (riflemen of Piedmont). The French made suitable dispositions to arrest the new danger. Colonel Forgeot, who commanded the horse-artillery, and had not come into action until the Russians were retreating after the failure of their first assault, now placed seven batteries of his force along the front of the French line, more especially to the right below the positions occupied by Fauchaux, where the ground being undulated rather than steep, favoured his dispositions. General Pelissier himself now arrived upon the scene of action, speedily followed by General Simpson, the latter rather as an observer. Pelissier brought up the reserves,—Levaillant's division of the 1st corps, Dulac's division of the 2nd, and the Imperial Guard.

Liprandi commanded the Russians, where the assault was in the direction of the division of Fauchaux and the right of Herbillon's

division; Prince Gortschakoff in person directed the assault against the left of Herbillon's division and the division of De Failly, General Read having fallen in the previous attack.

The attempt to cross the bridge and to ford the river was not found so easy of accomplishment as when Read directed the previous passage. The *tête de pont* on the Russian side was defended for a short time fiercely; but the enemy pressed on in such overwhelming numbers that it could not be retained. Colonel Danner, at the head of the 95th, threw himself upon the bridge and defended it foot to foot, while the French batteries at either side supported him, sweeping the further end of the bridge with a *mitrail*, before which great numbers of the assailants fell. Still the river was forded in several places, and the heights ascended; but the left wing of Herbillon's division, and the supports under Cler, repulsed the assailants with a fatally precise fire, and once more a bayonet charge pushed them back upon the Tchernaya. The right of Herbillon's division and the division of Fauchaux were not approached by the bayonet on this occasion; the batteries of Forgeot's horse-artillery poured forth so destructive a fire, that the Russians hesitated, wavered, and fled, before they felt the touch of French steel. Thus, once more, the left bank of the river was clear of the enemy; but this immunity did not continue long, for the seventeenth division, as if ashamed of its repulse, rallied with alacrity, and, reinforced by the regiment of Odessa, composed of several battalions, made a more determined charge than ever, and this time upon the extreme right of the French. The object of Liprandi seemed to be to pierce between the French right and the Sardinians; this would open for them a passage to the plain of Balaklava. General Marmora perceived the intention of Liprandi before the attempt was developed, and sent the second Piedmontese division, under General Trotti, to form along the aqueduct. This division he supported by Sardinian and English cavalry, in case opportunity should be afforded for their action. Besides these excellent dispositions, he directed several batteries upon the flank of the Russian column. Rightly judging that he had little to fear from the enemy in front of him while so large a force was directed against the French right, and knowing that if any attempt were made his Turks and Bersaglieri would keep them at bay until reinforced, he thus detached a large amount of his troops against the flank of the enemy. Before Trotti had time to deploy on the extreme of the hill occupied by the French, the battle there had raged with great fury. Some writers represent Trotti's division as only arriving when the enemy was repulsed, and the guns of the Sardinians as playing upon

the flank of the flying Russians; but French officers of the highest authority, who were present at the action, and Sardinians, who were also engaged, represent the discomfiture of the assault as due in great part to the heavy fire of Trotti's batteries and the guns of position, which were turned upon their exposed flank. This was the circumstance which really prevented the execution of the out-flanking movement, for the troops who sought to effect it, taken in front and flank by cannon and musketry at close range (the mists no longer present to cover their advance), were sacrificed in prodigious numbers, and staggered back to the aqueduct, falling in lines beneath the fire of their triumphant foes. Yet this bleeding, stricken mass rallied upon the aqueduct, and opened a formidable fire of musketry upon the French, taking little or no heed to the Piedmontese upon their flank. The Odessa regiment, which had hitherto remained in support, and in observation of which the Sardinians were obliged to manœuvre with circumspection, now made its way through the shattered but obstinate remnant of the seventeenth division, and ascended the hill in close column, preserving its order under a most galling fire, and moving with the most steady and perfect discipline. This fine body of men directed its way to the extreme right of the French, where a battery had been placed, and behind the battery General Cler, with two battalions, was concealed on a slight declivity. His orders were that not a shot should be fired until the drums beat the charge. The Russians advanced with the greatest audacity, charging the battery with the bayonet; the gunners, having given a terrible salvo, sought shelter. The drums instantly beat the charge; the two battalions sprang forth and fired; a sudden flash from the long line of bayonets gleaming in the morning sun—a cheer—a shock—another cheer, and the proud brave regiment of Odessa fell as the ripe leaves cut by the blast of an autumnal storm. Many perished on the slope, many in the aqueduct and in the space where it joins the Tchernaya. The avenging French pressed on with order but rapidity, and smote with terrible energy, as if a winged sword flashed from Heaven upon the vanquished. Trotti poured in his fusillade along the flank, and the guns from the Sardinian batteries showered death upon the doomed battalions. The colonel and nearly all the officers were among the slain. One-third of that fine body of men were seen clambering up the sides of the Tchoulou, or seeking shelter where any projecting crag afforded them a partial cover. The battle was over—the victory was won; but the punishment to be visited upon the enemy was not even yet exhausted. They had brought over three fieldpieces in the last attempt near the stone

bridge, which were well placed and well served. In the Russian eagerness never to lose a gun, many men were lost in their efforts, which were successful, to carry the pieces away. Their sufferings were very considerable in front of the Sardinians, for as Gortschakoff collected and deployed his beaten battalions upon the heights, the English battery, composed of guns of tremendous power, threw its missiles among them. The loud roar of the English artillery, which smote the ear above all the din of battle, now seemed to break out with redoubled fury, as Captain Mowbray cannonaded the enemy, who formed his lines upon the opposite plateaux, the left resting on the Telegraph Hill—or, as General Marmora designated it, the Tchorgoum Mamelon—and the right resting on the lower slopes of the M'Kenzie.

Considerable discussion has been raised as to the possibility or propriety of a cavalry charge upon the flying enemy, and Mr. Russell says that if a Murat had commanded the cavalry, thousands of the enemy would have been made prisoners and their batteries captured. This, however, is by no means certain. A cavalry pursuit on such ground would probably have been, in some respects, a repetition of the scene at Balaklava when the light cavalry were slaughtered. The Russian batteries on the heights would have mowed down their fellow-soldiers of the retreating infantry, according to their custom, in order to reach the victorious cavalry. Marmora did order forward the Sardinian and English cavalry immediately at his disposal, and prisoners were made and fugitives cut down, but General Pelissier would not support that movement, for the reasons alleged above. Some French officers gave out that Pelissier would have pursued the Russians with the whole cavalry force, had not General Scarlett refused to expose his troopers to so great a risk; but there was no truth in this. The English general was not only ready to act, but he and his horsemen were burning for a charge. Pelissier was actuated by a prudent and just reluctance to sacrifice the gallant soldiers of an allied nation where the issue was so uncertain; and the results did not promise that the prize would compensate for the hazard of the undertaking. Sir Edward Colebrook, who paid a second visit to the Crimea immediately after this battle was fought, kept a journal of what fell under his observation, which was afterwards privately circulated among his friends. Sir Edward favoured the author of this History with a copy, from which the following extract is pertinent to the discussion as to the propriety of a cavalry charge. The whole of Sir Edward's sketch of the scene of conflict is extremely interesting as well as correct, we therefore give it entire:—

"The 22nd (August) we started with Major Tupper for the Tchernaya and scene of the Russian attack; we passed over the field of the light-cavalry charge of last October, and ascended the opposite heights, now occupied by the French. As Tupper was present in the action with the horse-artillery, and had been over the field afterwards, I could not have had a better guide. I was struck by some points of resemblance to the position occupied by the Russians before the Alma, and carried by the British. A river winding sluggishly in front, between steep banks, here and there fordable, but full of holes; the artillery placed on the side of a gently rising hill, forming a natural glacis, sweeping the plain by which the Russians advanced. The French position was, however, much stronger than the Alma. Our troops were able to form under cover of the hill, after crossing the river, though some were unfortunately pushed forward in confusion, which occasioned severe loss. The Russians, on the other hand, were exposed during the whole of their advance. The Tchernaya besides was a more difficult river to pass than the Alma, and, moreover, the French position was defended by a second water-course, viz. the aqueduct, which, though little more than a ditch, was a deep one, with high banks, and they were lined by troops. When we add to this that the Russian artillery were placed on the spur of the opposite hill at long range, and unable to advance as the troops moved forward, their attack on this occasion was rash in the extreme. Some guns were brought down in the plain, a short distance from the river, but they were too few in number and unable to hold their ground.

"This attack may be said to have been a fight for water; the white cliffs opposite are said to be very deficient, and the mass of the Russian troops are kept on the Belbek. Had they carried the heights, they would have occupied a strong position with a river in their rear, and been ready to move offensively at any time, while our large force would have been hemmed into a narrow space and starved for want of water, or, in spreading to obtain it, they would have been open to attack. Some impatience has been expressed at the French success not having been followed up, and it is said that our cavalry were invited to pursue the retreating Russians and declined.*

* "Major-General Sir J. Scarlett has pointed out to me that this is incorrect. What really took place is described in the following passage of Marshal Pelissier's despatch on the occasion.—'For a moment I felt inclined to order a portion of the cavalry to charge, and cut down the remnant of the 17th Russian division between Tchoulou and Traktar Bridge; with this object in view I had prepared some squadrons of Chasseurs d'Afrique, who were joined by some Sardinian squadrons, and by one of General Scarlett's regiments, the 12th Lancers, from India; but the retreat of the Russians was so prompt

I feel bold to say, if the inspection of the ground by an idle amateur is worth anything, that an attempt to follow the enemy with cavalry alone would have been madness. The Russian artillery were well placed for defensive operations though not for attack, and the cavalry, even if it crossed the river (which was not very easy in face of an enemy), would have met with destruction. It would have been, in fact, another Balaklava. If any pursuit was attempted, it should have been by the whole force, but allied movements cannot, from their nature, be as rapid as bystanders would wish; and pursuit to any distance was out of the question, as the position the Russians fell back upon was of immense strength. The Russians besides, though beaten, fell back in good order, and their retreat was covered by both cavalry and guns.

"We followed the course of the Tchernaya to the ford in front of the Sardinian position, and rode to their outposts on the hill occupied by the Russian artillery on the 16th. I had a double object in this—I was able to view the field of battle from the Russian side, and reconnoitre the white cliffs that bar our passage to the north. They look like white walls, stretching for miles to the east without a break, and any attempt to carry them by direct assault would be, I should think, perfectly hopeless.

"This was to me a day of much interest. It wanted the excitement of the sight of actual conflict, but I was spared the horrors of a battle-field when the strife is over. The dead were removed, but the field bore abundant traces of the struggle, remains of accoutrements, cartridges, and Russian bread in great quantities."

If the appearance of the field, as seen by Sir Edward Colebrook six days after the battle, gave evidences of a fearful struggle, what must have been the exhibition of horror presented there when in the bright noon and afternoon of an August day the wounded were collected, and the narrow sphere of the conflict was wholly open to view. The dead lay in heaps on both sides of the river, especially where the most desperate efforts were made, and where the regiment of Odessa was cut to pieces on the French right. The Bridge of Traktar was choked with the dead and wounded; the river flowed reddened with blood—the allies could that we could only have made a small number of prisoners, and this fine cavalry might have been reached by the enemy's batteries still in position. I deemed it preferable not to expose it for so small a result." So far from declining to advance, part of the British cavalry had been put in motion to support the French squadrons when the order to advance was countermanded. As the report in the text was current in camp after the action, and it has received countenance from my journal, which has been already privately circulated, I am glad to have the opportunity of inserting this correction in a note."

not even water their horses in it for several days. The French loss was only 19 subaltern officers killed and 53 wounded; 152 sub-officers and soldiers killed, 146 missing, and 1163 wounded. The Sardinians lost only 250 men. The Russian sacrifice to this sanguinary enterprise it is impossible to estimate with accuracy. The French buried 2129; the Russians buried 1200: making the number certainly slain 3329. There were 1664 wounded Russians carried by the French ambulances from the field, and 400 prisoners were taken uninjured. The wounded borne away by the enemy were very numerous, and many perished during their retreat in the evening, whose bones were left to whiten on the slopes of the M'Kenzie. It is probable that 10,000 were lost to the Russian army altogether, for it was believed that the numbers they buried on the right bank of the Tchernaya were greater than announced in their report; besides, they dug deep graves on the heights, to which, for hours after the battle was over, they were busied in carrying those who, borne to their hospital accommodation in the rear, had proved mortally wounded. It may be easily conceived that the slaughter was immense from such numerous assaults made by compact bodies of men, and continued without intermission for five hours.

An armistice for the burial of the dead took place; but in consequence of the Russians barbarously firing on the French ambulance-parties, who were carrying away the Russian wounded from the field, by which many of those poor wretches were mutilated or killed, Pelissier refused to bury their dead; Gortschakoff, without any apology for the barbarity thus practised by his soldiers and sanctioned by his officers, sent down 2000 unarmed men to aid in the work of burial. They were attended by a Cossack guard to prevent their deserting.

Probably the Russians never fought with a greater contempt of death—not even at Inkerman—which was attributed to the excitement of intoxication infuriating their combativeness, intensifying their fanaticism, and stupifying them to a sense of danger. The regiment of Odessa behaved best where all behaved well. Their skill did not equal their vigilance, alertness, and caution in making the surprise, nor their courage in executing the duty imposed upon them. It became obvious that the Muscovite army was no match for the allies in the field.

As soon as the conflict closed Pelissier published an order of the day, in which he thus proclaimed who the officers were by whom the most efficient services were rendered:—

"Camou and Fauchaux's divisions have nobly upheld their ancient reputation. The gene-

als of brigade, especially De Failly, Cler, and Wimpffen; Colonels Douay, Polkes, Danner, and Castagny, are entitled to the gratitude of the army. I cannot mention here all the emulators of their valour; but I must particularly mention the skilful manner in which Colonel Forgeot directed our energetic cannoniers, and the brilliant conduct of the artillery, both of the Imperial Guard and of the divisions."

Pelissier sent a telegraphic despatch to the French emperor, who received the glorious news while the Queen of England and her royal consort and children were enjoying the festivities of St. Cloud. In the early part of August her majesty was observed in London as looking anxious and dispirited; at times her countenance, when she appeared in public, bore traces of the deepest care; but the latter part of August must have revived her hopes, as she never despaired of her army, nor doubted the justice of her cause. On the day she prorogued parliament, previous to her visit to Paris (as already related), she received the telegraphic despatch of the bombardment of Sweaborg, and soon after, amidst the greetings of the French court and capital and nation, along the electric wire flashed the glorious intelligence of the decisive victory of the Tchernaya. Amidst the solicitous attentions and hospitalities of St. Cloud, the Tuileries, and Versailles, the emperor snatched leisure to congratulate his army, of which he was ever mindful, whether disease and disaster decimated it, or glory illumined its eagles. He thus addressed Pelissier:—

Palace of St. Cloud, August 20.

"GENERAL,—The fresh victory obtained on the Tchernaya proves, for the third time since the commencement of the war, the superiority of the allied armies over the enemy, when in the open country; but if it does honour to the courage of the troops, it does not the less mark the excellent dispositions which you have made. Address my congratulations to the army, and receive them also on your own part. Say to those brave soldiers, who for more than a year have supported unheard-of fatigues, that the term of their trials is not distant. Sebastopol, I hope, will soon fall beneath their blows; and should this event be delayed, the Russian army (I know it from information that appears positive) could not maintain, during the winter, the struggle in the Crimea.

"This glory acquired in the East has greatly moved your companions in arms in France; they burn to share your dangers. Consequently, with the twofold object of responding to their noble desire, and of procuring repose for those who have already done so much, I have given orders to the minister of war for all the regi-

ments remaining in France to proceed, by degrees, to replace in the East those who are to return.

"You know, general, how I have lamented being detained far from that army which has again added to the lustre of our eagles; but now my regrets diminish, since you hold out to me the prospect of the speedy and decisive success which must crown so many heroic efforts.

"With which, general, I pray God to have you in his holy keeping.

"NAPOLEON."

This eulogy was deserved; never did the soldiers of France behave more valiantly. On the spot by the bridge where De Failly's gallant brigade combated, and on the acclivities where Commander Darbois and the men of his battalion withstood a host until support arrived, French valour shone conspicuous; they might well receive the applause of France and the emperor.

Great curiosity was felt all over Europe to learn in what light the Russian commander would place the affair before his imperial master, and in what dress the Russian government would clothe the account of so signal a discomfiture. Curiosity was gratified, a defeat was acknowledged, but the Russian chief claimed a triumph in the same breath. He admitted that his legions were repulsed in an attack, but he at the same time represented it as more a reconnaissance than a battle. He acknowledged the failure of his efforts to disturb the allies from the positions they assumed, but swaggeringly boasted how he had only *withdrawn* his forces to a better position, where for hours he awaited the enemy, who did not dare to come over and attack him! As if even Russians could be imposed upon—blinded by bigotry, fanaticism, ambition, to whatever extent—by the idea that any general would abandon his strong lines, where he had repulsed a powerful enemy, to attack him in all but inaccessible positions, where even victory would be barren of results. The foregoing description of these positions, by Sir Edward Colebrook, will show the reader the folly of any such exploit, and it is to be supposed that all who could read in Russia were by that time well acquainted with the nature of the ground defended by the Russian armies. The following was the authorised Russian report:—"A report was received yesterday from Aide-de-camp General Prince Gortschakoff, dated August 5th (17th), containing the following details, which explain his short telegraphic despatch of the same day. Desirous of turning away the enemy from the siege-works of Sebastopol, and at the same time to ascertain the forces of the allies, Prince Gortschakoff

undertook an offensive movement in the Valley of the Tchernaya with a portion of the troops encamped on McKenzie Heights. On the 4th (16th) of August, at 4 A.M., these troops divided themselves into two columns; the right commanded by Aide-de-camp General Read, took a front direction against the so-called Fedukhine Heights; and the left, commanded by Lieutenant-general Liprandi, advanced on Tchorgoum. In a moment the two columns drove away the enemy from the right bank of the Tchernaya. Lieutenant-general Liprandi occupied the Heights of Tchorgoum. On its side, the right column advanced with extraordinary rapidity towards the river, crossed it under the violent fire of the enemy's batteries, then crossed a large canal or aqueduct, and, carried on by the excitement of battle, advanced directly on the Fedukhine Heights. In the interval the enemy had already had time to bring up considerable forces to the menaced point of their fortified position. The troops of the right column, who were scaling the escarpment, met a desperate resistance there. All the efforts of our brave infantry were fruitless. On this occasion we suffered a disastrous loss. General Read and the chief of his staff, Major-general de Weimern, were the first to fall. The commander-in-chief, however, hurried up in all haste to the right column, and, seeing that our troops were wasting their heroic efforts on that point, ordered a retreat beyond the Tchernaya.* Having retired to about half-cannon range, Prince Gortschakoff ordered his lines of battle to halt, in the hope that the enemy would pursue us and offer us the opportunity of fighting them in the open field. The allies, however, did not stir from their positions; after remaining four hours in view of our adversaries, our troops quietly returned to McKenzie Heights. In announcing, with grief, the losses we have suffered, Prince Gortschakoff at the same time pays a tribute to the unexampled courage displayed by our troops in the sanguinary combat of the 4th (16th) of August, and he attributes the losses to the excess of ardour of the right column. The enemy having driven back our attack, did not dare to take the offensive, despite his numerical superiority."

The army at the disposal of Pelissier was not numerically superior, as this report asserts, nor was it numerically equal to the forces which Prince Gortschakoff had then at command for field operations. The above report was founded on the Muscovite general's despatch, but expresses the view the Russian government desired the people to take, with more perspicuity

* "At this moment Aide-de-camp General Baron Wrewsky, who was at the side of the commander-in-chief, was hit by a cannon-ball. A quarter of an hour previously his horse had been shot under him, but, despite the confusion he had then received, he remained by the side of Prince Gortschakoff."

and brevity than the letter of the prince to the war-minister at St. Petersburg.

The desires of the public in Western Europe, and in Sardinia and Turkey, to peruse the despatches of the allied generals was very great. That of the French general was the most full and important; it was dated the 18th, and was addressed to Marshal Vaillant in the following terms:—

"You will have learnt by my telegraphic despatches of yesterday and of the day before the general results of the battle of the Tchernaya; to-day I send your excellency a detailed report of that battle so glorious for our arms.

"For some days, although the enemy abstained from any apparent movement, certain indications made us suppose he would attack our lines on the Tchernaya. You know those positions, which are excellent, and which are covered to the full extent by the Tchernaya itself, and by a canal, which forms a second obstacle. The Sardinian army occupies the whole of the right, opposite Tchorgoum; the French troops guard the centre and the left, which joins after a declivity our plateaux of Inkerman. Independently of a few fords, which are had enough, there are two bridges across the Tchernaya and the canal: one, a little above Tchorgoum, is under the guns of the Piedmontese; the other, called Traktar Bridge, is below, and almost in the centre of the French positions. Looking straight before one towards the other bank of the Tchernaya, you behold to the right the Heights of Tchoulion, which, after extending themselves in undulating plateaux, fall somewhat abruptly towards the Tchernaya below Tchorgoum, opposite the Piedmontese. These heights diminish opposite our centre; and starting from that point to the rocky sides of the McKenzie plateaux, there is a plain about three or four kilometres in width. It is by that plain the McKenzie Road leads across the Tchernaya at Traktar Bridge, and, after passing through our pontoons leads into the Balaklava plain.

"A strict watch was kept all along our lines—the Turks, who occupy the hilly ground of Balaklava, were on the alert, and watched Alsou; and General d'Allonville, also put on his guard, doubled his vigilance in the high Valley of Baidar. My mind was quite at rest, moreover, as regards the extreme right; it is one of those mountainous regions where it is impossible to manœuvre large bodies of men. The enemy could only make false demonstrations there; in fact, that is what occurred. In the night between the 15th and 16th of August, General d'Allonville notified that he had troops opposite him, but his attitude imposed upon the enemy, who attempted nothing on

that side, and dared not attack him. During this time the main body of the Russian troops, which had descended from the McKenzie Heights with the intention of debouching near Aitodor, advanced, favoured by night, on the Tchernaya; to the right the seventh, fifth, and twelfth divisions crossed the plain; and to the left the seventeenth division, a portion of the sixth and the fourth, followed the plateau of Tchoulion. A strong body of cavalry and 160 pieces of artillery supported the infantry.

"A little before daybreak the advanced posts of the Sardinian army, placed as videttes as far as the Heights of Tchoulion, fell back, and announced that the enemy was advancing in considerable force. Shortly afterwards, in fact, the Russians lined the heights of the right bank of the Tchernaya with heavy guns (*pièces de position*), and opened fire upon us.

"General Herbillon, who commanded the French troops on this point, had made his arrangements for battle to the right of the Traktar Road. Faucheux's division, with the third battery of the 12th artillery in the centre; his own division, with the sixth company of the 13th; to the left, Camou's division, with the fourth battery of the 13th. On his side, General della Marmora had ranged his troops in order of battle. At the same time, General Morris's fine division of *Chasseurs d'Afrique*, speedily joined by General Scarlett's numerous and valiant English cavalry, took up a position behind the hills of Kamara and Traktar. This cavalry was to take the enemy in flank, in case he should succeed in forcing a passage by one of the three outlets of Tchorgoum or Traktar, or at the incline to the left of General Camou.

"Colonel Forgeot, in command of the artillery of the Tchernaya lines, kept six batteries of horse-artillery, two of which belonged to the Imperial Guard, ready to act as a reserve. Six Turkish battalions of Osman Pasha's army, led by Sefer Pasha, came to lend us assistance. Finally, I ordered forward Levaillant's division of the first corps, Dulac's division of the second corps, and the Imperial Guard, comprising reserves capable of remedying the most serious *contretemps*. The thick mist which covered the depths of the Tchernaya, and the smoke of the cannonade, which had just commenced, prevented us distinguishing against which particular point the chief effort of the enemy would be directed, when, on our extreme left, the seventh Russian division came tilt against Camou's division. Received by the 50th of the line, the 3rd Zouaves, who charged them with the bayonet, and by the 82nd, which took them in flank, the enemy's columns were compelled to make a *demi-colte* to recross the canal, and could only escape the fire of our artillery by getting out of range to rally. That division did not appear again during the day.

"In the centre the struggle was longer, and more desperate. The enemy had sent two divisions (the twelfth, supported by the fifth) against Traktar Bridge. Many of their column rushed at once upon the bridge, and the temporary passages they constructed with ladders, pontoons, and madriers. They then crossed the Tchernaya, the trench of our lines, and advanced bravely on our positions; but, assailed by Generals Faucheux and De Failly, these columns were routed, and the men recrossed the bridge occupied by the 95th, and were pursued beyond it by the 2nd Zouaves, the 97th of the line, and by a portion of the nineteenth battalion of *Chasseurs-à-pied*.

"However, while the artillery was roaring on both sides, the Russians re-formed their columns of attack, the mist had cleared, and their movements became distinctly visible. Their fifth division reinforced the twelfth, which had just been engaged; and the seventeenth was preparing to descend the Heights of Tchoulion to support these two first divisions.

"General Herbillon then ordered General Faucheux to be reinforced by Cler's brigade, and gave the 73rd as a reserve to General de Failly. Colonel Forgeot, moreover, placed four batteries of horse-artillery in position, which gave him on this front a total of seven batteries to be brought to bear upon the assailing masses. The result was that the second attempt of the Russians, in spite of its energetic character, proved of no avail against us, and they were compelled to retreat with great loss.

"The seventeenth Russian division, which had come down throwing out large bodies of riflemen as skirmishers, had no better success. Received with great resolution by General Cler's brigade, and by a half-battery of the Imperial Guard, harassed on the left by the troops of Trotti's division, who pressed it closely, that division was compelled to recross the Tchernaya, and to fall back behind the batteries of position which lined the heights from which it had started.

"From this moment, 9 A.M., the defeat of the enemy was inevitable. Their long columns withdrew as fast as they could, under the protection of a considerable body of cavalry and artillery.

"For a moment I felt inclined to order a portion of the cavalry to charge and cut down the remnant of the seventeenth Russian division, between the Tchoulion and Traktar Bridges. With this object in view, I had prepared some squadrons of *Chasseurs d'Afrique*, who were joined by some Sardinian squadrons, and by one of General Scarlett's regiments, the 12th Lancers (from India), but the retreat of the Russians was so prompt, that we could only have made a small number of prisoners, and this fine cavalry might have been reached by some

of the enemy's batteries still in position; I deemed it preferable not to expose it for so small a result. General della Marmora did not, moreover, stand in need of this support boldly to retake the advanced positions which his small posts occupied on the Heights of Tchoulion.

"At three o'clock the whole of the enemy's army had disappeared. The division of the Guard and Dulac's division relieved the divisions engaged, as they stood in need of some rest. I sent back the first corps of Levaillant's division, and the cavalry returned to its usual bivouac. This splendid action does the greatest honour to the infantry, to the horse-artillery of the *Garde*, to that of the reserve, and to the artillery of divisions. I will shortly ask your excellency to place before the emperor the names of those who have deserved rewards, and to submit to the approbation of his majesty those which I may have awarded in his name. Our losses are doubtless to be regretted, but they are not in proportion to the results obtained, and to those we have inflicted upon the enemy. We have eight superior officers wounded, nine subaltern officers killed, and fifty-three wounded; 172 non-commissioned officers and soldiers killed, 146 missing, and 1163 wounded. The Russians have left 400 prisoners in our hands. The number of their killed may be estimated at more than 3000, and of their wounded at more than 5000, of which number 1626 men and thirty-eight officers have been taken to our ambulances. Among the slain found by us are the bodies of two generals, whose names I have not been able to ascertain.

"The Sardinian army, which fought so valiantly at our side, has about 250 men *hors de combat*. It inflicted a much greater loss upon the enemy. One hundred prisoners, and about 150 wounded, remain in its hands. I am sorry to announce to your excellency that General della Marmora has informed me that General Count de Monteccechio, whose character and talents he greatly appreciated, was killed gloriously at the head of his brigade.

"I must point out to your excellency the rapidity with which General Scarlett's cavalry, placed at my disposal by General Simpson, came up. The martial appearance of these magnificent squadrons betrayed an impatience which the happy and prompt result of the battle did not allow me to gratify.

"The English and Sardinian position batteries, and the Turkish battery which Osman Pasha had sent to Alson, fired with great precision and success. I thanked Osman Pasha for the promptitude with which he sent me six Turkish battalions under Sefer Pasha (General Kosejizki), four of which during the day occupied the passage near Tchorgoum.

"Nothing remarkable took place during the

day on the Sebastopol side. General de Sallés and Bosquet were, however, prepared to drive back with energy any attack of the besieged. I send your excellency with this report the copy of a plan for the battle of the 16th, found upon the body of a Russian general, supposed to be General Read, who commanded the enemy's right, and was especially entrusted with the attack on Traktar Bridge."

General Simpson wrote as follows. His despatch was also dated the 18th, and addressed to Lord Panmure:—

"In my despatch of the 14th instant I informed your lordship that I had reason to believe that the Russians would attempt by a vigorous attack to force us to raise the siege. This they endeavoured to do on the morning of the 16th, but the result was most glorious to those of the allied troops who had the good fortune to be engaged.

"The action commenced before daylight, by a heavy column of Russians, under the command of General Liprandi, and composed of the sixth and seventeenth divisions, with the fourth and seventh divisions in reserve, attacking the advanced posts of the Sardinians.

"The ground occupied by them is on commanding hills on the right of the position, on the left bank of the Souhaia River, where it forms its junction with the Tchernaya, with two advanced posts on the opposite side. These were held with very determined gallantry for a considerable time, but being separated from their supports by the river, and not having the protection of artillery, they were compelled to leave the most advanced one.

"About the same time the fifth and twelfth divisions, to which was added a portion of the seventeenth, advanced against the Bridge of Traktar, held by one battalion of French infantry of the line, who were for a short time obliged to yield and fall back upon the main supports; with these, however, they quickly retook the bridge at the point of the bayonet.

"Again the Russians attacked with persevering courage, and were enabled to follow up their advantage by gaining the heights which rise precipitously on each side of the road; their success was but momentary—they were driven back across the river, leaving the ground covered with dead and wounded.

"The Russian general, in no way daunted by the failure of his two attempts, ordered a second column, of equal force to the first, to attack; they advanced with such impetuosity, covered by the fire of their numerous artillery, that a third time the bridge was carried, and the heights above it crowned; but they were again repulsed, and retired in great confusion into the plain, followed by the bayonets of our gallant allies.

"The general officer who commanded the Russian column, and who is supposed to be General Read, was killed, and in his possession was found the orders for the battle, signed by Prince Gortschakoff, who commanded in person. From these it would appear that it was a most determined attempt to force us to raise the siege. Had they succeeded, Balaklava was to have been attacked by one portion of their army, whilst the heights on which we now are, were to have been stormed with the other; at the same time a vigorous sortie was to have been made from the town on the French works on our extreme left, from the Quarantine, and another on the works on our extreme right on Mount Sapouné.

"The action which I have endeavoured to describe is most glorious to the arms of the French and Sardinian troops. To meet the force of the Russians the former had but 12,000 infantry, and four batteries of artillery engaged; the latter had 10,000 men in position, 4500 actually engaged, and twenty-four pieces of cannon.

"The Russian force consisted of from 50,000 to 60,000 men, with 160 pieces of artillery, and cavalry to the amount of 6000. This disparity of numbers will readily explain to your lordship the difficulty that would have been experienced, had an attempt been made to follow up the advantage by a pursuit. The Russian retreat, moreover, was protected by the fire from the heavy guns in position on the McKenzie Heights.

"The loss sustained by the Russians is estimated at between 5000 and 6000 men, including 600 prisoners, whilst on the part of the allies it does not amount to more than 1000 men.

"This brilliant affair has caused the greatest delight amongst the ranks of the allied army; and whilst it adds fresh lustre to the gallant achievements of the French arms, it is with the utmost pleasure that I have to record the intrepid conduct and gallant bearing of the Sardinian troops, under General della Marmora, who have for the first time met, conquered, and shed their blood against our common enemy, who is now disturbing the peace of Europe.

"Captain Mowbray's battery of 32-pounder howitzers was placed in advance with the Sardinian troops, and did most excellent service in preventing the advance of the enemy's artillery. Our cavalry, under Lieutenant-general Sir J. Scarlett, K.C.B., was placed in the plain of Balaklava, prepared to take advantage of any circumstance that might present itself; but the opportunity did not arise for calling upon their services.

"I regret that I am unable to give a more detailed account of the part performed by the

Sardinians, as up to this time I have not received General della Marmora's report."

General Simpson again sent home a despatch on the 21st:—

"In my despatch of the 18th instant, I was unable to give as detailed an account of the part taken by the Sardinian troops in the battle of the Tchernaya, as I could have wished. I have since received General Marmora's report, of which I have now the honour to send you a copy.

"The killed and wounded of the Russian army exceed, if anything, the number I originally stated. An armistice was granted, to enable the enemy to bury the dead, and vast quantities were carried away. The fire from the batteries of the allies has been very effective, and the result attained has been sufficient to enable the works against the place to progress satisfactorily.

"I beg to inclose the list of casualties to the 19th instant. Major McGowan, 93rd Highlanders, who was reported to me as missing, in my despatch of the 11th of August, I have since ascertained was attacked whilst posting his sentries in advance of the trenches, wounded severely, and made prisoner."

The inclosed report of the Sardinian general was dated from Kadikoi on the 17th:—

"The interest which you are so kind as to evince in everything relating to the Sardinian expeditionary army makes it imperative upon me to inform your excellency of the share taken by the troops under my command in the engagement on the Tchernaya yesterday.

"Upon receiving the report of Colonel Des-saint, attached to the French head-quarters, which you were good enough to communicate to me on the evening of the day before yesterday, and by which we were led to expect very shortly an attack on the line of the Tchernaya, I at once gave orders that my troops should be under arms yesterday morning at an earlier hour than usual.

"At break of day our outposts stationed on the mamelon, which commands Tehorgoum, were enveloped in a well-sustained fire of artillery, which proceeded from three batteries posted opposite to the breastworks by which our outposts were covered, and on the two mamelons further to the right, which form the two banks of the Tchouliou. They were at the same time vigorously charged by three Russian columns, which came on with fixed bayonets, and attacked our breastworks in front and rear, the men composing these columns carried ladders with them to scale the parapets. The preconcerted signal of alarm was immediately given, and the troops took up the posi-

tions which had been assigned to them in anticipation of this attack.

"I begged his excellency Osman Pasha to bring up the Turkish troops which were stationed furthest off; and I ordered the fourth battalion of riflemen (Bersaglieri) to the support of our outposts, which only consisted of three companies, in order that these latter might be enabled to hold their ground as long as possible, and thus give us time to complete our arrangements.

"Attacked in the rear by the enemy's artillery, and charged by three columns of infantry, the outposts, after an hour's firing, fell back, the reinforcements I had sent to them greatly facilitating their retreat. At the same time I made every effort to silence the enemy's guns. In this endeavour I was assisted by the Turkish fieldpieces from Alson, and by the English battery, with which you were good enough to reinforce us. Several of the enemy's ammunition waggons exploded between seven and eight o'clock.

"In the meantime the Russians had stationed fresh batteries near the centre of their position, and had opened a most effective fire of artillery on the *tête de pont* at Traktar, and on the French positions on our left. A column of infantry, under cover of this fire, attacked the Mamelon, which formed the extreme right of General Herbillon's division. The first column had crossed the Tchernaya, and surmounted the steep ascent of the mamelon, in spite of the fire of the *tirailleurs*, when it was vigorously attacked by the French troops in support, and hurled back, broken and disordered, into the Tchernaya.

"As I considered, from the subsequent dispositions of the enemy's forces, that he only intended to make a demonstration of artillery before our position, while he concentrated his infantry chiefly on the extreme right of the third division (Faucheux), on which point a second column was now advancing, I ordered a portion of my fifth brigade, under the command of General Mallard, to march to the support of the right wing of the French, and I posted two of our batteries in a position from whence they could obtain an oblique fire upon the Russians. At the same time I requested the English cavalry to move down into the plain to be in readiness to charge. I had given similar orders to my own cavalry.

"When the soldiers of my fifth brigade arrived at the Mamelon they found that the enemy's attack had been already repulsed; but the fire of the two batteries of the second division (Trotti) appeared to do great execution on the second Russian column, which, checked in front by the French troops, and harassed in the rear by the fire of our batteries and the musketry of our battalions, fell back in the

greatest disorder. I then ordered some of our battalions to advance under cover of the riflemen (Bersaglieri), but I was requested to countermand this movement.

"The enemy, repulsed at all points, commenced his retreat. One column, which appeared to me to consist of a division, retreated by the Valley of the Tchoulion. Another division, the one which had attacked our outposts and the French right in the morning, fell back upon the zigzag mamelon; while a third division followed the road which leads to M'Kenzie's Farm. I took advantage of this state of things to re-occupy with my troops the zigzag mamelon, in which design I succeeded perfectly, in spite of the imposing force which the enemy still retained on that point. In the meantime, three battalions of Turkish troops advanced into the Valley of Tchorgoum, to replace the battalion of Cialdini's brigade, which was occupying the Heights of Karlooka. Later in the day I crossed the Tchernaya with four squadrons, and marching in a parallel line with the zigzag mamelon, came upon the old Russian redoubt, whence I could easily discern, at a little distance before us, a very fine array of regular cavalry, supported by horse-artillery. It was distributed in twelve separate bodies, and must have been composed of at least fifty squadrons. This cavalry did not fall back on M'Kenzie's Road till the whole of the infantry and artillery had effected their retreat.

"The losses sustained by our troops, a portion only of whom was engaged, were very inconsiderable. They amount to about 200 men placed *hors de combat*; and I impute the fact of our not having lost more men mainly to the works with which we fortified our position, and to the batteries of heavy guns which you were so obliging as to lend us for their defence. It is, however, my painful duty to announce to your excellency that Count Montecchello, the general commanding the fourth brigade, is mortally wounded; a ball passed through his chest."

Two days after the battle Admiral Bruat addressed a despatch to the French minister of marine, which places in a very interesting light the progress, character, and results of the battle. This despatch also gives other information:—

"I went yesterday morning to head-quarters, whence the general-in-chief conducted me to the field of battle of the Tchernaya. The exact number of the loss of the enemy could not be ascertained, but by the time we had returned to head-quarters it had been found that 1700 wounded Russians had been taken up, and that 400 prisoners have fallen into our power. In order to clear our ambulances, the general-in-chief requested me to

send to the Bosphorus all the wounded Russians whose condition would allow of their being carried to Kamiesch. In addition to the *Montezuma*, which carries 250 of our own sick, I dispatched to-day to Constantinople the *Wagram* and the *Charlemagne*, of the line, and the steam-frigate *Labrador*, which will together receive on board 1200 wounded, 400 prisoners, and 600 *gendarmes* of the guard. On their return from the Bosphorus, these vessels will bring to Kamiesch the brigade of General Sol, comprising about 3200 men. I can now make known to your excellency the general impression which the victory of the Tchernaya appears to me to have produced in our army. No engagement had ever before proved in so striking a manner the superiority and moral ascendancy of our troops over those of the enemy. The arrangements made by the Russian army indicate a well-concerted and well-studied plan. No error similar to that of General Soimonoff at the battle of Inkerman was committed on this day. The Russian divisions attacked our positions at the prescribed hour, and with a perfect knowledge of the ground; they took possession of the Bridge of Traktar, and forced the Sardinian advanced posts to fall back. When the brigade of General de Failly assumed the offensive, 1500 or 2000 Frenchmen drove back 8000 Russians beyond the Tchernaya, and in an hour after 45,000 Russians retreated before 10,000 or 12,000 of the allied troops. The affair of the 16th was much less a battle than an immense sortie, repulsed with incredible vigour. The enemy had not advanced out of reach of his heavy batteries, and he retired under the protection of the works which crown the plateau of McKenzie, as soon as he perceived that our troops were not intimidated by the considerable masses which he had deployed on the plain. He had, perhaps, hoped to draw us under the fire of his heavy batteries, and to get our troops among the heights, whence his artillery could have played upon us with destructive effect. The general-in-chief did not allow himself to be led into this imprudent pursuit. By bringing forward his cavalry, he might have made a few prisoners, but our squadrons must have passed over the Bridge of Traktar, which was within reach of the enemy's guns, and they must have entered the plain under a cross-fire from artillery and musketry, and having behind them a fordable river, the banks of which are very steep. Thanks to the intelligence of the general-in-chief, our success remains intact and complete; the enemy has returned within his lines, and the army of relief having been paralysed, the siege may be carried on with security. The difficulties which it presents are doubtless but little lessened by our victory; it is still a work of perseverance

and of method, but the issue of it can no longer be doubtful. Russia will not have to congratulate herself on the prolonged resistance of Sebastopol. Her finances and her armies are almost entirely exhausted in supporting, at the extremity of the empire, a struggle all the conditions of which are to our advantage. If Sebastopol had fallen after the battle of the Alma, it would only have been a surprise; Russia would have lost a fleet and a naval arsenal, but the prestige of her power would not have been seriously weakened. Now, on the contrary, her strength has been worn out in long and useless efforts: her old soldiers have disappeared; she now brings forward on the field of battle more young recruits than tried battalions, and the wounded and prisoners who fall into our power appear worn out by fatigue and insufficient nourishment. The Russian government, deprived of the resources of the Sea of Azoff, can no longer replenish its storehouses; its soldiers only receive for their rations bread, salt, and water; brandy is only distributed on days of battle, and scarcely ever meat. When the rains of autumn overflow the roads, I know not how the enemy will be able to procure food for his numerous army. Its situation appears to me most critical; and I see in the attack of the 16th, so weakly followed up, a greater symptom of discouragement than of daring. The perspectives of the future call for a vigorous effort on the part of the Russians; with us, on the contrary, it counsels prudence. The general-in-chief yesterday morning opened a fire from our siege batteries. If we succeed in silencing the fire of the enemy, our advances will be pushed on with great activity; if it be found necessary to await the arrival of mortars to obtain that result, the delay, the consequences of which had been a cause of apprehension, will be now attended with less inconvenience than ever. We know by the avowals of the Russian generals themselves, what losses they incur by our fire; these losses cannot but increase, and the means of the enemy for repairing them will every day diminish. In the meantime our army receives constant reinforcements, and lives in abundance. In spite of the daily fatigues to which it is subjected, its heroism supports it; and the facility with which the new loan has been subscribed for proves that France will not abandon it. The victory of the Tchernaya appears to me, therefore, calculated to tranquillise the least confident minds. It is a grand affair, the first effect of which will be to restore confidence to all those who had been somewhat shaken by the check of the 18th of June.

"I have received the most satisfactory accounts from the Sea of Azoff. The allied flotillas continue to scour the coast, and spread

terror and alarm in every direction. The *Descartes* left yesterday for the Strait of Kertch, having on board a reinforcement of 400 marines: the English also send 800. The general-in-chief, at my request, has ordered Colonel Osmond to concert measures with Commander Bouet, of the *Pomone*, for occupying Taman

and Fanagoria long enough to completely destroy the buildings which the Russians have preserved in these two establishments. The materials will be made use of for building barracks on Cape St. Paul. With timely precautions the garrisons of the Strait of Kertch will pass the winter there without suffering."

CHAPTER XCVII.

SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL FROM THE BATTLE OF THE TCHERNAYA TO THE EVE OF THE FINAL ASSAULT.

"To possess all the various qualifications requisite for command is not very common, even among those who are good officers in an inferior rank; hence, unless there is a wide field for selection, the chances must be much against its being possible that a satisfactory choice should always be made. . . . In order to insure such selection not being made lightly, or from favouritism or political motives, we would suggest that such promotions should be given in such form as your majesty may be pleased to determine; the recommendation in which the services of the officer shall be detailed being made public, with a view to insure the responsibility which ought to attach to appointments thus made out of the regular course of army promotion."—*Report of Commission on Promotion in the Army, 1851.*

THE truth of the motto selected for this chapter was exemplified before Sebastopol at the period of which we now write. General Simpson, a safe, careful, industrious, and zealous officer, did not possess the requisites for high command any more than his predecessor. He had certainly more experience as to the superintendence of large bodies of troops, for in this respect Lord Raglan had none whatever; but he was equally deficient in energy, personal activity, enterprise, and comprehensiveness of conception. He did not possess genius. The French general was a good engineer officer, but was said to manage infantry but indifferently, and to be very incompetent in the use of cavalry. He also lacked personal activity, being exceedingly corpulent, and far advanced in years. He was accustomed to drive about the camp in an open carriage, attended by the useless pomp of a large escort of hussars. Canrobert, although fond of display, dispensed with this useless trouble to the soldiers, and was daily seen on horseback—often alone, or attended by a single aide-de-camp or orderly—visiting every post, and inspecting everything. *For a siege*, Simpson was no better than Raglan, but Pelissier was a decided improvement upon Canrobert: he was more intellectual, enterprising, and resolute.

During the latter part of the month of August promotions were made by the British government in the manner condemned by the motto of this chapter. That we may not appear querulous or actuated by hostility to the government of the day, we give a specimen from the pen of Mr. Russell, of the grievances to which both army and navy were subjected from this cause:—"The vacancy occasioned by the death of Commander Hammet, of the *Albion*, is filled up, I understand, by the promotion of Lieutenant Pasley, of the *Royal Al-*

bert, who is thus put over the heads of at least five or six lieutenants of the Naval Brigade—lieutenants of ten years' standing, or even more, and who have now passed eight months in the trenches, and been in four bombardments. This needs no comment from me; but it may be thought to require explanation from those who ordain and sanction a system of preference, which, to persons uninitiated in the mysteries of naval promotion, must seem unjust. In one point of view, it is an invidious task to draw public attention to such cases as this; but it should always be understood that no slur is intended to be cast on the person preferred. Lieutenant Pasley may be a most meritorious officer, but one naturally feels curious to become acquainted with the services that entitle him to walk over his seniors, who for two-thirds of a year have been engaged in actual and severe warfare, have been decimated by Russian shot, and have taken their full share of hardships probably unparalleled in the history of war since the campaign of 1812."

The evils of a divided command had been much felt at the battle of the Tchernaya, and continued to be felt afterwards while the allies were in expectation that the attack would be renewed. Osman Pasha, the Turkish general, could not be prevailed upon to take part in any general combination, pleading the directions of Omar Pasha to hold fast by his positions. Omar was angry with his own *status* in the allied counsels and operations, and seemed more disposed to embarrass than aid the conduct of the war. General Herbillon, as senior general of division, had commanded at the late engagement until Pelissier arrived, but the whole line, from Baidar to Inkerman, was afterwards placed under the command of the chief of the Imperial Guard, Régnaud de St. Jean d'Angély, as *général d'un corps d'armée*.

This measure did not seem to please Osman Pasha, who maintained his separate authority; and it placed Marmora also in difficult relations, as his chief was General Simpson, the Sardinian corps being attached to the English army.

The Russians continued to throw forward parties in reconnaissance, and the Cossacks made a prompt incursion upon the lower part of the Baidar Valley on the withdrawal of the French cavalry, and carried away stores of hay and other forage, with huts, utensils, arms, accoutrements, &c., which it is hardly likely that d'Allouville had intended to abandon.

On the 23rd large bodies of Russians were seen in observation of Marmora's corps, and an attack was expected there on the morning of the 24th. For this the gallant Piedmontese made ready with their accustomed coolness, but the enemy did not venture upon the hopeless task of dislodging them from their positions.

The general statements of deserters were to the effect that an attack all along the line, from Baidar to Inkerman, and along the trenches, from Inkerman to the Quarantine, might be daily expected. The French Imperial Guards were consequently placed in position upon the Fedukhine Hills, and other French troops were moved down as supports.

Notwithstanding the large reinforcements received by Gortschakoff prior to the battle of the Tchernaya, troops continued to arrive at his camp for a week after in small detachments; and a "Tatar" spy brought word on the 24th that two divisions of grenadiers were expected soon. This news put the allied generals again on the alert, and dispositions were made to repel an attack in greater force than that made on the 16th.

Three redoubts were erected for the protection of the Traktar Bridge, which the French called *Raglan Redoubt*, in honour of the deceased British chief; *Bizot Redoubt*, in honour of their own general of engineers, who had been slain; and the *Redoubt de la Boussinière*, in honour of the artillery colonel of that name, who fell upon the 18th of June.

There were various other works erected by both French and Sardinians, which made the allied positions like a great intrenched camp. The Turks, upon whose flank the enemy might descend from Baidar, did nothing to strengthen their posts, nor could their neighbours, the Sardinians, induce them to cut a sod, or raise a shovelful of earth. The policy of Osman seemed to be, doubtless under the directions of Omar, to do nothing, except fight when attacked, which no doubt the gallant Ottomans would have done.

The French cavalry returned to their old post, and were accompanied by some battalions of infantry, who reconnoitred the Baidar Valley,

and climbed the mountains, continuing their course to the Upper Belbek. They suffered in their reconnaissances from want of water. The French dragoons also made reconnaissances along the road to Yalta, as if some appearance of the enemy in that direction was expected.

Two companies of the 89th English regiment of the line were stationed in the Valley of Vanutka, which is separated by a ridge from the Baidar Valley. It was suspected that the Russians were in this neighbourhood in some strength, but the troops in the valley were not molested. Some French artillery joined them, and these were followed by other French troops, and all were engaged in making gabions for the siege, abundant material for such a purpose being there easily found.

The following despatch of General Simpson, dated the 25th of August, will show his view of the proceedings of the Russians in the field:—

"Having been engaged since daylight in a careful observation of the position in front of Balaklava, I am unable to address your lordship at any length to-day. The enemy have been concentrating troops at the McKenzie, Tasova, and Carales, their left extending as far as the village of Makoul, and are supposed to have received considerable reinforcements, which probably consists of two divisions of grenadiers, which have been conveyed in carts from Bagtché Serai and Simpheropol. The bridge across the great harbour is nearly completed, and large bodies of men are employed in erecting earthworks on the north side of the harbour. Intrenchments have been thrown up on the Severnaya Hill, extending from the sea-coast to the site of the first lighthouse, facing the north. From various sources we learn that the Russians on the right bank of the Tchernaya are held in perfect readiness for an offensive movement. Our siege operations progress steadily, with, I regret to say, heavy casualties on our side, as your lordship will see by the accompanying lists."

The demonstrations observed by the British chief continued to be made, and so menacing did they become, that he thought it necessary to reinforce the lines upon the Tchernaya, and ordered Sir Colin Campbell, with the Highland division, to take ground upon the extreme right, near Kamara. Fifty guns were also ordered by General Simpson to the support of the allied force.

Co-operating with these preparations, Mr. Beatty, of the railway corps—if we may so designate Sir Moreton Peto's *brigade*—was directed to superintend the formation of two rails: one from the *Col de Balaklava* to Kamiesch, which would facilitate communications between the French and English depots; and the other from

Kadikoi, joining the old line (as it may now be called), to Tchorgoun, or rather to that part of the Sardinian position which faced the village. The railway people who survived the toils and sickness incidental to their task and to the climate had gone home, but French and Sardinian soldiers undertook the work; and Mr. Beatty was assisted in his superintendence by Mr. Campbell and a few others of the railway officials who remained. The original line of railway was so broken up by the rough uses to which it had been subjected that it required almost to be renewed. Mr. Beatty undertook to place it in a working condition to last the winter, should the troops be compelled to remain, and this was now generally foreseen.

Reform became the order of the day at Balaklava; and, under the administration of Admiral Freemantle, harbour-regulations were enforced, which were conducive to the public advantage.

The British cavalry were occupied much during the latter part of August in taking up various positions behind the right centre, the right, and the extreme right of the allied lines; and their splendid appearance was the theme of commendation amongst French, Sardinians, and Turks.

Brigadier Cameron's Highland Brigade was moved closer to the rear of the Piedmontese, where they took up a position with a detachment of the Bersaglieri.

September opened upon the Tchernaya as August ended—in suspense to the allied armies, but in vigilant expectation of a renewed battle. The Russian army on the McKenzie Heights began, however, to diminish gradually; deserters alleged that they were withdrawing from the Belbek, that the cavalry had suffered many losses of animals from want of forage, and that, therefore, a large division had been sent away to Bagtché Serai. Still the Russian engineers, sappers, and artillery were busy in strengthening their positions, and a battery was erected on the projecting spur opposite to the "Fedukhine Mountains," which commanded a good path to the Tchernaya.

On the 2nd large masses of the enemy were observed concentrating on Upa, Ozenbach, and Tchoulion; and Prince Gortschakoff in person made a close reconnaissance of the allied positions. So near to the period of the final assault as the 4th of September, General Simpson was in expectation of an attack in that quarter.

In the description of the battle of the Tchernaya, an interesting quotation was made from a journal privately circulated among the friends of Sir Edward Colebrook, with which the baronet politely favoured us. The following relation of visits made by him to the allied lines above the river shortly before the capture

of Southern Sebastopol, will assist the reader in forming a better idea of the scene then presented by the allied forces, and of the strength of their positions:—"The reports of an intended attack by the Russians were so rife in camp, that we started again this morning with the early dawn, and had a delicious ride to Kamara, which I had not visited since the beginning of October last year. How changed the scene! The ground now alive with French, Sardinians, Turks, and English, was then the neutral ground of the two armies, and a scene of complete solitude. The eye then ranged from the white cliffs that marked the Russian position, to the green slopes along the range of the south coast, without discerning a sign of life. The valleys below me are now not merely full of human beings, but large herds of cattle cover the plain. Visited the Highlanders, who marched here yesterday, and again to-day, to strengthen this part of the line. This is a measure of precaution that one cannot reprove; but the difficulty of moving any large force against our right flank is evidently so great, that I scarcely think it was needed. The heights beyond Kamara command a fine view of the country eastward of the wall of white cliffs which bar our passage to the north. It is composed of hill and dale, with narrow valleys, evidently passable; but a large force with artillery would experience great difficulties, and a small one would be crushed. The lower one (the Aitodor) is the quarter from which it is said the attack is to come; but I scarcely think the enemy could bring against us from this quarter a sufficient force to make the attack the principal one; and it would, moreover, be so far separated from the main body as to render combination very difficult. The Highlanders are encamped in a delightful situation, on the slope of the hill, as if the object was to show themselves to the enemy. They are not a little pleased to be out of the trenches, and are preparing for a stay of a few days. This favour to a division which was encamped at Balaklava the whole of the most trying season, and has scarcely had six weeks of trench work, is a subject of much, and, I think, just admiration."

The following observations as to the difficulty of relying upon the information obtained on the spot, amidst the events passing, confirms the opinion frequently expressed in the course of this History, that it is only by a comparison of the accounts of a number of eye-witnesses, carefully collated, and the whole submitted to the judgment of competent military authorities, that accuracy could be maintained. It has been by this method that the relations of facts in our pages have been preserved from material error. Sir Edward made in his journal of the

28th of August this entry:—"I rode with Gaspar Tupper and Twopeny to the Baidar Valley, ascending the Marine Heights, and crossing the ridge to Vanutka Valley, and thence followed the Woronzoff Road. We were anxious to make the excursion as soon as we could, and while the French troops were in occupation of Baidar; and it may serve to show the difficulty of procuring information of what is passing in other parts of the same army, if I mention the different reports that reached us of the state of things we should find there. 'Our own Correspondent' told me on the preceding day, upon the authority of one of General Jones's staff, that the Russians were in occupation of the Phoros Pass, and the French had fallen back. I repeated the story in the cavalry camp, and it was instantly contradicted by an officer present, who said some officers of the quartermaster-general's department had reconnoitred in that direction, supported by a French escort, and there was no truth in it. The next morning, as we started, an officer we fell in with repeated the original story, on the authority of some friends whom he named, who had been at Baidar the previous day; but a few miles further on, Sir Colin Campbell, whom we fell in with, treated the whole thing with ridicule, and turned the balance the other way; and so it remained for the rest of the day. Our ride onwards was very refreshing. Well-grown trees, and hills covered with wood, were grateful to eyes dazzled by the glow of the plain and blinded with dust. Vanutka somewhat resembles in its form and breadth a west of England valley, but with an appearance of wildness and nature, as if unfrequented. We did not descend into the Baidar Valley; the view from the pass by which it is entered from the west was to me disappointing; the surrounding mountains are wanting in grandeur, and are only partially clothed with wood. It is a fine broad, rich valley, but scarcely deserving its reputation, if I may be allowed to judge of it from one point of view. As the heat was oppressive, I returned home by the Woronzoff Road and the Sardinian positions. The mountains on my right were evidently impenetrable, except at rare intervals, and then only by wild pathways. I was set quite at my ease as to the probability of any attack on this side. The occupation of the Baidar adds nothing to our security. Next morning, Tuesday, rode up to Kamara, and breakfasted with Sir Colin. The country lay like a map before us, and Sir Colin pointed out what he considered the position of the enemy, and the points from which they might probably attack us. It seems the Russians are not dependent on the McKenzie Road alone for their advance, as they have formed another towards Aitodor, descending

the white cliffs, and passable for artillery; they, besides, have another road through the country further eastward. They can thus choose their point of attack, and advance without being observed. This is their only advantage, for our position is so strong that with good troops it would be impregnable. Of this I had good means of judging, as I took a ride with Captain Mansfield, Sir Colin's aide-de-camp, after breakfast, and went to the hill occupied by the Sardinians, and a conical hill further to the right, forming an advanced post of the Turks. The former is a most commanding position; artillery placed here sweep the opposite hills and valleys, and an enemy advancing by the latter could not deploy. But the great advantage of our present line is, that the Russians could not plant their guns effectively. Sir Colin told me that if the attack of the 18th had succeeded, we should have made a push for the Aitodor. This part of the Russian position has, however, been subsequently strengthened by heavy ship-guns; but in the event of the siege operations being successful, I have little doubt we shall make some attempt to force the position either at that point or further westward."

In the foregoing pages of this chapter, the narrative has been confined to the circumstances of the opposing armies in the field, where proceedings assumed an increased importance after the battle of the Tchernaya. Attention will now be directed to the progress made in the works before Sebastopol, and within the city.

Immediately after their disaster at Traktar and Tchorgoum, the Russians laid a bridge of boats across the harbour between the north and south sides, showing that their confidence in the defence of Southern Sebastopol was gone. Over this bridge vast convoys of *matériel* of war and stores were seen daily proceeding from the south to the north side of the harbour; subsequently a bridge of less capacity was thrown across further up, and deserters who swam to the French ships of war declared that the powder had to a great extent been removed from the sea defences, and that the enemy had anticipated defeat at Southern Sebastopol by every timely measure possible to the occasion. Several deserters perished in similar attempts to reach the ships by swimming, although aided by various supports carefully provided.

On the day that the battle of the Tchernaya was fought, the allies opened a heavy fire along their intrenchments, which the enemy fiercely returned. Nothing worthy of detail occurred before Sebastopol during the first week after that battle. There were frequent alarms, and there was much cannonading. On the night of the 20th-21st, the French on

their extreme left bombarded with great energy; the enemy responded with promptitude, and sustained the response with animation. The 56th British regiment of the line landed at Balaklava, and was attached to the first division. There was much discontent among the old soldiers at the circumstance of "raw lads" being almost the only description of recruits which "arrived out." Many of these poor boys sickened and died almost immediately. The officers complained of a similar evil amongst themselves: nearly all the ensigns who joined regiments in the Crimea were mere striplings, ignorant of their profession in every way, and utterly unfit for service. They were of little use to the older officers, and often an incumbrance; like the recruits they were soon invalided, and might almost as well have been detained at Scutari *en route* as sent to the Crimea. Among the lieutenants was a large proportion of very young and inexperienced men, and many of them imperfectly drilled. Young lieutenants were even in command of companies. The disadvantage of such a state of things, both among the officers and in the ranks, was afterwards proved at the grand assault on the 8th of September.

The French perseveringly worked on their sap towards the Malakoff; but the rocky nature of the ground in front of the Great Redan, and the commanding position of that work, rendered it impossible for the English to carry forward their sap but by very slow degrees. Meanwhile, the loss of men on the part of the allies became very great; the French lost more than the English, but the English more in proportion to their numbers. The rifle-fire maintained every night by the British, to prevent the enemy repairing the damage done to his parapets and embrasures through the day, was constant and skilful. The fire directed upon the British trenches in consequence was very severe. The losses experienced from night to night may be judged of by the fact that, from the 20th to the 23rd, including both dates, the British had 2 sergeants and 24 rank and file killed, and 8 officers, 8 sergeants, and 168 rank and file wounded—above 200 men in three days. The losses from the 24th to the 26th August were—24 rank and file killed; 9 officers, 6 sergeants, and 137 rank and file killed, wounded, and missing. On the 24th, Major Warden, 97th, and Lieutenant Bigge, 23rd, were slightly, and Captain J. F. Browne, R.E., was severely wounded. On the 25th, Captain R. Drummond was dangerously wounded, and Lieutenant-colonel Seymour, Scots Fusileer Guards, was severely hit on the head by a piece of shell; Lieutenant Laurie, 34th, was slightly wounded the same day; and on the 26th, Lieutenant Rous, of the

90th, and Captain Arbuthnot, R.A., were wounded severely. From the 27th to the 30th August, 1 officer, 1 sergeant, and 20 rank and file were killed; 6 officers, 4 sergeants, and 152 rank and file were wounded. On the 28th, Captain Forbes, Grenadier Guards, was very slightly wounded. On the 29th, Captain Farquharson, Scotch Fusileer Guards, and Major Graham, 41st regiment, were severely wounded; and on the 30th, Captain Wolsey, of the 90th, acting as engineer, and Lieutenants Ware and Brinkley, 97th, were severely wounded.

On the 25th, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe arrived in the Crimea from Constantinople for the purpose of investing with the Order of the Bath such officers as her majesty was pleased to confer that honour upon. The ceremony did not take place until the 27th, in the front of General Simpson's quarters. A canopy decorated with the allied flags was erected there, the standard of England surmounting them. A guard of honour consisting of men from every arm of the service attended the ambassador. General Pelissier and his staff were in attendance. An observer, a member of the English medical staff, more particular than polite, described the general as "a thick, puffy, dark little man," and General Simpson as "a tall, lank, grey-headed, sedate-looking person."

The honour was conferred on Rear-admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, Rear-admiral Sir Houston Stewart, Lieutenant-general Sir Colin Campbell, Lieutenant-general Sir H. Bentinck, Lieutenant-general Sir W. Codrington, Lieutenant-general the Hon. Sir James Yorke Scarlett, Major-general Sir Richard Airey, Major-general Sir Harry Jones, and Major-general Sir William Eyre.

On the conclusion of the imposing scene, the bands struck up "God save the Queen," and the artillery fired a royal salute. The troops then filed off and retired. Lord Stratford remained for several days, conferring with General Simpson, Admiral Lyons, and the medical staff, on various matters important to the service. The next day General Simpson sent the following despatch to the minister of war:

"Since the attempt of the enemy to force the passage of the Tchernaya, on the 16th instant, no movement of aggression has taken place; but all the accounts I have received tend to show a disposition on their part to renew the attack. I have considered it necessary to send the Highland division, composed of the 42nd, 71st, 79th, and 93rd regiments, under the command of Lieutenant-general Sir Colin Campbell, to reinforce our extreme right, and they are now encamped on the slopes of the heights overhanging the village of Kamara. I have likewise placed fifty guns and the cavalry in reserve, to act on the first appear-

ance of the enemy. The 56th regiment has arrived, and I have attached it to the first division. The siege operations are progressing favourably; but, owing to the brightness of the nights, a large amount of work cannot be executed. The raft bridge, from the north side to the south shore, has been completed, and is actually in use by the enemy; and a considerable increase of troops, with a good deal of movement, is observable in the town. The installation of the Knights of the Bath took place yesterday at my head-quarters, and was conducted with great dignity and solemnity by Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe. The effect was most imposing, attended as the ceremony was by the naval and military commanders-in-chief of the allied forces; and after the delivery by her majesty's ambassador of a peculiarly eloquent discourse upon the character and history of the most honourable Order, the several knights were respectively invested with the insignia of their class. I transmit the weekly report of the principal medical officer, which shows a decided improvement in the health of the army, and the list of casualties to the 26th instant."

As evidence of the corruption pervading every state department, each of these gallant officers had to pay £164 13s. 4d. for the honour thus bestowed upon him. Poor men of merit are necessarily barred out from such rewards.

On the night of the 29th of August a 13-inch shell from the city burst through the roof of a tumbril, from which the French were discharging powder into one of their magazines, near the Brancion Redoubt. The cartridges in the tumbril were of course exploded, and the proximity of the magazine caused the explosion to be communicated to it, and a fearful report, followed by sheets of flame, broke over the works. There were at the moment seven tons of gunpowder in the magazine, besides shot and shell. These were hurled into the air, and were scattered over the trenches, falling in showers on the redoubt. Four officers and thirty-six men were blown up, and three times as many were wounded, some mortally, many seriously, by the shells and balls, or their fragments. The last reverberations had scarcely died away over Sebastopol, when a loud cheer ascended from the enemy's works, which was answered by angry salvos from the French and English batteries.

On the night of the 30th a body of Russians succeeded in gaining the advanced trench of the English before they were observed. The guard made little resistance, being chiefly composed of feeble recruits. The enemy very promptly began to pull down the gabions, and to fill up the parallels, while a portion of them advanced to attack the next parallel. The 97th

regiment received them with a steady and resolute fire, by which they were utterly discomfited. The men of the 97th then charged, led by Captain Brinkley and Lieutenants Preston and Ware; the captain and Ware were wounded, and Preston was killed. These gallant officers, especially Lieutenant Preston, behaved nobly, emulating the example set by the brave Captain Vickers, who on a previous occasion of like peril so heroically died. Captain Pechell behaved also with great gallantry, and was wounded slightly; four days afterwards he was killed in the trenches. Colonel Bumbury received and deserved the notice of General Simpson.

Such losses, however severely felt by the English, were still more severe and frequent with our allies, who had nightly 150 men killed and wounded in the trenches. The Russians suffered far beyond the injury they were able to inflict. Pelissier remarked—"I lose a fine brigade in ten days; the enemy loses a division a week, and if this goes on for a month he will be deprived of a *corps d'armée*."

On the 1st of September, five days before the opening of the bombardment, Sir Edward Colebrook, under the guidance of his friend, Colonel Chapman, visited the trenches, and his journal contains the most striking and graphic description of the appearance of the opposing lines which we have perused or heard from those who, like Sir Edward, were witnesses. His description thus commences:—"The batteries are this year so much advanced, and the formation of the ground so peculiar, that it is impossible to judge of our attack except by an actual visit. We rode down to the battery which bears the name of my guide, by a ravine strewed, as are all those leading to our trenches, so thickly with shot, that I could not help asking whether some of the heaps had not been collected by hand. Every bend on the hill had acted like a funnel to mass them together in this peculiar way. Arrived at the battery, which now constitutes our first parallel, I had before me the battle-field of the last six months; our works pushed on for upwards of half a mile in advance, and crowded with men as they approach the front; Rifle-pits and Quarries, the scene of our struggle in the spring, and the cemetery to which our troops penetrated on the 18th of June. Chapman recommended a nearer survey from an advanced battery on our left, and we passed along the edge of the great ravine, dividing the French and English lines, by a singular path, here and there running under masses of projecting rock, which form natural caverns,* where our men find shelter, and in some cases are turned into magazines. We reached the promised battery at last, which rests on the ravine, and is

* The Ovens.

in advance of the second parallel. We were joined by Neville, of the engineers, who came down on duty. The scene was very striking; the Flagstaff Battery (Russian) rose high on our left, and seemed, to my unprofessional eye, to command us. Before us lay the creek which forms the harbour, which we could follow through its length, and which this battery was raised to command. On our front I could follow distinctly the long outline of the Russian works, forming almost one continual line of embrasures; and on the extreme right we could see in profile the Malakoff (in itself a fortress), and the French works carried up to its very edge. I was not left to enjoy my view very long, for a midshipman, who was running about in a very lively manner, as he entered warned us that we were going to open fire, and the seamen began to point the guns. We moved a little to one side, to watch the effect of the shot, some of which were directed against the bridge of boats, and others against the battery. The range of the former was too great to be relied upon; one excellent shot had been made from this battery a few days before. 'Now,' said Chapman, 'let us move a little further off, for we shall soon have a shot from them;' we had hardly gone twenty yards to the left, when a volume of smoke from the Garden Battery was followed pretty closely by the whiz of a shot over our heads, and shot and shell followed in rapid succession; two of them striking the parapet, scattering the dirt over us; one entering an embrasure without causing any casualty, another bounded off our magazine, and the remainder plunged into the ravine behind us. This was too hot to be pleasant, and I began to think of the difficulties of a retreat, for though I was snug enough under the parapet, the road by which I came was evidently dangerous. However, my guide was quite alive to this, and we returned by the zigzag on the right. We had to pass the line of fire to get there, and stopping at a new work in course of formation, which Chapman wished to see, I had an amusing specimen of the manner in which the working-parties threw down pickaxe and shovel when the look-out man cried 'shot,' and rushed to the parapet, in which, of course, I followed their example. I was not sorry to be out of this, and should probably have felt more apprehension, if it had not been for the coolness of my friends, and the good-humour of the men in the batteries, and the absence of casualties, which made it difficult to regard it as a scene of danger. We moved away to the right, till we reached the ravine which separated the left and right attack, and then got into the zigzags. These, in some cases, gave no cover, the bare rock protruding above the surface. Apart from the lively episode which distinguished it, my visit has

been a very instructive one. It has enabled me to judge by observation of the extent of these works, the difficulties under which they are carried on, the bearing of the fire of the batteries, and the peculiarity of the ground. Though the ravines run with a certain regularity the ground does not; it is broken into hills and mamelons, which complicate the warfare, and give a field for military skill, which any map imperfectly explains. For instance, the broken ground called the Quarries immediately in front of the Redan, covers a battery which bears on the Malakoff, and supports the French attack. I do not think it is sufficiently known that many of our works were carried on and completed during the middle of that trying season that wasted the army. The second and third parallel were so made. Whatever difference of opinion may exist as to the propriety of pushing forward the siege at such a cost of life, it must add, if anything can, to the admiration of the energy and fortitude of our countrymen to know that in the midst of difficulties, such as rarely have been encountered by any army, we steadily advanced against the enemy's works, and that there was no moment of faltering in our progress. The Garden Battery, whose fire I experienced, has been the most troublesome during the siege, and caused more casualties than any other, enfilading our advanced works, and never silenced by our fire."

Rumour ascribed insubordination to the garrison, and it was observed that strange shouting and discharges of musketry were on some occasions heard from within the city. Deserters alleged that in one of these instances of riotous noise, an officer of distinction and 100 men were executed for disobedience.

By the beginning of September the French works were pressed up so close, that one of their trenches was designated the "slaughter-house;" half of those who nightly entered it were returned killed or wounded. Mr. Russell made this entry in his journal:—"From the head of the French sap one can now lay his hand on the abattis of the Malakoff." He represents Major Graham, an amateur, as having done so, and paying as a penalty the loss of his arm; and Mr. Gauchier, a midshipman of the *Caradoc*, as incurring a dangerous wound by his daring conduct near the same spot. By the time the last (as it is generally called the sixth) bombardment* was opened, the French sap was carried to within twenty-five yards of the salient of the Malakoff. The English, however, were not able, for the reasons already assigned as accounting for the slowness of their progress, to approach nearer to the Great Redan than 200 yards.

* We have not numerated each general cannonade as a bombardment.

On the north side the enemy threw up prodigious earthworks, and seemed to place his only hope of an obstinate resistance ultimately there.

The Malakoff and Redan suffered under the daily fire of the besiegers, and the Russians made repeated and gallant efforts to repair the embrasures in the open day; the only result was a terrible sacrifice of life from the sure aim of their enemies.

The armament of the allied lines assumed extraordinary magnitude and power. The Green-hill Battery, which in the bombardment that had last taken place was so prominent, appeared in the rear; in advance of it a battery of fifteen mortars was constructed, as well as other new batteries armed with ponderous artillery. Everything portended that one of the bloodiest struggles which war ever set man to make with man was about to take place. The remark was touchingly true with which a correspondent of the *Times*, signing himself E., commenced a letter on the 1st of September:—"There is many a fine fellow in camp thinking this morning of some pleasant terrain, where partridges abound, and friends are gathered, intent upon harmless slaughter, who will never see the old country again."

The spirits of the men were, however, buoyant, especially as the grand finale approached. Amidst all these terrible preparations for a battle of artillery, the most dreadful the world had ever seen, and which had as yet occurred even around Sebastopol—and while all were talking daily of the assault and carnage by which the objects of the bombardment were to be made effectual, the men enjoyed great liveliness of spirits, and heartily joined in every diversion which their wit could devise. The sailors were the gayest of the gay: the following is a specimen of their amusing devices:—

THEATRE ROYAL, NAVAL BRIGADE.

On Friday evening, 31st of August, will be performed—

DEAF AS A POST!

To be followed by

THE SILENT WOMAN.

The whole to conclude with the laughable farce entitled
SLASHER AND CRASHER.

Seats to be taken at 7 o'clock. Performance to commence precisely at 8 o'clock.

God save the Queen! Rule Britannia!

Upon this Mr. Russell remarks:—"And right well they played. True, the theatre was the amputating house of the brigade, but no reflections as to its future and past use marred the sense of present enjoyment. The scenes were furnished from the *London*, the actors from the brigade. There was an agreeable ballet-

girl, who had to go into the trenches to work a 68-pounder at three o'clock in the morning; and Rosa was impersonated by a prepossessing young boatswain's mate. Songs there were in plenty, with a slight smack of the fore-castle, and a refrain of big guns booming down the ravine from the front; but they were all highly appreciated, and the dancing was pronounced to be worthy of Her Majesty's, ere Terpsichore and Mr. Lunnley retired from the concern. Nor were fashionable and illustrious personages wanting to grace the performance with their presence, and to relieve the mass of 2000 commoners who cheered, and laughed, and applauded so good-humouredly. Your elegant contemporary's types need not have blushed to print such names as the 'Duke of Newcastle,' who paid marked attention to *Deaf as a Post*, and led the *encore* for a horn-pipe of the first force; as 'Lord Rokeby,' who was as assiduous as his grace, besides those of generals, brigadiers, lords, and honourables. The sense of enjoyment was not marred by the long-range guns, which now and then sent a lobbing shot near the theatre, and never did any harm; and if the audience were amused, so were the performers, who acted with surprising spirit and taste. What would old Benbow or grim old Cloudesley Shovell have thought of it all?"

The cavalry at this period were strengthened as to numbers by drafts from England; but like those sent out to the infantry, they were composed of mere boys, without discipline or physical power, and they drooped and pined in sickness soon after their arrival, but not being exposed to the same hard work as the newly-arrived infantry drafts, they did not die in the same proportion. On the 4th of September General Simpson thus addressed Lord Panmure:—

"From the heavy fire maintained by the enemy on the head of our sap, the progress made has been slow, and accompanied, as must be expected, by several casualties among the sappers and working-parties; and it is with great regret that I have to report the death, last night, of Captain Pechell, 77th regiment, whose conduct I had occasion to bring before your lordship's notice in my despatch of the 1st instant. Within the last few days a second bridge has been commenced from the north shore to Karabelnaia, the object being evidently to expedite the removal of stores from the dockyard. The continued reports we receive induce General Pelissier and myself to believe that the enemy still meditate an attack in force on our positions on the Tchernaya, to meet which the troops are kept in a continued state of readiness. The 82nd regiment have arrived from Corfu, and have disembarked this

day. I intend them to relieve the 13th regiment at Balaklava, which has joined the first division, under Lord Rokeby. The health of the troops is excellent. I inclose the list of casualties."

The general does not relate in this despatch that early on the morning of the day he wrote, before dawn, a heavy fire was opened by the Russians, followed by a sortie, which was the means of effecting injury upon the head of the English sap, and of slaying and wounding

several officers. Two sergeants, Coleman and O'Grady, distinguished themselves: the latter fell dead while requesting permission to storm a rifle-pit with a small party of his soldiers.

At last the memorable 5th of September arrived, when the grand and final bombardment was opened. A description of it, and of the assault which followed, is reserved for another chapter; meanwhile, the attention of the reader must be directed to other spheres of action, where the arms of the allies had chequered fortunes.

CHAPTER XCVIII.

THE WAR IN ASIA MINOR.—DEFENCE OF KARS.

"Here stand, my lords! and send discoverers forth
To know the numbers of our enemies."

SHAKESPEARE. *Henry V.*

In a former chapter the narrative of affairs in Asia Minor was brought up to the month of June. The struggles of General Williams and his little band of European officers to secure Kars and Erzerum against the enemy, and the almost hopeless, yet determined and persevering efforts of Williams to conquer all obstacles, were depicted; the futile correspondence of the general with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Lord Raglan, and the enlightened and vigorous interference of Lord Clarendon on his behalf, were also detailed.

We have now to relate how the Turkish and Western governments conducted the war in that part of the world, and in what a different spirit everything relating to it was regarded by Russia. From the beginning of June until Kars fell, and the men of its garrison were made captives, the Western governments, taken up wholly with the Crimea, neglected the defence of Turkish Armenia, and all but left it and its brave defenders as spoils for the enemy.

The Turkish government seemed to abandon these fine regions to their fate. Officers were appointed to high command simply because they had court favour. The government of the Porte conducted its military affairs in Asia as the English government did everywhere, except when checked by the people: commands were assigned because of the rank of the candidates, their relation to those in high places, or their influence in the Divan, irrespective of experience or personal adaptation to control large bodies of men.

The Russians, on the other hand, showed in every step they took how well they knew the value of their Transcaucasian conquests, and how vulnerable the Turkish empire was in that direction. While the forces of Russia were being driven from the Danube, they never withdrew a man from Russian Armenia,

Georgia, or Mingrelia; while the baffled and discomfited Paskiewitch, Gortschakoff, and Luders, were fugitives behind the Pruth, Andronikoff and his fellows were beating the Turks at Kuyukdere; even long after, when the defenders of the great Crimean fortress were finding shelter in the northern forts, and looking down upon the burnt and shattered ruins of Southern Sebastopol, for which they had so long vainly battled and bled, Mouravieff was capturing the northern capital of Asia Minor, and the army which had constituted its garrison. The Russians never relaxed for an hour their efforts upon the Georgian and Armenian frontiers because of any defeats suffered in Europe, or the waste of their armies there. The French seem to have kept a selfish rather than a vigilant eye upon events in Anatolia. It is notorious that the expedition of Omar Pasha, which took place in the autumn, and was intended indirectly to relieve Kars, was impeded by the allied generals in the Crimea, the British commander being governed on the occasion by the superior will of Pelissier. The French took no interest in the war on the Asiatic shores of the Black Sea, because they had no possessions which Russian influence over Persia and Central Asia could endanger. Besides, they were jealous of the oriental dominion of England, and would not object to see our Indian empire at all events weakened by apprehensions from Central Asia. It is quite certain that our allies gave as little assistance as it was possible to give in that direction to the Turks, or to the British officers sent among them. This was a short-sighted policy on the part of our ally, for the Dardanelles may be reached more effectually and speedily by way of Asia Minor than by way of the Danube, and wherever the double-headed eagle appears, there the eagle of France must encounter it at whatever disadvantage. If France allow

Russia to emerge into the Mediterranean as a great military, and, then necessarily, great naval power, it will not be for her to restore the European balance. She would then be compelled to act a secondary part to England, without whom she could neither have help nor hope. Amidst such a complication of circumstances and interests, England should have saved Kars at any cost, however enormous; she should never have suffered it to be invested; she ought, for the sake of her own Asiatic influence, to have seen to the defence of Anatolia, and to have pushed back Russia behind her own frontier line. Victory in the Crimea saved Turkey, and humbled Russia at St. Petersburg; but France had the chief glory there, while the victories of Russia in Asia humbled England before Persia and the petty states of Central Asia, without affecting the prestige of France in any way. Happily, the glorious conduct of the British officers at Kars, and all through the Asiatic campaigns, redeemed our influence.

The successful ambition of Russia in the East, during the last and present century, was an earnest that she would strain every nerve to hold her footing, east as well as west of the Black Sea. The following sketch of Russian conquest on both shores of the Euxine, within three-quarters of a century, ought to have roused the Western governments to provide for the repulse of Russia, as well on the Asiatic as the European shores of the Euxine:—

ACQUISITIONS FROM TURKEY.

Country north of Crimea	1774
The Crimea and country between the Sea of Azoff and Caspian	1783
Country round Odessa	1792
Bessarabia	1812

ACQUISITIONS FROM PERSIA.

Mingrelia, on the Black Sea	1802
Immeritia	1802
Ganja	1803
Karabagh	1805
Sheki	1805
Shirvan	1806
Talisk, on the Caspian	1812
Georgia	1814
Erivan, Mount Ararat, and Etchmiadzin ..	1828
Akalzik	1829

Early in the summer of 1855, General Mouravieff, as has been already shown in a previous chapter, succeeded Prince Bebutoff as commander-in-chief of the Asiatic army of the czar. This vigorous general took every precaution to secure his communications, and with activity and spirit took the offensive. On the side of the allies everything depended upon the skill and courage of General Williams, who had little support which he could rely upon but the heroism and military proficiency of a band of British and Hungarian officers. His importunities for help to Constantinople had not been attended to, and England made

no direct effort to supply him with anything. Lord Clarendon and the British government were well affected to him, and zealously affected to the cause; but either they were incompetent to manage any system of relief, or they relied upon their representations through their ambassador at Constantinople producing a due effect upon the Porte, or they supposed that Lord Raglan would provide relief. We cannot but think that had the allied generals in the Crimea been men of genius, or even of extensive information and solid mental power, they would have devised some practicable scheme for the relief of General Williams. There were ships, stores, and ammunition at Balaklava, and enterprising naval and military men, able and willing to undertake any task assigned to them, that could have been spared; but not only was nothing done by the allied chiefs, they repressed and chilled what others would have attempted. From first to last Williams was sacrificed to a cabal at Constantinople, in which Lord Stratford and certain pashas had an inglorious part, just as the noble and dauntless Guyon had been sacrificed by similar jealousies and intrigues, in which the same and other persons had figured.

When Mouravieff commenced an offensive part, Williams was at Erzerum, and the various pashas were taking matters as quietly as Omar Pasha did at Eupatoria. The Christian populations were disaffected, the Greeks ready to fly to arms for Russia, and already engaged as spies, in which avocation the Armenians competed with them, the former actuated by bigotry, the latter by interest. The Kurds and other Mohammedan tribes, although bigoted Mussulmen, were ready to sell themselves as irregular troops to Mouravieff, and the Circassians, who were hearty in the cause of Turkey, held back in disgust, in consequence of the bloody and barbarous deeds which certain base and cowardly Bashi-bazouks had perpetrated.

The difficulties of Williams were innumerable; but his spirit was equal to them all. Finding that Kars was menaced he hastened thither, still further strengthened the defences, and prepared the garrison to meet the foe in the battery or the field. His example and his genius inspired all classes, so that the citizens of Kars offered to arm in the defence without pay, and the Turkish soldiers demanded to be led against the enemy. It was absolutely necessary, however, for Williams to act on the defensive, because of the numerical inferiority of his troops, and their deficiency in *matériel* of war. The various departments of an army which require to be in proportion, in order to secure its efficiency, were far otherwise at Kars. Williams had scarcely any cavalry, the few he had were inefficiently provided; and

there were no engineers, or intelligent sappers and miners, to carry out properly and promptly the orders of the European officers. His whole force did not exceed 17,000 men, while that of Mouravieff consisted of 28,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and more than their proportion of artillery. Of this force 25,000 men advanced upon Kars at the beginning of June. Vassif Pasha, the *muschir* (or field-marshal) of the Turkish army of Asia, became alarmed; and when the Russians were within four hours' march, he proposed to Williams to fall back upon Erzerum. This was regarded simply as a proof of weakness and timidity on the part of the honest but unenterprising *muschir*; but since the war terminated, circumstances transpired to justify the belief that he had orders from the Porte to induce Williams to take this step, without positively insisting upon it. At all events, the Turkish pashas, after hostilities closed, continued to denounce the defence of Kars as bad in strategy. They alleged that Williams destroyed their army, allowing it to be caught at Kars as in a trap, instead of falling back upon Erzerum, and there, by obtaining reinforcements, and being in the midst of his supplies, to operate from a new base against the enemy: these allegations we shall confute in another page. When General Williams set out from Erzerum, he left Colonel Calandrelli, an Italian engineer officer, engaged in making intrenchments and otherwise fortifying Erzerum. On the road the general and Dr. Sandwith met Mahmoud Effendi, a Polish renegade, who brought despatches from Colonel Lake. The Pole gave Dr. Sandwith a most gloomy account of the prospects of defence at Kars, and at the same time represented retreat from it as impossible, Mouravieff having at his command 10,000 cavalry—a computation not far beyond the truth. He also insinuated that Colonel Lake and Captain Thompson were likely to be over-governed by the pashas to abandon the defence altogether—a supposition as little likely to become fact as any well could be. On the route the general and his staff met convoys of sick coming from Kars to Erzerum, and Madame Tasklar, the wife of a German officer, who nobly followed the fortunes of her husband in the war, but who was prudently sent away from the impending horrors of a siege.

On the 7th, an escort of lancers and the English officers of the Kars' garrison met the general on the road to greet his arrival; the whole party soon after entered the city amidst the rejoicings of the soldiers and inhabitants. General Williams and his suite were delighted to find that by Colonel Lake's assiduity and talent the camp of Kars had been amazingly strengthened. The excellent plans of Guyon had been partly carried out by Colonel Lake,

acting in the name of General Williams, and by the superior means at his disposal. Dr. Sandwith declares that the provisions were found to be insufficient for a siege of any duration, and that there was only sufficient ammunition for an expenditure of three days. The horsemen he and other officers describe as ill-disciplined, but rudely brave, and all accounts concur in representing the horses as in a ludicrous condition, so long had they been deprived of adequate forage. One might apply most fitly to this cavalry the description given of the English troopers by an enemy, in Shakspeare's *Henry V.*:—

“ Their horsemen sit like fixed candlesticks,
With torch-staves in their hand; and their poor jades
Lob down their heads, dropping the hides and hips,
The gum down-roping from their pale-dead eyes;
And in their pale dull mouths the gimmel bit
Lies, foul with chewed grass, still and motionless;
And their executors, the knavish crows,
Fly o'er them all, impatient for their hour.”

Dr. Sandwith found that of 2000 beds which he had applied for three months before as absolutely essential to the wounded and sick,—whose numbers would be great in case of a protracted siege,—not one had arrived. General Williams was all but driven to despair by finding that the pasha of Erzerum, instead of sending to Kars three months' provisions, as the general supposed he had done, these indispensable supplies were left at Yenekoi, a long day's march from the city! There were not arabas and horses in sufficient numbers to convey them, and if there had been, before the convoy could arrive the Russians would hear of its errand through their Armenian spies, and by a *detour* secure the prize, and make the escort prisoners, as that escort would necessarily consist of infantry, from the deficiency of troopers in the garrison.

Schwartzzenburgh, a German officer, reconnoitred the enemy before his arrival, and reported his army to be 40,000 in number—a gross exaggeration. The following is a correct, although popular, description of Colonel Lake's fortifications. Kars is situated under a precipitous range of rocky hills, which run east and west. The ascent in the western extremity is easy—“it is a sort of mamelon called *Tahmasp*.” The eastern extremity of the range is abrupt, rocky, and precipitous; this is called *Kara-dagh*, and is within a mile of the town; *Tahmasp* is twice that distance. The range is separated by a gorge (or valley, as the Russians call it), through which flows a river passable by bridges, one of which only was constructed by Colonel Lake. On the south of Kars a large plain extends for some miles, and is then barred by a range of easy sloping heights. These hills commanded the city in a military sense, and Lake therefore fortified them. Several open works covered these heights before

the arrival of either Lake or Williams, which had been erected at the suggestion of the gallant but unfortunate Guyon. On the west of Kars there was an old open work, called "Veli Pasha Tabia," which Lake converted into a strong defence. A block-house was so placed within the Tabia and protected by earth as to be bomb-proof; this was dignified by the name of Fort Lake, and was mounted with four 36-pounders and four smaller guns. This Colonel Lake considered to be the key of the place. Breastworks extended from this important position for a mile and a half eastward to the gorge, strengthened at intervals by strong redoubts; at the extremity of the gorge there was a redoubt called Teesdale Tabia, which had been placed by that very young officer at the close of 1854. This was, however, commanded by a fort at the opposite side of the gorge, called the Arab Tabia, after the glorious earthwork of Silistria, which there defied the power of Russia. The Arab Tabia was, in turn, commanded by the eastern forts on Kara-dagh. These defences, on the northern side of Kars, were united to the works on the plain by forts and breastworks. The weakness of the defence was its extent. It would have required an army as numerous as that of the besiegers properly to man such extensive works, and all must be garrisoned, or they would, of course, be seized by the enemy, who, by possessing any one link in the chain, was thereby in a better condition to seize all the rest.

On the 10th, a citizen of reputation waited upon General Williams with the brave offer of arming the citizens, and politely added the intention of "bringing as many of the Giaours' heads as Veeliams Pasha might like to accept, and lay them at his feet; Inshallah!" (please God). "Veeliams Pasha" informed him that it would not please God at all, nor please him; that enemies, dead or alive, were to be treated with lenity and mercy, and to be exempt in either case from insult. This greatly astonished Osman Agha, as this senior of the city was named; but nevertheless he would fight, and so would all the citizens. The muschir, Vassif Pasha, and Hussein Pasha, a Circassian chief, and Ismael Pasha (the Hungarian General Kmety) co-operated with General Williams in every possible way.

Lake employed himself in instructing the officers in their duties, and Teesdale displayed extraordinary activity, and, notwithstanding his extreme youth, great wisdom and skill. One might apply to this intrepid and clever young warrior the words of the great dramatist:—

"I do not think a braver gentleman,
More active, valiant, or more valiant, young,
More daring, or more brave, is now alive
To grace this latter age with noble deeds."

Dr. Sandwith and Colonel Lake had a

narrow escape of life in an outpost skirmish two days before the Russian army arrived before the place. Colonel Lake and the doctor were reconnoitring the Russians with a small body of regular cavalry and a troop of Bashi-bazouks, the latter being in advance. A Russian regiment of cavalry was in observation, and made an attempt to cut off the English officers. Colonel Lake ordered the cavalry to retire, which, the moment the Bashi-bazouks perceived, they uttered a yell and took to flight, rushing among the regular cavalry, and throwing them into disorder; before they could re-form, the Russians were amongst them, cutting down the Turkish troops with desperate earnestness, who fled, scarcely offering any resistance. The British officers escaped only by the fleetness of their steeds. At last the Turks were rallied, and the Bashi-bazouks made a wonderful display of bravery, firing their pistols at the distance of 1000 yards.

At daybreak on the 16th of June the advanced guard of the Muscovs attacked and drove in the pickets of the Moslems. The outposts made a brave but abortive defence. The advanced guard of the enemy consisted of three regiments of Cossacks, supported by horse-artillery and a rocket troop; before these the Bashi-bazouks rapidly fell back, fighting wildly and irregularly. The Turkish light infantry retired in skirmishing order, offering to the Cossacks an opportunity of which they had not the skill or courage to take advantage. When the Turkish light troops fell back, the main army of Mouravieff gradually appeared. It was a fine body of men, their arms and high helmets gleaming in the midsummer morning sun; they formed before the town, taking post with celerity and order. Perhaps no Russian army was ever held so well in hand by any general, nor did a Russian chief before ever command a more compact and well apportioned body of troops. Mouravieff had not his forces in line before half-past six o'clock. His reconnaissance was soon effected, and his orders given. These orders were instantaneously obeyed, and the attempt upon the town began. The troops of the Russian general were drawn up upon the road, and the slope of country skirting on either side the road from Gumri, entering Kars upon its eastern suburb. The aspect presented by his army was very imposing, and well calculated to intimidate the less happily-appointed Osmanli. The infantry of the assailants composed three strong columns; these were flanked by three regiments of dragoons, and supported by 48 pieces of cannon. Behind these was a column of reserve infantry, and an immense commissariat train, protected by Kurdish cavalry in the czar's service. When the Bashi-bazouks retired before the advanced guard, the cavalry of that force

attempted to enter the town with them, so hot was the pursuit; for the Bashi-bazouks had spiritedly covered the retreat of the infantry, and were exposed to imminent risk in doing so from the swarms of Cossacks which crowded upon them. As the Russian cavalry made a dash to enter the town, they were received with such a fire from the Turkish artillery as rendered a flight more speedy than their charge—a good proof of their discretion. The Russian guns moved up and opened a heavy fire, under cover of which the cavalry re-formed, and made another dash for the town. They were again met by so severe an artillery fire that they fled, and this time so hastily and shamefully that they never halted until they reached the main body. The guns limbered up and followed them, receiving, however, considerable damage from the Turkish cannon. This smart affair seemed to cool the haste of the Russian chief, who drew off his army, and took camp between Zaiur and Akche Kaleh.

Mouravieff was evidently surprised at the brave and skilful resistance which he encountered, and resolved to deliberate before any plan of assault should be carried into execution.

The Turks were much encouraged by their success; and the news of a great victory, exaggerated in every conceivable way, spread among the wild tribes of Northern and Central Asia, and was borne by innumerable voices to the Dardanelles, Constantinople, and even to the Crimea. Williams tempered this elated feeling while he used it, impressing upon the soldiery that they were a match for their foe; but that as the advantage in numbers and appointment was on the enemy's side, they must make up for this disparity by their courage and prudence, by indomitable labour and patriotic self-sacrifice. To these exhortations the men responded with enthusiasm, repeating again and again that "Williams Pasha was no end of a man."

The conduct of the Turkish cavalry was better than Williams himself had any expectation would be the case, although he had a higher opinion of the mettle of the wild horsemen of Asia Minor than any of his officers possessed. Much of their improved spirit had been produced by that most gallant man, Guyon.

The following letter from General Williams will show the state of his mind as to the events which were passing around him, and throw further light on the Russian attack. It is addressed to the Earl of Clarendon:—

Kars, June 17, 1855.

"MY LORD,—Yesterday being the feast of the Bairam, I fully anticipated an attack, and the troops were consequently held in readiness

throughout the preceding night, and stood to their arms before daylight.

"Our advanced posts were driven in soon after daylight, and the Russian army appeared on the height about half-past six o'clock: its advanced guard consisted of three regiments of regular Cossacks, supported by artillery and rockets. The main body of infantry marched in three columns, flanked by three regiments of dragoons, and supported by six batteries of eight guns each. In the rear appeared a strong column of reserve infantry, then the waggons, carrying, as I have since heard, three days' provisions. The whole force could not have been less than 25,000.

"Nothing could be more perfect than the handling of the enemy's army as it advanced upon the front of our intrenchments formed by the line of works called Arab Tabia, Kara-dagh, and Hafiz Pasha Tabia, and facing the Gumri Road. Our cavalry, pickets, and Bashi-bazouks retired, skirmishing with the regular Cossacks until within 1000 yards of our lines, when the enemy's cavalry made a desperate rush, supported by its reserves of skirmishers, and also by a rocket troop, to enter the camp with our outnumbered cavalry under Baron de Schwartzburg, but they were instantly checked by the artillery from Arab Tabia, Kara-dagh, and Hafiz Pasha Tabia; they then fell back upon the main body of the Russian army, which retired in the same order in which it had advanced, and, after halting for a few minutes, finally disappeared over the hills, and has resumed its old camping-ground at Zaiur and Akche Kaleh.

"As the enemy carried off their dead, we could not ascertain their loss, but it is estimated from one hundred to one hundred and fifty; ours amounted to six killed and eight wounded.

"The spirit of the Turkish troops was excellent, evincing, as they did, as much readiness in the defence as they had shown in the construction of their epaulments. If the enemy had attempted to carry his original intention into execution, he would, I confidently believe, have met with signal disaster.

"The precautions which I have recommended the *muschir* to take are in no wise slackened, and we are now preparing for an attack of the heights in the rear of the city. The labour of the officers of my staff have been incessant; and I have to record my thanks to Colonel Lake, to Major Teesdale, and Captain Thompson, and to Dr. Sandwith, as well as to Messrs. Churchill and Zohrab, the secretaries and interpreters, whose duties are equally arduous and fatiguing.

"I have, &c.,

"W. F. WILLIAMS."

The citizens were true to the promise made in their behalf by old Osman; and boys of fourteen were armed with rusty muskets, and the swords of deceased fathers, who perhaps had carried them bravely. Veiled figures were to be seen embracing these youths, and telling them to go and fight the infidels, followed by a mother's or sister's prayer. Many of the Russian cavalry, on the 16th, in their foiled attempt to enter the town by a *coup de main*, were brought down by shots from those old muskets fired by these tiny hands. The rocks of Kara-dagh furnished admirable cover, from which citizens and soldiers were able to take deliberate aim at the cavalry.

Day by day anxiety and vigilance prevailed in Kars, and the Russian army was reinforced. Dr. Sandwith states that soon after their first appearance before the place they amounted to 40,000 men, their cavalry numbering 10,000. This does not agree with other trustworthy accounts, which represent the number as 10,000 less; but the doctor is also trustworthy, and we have no means of saying on which side the error lies.

On the 20th of June the garrison was cheered by intelligence from various directions that help was at hand: 600 Lazistan riflemen, a bold and sanguinary band, were announced as hiding in a neighbouring village, ready to enter that night. The pasha of Batoum, although himself menaced by a powerful force, his own army only numbering 3600 men, was organising irregulars for the muschir's service; and 2000 Abasian Caucasians were represented as on the march to aid the garrison. The last of these communications brought very improbable news, the second very little to be relied upon; the first was not only likely, but true, for the next morning the Lazistans entered, with their tricolour banners flaunting in the air, and the star* and crescent gleaming upon them. They marched in, singing a wild chorus, in which sundry dreadful things were threatened to the Giaours, and great things said of the faith and the faithful. The song also flattered the singers a good deal, who were, nevertheless, very likely persons to do anything out of the way fierce. They were an active, agile, muscular set of fellows, with beautiful rifles, and having in their girdles formidable-looking *kamas* (broad, long daggers), and at least a brace of huge pistols. They seemed under perfect control by their chief or *deribey*, and were regarded by the citizens with the sort of welcome given to persons whose aid is desirable, but whose company, except in hard necessity, would be gladly dispensed with.

At this juncture the position of the enemy

was essentially different from what it was on the 16th, the day of the attack. Mouraviëff broke up his encampment on the positions already referred to; and as flank marches had become all the fashion, the general effected one which was strategically better than those in the Crimea, of which so much was written there, and in Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. Mouraviëff surrounded the Turkish intrenchments, and placed himself near the weakest part of the Turkish position.

The first great trial to the garrison was the interruption of its communications with Erzerum. This was effected by the rains, without any intervention of the enemy, for some days; but Mouraviëff was too good a general not to cut off all hope of supply and correspondence in that direction. To accomplish this, he again moved his camp, taking up his position on the south-west of the town. At the same moment intelligence arrived that the garrisons expelled from the forts on the Black Sea, during the operations which we have already described as having been accomplished in and after the second Kertch expedition, had directed their march by way of Tiflis to join the army of Mouraviëff.

Day by day Bashi-bazouks forced their way into the place, but most of them were *canards* and robbers. It seems unaccountable that cowards should make their way through difficulties to a place where there was so much occasion for combat, and that depredators should place themselves under the discipline of a besieged city, where there was not sufficient food for the garrison. Fanaticism is probably the explanation of such conduct. The Lazistans became discontented before they were one week within the lines; they wished for more fighting and more notice. The muschir did not know how to manage them. What Turk ever did know how to manage the Lazistans, or any other refractory Asiatic tribe whatsoever? The *Ingleez* pasha had a new scope for his varied abilities in mediating between the muschir and Ali Bey, the Lazistan chief; and he patched up a peace, more effective, however, although a patchwork, than that which the Paris Congress ultimately achieved under the presidency of M. Walewski.

So early as the 22nd of June intrigues were discovered which would be inconceivable anywhere out of Turkey or the Spanish peninsula. The civil governor of Kars sent word to the citizens not to obey Williams Pasha, as he was a Giaour—an infidel, and they were true believers. Williams adopted in this case the only safe policy in the East—one well expressed by the trite and vulgar phrase, “taking the bull by the horns.” He summoned the

Greeks had employed. Supposing them to have some magical efficacy, they adopted them.

* When the Turks conquered Constantinople, they found these emblems everywhere, which the Byzantine

pasha to a council, exposed his villany, calmly listened to his lies, and let him go away under a vague impression that something very terrible, such as was out of the line of any but an "*Ingleez* pasha" to inflict, would await his dereliction of duty.

The spirit and character of the Russian general, so early as the 23rd of June, began to display itself. The Cossacks captured the post, the letters were read by Mouravieff. He fairly, by the rules of war, appropriated all political and military intelligence, and courteously, by the prompting of a generous and manly nature, sent a flag of truce to convey to the English gentlemen their home letters. Mouravieff was born in Russia by some great mistake; the most chivalrous of nations might be proud of him. He made war as a great soldier, an accomplished gentleman, and a true-hearted, humane, gentle, generous man. If ever he set his foot on English soil, he will meet a reception such as Englishmen know how to give a truly gallant and generous enemy.

The surrounding pashas were now energetic in raising irregular troops; but of what avail could they be in a garrison without supplies? Provender and provisions were necessary; and these the pasha of Erzerum might have sent, but did not, or sent, and left on the road, where he must have supposed the Russians would have captured them. It is marvellous that Williams did not make sure that the provisions sent from Erzerum were not actually delivered at Kars. He had no confidence in the pasha of Erzerum, yet he seems to have trusted implicitly to his fidelity in the one grand vital matter of provisions.

Rumour of attack and preparations to meet it disturbed the streets of Kars by night and day, until, on the 29th, a large force detaching itself from the main body of the besiegers, marched westward; their object was rightly conjectured—it was to seize the corn at Yenikoi. They captured and burned it. The spies employed by Williams were as useless, or rather as mischievous, as Guyon had found them in 1853-4. The Armenians sold themselves to the highest bidder, which was Mouravieff, and the Greeks brought all the intelligence to him as much for love as for money. Even the Bashi-bazouks betrayed him. If ever man was placed in a position purely and intensely vexatious and discouraging, this English agent and general was so placed. We wonder much that, with Williams' knowledge of Asia Minor, he should have put any confidence whatever in any spy. Major Edwards, in the Punjaub, seems to have attained to the perfection of management in the matter of oriental spies. The more open, frank, and straightforward a man is, the best chance he

has with spies anywhere, but most of all in the East. Williams was not deficient in these qualities, but he was beset with difficulties so peculiar and unprecedented that no human genius could have surmounted them all. That the man should have hoped and struggled notwithstanding, should have compelled fortune to wait on him so long, and have brought, as it were, his conqueror to do him homage, proves his greatness.

On the 3rd of July Mahmoud Effendi, at the head of 500 Bashi-bazouks, was sent out on a reconnaissance, with stern orders to attack none but armed men, and not to plunder. They sallied forth with great ostentation, a most extraordinary-looking set of ragged rascals—

"Scarce blood enough in all their sickly veins
To give each naked cuttle-axe a stain."

They had not gone far on their expedition when they met some Russian infantry, who fired, and Mahmoud and his cavaliers galloped away.

On the 8th of July a body of Bashi-bazouks were attacked by a party of Russian skirmishers, and, of course, galloped off in mad haste after firing their long pistols into the air. The first to run was the colonel, and he kept the lead, his banditti were not able to keep up with him. Such were some of the immortal defenders of Kars! General Williams insisted upon the degradation of the colonel to the ranks. The same day one Omer, a Mussulman in the service of Russia, deserted and brought fifty of his irregular Mussulman troops with him. The muschir made him a pasha.

It would be impossible to recount all the demonstrations on the part of the enemy, and the frequent skirmishes between the irregular cavalry of both armies. The Bashi-bazouks always fled, but generally inflicted some injury on their pursuers. On one occasion, as the enemy overtook them, each Bashi-bazouk, who lay crouched on the mane of his horse, suddenly turned and fired; five Russians fell dead, and several were wounded; the Bashis escaped unhurt: first in fight, first in flight, these strange horsemen were the only available men for a certain kind of useful work which Williams had.

By the middle of July it was found that during the whole period which had elapsed since Williams had arrived in Kars, the provisions had been pilfered, and that systematic peculation of food and provender had reduced both below the limits to which Williams supposed they had sunk. Up to this time small supplies of vegetables so frequently arrived from the country as, on the whole, to constitute a considerable arrival of food; but now the blockade was perfectly established, and no hope of any similar resource could be entertained.

During the remainder of July and during the first week in August, the Russians remained unaccountably inactive. The internal troubles of the town were great, the Lazistans demanding food under menaces of fighting their way out. Williams still preserved his influence, and sustained the public hope; his own hope was sustained only by the promises of relief from Batoum and elsewhere, and by the gallant spirits of the little circle of European officers by which he was surrounded, obeyed, and loved.

The month of August did not open favourably for the besieged. The Lazistans contrived to find their way out in bands, and plunder the neighbourhood, and when called to account for their bad conduct, presented their rifles and drew their *kanus* on the British officers Teesdale and Thompson. After much resistance they were captured, disarmed, flogged, and imprisoned, which vigorous proceeding put an end to Lazistan insubordination. The besieged were much troubled by the skirmishings at the outposts, the Cossacks endeavouring to kill or capture the Turkish grass-cutters, and the Bashi-bazouk cavalry striving to protect them, but so irregular were the tactics of these warriors that their efficiency was always doubtful. Even if possessing fodder for their horses, they would have been an incapable force. The English officers who knew India well would have been glad of even a few squadrons of the excellent irregular cavalry of India, which ought to have been employed in this war, at all events in the Asiatic department of the struggle. We concur with an officer of the Company's service, who in a letter thus remarks:—"Had two or three of these regiments been sent to co-operate with the sultan's generals in Asia, there would have been no difficulty in escorting the supplies from Erzerum, and no necessity for the capitulation of Kars. The irregular cavalry are free lances, receiving monthly pay for the service of themselves, their horses, and arms. They are armed with either sword, carbine, or lance, and each man selects the weapon with which he is most expert—an incalculable advantage in hand-to-hand encounters. The horses are surveyed and passed by European officers, and none admitted under a certain value. In many regiments this is fixed at 400 rupees, or £40. Their dress consists of a small turban, worn generally on the side of the head, long blue frock-coats, and high jack-boots. The irregulars of the Deccan use the Mahratta saddle and bit, the former heavy, but never known to wring a horse's back if properly adjusted; the latter excessively severe at will, but, with a light hand and trained horse, the finest military bit in the world. They take immense pride in the condition of their horses,

and in the brightness and temper of their arms. They use wooden scabbards, and their swords, generally old regimental ones, are as sharp as razors. They never draw them, except when obliged, and never return them to the scabbard without wiping them. They ride long, and their seat is the most erect and graceful I know. The handling of their horses and the rapidity with which they wheel, halt in full career, and again dash off like a bird on the wing, beat hollow any Arab or South American I have ever seen. It is impossible to conceive finer specimens of the Asiatic warriors than are presented by many of these wiry Mahrattas. They are the *beau idéal* of light cavalry, and as graceful and picturesque in their way as ever were Prince Rupert's cavaliers. The service is very popular, and none but men of property, caste, and unblemished character can gain admission. Those of the Deccan are composed entirely of the gentry and small landed proprietors, whom caste compels or inclination prompts to a military career. The high sense of honour and the chivalrous nature of some of these high-caste gentlemen remind one more than anything else, in these practical times, of the days of Bayard and Gaston de Foix. No promises, no threats will induce a high-caste Mussulman of the Deccan to give up his arms. If compelled to do so he is disgraced for ever. Not many years ago, during some disturbance, several sirwars of the Deccan Irregulars were desired to deliver up their arms. They demurred, they entreated, they declared that if compelled to do so their caste was gone; death was preferable. The order, however, was imperative, there was no appeal. When the officer came to receive their arms they asked once more if there was no chance. They were told none. At once, by a preconcerted movement, they put their pistols to their breasts and shot themselves. Is not that the metal of which to form soldiers? They are constantly ready for active service, and the celerity with which they prepare for the longest marches is as incredible as the marches themselves. I remember returning from an unsuccessful pig-hunt at Aurungabad, some years ago, with the late Brigadier Mayne, than whom no more gallant *sabreur* ever drew sword on the plains of India, and as we approached the cantonments of the 2nd or 3rd Irregular Cavalry of the Nizam's contingent, he ordered the assembly to be sounded. There was not then a soul visible, and we took out our watches to time them; in six minutes from the first note of the bugle-call the whole regiment (with the exception of a few stragglers in the bazaar), with their camels and baggage tattoos, were on parade, and ready to march on the instant to Hyderabad or Cabul. The length and rapidity of their march is marvellous, and would in

Europe establish an *alibi* for a whole regiment without difficulty. They are still the same Mahrattas whose swift mysterious marches under Hyder and Serajee paralysed Hindostan, and nearly drove the British from their newly-acquired territories. One word more, and I have done. Half Europe is now mad on the subject of the Zouave dress. It is declared to be, *par excellence*, the dress of a soldier, unequalled for beauty, comfort, and convenience. If so well suited for Europeans, how admirably adapted must it be for our Sepoys, suited at once to their climate and their nationality. Nothing can be finer than a Rajpoot or Brahmin Sepoy swaggering through the bazaar in his turban and flowing robes, off duty; nothing more ludicrous than the helpless appearance of the same individual in tight stock, tight red coat, tight black trowsers, with boots and shako to match, trussed for parade."

Amongst the calamities resulting from want of cavalry, most of the bullocks of the garrison were carried off early in August; while British officers, unable to send out scouts, were kept in profound ignorance of the movements of Mouravieff. At last tidings were brought, somehow, that he was before Erzerum with the greater portion of his army. A sergeant of cavalry made his way into the Turkish lines, and informed the general of the actual state of the case. Veli Pasha, at the head of 5000 Turkish troops, was posted at Toprak Kaleh to watch the Russians at Bayazid. The vanguard was posted at Kuprikoi, where the vanguard of the Russians encountered them. The light fieldpieces of these forces exchanged a brisk cannonade. At dark, Veli retrograded towards Erzerum, through the plain of Hassan Kaleh. This he effected judiciously, sending on first his baggage and heavy artillery. Having reached within two hours of D  v  boyonou, an intrenched position where Veli intended to defend himself, he sent on the *chaoust*, or sergeant, to inform the muschir at Kars of his proceedings. The *chaoust* could only give the additional information that at dawn of day he looked down from a mountain, and saw the Muscovs in pursuit—but the Turks would be sure to reach the fortified position upon which they retreated.

On the 7th of August, Mouravieff being absent with the divisions before Erzerum, his second in command persuaded himself that he could effect the conquest of Kars; but only proved how powerless the Russian army would have been without the genius of Mouravieff. The Russians came on soon after daylight in dense columns, and were met by a tremendous fire from the guns of position on the Kanli Tabia. The balls ploughed through the columns of the enemy, who retired and re-formed; a second time they made a similar attempt—

similar results followed; a third effort was made in like manner, and ended just as the other attempts had terminated. Only one shell reached the Turks. The slain and wounded of the enemy were hundreds, which could be verified as the Russian ambulances carried them away, and were permitted to do so unmolested. While this was going on before the Kanli Tabia, the cavalry threatened Hafiz Pasha Tabia and Kara-dagh.

Just as the enemy retreated from these last-named places, Teesdale, who, from the opposite side of the defences had heard the firing and galloped up to the menaced position, ordered a monster cannon to be elevated, and, "laying the piece" himself, threw a ball of enormous magnitude into the midst of the retreating squadrons, causing signal havoc among them. The enemy galloped out of range too quickly to be in any danger of a repetition of hostilities from "the big gun." Thus Teesdale had the honour of firing, with his own hands, the last and the best shot of the action. When Mouravieff heard of the consummate folly of his lieutenant, he was much enraged, and made criticisms upon the skill of the officers of his army not at all commendatory.

The conduct of Captain Thompson, at this crisis of affairs, was passing excellent. His post was the Kara-dagh; his vigilance never seemed for one moment to tire; from dawn to dusk his glass was perpetually directed to the enemy; he lay down when he could no longer watch them, obtained an hour's repose, and then rose and visited every sentry round the works. "No part of our position," says Dr. Sandwith, "was better if so well guarded as that where this Argus had taken up his quarters." Teesdale and Kmety were posted at Tahmasp Tabia. Kmety was a Hungarian, and Dr. Sandwith did him but justice when he called him "a gallant man, and a first-rate soldier." Both Thompson and this Hungarian had so far rendered great service. The infantry was brought to the state of organisation it then assumed by the efforts of Thompson; Kmety's services were intelligent, and he was unremitting at his post. Of Lake, Dr. Sandwith said, "All day long he is working at the intrenchments; his couch is his saddle, for he is all night visiting the sentries; he does his best to wear out an iron frame."

Intelligence arrived that many officers had fallen in the recent attack, and among them the general in command. Officers' funerals were observed on the 9th in the enemy's lines.

On the 10th of August, Mouravieff retired from the vicinity of Erzerum. Having reconnoitred the intrenched camp at D  v  boyonou, he abandoned the hope of making any impression upon it. Throughout the month

of August, unfounded rumours continually reached Kars that troops landed at Batoum, Redout Kaleh, Trebizond, and elsewhere, which are not particularly noticed in this narrative, as they will properly fall within the scope of another chapter.

On the 10th of August, the same day which brought Mouravieff again before Kars, General Williams wrote to Lord Clarendon in these terms:—

“Mouravieff, before his late advance towards Erzerum, had been reinforced by a regiment of infantry from Georgia, making up a total of thirty-three battalions of infantry. The force he left to observe us consisted of eighteen battalions of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, and fifty-four guns. As neither our numbers (which I abstain from stating) nor our organisation could hold out a chance of success in any attack upon such an army as now observes us, I have advised the *muschir* still further to strengthen his intrenchments, and this counsel his excellency has steadily carried out, through the zealous superintendence of Colonel Lake.

“During the absence of the Russian commander-in-chief the general in command of the corps of observation has kept our garrison on the alert, more especially his cavalry, which, from its superior numbers and discipline, is master of the neighbourhood. But on the 8th instant the enemy, losing sight of his usual precautions, advanced with large masses of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, to within gunshot of the Kanli Tabia, on the south-east angle of our intrenched camp, when a well-directed fire from the guns of that redoubt obliged him to retire with the loss of several officers and many men.

“With regard to the movements of General Mouravieff, I learn through a verbal message from Veli Pasha, sent by an orderly dragoon from the close vicinity of the Dêvéboyonou, that he had executed his instructions by falling back from Kuprikoi on that pass, which I had selected, and in part fortified, before I left Erzerum; but I am still ignorant of what has subsequently taken place between the two armies in that neighbourhood, although a week has elapsed since the arrival of the orderly dragoon above alluded to. If, however, we can believe a man who has just reached Kars from the Soghanli-dagh, and who assures me that General Mouravieff's *corps d'armée* was camped last night on this side of that mountain pass, and consequently in the plain of Kars, I must draw the gratifying conclusion that he has found Veli Pasha's position, joined to the fortifications of Erzerum, too strong to molest without losses which he was not prepared to risk. Be this as it may, I trust the allies will, by a prompt diversion in Georgia,

oblige General Mouravieff to retire, otherwise nothing can save Kars from falling into his hands. We are now on two-thirds of our ration of bread, and the cattle seized from the villages will not supply animal food for anything like the period named in my last despatch. The horses of the cavalry and artillery begin to feel the want of barley, and will soon be unfit for service.”

During the week after the date of General Williams' despatch, the garrison was alarmed by perpetual cavalry reconnaissances, and changes of position on the part of the blockading force. During that time also symptoms began to appear of a disposition to desert on the part of the Bashi-bazonks and Lazi, nor were these indications of unfaithfulness wholly confined to these departments of the garrisons. In consequence of this state of matters the *muschir*, at the general's suggestion, issued a proclamation on the 18th, declaring that any persons caught in the act of desertion should be shot instantly.

On the 19th a protracted skirmish did little execution on either side. A spy was detected, who was tried next day, and shot the day following.

On the 21st a large Russian convoy was observed, accompanied by two siege-guns. The garrison was much troubled by the proof of the enemy's intention to persevere, and not to content himself with the slow process of a blockade, however effectual. Colonel Lake armed the Kanli Tabia with four additional guns, all of very large calibre. On this day General Williams again addressed Lord Clarendon on the general peril of affairs:—

“Since I had the honour to address your lordship on the 15th instant, the enemy's infantry and artillery have remained in the camp they then occupied. The cavalry, supported by horse-artillery and rockets, however, has taken a strong hill position to the north-west, about an hour's march from our lines, and, assisted by his numerous irregular horse, cuts off all communications with Erzerum, *vid Olti*, with Ardahan, or, indeed, any other place whence we could draw supplies of any kind.

“A convoy of 3000 arabas, or country carts, and 2000 camels, is now in sight, coming from Gumri. Battering guns, drawn by bullocks, accompany this convoy. I have, therefore, requested Colonel Lake to convert the barbette battery of Kanli Tabia into one with embrasures, and to take such measures for strengthening the armament of this and other works as the occasion requires.

“The weather is oppressively hot, yet the troops are in excellent health, the hospital list amounting to 289.

“Should her majesty's government and its allies determine on making Trebizond the base

of future operations against Georgia, I still trust that an immediate and powerful demonstration will be made by a Turkish army from Redout Kaleh; and for the present defence of Erzerum, I would beg strongly to urge the landing of a division of General Vivian's force at Trebizond, and a rapid advance upon Erzerum, so as to insure the retention of that important fortified post in the hands of the allies, even if this division of the contingent found itself unable to succour us."

It will be seen from this despatch that the main hope of Ferik Williams was a diversion in Georgia by Omar Pasha, which was at that time determined upon. In a separate chapter the plans and efforts to relieve Kars will be considered, when the scheme of a diversion by Omar Pasha will be related and discussed. It is desirable that the reader's attention, however, be fixed on the fact that the commissioner hoped great things from an expedition to Georgia from Redout Kaleh, as in future stages of the discussion of the relief of Kars it will appear that the general altogether denounced Soujuk Kaleh, some distance to the north of the former, as a base of operations.

On the 22nd, several of the citizens of Kars suspected of being spies were seized, among them a surgeon; the latter was acquitted, but the rest, or most of them, were either condemned or remanded to prison for further investigation. During the succeeding week several Armenians were committed to prison as being in correspondence with the enemy; it was probable that the whole Armenian population would have supported the enemy in any form for which they had opportunity, except fighting, for which that race have no taste in these days. Williams congratulated himself and the British government, and the Turkish authorities, a short time after (September 14th), upon the fact that the traitors hitherto had been all Mussulmen, not one Christian having been implicated. It is difficult to reconcile this statement with the journal of Dr. Sandwith, and our information from other sources. It was more easy to detect Mohammedan deserters or spies; *they were not used to it*; treason among them was comparatively rare, whereas the whole Christian population of Kars and Erzerum had long been disloyal, and skilful in all manner of intrigues in the interest of Russia. It must be admitted, however, that the reforms which had just been decreed by the sultan, and announced to the citizens of Erzerum and Kars by General Williams, in a very wise way, and at a time most opportune, greatly checked all treasonable practices and tendencies among them. The oppressions with which these populations had been visited by the Turks, rendered voluntary obedience to the sultan's throne

impossible; disloyalty was not only patriotic, but Christian, in the esteem of both Greeks and Armenians. Besides, these races were so furiously bigoted, that they sympathised with the fanaticism of Russia; and however Greek and Armenian might dispute with one another about creeds and forms, and quarrel with one another for the precedence of their respective rites, they were always willing to unite in promoting Russian aggrandisement as the chief hope afforded them of humbling their Moslem persecutors. Probably the principal grievance felt by both Armenians and Greeks was, that they had not the freedom of persecuting one another, all other Christians, especially Latins, and the Turks most of all. Much as General Williams seems to have known of the Turkish empire, from the banks of the Nile to Tunis, from Constantinople to Kars, he does not seem to have had a very clear insight of the genius and spirit of the religious sects.

On the 25th of August the general sent this despatch to the English Foreign-office:—

"I am sorry to inform your lordship that great apathy reigns at Erzerum, from the highest functionary to the lowest; every pasha and bey who has been charged with missions from this camp to that city has, in his turn, disappeared from the scene—a scene from which all of high rank are glad to escape. I therefore trust that, through your lordship's representations, they may receive from the Porte the most stringent orders to execute the directions forwarded to them by the *mushir*."

Upon this despatch Colonel Lake remarks, in his work entitled, *Kars and our Captivity in Russia*:—"While we had to endure this neglect the enemy was receiving reinforcements, pressing more closely on our pickets and advanced posts, forage became so scanty that we were compelled to send away our half-starved cavalry horses, and so closely were we now beleaguered, that we could scarcely get a messenger safely out of the camp. A memorandum made by our general on the 1st of September, received by Consul Brant at Erzerum at sunset on the 5th, proves our condition at this crisis of the blockade. 'The most is made of our provisions; the soldier is reduced to half allowances of bread and meat, or rice-butter; sometimes 100 drachms of biscuit instead of bread, nothing besides—no money. Mussulman population (3000 rifles) will soon be reduced to starvation. Armenians are ordered to quit the town to-morrow. No barley; scarcely any forage. Cavalry reduced to walking skeletons, and sent out of garrison; artillery horses soon the same. How will the fieldpieces be moved after that? The apathy of superior officers is quite distressing. We can hold out two months more. What is being done for the relief of the army?'"

The 26th of August was a day of considerable interest to the garrison from a daring exploit of Kmety and Teesdale. To the north of the city were posted some strong detachments of the Muscovite cavalry. Between these forces and the defences were some rich fields of barley, ready for the sickle. To hold these fields until the harvest was reaped and carried away was the project contemplated by the enterprising Hungarian, and equally enterprising Englishman. How impossible would such a plan have seemed to the "cautious" commanders-in-chief in the Crimea, French and English; and how certain of failure would any plan for the like have proved, if there were spirit sufficient to undertake it! What confusion and blunders would have attended every step! Our heroes at Kars accomplished this perilous feat; it was prepared with foresight, and taken with resolution. But how was this valuable harvest of barley ever to be captured? There were no cavalry to face the formidable sotnias of the enemy, and what general would attack them with infantry? Besides, if the force which might attempt to seize upon the fields should not be cut to pieces by the cavalry, how were they to hold them until the barley was reaped? Or if they should succeed in doing so, how was it to be carried away? Would not an overwhelming force of the enemy fall upon them, annihilating or capturing troops, reapers, and carters together? It seemed to be an undertaking very improbable of accomplishment; but, somehow, fortune often opens up a way for those who, under adverse circumstances, court her smiles by genius and valour. The force selected for this hazardous feat consisted of a strong detachment of rifles, and four of the heaviest field-guns in the place. These were to proceed direct to the cavalry camp of the enemy at Ainali, the force of which consisted of a strong brigade, comprising two regiments of dragoons, several parties of mounted Kurds, several sotnias of Cossacks, and a few squadrons of other irregular cavalry. To obtain some security against an attack in force while denuding the barley-fields of their treasures, the plan was adopted of posting Hussein Pasha upon the height of Tahmasp with two trumpeters. From this elevation he could overlook the Russian camp, and, in case of any dangerous movement, the two trumpeters would give a warning blast. Having completed their arrangements, the two heroes sallied forth at the head of their force. A broad valley had to be passed, very favourable for the action of cavalry; but, nothing daunted, the enterprise was begun, and the barley-fields were attained. The Russian cavalry trusted to the fieldpieces attached to their brigade, which opened upon the Turks,

whose fire was superior in weight, and far more skilfully directed. The Cossacks at last charged upon Kmety's flank; but a party of the riflemen, concealed among the barley, opened such a fire upon them, that they speedily wheeled about, leaving such a proportion killed and wounded behind them, as proved that the gallant little Turks were good marksmen. During the battle of artillery, and the cavalry charge, the reapers worked away, and succeeded in cutting down and carting the corn. Just at that juncture a shrill note from the Tahmasp gave the alarm. Hussein Pasha had seen the commotion in the Russian camp, and the speed with which their cavalry took to horse, and he gave forth the trumpet sound, as arranged. Kmety did not seem in a hurry; the Russian cavalry and field-guns had retired out of range of his large fieldpieces. Hussein Pasha again, anxious, renewed the warning, and far louder than before, the clangour of the trumpets filled the plain. Still Kmety did not seem to hasten, and Hussein began to fear that all was lost; he sent an aide-de-camp, who met the gallant Hungarian and his *alter ego*, Teesdale, with their brave Turks, "making no haste but good speed," and by the steadiness of pace securing an orderly retreat. The heroes retired safe to the garrison; not a man was hit, and their booty, of unspeakable value to them, was as completely as it was skilfully and bravely won. As Kmety came safely under the guns of the defences, Mouravieff's whole army appeared in order of battle, just in time to see what valour and capacity had snatched from beneath the beards of his astonished soldiers. The Muscovite army drew up on the slope of a hill opposite Tahmasp. The trumpets of the garrison sounded the general alarm, the drums beat to arms, and the citizens, hurrying to and fro, seized their weapons, and sought their posts for the expected conflict. The batteries were all soon manned, and the garrison looked forth defiance upon the opposing host until darkness fell upon the scene. The Russians remained on the ground all night, expecting a sortie, and suffering intensely from the frost; for, while the days were fiercely hot, the nights, as is common at that season in Armenia, were intensely cold. Had the enemy attacked, the garrison was in an excellent condition to have performed its duty; the soldiers were full of confidence in themselves and their leaders; the citizens, to some extent, would have fought bravely in the batteries; and the defences had then assumed most formidable strength; nearly the whole of the lines were protected by *trous de loup*, which would have rendered the success of a night assault next to impossible.

On the 29th of August another spy was hanged; but the hanging of a few spies did

not put an end to the communication of valuable intelligence to the enemy, which led Mouravieff to adopt the policy of a blockade rather than of the usual siege approaches, which would have been attended by a greater expenditure of life among his troops. Thus the month of August closed; no help for the garrison arriving from Erzerum or Trebizond, and no diversion effected from Redout Kaleh, Batoum, or from any other quarter; everything depending upon the skill of the British and foreign officers, and the bravery of them and the common soldiery.

On the 2nd of September a flag of truce brought sixty Turkish prisoners from the Russian camp to the garrison: these men were not soldiers nor citizens (with a few exceptions), but peasants and small land occupiers from the vicinity. The object of Mouravieff in sending them was to corrupt the citizens, and to cause the troops to desert, they having been well prepared by his agents for the performance of this work. Some of them did their best to fulfil their dishonourable bargain, and some betrayed him: of both classes a few were hanged, and the rest terrified. It did not need their advent to create disaffection; a whole battalion of rediffs had to be broken up, and the men dispersed among other corps. Some of these fled, and were captured and shot.

Early in September, General Williams wrote to Lord Clarendon:—

“On the 1st of September mutiny and desertion have had to be repressed by strong measures. The vigilance of the enemy is extreme. He has been reinforced by 2000 cavalry, and presses, if possible, still more closely on our pickets and advanced posts, where a daily struggle takes place for forage, which has for several days failed to supply our wants; a large portion, therefore, of our attenuated cavalry horses has been sent from the camp, in order to seek subsistence beyond the mountains and out of the reach of the enemy’s cavalry, which cannot be estimated at less than 10,000. General Mouravieff, with his infantry and artillery, occupies the same positions which he held when I last wrote.

“It is with the utmost difficulty that either horse or foot messengers escape the vigilance of the enemy, and I abstain from entering into details which might fall into their hands. The garrison preserves its health, notwithstanding the great difference of temperature between day and night: its spirit, I am happy to add, is excellent.”

The beginning of September rapidly developed new miseries within the closely-pressed garrison, and all the former inconveniences were intensified. The horses died very fast;

the weather was still too warm to allow of their flesh being salted and prepared for human food. General Williams determined to save the remainder of the horses, and as many men as they would mount. By this means the garrison would be relieved of surplus mouths, while, for the purposes of defence, its hands would not be greatly weakened. A thousand horses of all sorts, which had been used for every variety of purpose, were mustered at Tahmasp at sunset, and received an excellent feed of barley. As soon as it was twilight, they gradually defiled through the Valley of Chorek in the direction of Olti. The suspense and anxiety of the garrison were very great, and many a prayer followed them. Some foretold their destruction, others their capture; while an opinion prevailed with many that they would never dare to cut through the strong cavalry forces of the enemy, and would return to the lines. Silence and suspense reigned over the defences, all listening with painful intensity for the sound of horses’ hoofs, or the clash of arms, when pistol-shots suddenly interrupted the stillness; they were only a few—a mere discharge from some Cossack outpost. Silence again ensued for a few minutes; a volley of carbines attested a severe cavalry skirmish; this was scarcely over when a long roll of musketry filled the air; this, too, ceased, and the crack of rifles at intervals terminated the sounds of conflict. The gallant Turks had driven in the pickets, which, retiring upon the main body of the cavalry outposts, there discharged their carbines and fell back upon the infantry, who, supposing a sortie, received the Turkish cavalry with a heavy musketry fire, falling back upon their supports. At last they perceived that it was not an attack; that a portion of the garrison was actually cutting its way through the Russian lines, which was successfully performed: a dropping fire after them, as they won their perilous way, was all the enemy could do. What number of these cavalry was killed or captured was not ascertained; some lay wounded, and were taken care of by Mouravieff, who was as humane as he was wise and brave; others crept away and found shelter among the country people; but the great proportion galloped through, escaping the shot and sabre of the Muscovs.

On the 4th of September forty soldiers deserted to the enemy at once. This was the severest shock to the garrison it had yet experienced; this *grand coup* of the disaffected was followed by various similar attempts on a small scale, and when the fugitives were caught they were executed. On the 5th of September the muschir offered a reward of 500 piastres, and General Williams a reward of 2000 from his private purse, for detection of any deserter.

The horses which were unsuitable to send

with the force which cut its way through the Russian lines were gradually slaughtered, until the dogs of the town lay about the streets gorged with feasting upon their carcasses.

The food of the inhabitants was becoming scarce, but General Williams having bought up large supplies at the beginning of the siege, was enabled to dispense rations of corn daily. He also bought from the rich and distributed among the poor. The exertions of Mr. Zohrab, the interpreter, were most beneficial in these matters. Concerning the exciting events of the blockade up to this date, the fullest and best account is to be found in a parliamentary "Blue-book;" the works of Dr. Sandwith and Colonel Lake are meagre and incomplete. The volume of Dr. Sandwith is well written, and in many respects an interesting book. Colonel Lake acts better than he writes, for although his book was written after that of the learned and gallant doctor, it is much less graphic and complete as to the incidents of the blockade. In turning to the despatches of General Williams, we glean the true state of things with far more of particularisation and minuteness than can be obtained from the journals of his staff. To give the whole of these despatches to our readers would be impossible, because of the space they would occupy, but the pith and prominence of the information they contain, and of those written by Consul Brant, of Erzerum, is transmitted to these pages.

Early in September, the general wrote to the foreign minister of England a despatch containing the following remarks:—

"We have just heard that one of the detachments of infantry and cavalry (under Coblian Ali Bey) which so harass us, has marched towards Ahkiska, which place is menaced by an incursion of irregulars, by order of Mustafa Pasha of Batoum. This will convince your lordship that a serious demonstration from Redout Kaleh would cause the immediate departure of at least a large corps of General Mouravieff's army, whose camps remain where they were when I last had the honour to address your lordship."

* It was evident that whatever tended afterwards to alter the general's opinion, his main hope in September was the accomplishment of

a diversion, by Omar Pasha, from Redout Kaleh in Mouravieff's rear. This seems to have been the hope of all the European officers, although Dr. Sandwith was less sanguine than his chief of any advantage from the action of the allies in the rear of the blockading army. Consul Brant wrote in the same strain as General Williams, although he, a few days afterwards, began to hesitate as to the efficiency of such a plan. Lake and Sandwith also subsequently blamed the Turkish and British governments for ever thinking of acting otherwise than from Trebizond or Batoum. It would be hard to expect those governments to have been better informed than the British consul and others on the field of action itself—men long acquainted with those regions. The language of the consul in the beginning of September on this subject was—"If Omar Pasha be quick in his movements, he may yet be in time, but delay is fraught with imminent danger; and I shall be very anxious until I hear of the landing of an adequate force at Redout Kaleh, as Kars by that event alone might, I hope, be saved."

On the 8th of September, a day the most remarkable in the annals of this war, because of the conquest of Sebastopol, the garrison was encouraged by several circumstances. A foot-messenger brought news, more pleasant than true, that Omar was about to land at Batoum with 40,000 men. Kadri Bey informed the general that a large store of corn had been discovered within the lines, which a notorious peculator, one Selik Agha, had pilfered from time to time from the public stores. This discovery gave every reason to believe that the garrison could hold out until the middle of November.

We have now arrived at that point in the history of the blockade in which the schemes for the relief of Kars by the Turkish government and the governments of the allies must be considered, in order to account for the hopes which the foregoing extracts from the consul and the commissioner express, and which led to so many unfounded rumours floating perpetually into the blockaded lines.

Our next chapter will be devoted to the relation of what was done or purposed for Kars beyond its own confines, up to the period to which we have brought the narrative of events in Armenia.

CHAPTER XCIX.

PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE RELIEF OF KARS.

"There is one preliminary to relieving a besieged town which is indispensable, it is that you must first find your army."—LAWRENCE OLIPHANT, *Transcaucasian Campaign*.

IN the last chapter it was shown how the garrison of Kars hoped against hope, and struggled on, looking evermore towards the sea, as the source from whence help only could come. It was related how rumours of a relieving army under Omar Pasha continually reached General Williams and his comrades, and sustained their spirit. It is the historian's office in this chapter to point out in what circumstances these rumours had their birth, and what efforts were put forth for the relief of the suffering brave. The endeavours of General Williams, the muschir, and the consul at Erzerum to awaken Lord Stratford or the Turkish authorities at Constantinople to a sense of duty concerning the war in Asia Minor, were urged in vain; although some effect was certainly produced, and a great appearance of interest in the gallant but ill-fated garrison of Kars at last assumed. The allied generals in the Crimea were as immovable as the English ambassador, the French ambassador, and the Turkish seraskier at Constantinople. Ostensibly, General Williams belonged to the army of the Crimea, and was under the command of Lord Raglan and his successors; but he might as well have belonged to the army of Scinde, or expected orders, encouragement, or advice from Beloochistan or Candahar, as from the generals-in-chief in the Crimea. The French government took, apparently, no interest at all in the fate of Kars, or as to what happened in Asia Minor. To conquer Sebastopol was the grand design of the emperor, and already it is plain, from the light thrown upon his proceedings by subsequent events, he had determined upon making peace at the moment most propitious to the glory of the French arms, although all the objects of the war should not have been accomplished. The English government was alone in earnest. Lord Palmerston and his foreign minister were deeply solicitous to save Kars, and to adopt any measures, even although considerable risk attended them, which would cause the blockade of Kars to be raised, and secure the sultan's Asiatic dominions; but the generals in the Crimea raised obstructions, and thwarted the enterprising spirit of the English Foreign-office. In June the Porte, and the English ambassador to the Porte, professed to be in a state of great anxiety concerning the dangers by which Kars was menaced. The French and Austrian ambassadors did not pretend to any interest in the matter, and the

latter was solely occupied, so far as Asia was concerned, in preventing the Porte from confiding a command to the talented and intrepid Guyon, and from employing Hungarian, Polish, and Italian officers in any service there. So cleverly did the Austrian press this, and so well sustained was he by the corrupt pashas, who were jealous of the magnificent talents and chivalrous valour of Guyon, that the sultan and his more sincere advisers were overborne. Williams was not only in want of ammunition, food, fodder, money, and *matériel* of war—he required fivefold the number of good European officers to assist him. It was a great misfortune that a measure contemplated early in the war had not been carried out—that of sending Behram Pasha (Lieutenant-general Cannon) to the post of second in command in the army of Asia. That officer having gone to the Danube to see the state of affairs there, was so pressed by Omar Pasha to join his army that he accepted the command of the light division, which was the means of relieving Silistria by a feat of strategy and valour not surpassed in the whole war in any field of action. "Behram Pasha," said an experienced Indian officer to the author, "was born a soldier." General Evans had predicted of him, when only a young subaltern, that he would be a distinguished commander—and Sir de Lacy's prophecy was fulfilled. Perhaps, however, had General Cannon been in Asia, he would have been treated as Guyon was, by the villainous brood of pashas that plundered the sultan's provinces, and betrayed his interest and honour in Asia Minor. The Turkish government professed to be desirous to send an army of their best troops, under their ablest general, either to march upon Kars, or to create such a diversion as would certainly draw off the enemy from the blockade; but so beset by personal and national jealousies, private interests, rival claims, incompetency, and intrigue was every scheme projected for either of these objects, that nothing was done until it was too late to do anything efficiently. The Turkish government, the seraskier, the French and English ambassadors to the Porte, the commanders-in-chief in the Crimea, the Turkish general, the French government, all are open to suspicion as to their sincerity in these proceedings. The English cabinet alone appears with unstained honour in this cause. Among the most vile, or else the most ignorant, ebullitions of party spirit in the British senate,

the attack upon the government for its conduct in the affairs of Kars stands very prominently. Perhaps the mere advocate, reckless of the righteousness of his cause, and eager only for a party triumph, was more conspicuous in the speech of Mr. Whiteside, the member for Enniskillen, delivered in the House of Commons, than in any other delivered in that assembly during the course of the war. We shall endeavour to unravel the skein of intrigue which attended the plans and efforts for the relief of Kars, so far as is necessary for the information of our readers.

The favourite idea at Constantinople was the landing of a Turkish army on the east coast of the Black Sea, forcing the Suranin Pass, and threatening Tiflis. It was also believed there that the most suitable general to intrust with this great undertaking was Omar Pasha. He was not only willing to go, but ambitious of the honour; and as soon as he received any intimation of the proposed enterprise, he placed himself in communication with the Turkish government as a candidate for the command. He was dissatisfied with his continued inactivity in the Crimea. From some cause or other, the Turkish troops before Sebastopol were always left to guard the rear; and except on a few occasions of reconnaissance, they were either posted as a rear-guard to the troops before Sebastopol, or to those occupying the Heights of the Tchernaya. Omar felt that he had talent, and chafed at his position. This was one reason why he did so little at Eupatoria, for however deficient his means of transport there may have been, his forces were sufficiently large, and his means available, to have advanced some ten miles, and taken up an intrenched position. By thus acting, he would have intercepted the Russian convoys, and have rendered great services to the siege. But it was observed that after the Austrians were allowed to interfere with his pursuit of the Russians in their retreat from the Danube, he never regained his good humour nor his confidence in the allies, especially the French. Even at the battle of Eupatoria, it was observed by military men that he did not show his accustomed zeal; and although he had resolved, if possible, not to be beaten, he showed no disposition to take any advantage of his success.

It was, as already observed, the middle of June before any signs of interest in the fate of Kars seemed to rouse the authorities, native or foreign, at Constantinople. On the 13th of that month Lord Stratford de Redcliffe delivered certain instructions to M. Pisani, from which persons would suppose that the dearest object of the ambassador's heart was the salvation of that city. It is ludicrous to peruse his lordship's expressions

of vital concern, after what has been shown in former chapters of his ignorance or indifference, or worse:—

“I learn from Brigadier-general Williams that the Russians appeared, when he wrote, to be meditating an attack on the army at Kars, and I fear we shall have to deplore the little or tardy attention paid to my earnest and repeated requisitions for supplies and reinforcements. Even now, at the eleventh hour, it is most desirable that all which it is in the power of the government to do in these respects should be done without a moment's delay. According to my last advices from General Williams, money was greatly wanted, and he presses the demand most earnestly upon me. See Fuad Pasha and the seraskier without delay, and urge them to send off as large a sum as they can possibly spare, while they are preparing whatever may yet be forwarded in point of men and supplies. The case does really seem to be very urgent.

“I learn from our consul at Trebizond that the Russians had made an attack on Churukso, and been repulsed with loss after a sharp engagement. Has the Porte any news of this?

“Now that Circassia is cleared of the Russians, why should not the old idea of uniting the army at Batoum with that of Kars be acted upon in the present emergency? Suggest this impressively. I am assured that Batoum may be held with a very small force, supposing it to have works sufficient to be relied upon; but of this I am no judge.”

The Porte had been in possession of exact intelligence before the English ambassador, but either did not take the trouble of communicating it to him, or, desirous to humiliate the infidel pasha, purposely concealed it, lest he should remonstrate upon their apathy.

On the 19th of June the seraskier proposed to Lord Redcliffe, that a portion of the allied fleet should cruise upon the Caucasian coast, and that 10,000 men should be sent from the garrison of Batoum, which would still, in the seraskier's opinion, have a force of 5000 men to defend it. Here, again, either the Turkish official sought to impose upon the English ambassador, or he was most culpably ignorant of the state of the garrison at Batoum, the total strength of which was only 3700 men. General Williams himself was actually, at the moment, better informed as to the condition of the Turkish troops at Batoum.

The general tone of the official Turkish communications at that juncture with Lord de Redcliffe showed their desire to abandon Kars, and fall back upon Erzerum. This was under the pretence that it was bad in strategy to defend Kars; but it was well known that the pashas whom Williams had caused to be re-

called for their peculations had intrigued against him. These men had been appointed by Omar Pasha's influence, and Omar, notwithstanding the clearest proofs of their guilt, prevented any punishment from being inflicted upon them. This circumstance not only threw suspicion upon the whole of the proceedings of the Porte, but also upon the subsequent military plans and proceedings of Omar himself. The correspondence of Vassif Pasha, the muschir at Kars, shows that he was of the same opinion. This will appear from the first despatch written from Kars, on the 9th of June, by General Williams to the Earl of Clarendon:—

“On the day after I addressed your lordship from D  v  boyonou I received from Colonel Lake the confirmation of the intention of the Russians to attack this place in great force; I also got a confidential message from the muschir proposing to abandon Kars and defend Erzerum. I instantly wrote back to Colonel Lake to beg the muschir to act with the utmost vigour, and pressed on and reached Kars the day before yesterday, where I have used every endeavour to instil energy into the mind of the muschir, and I likewise abstained from remonstrating with his excellency on his strange proposition to abandon a place which we had been at such trouble to provision and fortify, thinking, as I do, that he feels the weight of the false step he was about to take, and is willing to act upon my suggestions.

“With this impression, I have been occupied all day in stationing the troops in the various batteries, in arming and supplying those batteries with ammunition, and in addressing to each regiment words of encouragement and hope. The enemy, in force about 30,000 men of all arms, accompanied by a train and vast supplies necessary for a siege, is within four hours of us, and will, most probably, attack us to-morrow.

“I have advised the muschir to write to Mustafa Pasha, of Batoum, for 5000 men to be directed on Ardahan, and to Veli Pasha, of Toprak Kaleh, to prepare for an instant march when he shall have received orders for it. This is all I can do in our isolated and neglected state; and I am happy to say that our garrison appears in good spirits, and promises me to do its duty.”

A few days after the date of this despatch, General Williams knew that no help could come from Batoum by any force at the disposal of the pasha then there.

The letter of Vassif of which Williams complains was no doubt written by the instigation of the officials at Constantinople, or, at least, because Vassif knew that that was their policy.

General Williams believed, and, after the peace argued, that by detaining a Russian army to the end of November within eight miles of their own frontier, he had paralysed their operations in Asia. This was undoubtedly the case. On the other hand, the opponents of this opinion say that the price paid for the detention of the Russians before Kars was the loss of an army, of a vast artillery, and of all the English officers serving in Kars, and nearly all those in Asia Minor. In the spring the Russian general could have operated from Kars as a new base of operations, and with all the advantage desirable, from having “snuffed out” the English influence in Armenia; whereas, if General Williams had allowed the muschir to retire with his troops and his splendid field-artillery in time upon Erzerum, there could be no doubt of the safety of that place, which was rendered desperate by the surrender of Kars; and in the spring, as it was easier to reinforce an army at Erzerum than at Kars, the allies might from that place and from Batoum act against the enemy in the field. Had the war continued, the defence of Kars would have only brought glory to England, but no gain to Turkey. This is the Turkish view of the subject. There is little likelihood, however, that those who urged it in June at Constantinople were actuated by any deep convictions of its soundness; but were rather moved by choler against Williams Pasha, the curber and scourge of corrupt Turkish chiefs. The view taken by General Williams was the correct one, which upon a future and more appropriate page of this History shall be proved.

On the 22nd of June Consul Brant wrote from Erzerum. His despatch, or copies, reached Lord Redcliffe on the 11th of July, Omar Pasha, at Sebastopol, four days later, and Lord Clarendon eight days later. This despatch was the means of suggesting to Omar the desirableness of placing himself at the head of a Turkish army, and hastening to the rescue:—

“It were superfluous (wrote Mr. Brant) to detail events at Kars, as General Williams addressed a despatch to your lordship of as late a date as a short note I received from him. The despatch to your lordship I forwarded yesterday by a special messenger to the Porte, sent off hurriedly by the authorities to solicit immediate reinforcements.

“The army of Kars is in a difficult position within its intrenchments, from which it cannot issue in face of a superior Russian force, including a large body of cavalry, which may be said to be entirely wanting in the Turkish army; for a few regular cavalry badly mounted, armed, and clothed, without any knowledge of drill, or any efficient officers, cannot be taken into account. There is at present at Kars no

deficiency of provisions; but if there be no possibility of introducing supplies, the garrison will ultimately be forced to surrender for want of food, if the Russians maintain their position. It were therefore necessary, in order to save Kars and its army, to send up reinforcements as rapidly as possible, and more particularly to supply the want of cavalry. The civil and military authorities have urged this on the Porte, and have begged me to request his excellency the Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe to impress on the sultan's government the very critical position in which Kars and its army, as well as Erzerum, will be placed by the slightest delay in complying with their demand.

"It was evident that while Riza Pasha occupied the post of seraskier nothing could be expected; his neglect of this army has been so marked that everybody believes that he wished its destruction. Possibly one of the causes of this supposed feeling may have been his desire to save the credit of his *protégé*, Zarif Mustafa Pasha, by showing that he was not so much to blame, since nobody could do better. But the advent to the seraskierat of Mehmed Rushti Pasha leads people to hope that effectual reinforcements will soon be sent; not a moment, however, must be lost, or this ill-used army will either perish of hunger, be vanquished by the discipline, efficiency, and numbers of the enemy, or be forced to capitulate.

"Everything that energy and skill can accomplish may be expected from General Williams; but it may be feared that his health will fail him under the incessant fatigue he undergoes. It is fortunate that the muschir agrees to his suggestions on every point, and that the military council is not now, as formerly, divided by intrigues. It is also fortunate that the general's care of the soldiers, his watchfulness and energy, and his calm and resolute bearing, have won the confidence of the army, and that he is admirably seconded by the few British officers on his staff. Still these advantages, great as they are, cannot counteract the scanty numbers of the force, its want of discipline and efficient officers, and the absence of cavalry; so that the preservation of this small, devoted army, must depend more on its receiving reinforcements than on its own conduct, however brilliant and self-devoted they may be.

"The muschir has this moment informed me that, in consequence of the enemy having intercepted the direct communications with Erzerum, he should send off, in an hour, a courier by an indirect route. I must, therefore, in as few words as possible, detail the events which occurred since I informed your lordship, on the 19th instant, that the Russian army under General Mouravieff had, by a flank march,

established itself opposite our intrenched camp, at a distance of three miles.

"The rain has been so heavy and incessant as to prevent the enemy from any attempt to attack our lines, but he has pushed forward large bodies of cavalry, supported by guns, burnt the surrounding villages, and destroyed one of our small depots of grain at Chiplaklee, eight hours on the Erzerum road, and probably thinking that our intrenchments are too formidable to take by a *coup de main*, he has sent to Gumri for eight heavy guns belonging to that fortress, which are now on their way to his camp.

"The duties of our garrison have been most trying, in consequence of the torrents of rain; but the spirit of the troops is good.

"I urgently recommend the immediate landing of troops at Trebizond, and if the season will admit of it, strong demonstrations from Redout Kaleh."

On the 26th of June the seraskier intimated to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe his conviction that Kars ought to be abandoned, at the same time suggesting immediate plans for its relief. The following despatch of his lordship to Lord Clarendon affects the same zeal upon the subject as his previous despatch:—

"Even at the 11th hour the necessity of listening to my advice, and sending off reinforcements without further delay is recognised. But where are these to be obtained? The Turkish ministers, who had talked of sending 10,000 men from Batoum to Erzerum, now, in their embarrassment, incline to another plan. They propose to form an intrenched camp at Redout Kaleh, and to concentrate there the corps of General Vivian completed by a draught of 10,000 men from the Bulgarian army, that of General Beatson, and the detachment from Batoum, reduced to 7000 men. The total of these combined forces would be about 30,000 of all arms. Stationary, they might operate as a diversion in favour of the army at Kars or Erzerum; advancing by Kutais on Georgia, they might either attack the Russians in the rear or force them to retreat.

"The main objections to this plan are the extreme insalubrity of the Circassian coasts and valleys from now till October; the incomplete organisation of Beatson's horse and the Turkish contingent; the difficulty of procuring supplies or transport; and the danger of exposing a mixed Turkish force to collision with a well-appointed and numerous enemy in the open field."

On the 30th of June a conference took place at the grand vizier's house. The English ambassador, the seraskier, and General Mansfield took part in the deliberations, which proved

that even the despatches of General Williams had not been attentively read by any of the parties concerned. The results of this conference are thus expressed in a despatch of Lord De Redcliffe to Lord Clarendon :—

“It was clear to all present that, whether the Russians besieged or turned Kars, the Turkish army required an effort to be made for its relief with all practicable dispatch, and that of three possible modes of acting for that purpose, the only one likely to prove effective was an expedition by Kutais into Georgia. To send reinforcements by Trebizond would be at best a palliative; to establish an intrenched camp at Redout Kaleh would, at this unhealthy season, be equivalent to consigning the troops to destruction.

“The real question was, whether a force numerically sufficient, and in all respects effective, could be collected in time at Kutais to make an excursion into Georgia and threaten the communications of the Russian army, placing it indeed between two hostile forces, should the Turkish army still be in a condition to take the field.”

The day after the meeting at the grand vizier's another took place, at which the seraskier, Fuad Effendi, General Vivian, and General Mansfield were present, for the purpose not of debating the policy of the proposed expedition, but its military arrangements, and determining whether General Vivian should undertake the command. General Mansfield gave this account of the meeting :—

“Fuad Pasha at great length went over all the matters which had been brought forward before his excellency Lord Stratford de Redcliffe the day before. He explained the situation of the army of Kars, and that it was proposed to relieve that army by a powerful diversion; that this diversion could be best made, indeed, only made, from Redout Kaleh, or some place in its vicinity, for the landing of troops and the establishment of a basis of operations; that troops so landing should be thrown in advance as quickly as possible on Kutais, and operate towards Tiflis, where it is considered the real objects of a war against Russia by the allies may be best obtained; that by such a grand operation the best chance for the army of Kars is secured, whereas by any other mode, means would be frittered away without result, either immediate or ultimate, to the good of the cause; that if the project is not adopted from want of means, they must have recourse to those measures in which they have no confidence. General Vivian replied that he should like to know what means were disposable for so great a plan.

“Fuad Pasha answered that, in the first place—

There was of the contingent now ready actually at Bujukdere	10,000
That part of the contingent to be immediately assembled in Bulgaria	10,000
To be drawn in addition from the garrisons in Bulgaria, and attached to the British contingent in camp	5,000
Beatson's horse	3,000
Albanian light troops	2,000
Garrison at Batoum and in the neighbourhood	12,000
One regiment of Egyptian regular cavalry	800
A body of cavalry expected immediately from Tunis.....	600
Total	43,000

To these various despatches Lord Clarendon replied, on the 13th of July, as follows :—

“The plan proposed by the Porte for the relief of the Turkish army at Kars, as sketched out in your excellency's despatches of the 30th of June and 1st instant, has been attentively considered by her majesty's government; and I have to state to your excellency that it appears to be objectionable for the following reasons :—

“It would be in the greatest degree imprudent to throw on an unwholesome coast, without means of land transport, without any certainty of provisions, without an assured communication with the rear, without an accurate knowledge of the country to be traversed, or the strength of the enemy to be encountered, and with the probability of a hostile population, 40,000 men, hurriedly collected from various quarters, imperfectly disciplined, doubtfully armed and equipped, and as yet unorganised, and to expose them at once to all the hazards and difficulties of a campaign against a Russian army. They would fall ill between Redout Kaleh and Kutais, and be defeated between Kutais and Tiflis. Moreover, the fragments to be united for the purpose of composing this army are so scattered about, that the crisis, if it is to take place, would be over long before it could reach the scene of action.

“Her majesty's government are of opinion that the wiser course would be to send reinforcements to the rear of the Turkish army, instead of sending an expedition to the rear of the Russian army. The reinforcements might go to Trebizond, and be directed thence upon Erzerum. The distance from Trebizond to Erzerum is less than from Redout Kaleh to Tiflis, and the march is through a friendly, instead of through a hostile country; and at Erzerum the army would meet supporting friends, instead of opposing enemies, and supplies instead of famine.

“If the army at Kars cannot maintain that position against the Russians, it should fall

back upon Erzerum, and the whole Turkish force should be concentrated there. If the Russians are to be defeated, it will be easier to defeat them by the whole force collected than by divided portions of that force; and a defeat would be the more decisive the further it took place within the Turkish frontier.

"Trebizond is a port where supplies of all kinds might be landed, and her majesty's government believe that it is a healthy place, and that Erzerum is so likewise.

"Such an arrangement as that which I have described would give time for collecting and organising the various detached corps of which the proposed army of 40,000 men is to be composed; and her majesty's government entirely concur in Lieutenant-general Vivian's opinion, that an army thrown on a coast without means of transport and supplies is doomed to destruction."

The day after the above despatch of Lord Clarendon was written, Lord Panmure addressed a very peculiar letter to General Vivian, in which he oddly combines expressions of confidence in General Vivian, and a lecture to that officer on his want of caution in offering any seeming acquiescence, however slight, in a scheme so wild as that of the Turkish government. His lordship, by a side wind, defends the policy of attempting a *coup de main* at Sebastopol, while he deprecates the like on the opposite shore of the Black Sea, yet giving very sound reasons for his views in the latter case.

"I entirely concur in all that is said in that despatch as to the objectionable character of the plan proposed by the Porte.

"I place such full reliance on your professional ability, that I feel no anxiety lest you should undertake any expedition of a nature so wild and ill-digested as that contemplated by the Porte.

"While it is your duty to give every aid in your power, not simply as commanding the contingent, but as a British officer enjoying the confidence of her majesty's government, to our allies the Turks, it is at the same time necessary that you should be cautious in not risking the honour of the British name and your own reputation by undertaking military operations for which proper bases have not been laid down, communications opened, supplies arranged, and transport provided.

"A *coup de main* by means of suddenly throwing an army on the coast to threaten, or even to attack an enemy's stronghold, is one thing; but a deliberate expedition to invade an enemy's country, and on his own territory to make war upon him, is quite another. In the first case, something may be hazarded; but, in the other, every preparation must precede action.

"Moreover, from all the information which has reached me, I have reason to believe the army of Batoum to be in a deplorable state. I know the contingent to be scarcely organised; of the Bulgarian troops you can have no knowledge, and I presume that Beatson's horse are as little reduced to control and discipline as your own troops. In short, I am assured that it would be madness to attempt to succour Brigadier-general Williams in this way. It is too late to regret the policy which has left that gallant officer and his army exposed to such straits; but it would only be opening the way to fresh failure to follow out such schemes as have been proposed for the purpose of relieving him. You must, as I have no doubt you feel, lose no time in getting your force into order for service, which will be sure to await you somewhere, as soon as you are ready for it; but organisation is as necessary for an army as endurance and valour, and without the former the latter qualities are utterly unavailing."

On the 4th of July General Mansfield drew up a plan of his own, of which his despatch gives the following account:—

"The plan drawn up by me for the consideration of his Excellency Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, was then read—namely, to dispatch the troops by detachments, to save transport, of which there is a deficiency, the first detachment consisting of about 10,000 men. The men in the neighbourhood of Batoum, to the amount of 12,000, to be concentrated at Redout Kaleh.

"On the first detachment being landed, a forward movement of 22,000 men to be made immediately on Kutais; engineers being left at Redout Kaleh to trace and establish an intrenched camp, the labourers of the country being called in to assist their work.

"The first detachment being landed, the ships to return and take up the remainder of the force as it could be got ready, and to land it by battalions at the camp.

"I explained that the object of this was at once to render available for the relief of the army of Kars the resources and troops actually now ready, and not to interfere with the ultimate and larger objects of the expedition; that it was the opinion of her majesty's ambassador that the plan was feasible, but that it would be necessary to use the utmost diligence, both in throwing forward the force and in providing the supports, transport, and supplies.

"To all this the seraskier agreed most joyfully. He said it was exactly his own idea, which he had two days before expressed at the council of ministers. It was the only chance for the army of Kars. There was a canal from Poti to Redout Kaleh, the entrance of which

had been stopped up by the Russians when Redout Kaleh was evacuated by them. Poti, being out of range from the fire of shipping, is still held by them. He believed there are two battalions there now. The concentration of the men at Redout Kaleh would probably cause its evacuation; at all events, it must be taken.

"I agreed to this.

"The seraskier quite understands that the first advance on Kutais, as has been detailed, is not a substitute for the larger plan.

"There are fifty guns of different calibres for siege operations at Batoum of five, seven, and nine oaks respectively, five oaks being taken as the equivalent of twelve pounds.

"Twenty heavy guns will be immediately put in a state of readiness at the arsenal at Pera for the service of a siege.

"Plenty of boats can be procured at Batoum and Trebizond for conveyance of stores and guns on the river Rhion when Poti has been taken. It is only a question of paying the boatmen; there will be no difficulty in that respect.

"I then informed his excellency that her majesty's ambassador had communicated with the British government on the subject, and that it would be necessary to do the same, in due time, with the allied commanders."

It will be observed that the old delusion as to the force actually at Batoum is among the data upon which the general concludes that his plan was feasible.

On the 12th of July Lord Stratford telegraphed to the Foreign-office as follows:—

"Preparations for an eventual expedition, as explained in my despatches of the 30th ult., and 1st and 5th inst., are in progress. It might save much valuable time if you would inform me at once by telegraph whether government is prepared to sanction a powerful diversion by Redout Kaleh and Kutais into Georgia, if local investigation and the engagements of the Turkish and allied authorities as to the means of execution should warrant a calculation of success."

To this question the telegraph brought promptly back a negative answer, and informing his lordship that the army at Kars should fall back on Erzerum, and the force there, if needs be, when joined to the former, retreat upon Trebizond until so reinforced that a fresh and triumphant advance could be made.

Having sketched the proceedings at Constantinople, and the correspondence between various officials there and the English foreign minister, it is necessary to direct attention to what went on at another important focus of intrigue and discussion.

When General Williams sent his despatch of the 23rd of June to Lord Stratford, he requested a copy to be sent to Lord Raglan (according to his original instructions from the English foreign ministry). The despatch did not arrive in the Crimea until Lord Raglan was no more; it devolved, of course, upon General Simpson to deal with it. He showed it to Omar Pasha, who at once called a council of the generals and admirals. At that council Omar proposed to take with him his forces in the Crimea, and effect a diversion to save Kars. The council took place on the 14th, and on the 15th of July the English commissioner with the Turkish army in the Crimea, Colonel Simmons, sent a despatch to Lord Clarendon, which he received in London on the 30th. At first the allied generals were not disposed to concede a council to Omar on the subject, but he addressed to them the following stern letter, which showed them that he was not to be trifled with, and led them to revoke their previous decision. His letter was addressed to General Pelissier:—

"I have had the honour to receive the letter addressed to me by your excellency and the commander-in-chief of the English army.

"I hasten to inform you that yesterday, after I had addressed to your excellency the note of the 11th of July, I received from my government a despatch, informing me that the whole of Turkey in Asia, up to the gates of Constantinople itself, is undefended, and entreating me, as every hour is of the greatest value, immediately to find the means, and to put into execution the measures, necessary to avert the great danger in which the government of Turkey, and, in consequence, the cause of the allies, are placed.

"Under these circumstances, since I have in the Crimea 60,000 Turks, of whom the greater part are Asiatics, and whose families and property are exposed to the ravages of the enemy, and since I find that that army is inactive in the Crimea, without any prospect of immediate service that I can discover, I consider it my duty to my sovereign and the common cause to renew to you the proposal which I made in my note of the 11th of July.

"As the matter is represented to me by my government as one of the greatest urgency, I propose to proceed to-morrow, at 4 p.m., to the English head-quarters, where I beg you to meet me in conference."

The despatch of Colonel Simmons, above referred to, received by Lord Clarendon on the 30th, was as follows:—

"The generals have signified to Omar Pasha that, in the absence of further information, they considered a conference would be prema-

ture, his highness having in the meantime received despatches from his government, wrote again, pointing out to the generals the urgency of the subject, and called for a conference, which took place yesterday at General Pelissier's head-quarters.

"By Omar Pasha's desire, I was present. The conference was attended by General Pelissier, General Simpson, Omar Pasha, General della Marmora, General Martimprey, Admirals Lyons, Bruat, and Stewart.

"Omar Pasha explained to the conference the information he had received from his government relative to the Russian forces in Asia.

"It appears that their total force of regular troops is 80,000 men, of whom a large portion are cavalry.

"They have advanced from Gumri upon Kars with a force exceeding 48,000 men, of whom 10,000 are cavalry, the remainder having taken the route by Bayazid and Toprak Kaleh, which, leaving Kars on their right, will lead them direct upon Erzerum.

"The Turkish forces to oppose this forward movement of the Russians are posted as follows:—

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Guns.
In Kars	17,000.....	800.....	72
Ardahan	—.....	800.....	—
Toprak Kaleh	5,750.....	—.....	—
Erzerum	1,850.....	—.....	24
Total	24,600	1,600	96

"The cavalry having been driven in from Ardahan is all united with Kars, and the troops from Toprak Kaleh will probably have fallen back upon Erzerum, bringing up its garrison to 7600, a force totally inadequate for its defence, especially when its position and extent are considered.

"It will be quite competent to the Russians, therefore, to observe Kars, and with their superior cavalry prevent provisions from being taken into it, and, waiting its surrender from want of provisions, to move upon Erzerum.

"Omar Pasha considers this position of affairs of the utmost importance.

"His highness is of opinion that no time is to be lost in preparing a movement which shall check the progress of the Russians in Asia.

"For the reasons assigned in a letter, dated the 12th inst., which, by his desire, I addressed to Sir Edmund Lyons and General Simpson, his highness considers that his army is the only one, and he is the only Turkish general, who can successfully oppose the Russians in Asia. At the same time, as he stated at the conference, if a decisive operation were in contemplation, for the execution of which the presence of his army was necessary, and which would have for its object the capture of

Sebastopol, he should consider himself bound to remain, as, Sebastopol taken, the affairs of Asia become of comparatively trifling importance. If, on the contrary, no plan likely to lead to a decisive result has been decided upon, and the fate of Sebastopol should not be settled this summer, the position of the Russians in Asia becomes of the last importance, and might eventually decide the fate of Sebastopol.

"These being the opinions of his highness, he impressed upon the conference the necessity of the move he had proposed.

"The generals, however, and admirals, having received no information from their respective ambassadors at Constantinople which should lead them to believe that the affairs of Asia were in that precarious state in which Omar Pasha, from the information he had received from his government, believed them to be, decided that, in the absence of such information, they could give no opinion upon the subject.

"His highness, under these circumstances, informed the conference that his government having called upon him in such urgent terms to propose and carry, if possible, into execution some project for saving them and the country from the great danger with which it is menaced, he felt it his duty to proceed to Constantinople for a few days to confer with his government upon the subject.

"He accordingly proceeds to-morrow in her majesty's ship *Valorous*, which Sir Edmund Lyons, at his request, kindly placed at his disposal.

"I have to report that it is my intention to accompany him, as my presence may probably be of use in communicating with her majesty's ambassador."

It will appear from the above correspondence that, although the affairs of Kars had been six weeks under the most serious discussion at Constantinople, and measures of relief debated there, and voluminous correspondence carried on between Constantinople and the English cabinet, the commanders in the Crimea knew absolutely nothing about it, General Williams being all the while ostensibly under the direction of the English commander-in-chief. The allied generals had enough to do with Sebastopol, without being engaged for the defence or the succour of Kars; but they ought at least to have been informed of what was passing, if only in reference to any emergency arising which such information might affect. Nor can it be believed that they knew as little of General Williams' condition as they deemed it politic to assume; for General Simpson had in his possession the despatch of the commissioner of the 23rd of June. In the very same vessel which was placed at Omar's disposal to

bear him to Constantinople to consult with his government, a French officer was sent to engage the French ambassador there to thwart his plans! This French officer was on General Simpson's staff, and pretended he was sick, in order to conceal from Omar the real object for which he went. Omar set aside all competitors for the command of the expeditionary army, and was authorised by his government to undertake the enterprise as soon as the means could be found for its organisation. General Simpson sent home a despatch by the same vessel which carried Omar to Constantinople, which showed the determined repugnance of the chief officers of the allied armies to the plans of the Turkish generalissimo. This letter is dated the 16th of July.

"I have the honour to lay before your excellency copies of a correspondence that has taken place between Omar Pasha, General Pelissier, and myself, relative to a proposal made by the former to withdraw a certain portion of his troops from the Crimea, and have them transported into Asia.

"At a conference which was assembled at the French head-quarters on Saturday, the 14th, at the request of Omar Pasha, and at which he, General Pelissier, General della Marmora, Vice-admiral Sir E. Lyons, Vice-admiral Bruat, Rear-admiral Stewart, and myself were present, his highness set forth his reasons and views on the subject in question; he also produced a very large sheet of paper, which contained, as he affirmed, the instructions of his government; but, on being asked for a translation of which, he said that it would take a fortnight to make one.

"The arguments used by Omar Pasha were those set forth in the correspondence, and failed to produce any effect on the minds of the other members of the conference, who all, without exception, entertain the strongest objection to the withdrawal of any troops from the Crimea at this moment.

"Omar Pasha having failed in leading us to adopt his views, then announced his intention of proceeding to Constantinople to consult with his government, and he starts this day at noon, in her majesty's ship *Valorous*, by which same vessel Lieutenant-colonel Suleau, attached to my staff, in succession to the late Lieutenant-colonel Vico, proceeds with this letter, ostensibly for the purpose of restoring his health. General Pelissier has also charged him with a mission to the French minister on the same subject.

"I earnestly, therefore, beg your excellency to use your powerful influence with the Porte to cause our opinion to prevail over that of his highness; for great public interests are at stake, and serious consequences might result from his success."

On the 19th of July Lord Stratford wrote to the Earl of Clarendon, giving a decided opinion against the enterprise of Omar Pasha. It is unnecessary to print the whole despatch, as it is but a recapitulation of the despatch of General Simpson; the following passages, however, throw some light upon the real or supposed motive of the Turkish chief:—

"This impulsive resolution is by no means in keeping with the decided opposition offered by Omar Pasha to the late seraskier's requisition for detaching 5000 of his men from the Crimea. His highness may account for the change of view by referring to the pressure at Kars, and to the suspension of active operations near Sebastopol. But the generals, his colleagues, deprecate the latter ground of justification, and means might apparently be employed for the rescue of Kars without deranging the calculations of the allied armies in the Crimea.

"Omar Pasha also thinks that possessing, as he does, the confidence of the Turks, and being well known in Asia, where he has made several campaigns, he is more likely to gain the sympathies and assistance of the inhabitants in provisioning, in gaining information, &c., than strangers who do not know the language or country."

Lord Stratford assured the English minister that Omar was not likely to receive any support from the Turkish government for his plans. The astute pasha knew the Porte better than the English diplomatist, and swayed it at his pleasure. On the 23rd of July, his lordship informed Lord Clarendon:—

"Omar Pasha is still here. He has been most graciously received, and also most generously rewarded by the sultan, who has conferred a considerable grant of land upon him. I need not add that he is on excellent terms with his majesty's ministers, and particularly with the seraskier pasha. His highness, accompanied by the last-mentioned minister, called upon me yesterday. He is expected to leave, on his return to the Crimea, in four or five days.

"With respect to the dangers which threaten Turkey from the side of Kars, he proposes to add 25,000 men to the 10,000 or 12,000 at Batoum, to place himself at their head, and to make an incursion towards Georgia, starting from Redout Kalch, and turning Kutais to good account.

"This idea was debated last night in a council at the grand vizier's, and the result of the deliberations, as communicated to the embassy through M. Pisani, was, that the troops to be employed in the above-mentioned

manner under the command of Omar should be taken from Eupatoria to the amount of 20,000, and from Bulgaria to the amount of 5000, and that the contingent, with its numbers completed, should occupy the vacant space at Eupatoria. By way of alternative, it is proposed that if the above-mentioned plan be deemed objectionable, it might be so far modified as to take only 10,000 men from the Crimea, and 15,000 from Bulgaria, including those destined to form part of the contingent."

The last two despatches of Lord Stratford arrived on the same day with General Simpson's, and Lord Clarendon at once communicated with the French government through Lord Cowley, the English ambassador at Paris. The English government entirely coincided with the views of Omar Pasha, much to the chagrin and amazement of the Crimean commanders and Lord Stratford. Lord Clarendon urged upon the French government, through Lord Cowley, the feasibility of the British-Turkish contingent replacing effectively the troops proposed to be withdrawn by Omar from Eupatoria and before Sebastopol. Other suggestions were made by Lord Clarendon, calculated to assure the French government as to the efficient occupation of the rear of the allied armies at Sebastopol. The French emperor, still obviously thinking only of Sebastopol, signified his assent, provided the number of Turkish troops there were not diminished.

Before Lord Stratford received the telegraphic announcement that the Western governments had decided to support the views of Omar Pasha, the ambassador wrote the following important letter, dissuasive of the favourite idea of the English government, of operating by way of Trebizond. This despatch was dated July 30th:—

"The unfavourable judgment passed by her majesty's government upon the plans which have been lately under discussion is not adopted by the Porte, or, indeed, by any official or personal authority here. The seraskier, Omar Pasha, General Guyon, our own officers, as far as I have the means of knowing, agree with the Porte and the French embassy in preferring a diversion on the side of Redout Kaleh, as affording better chances of success, supposing, of course, that the necessary means of transport, supply, and other indispensable wants can be sufficiently provided. France is, at the same time, decidedly adverse to any diminution of force in the Crimea; and Omar Pasha, ready to place himself at the head of the Asiatic expedition, requires for that purpose a part of the troops now there."

This arrived in London on the 8th of August,

and a telegraphic despatch was sent in reply, as follows:—

"General Vivian's contingent to go immediately to Eupatoria.

"The Turkish troops there, 10,000 or 12,000, to go with Omar Pasha to Redout Kaleh.

"The Turkish troops at Balaklava and Kertch not to be diminished in number.

"The Turkish force to go to Redout Kaleh, under Omar Pasha, to be completed to its proper number by troops from Bulgaria or elsewhere, not from the Crimea."

The force proposed in the British despatch, influenced by the French government in no case and in no degree to diminish the Turkish troops before Sebastopol, differed as to its composition from Omar Pasha's army; hence new complications and new delays. The result was, Omar drew up a plan, in which he set forth his views in such a manner as he thought most likely to gain the assent of all parties. It is a masterly production, and had great weight with the English government, and even with its ambassador to the Porte.

"All the misfortunes which have happened to the army in Asia are to be attributed to faults in its composition, and to the fact that its chief was not invested with full powers. Every army in a similar condition must necessarily become demoralised. To renew the *morale* of an army in such a condition, the only remedy is to be found in energetic measures undertaken by an adequate force. For this reason the pasha considers it necessary to make the following observations relative to the proposal arrived by telegraph from the cabinet of London:—

"1. The troops now at Eupatoria are composed of different materials, Turks and Egyptians, and are deficient in the means of land transport. In case the means of transport should be taken from the Ottoman troops before Sebastopol, these troops will be reduced to a similar condition. It is evident, therefore, that the troops from Eupatoria are not capable of taking the field and of manœuvring.

"2. The troops at Eupatoria have in store at that place provisions for four months, both for men and horses, 60,000 chekis of firewood, and a large quantity of reserve ammunition and baggage. The Turkish fleet will not suffice for the transport of these stores, and even if the allied fleets lend their aid, there will be great loss of time, as well as of provisions, in moving them. Moreover, at the camp before Sebastopol, the Turks have no ports or wharfs, no storehouses for provisions, or magazines for ammunition; they have no hospitals, and in

case the Egyptians should be taken to the camp before Sebastopol, in order to allow the Turks being taken thence to Asia, being without huts, the Egyptians, without being utilised for the war, would, before the spring, perish of cold.

"3. If the Egyptians were to go to Asia, as it will be necessary to keep the field during the commencement of the winter, coming, as they do, from a hot climate, and being without the means of transport, they could not perform the necessary manœuvres; and the army being composed of different materials, there would be but little chance of success in the great and important operation to be undertaken.

"4. By the execution of this project the unity of the Ottoman, as well as of the English army, will be destroyed; and it is to be observed that much of the energy, if not the existence, of an army in warfare depends upon its unity.

"From the above observations it is evident that any general who would undertake the contemplated operation under the proposed conditions, would not only lose his reputation, but would place the alliance in great difficulties.

"As the pasha has the sacred desire of being of service to the alliance, as also of maintaining his military honour, and as, if he accepted these conditions, by temporarily relieving the three cabinets of their responsibility and taking it upon himself, he would bring a greater responsibility upon the same cabinets at a later period, and cause them greater embarrassments, he feels it necessary to make the following proposal, the execution of which will not endanger any operations already undertaken.

"He proposes that the troops at Eupatoria should remain where they are, thus avoiding the difficulties above indicated, and that the Anglo-Ottoman contingent should occupy Balaklava and Kertch.

"In both places the troops of the contingent will be within fortified lines, and will be separated from other influences, and being from the same army, they will no doubt render as good service in those positions as the troops which now occupy them.

"He proposes that the contingent shall be completed by the troops now at Kertch, and that any deficiency in numbers after these troops have joined them shall be made up from the troops now before Sebastopol.

"He proposes that the troops for the expeditionary force for Asia shall be taken from Bulgaria and from before Sebastopol.

"By these operations all difficulties will be removed, and the unity of both the British and Ottoman armies will be maintained.

"The pasha observes that, as every general in warfare ought to consider beforehand the

most difficult circumstances in which he may be placed by the events of war, and to provide as far as possible against misfortune, he supposes the case that the army of Kars is destroyed before his arrival in Asia, and that the Russians had advanced beyond that place, and states that in such a case, being with an army composed of different materials, in which he could not place entire confidence, he would find himself with his army in similar difficulties to those in which the army of Asia is now placed, and would thus not only cause great danger to the Turks, but also to the whole alliance.

"The pasha further observes, that every general to whom an operation is confided, ought to consent to the operation and its mode of execution, in order that he may be held responsible for its conduct; and adds, that if the conditions he proposes are accepted, and full powers given to him for their execution, then, trusting to the goodness of God, he will take the entire responsibility of the operation upon himself."

When the telegraphic despatch of the British government reached Constantinople, Lord Stratford sent a telegraphic message in return:—

"Fully convinced that any attempt to operate by the way of Trebizond would prove abortive, besides the want of time, and difficulties occasioned by the badness of the road, his highness argues that on no military calculation could he reckon upon being able to meet on equal terms the Russian army now engaged in besieging Kars, and advancing on Erzerum."

An elaborate despatch from the ambassador discussed the various sources from which troops could be drawn, and expressed the sanguine hope of the general that if adequately supplied with means, such as he demanded, he would accomplish the undertaking.

Notwithstanding the opinions entertained in London, Paris, and Constantinople, the commanders-in-chief of the British and French armies before Sebastopol discouraged and opposed the expedition in every possible way. Lord Stratford, as was recorded in our relation of events before Sebastopol, visited the Crimea, and mediated between the adverse views taken of the Asiatic expedition. The near approach of the final bombardment and contemplated assault made the allied chiefs the more earnest in opposing all extraneous efforts until the great coming event should be decided. There existed many grounds for viewing this reluctance to part with troops as reasonable; but when other troops, chiefly officered by British, were ready to take the place of those withdrawn, there appears on the whole to have been a narrow conception of all the demands existing in connection with the gene-

ral struggle. A new correspondence, opened by Lord Stratford from the Crimea, had to be submitted to the French emperor, whose decree was as dubious as the responses of the heathen oracles. Upon the arrival in the Crimea of the decision of the English government and the half permission of the French emperor, General Simpson protested against it, abiding resolutely by his previous judgment.

Thus time was consumed in useless contest, until the season was too far advanced to allow much hope of any useful issue to the enterprise. The views of Omar Pasha, as to this delay, were thus expressed by Colonel Simmons on his behalf:—

“The pasha doubts if the expedition will now be in time to save the garrison of Kars; but if not, it will at any rate prevent the enemy from establishing himself in the government of Erzerum, and there organising measures for a further advance into the interior in the next campaign.

“His reasons for preferring Kutais as a base instead of Trebizond, as recommended by her majesty's government, are shortly as follows:—

“If he should move from Trebizond upon Erzerum, the movement would be of long duration and difficult, from the distance to be traversed and the mountainous nature of the country, which is only traversed by mule-roads, rendering the passage of artillery a work of great labour and of slow process.

“In this case, if the army of Asia should have been beaten before his arrival, and the garrison of Kars either captured or disbanded, he would find himself inferior in force to the enemy, and therefore unable, his army being fatigued and diminished by a long and difficult march, to reconquer the lost ground; whereas, by moving upon Kutais, the enemy, whose principal force is in the neighbourhood of Kars, would be constrained to retire a large portion of that force, not having other troops available in front of Tiflis, to cover that town and his communication with it.

“If the pasha could, by a rapid movement in sufficient force, gain Kutais, and seize the Souron Pass, which is the key of the Tiflis Road, he considers he would there be in a position, according to circumstances, to act against Tiflis, or unite his force by Ahkiska with the army of Kars, if that place should not in the mean time have fallen.

“These are the pasha's reasons for preferring a movement from Redout Kaleh instead of from Trebizond. They are based upon the best information in his possession, from which it would appear that the total of the Russian regular forces amounts to 80,000, of which 35,000 men are before Kars, or towards Erze-

rum, the remainder being distributed throughout Georgia and Mingrelia, with but a small force of about 15,000 men between Tiflis and Redout Kaleh.

“It is evident, from this distribution of his army, that the Russian general has considered that the allies could not have sufficient disposable force to threaten his rear from the direction of Redout Kaleh.”

This was written on the 16th of August; yet at the close of that month the general was still at Constantinople. This was from no fault of his, but from the delays and obstacles thrown in his way by the coldness of the French government, and the ambassadors at Constantinople, and the vigorous opposition of the commanders of the allied armies in the Crimea. At the close of August, transports were ordered to Varna, to take in troops, by the Turkish government; but the obstacles raised at every turn by the Crimean generals created delay.

On the 11th of September Consul Brant, having had an interview with one Saleh Bey, a *meralai* of cavalry, who arrived from Kars *en route* to Constantinople, wrote to Lord Clarendon, conveying different views from those which he had previously urged on the minister, and doubting the possibility of success for Omar's expedition, on the ground that the route was unhealthy and intricate, intersected by rivers, and intercepted by woods and marshes; and averring that unless help were sent by Trebizond and Erzerum, Kars must be lost. It was noticed by the British ambassador at Constantinople that the proceedings of Omar were slow, which the ambassador attributed to deficiency of transport, *although vessels of large amount of tonnage in the aggregate lay idle on the waters of Balaklava*. Still preparations went on, and were continued through the early part of September up to the time of the storming of Southern Sebastopol, previous to which not a Turkish soldier was permitted to depart from before Sebastopol. Pelissier was omnipotent on this question; he overbore the mind of General Simpson, who was himself, as has been already shown, hostile to the withdrawal of Turkish soldiers from Sebastopol; but after the English general thought the Turkish troops might be safely withdrawn, Southern Sebastopol having fallen, Pelissier offered an obstinate opposition.

At this point of preparation we must leave Omar Pasha mustering his forces, and gathering his men at Varna, Eupatoria, and Sebastopol. The remaining story of Kars, and of the expedition of the Turkish general, must be reserved until other events are related, and especially that which left the troops of Omar at liberty to depart—the fall of Sebastopol.

CHAPTER C.

FINAL BOMBARDMENT AND STORMING OF SOUTHERN SEBASTOPOL.

"Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more,
Or close the walls up with our English dead."—SHAKESPEARE. *Henry V.*

THE first days of September were days of anxiety and suspense before Sebastopol. A certain uneasy feeling filled the minds of the men of the allied armies; all were impressed with the idea that the great event of the war was about to open upon them, and that the city must fall or the siege be raised. There was a very general expectation of another attack from the Russian army in the field. So close was the French sap pushed to the Malakoff, and also to several other points of the defence, that it was obvious the Russians must perceive that an assault was imminent; it was therefore supposed that one great and last effort would be made to relieve the place by attacking the extreme right of the allies. It was hoped that this would happen; but the defeat experienced on the 16th of August, from the French and Sardinians, had taught the Muscovites the impossibility of forcing the Bridge of Traktar, or any other portion of the lines upon the Tchernaya.

The determination of the allied chiefs to open the final bombardment, preliminary to a grand assault, was quickened by the fact that behind the Malakoff the enemy had begun to construct new works. There was a strong temptation to Pelissier to defer the undertaking until the arrival of 200 powerful mortars from France, which he expected; but, regarding all circumstances, the chiefs of both armies considered that the time had come to try the fortune of another bombardment and assault. The final arrangements for carrying these objects into execution were made without any prolonged consultations. The bombardment was to open on the 5th of September, and be sustained for three days, when the French were to storm the Malakoff, the Little Redan, and the Curtain by which these works were connected, and also other works on the left of the French lines; the assault of the English was to be confined to the Great Redan. The hour proper for the assault required consideration and discussion, after which it was fixed for noon. The reasons for selecting this hour were that it was one less likely to be selected for such a purpose than any other, or, at all events, would be supposed to be so by the enemy; at that hour the firing generally slackened, the guards were changed in the defences, and the men coming on duty would be less cognisant of the symptoms of an approaching assault than those whom they replaced; it was supposed from these, and other

circumstances likely to be taken into consideration by an observant general, that the hour would more favour a surprise by the allies than any other.

According to the programme, the French were simultaneously to assault the Little Redan, the Curtain, the Malakoff, and the works on the left attack; but the English were *not* to attempt the Great Redan until the French flag should be seen floating above the Malakoff. The reason of this was that the Malakoff commanded the great Redan, which could not, therefore, be held so long as the former remained unconquered.

It is not necessary to enter minutely into a description of the position and strength of the respective works, and the general appearance of the place and of the opposing lines on the eve of the bombardment, as the progress of the offensive and defensive operations has been noticed as the narrative of the siege proceeded. The besieged continued to strengthen every point up to the day of the bombardment with the same skill, energy, industry, and courage which they had shown throughout the unparalleled contest. The besiegers continued to press on their attacks until such formidable difficulties were presented to their further progress as to render an assault expedient.

There existed great facilities on the part of the French for pushing up their sap to the Malakoff. Colonel Hamley describes the ground as not rocky, but "cheese-like," yielding to the sappers' tools; and it was so pliable that they were able, with comparatively little trouble, to give it the form requisite. The Baron de Bazancourt, on the contrary, represents it as solid rock of so hard a formation that nothing but the most extraordinary labour, perseverance, skill, and fortitude could have subdued the impediments presented. There was perhaps more difficulty to be overcome by the French sappers than Colonel Hamley would lead his readers to believe; but Bazancourt never loses an opportunity of magnifying his nation—the *suppressio veri* and the *suggestio falsi* are not always avoided by him, nor does he often resist the temptation to be invidious. The ground before the Great Redan was just such as the Baron de Bazancourt describes that to be which the French sapped before the Malakoff: from its stern, rocky character, all attempts on the part of the English to push up the sap were rendered abortive, and they were never able to approach nearer than 150

yards, which was the distance of the most advanced trench, an unfinished one.

The works on the right of the French, upon which they principally delivered the bombardment and assault, may be thus described without encumbering the description with technical terms. Between the ravine of the Karabelnaia and the ravine of Careening Bay the Malakoff was the chief defence. This was sometimes called by the French, and always by the Russians, the *Korniloff Bastion*. This work at the time of the assault was in the form of an irregular redoubt, and was inclosed—a very small opening only existing in the rear. From the right of this bulwark there was a line of work called the *Cerrois Battery*, which extended to the Karabelnaia Ravine. On the left of the Great Bastion, and 500 yards from it nearer to Careening Bay, was an eminence less elevated, upon which was an irregular work, called by the Russians *Bastion No. 2*, but by the allies termed the *Little Redan*. Between these two works ran a line of defence called the *Curtain*. From the lesser eminence, or Little Redan, there ran a rampart to the great harbour; and where the junction of the latter with Careening Bay takes place, there was a work called *Bastion No. 1*. A battery, forming part of the works of this bastion, swept by its fire the approaches to the Little Redan. After the French became masters of the Mamelon, the first parallel which they laid down extended from the ravine of the Karabelnaia to that of Careening Bay. The next parallel was laid 100 yards in advance; this began at the Careening Bay ravine, but did not, like the first made, extend across to the ravine of the Karabelnaia, but terminated, when extended, towards the left, sufficiently far to comprise the Malakoff in its attack. From this point two zigzags were worked—one towards the Malakoff, the other towards the right face of the Little Redan. The first of these reached within fifteen yards of the ditch of the Malakoff; the second reached within twice that distance of the Little Redan. The rocky nature of the ground rendered it very difficult to work nearer in that direction.

Such was the relative position of the attack and defence when it was resolved to recommence the bombardment preliminary to the final assault. Private letters describe the feeling of responsibility and suspense felt by the chiefs of the allied armies, by the officers generally, and even by the soldiery, as overwhelming. It was the general opinion that the raising of the siege in case of failure would have been impossible. It was alleged that the allies could not operate in the interior of the Crimea, with either Balaklava or Eupatoria as their base of operation, and leave an army in their rear occupying a fortress so enormously

strong, and which the army so attempting to operate in vain essayed to conquer. It would have been necessary, in the opinion of those who thus argued, to send a new army of 100,000 men, to be itself reinforced gradually by as many more, if the strong position of the Russians on the Belbek were to be forced, and an attempt made to drive the enemy out of the Crimea (excepting the garrison of Sebastopol) upon Perekop. To retire by sea was next to impossible. The British embarkation at Corunna was not nearly so difficult an exploit as the embarkation of the allies from before Sebastopol would have been. It is unknown by experience how far in such operations the power of steam might alter the ordinary calculations of peril, but we are safe in saying that no military operation offering such formidable difficulties was ever successfully performed.

Early on the morning of the 5th, the French repulsed a sortie made by a few companies of Russian light infantry, in the hope of effecting a surprise. The British outposts were driven back, fighting, upon the Woronzoff Road, and the *chevaux-de-frise* thrown across that road carried to some extent; the British supports were, however, sufficient (as the advanced posts fell back) not only to repel the Russians, but to inflict some loss.

The bombardment of the Malakoff and the Redan recommenced the same morning, and under circumstances truly terrible—for so near were the batteries, as has been already shown, that a fearful sacrifice of life, by the shattering of works, and violent dispersion of splinters of wood, stone, and guns, ensued. A separate battle at the same time was waged by the Russian ships in Careening Bay, and the new batteries erected on the north side for their defence, against the new French batteries of enormous guns and mortars erected for the purpose of drawing off the fire of the Russian ships from the front of the Malakoff, where the French storming-parties suffered so much by the flank fire of these ships on the 18th of June. It was a contest of horrible slaughter, and the grand conflict of the siege. The intention of the allied commanders had been to bombard for six days before storming, so that the fire of the Russian artillery might be silenced, as well as that of the ships in the Careening Bay, before the troops advanced to the assault; but circumstances determined that the cannonade should be continued only from the 5th to the 8th: perhaps this in great measure arose from the state of the ammunition. Some writers allege that the allies were so short of ammunition as to have made the attack hazardous. In a work entitled *Letters from Headquarters, by an Officer of the Staff*, the English are represented as having ammu-

nition for ten days' quick firing, while the French had only sufficient for five days' slow firing.

The number of guns with which the allies opened the bombardment was 803. On the old French attack there were 332 pieces; on the French Inkerman attack, 267 pieces: making a total in the two separate French attacks of 599 pieces of ordnance.

The English had 204 pieces, which were thus classified:—

MORTARS.	
13-inch	31
10-inch	27
8-inch	10
5½-inch	20
Total mortars	91
GUNS.	
Lancaster	2
68-pounders	6
32-pounders	61
10-inch	7
8-inch	37
Total guns, as distinguished from mortars	113

It was arranged that the French on their old attack were to fire with the utmost rapidity, while the English and French on the Inkerman attack were to fire slowly on the 5th, 6th, and 7th, and to open on the 8th with their whole force and rapidity.

On the morning of the 5th, at dawn, the bombardment began upon the French left attack, under the direction of General Lebœuf. Almost immediately afterwards the British batteries opened, and then the French right attack joined in the roar of the cannonade. It was as if the myths of antiquity had become realities, and the gods warred and launched the lightnings and thunders of Heaven as the engines of their vengeance. For almost two hours and a half the French left fired at an extraordinarily rapid rate, and then paused, to allow the guns to cool. The Russians took advantage of this temporary cessation, and set about repairing their works, while they directed a new and concentrated fire upon the British Naval Battery. At ten o'clock the French resumed fire, and maintained it as before until noon, when there was another pause, and the French fire was slack until five o'clock, when it once more opened with terrible fury until night. The English fired with pertinacious regularity and deadly aim all day. The enemy seemed astounded by the dreadful attack directed against him, and responded in a manner in no degree proportionate. It was generally supposed that the garrison was adopting the course taken by it in the bombardment preceding the assault of the 18th of June—that of keeping their artillery-men under cover, and reserving fire until the moment of the assault. During the first

day's bombardment the enemy pushed out a considerable force, estimated at 15,000 men, against the right of the lines upon the Tchernaya; they skirmished with the Sardinians above Tchorgoum, and succeeded in driving in their outposts, but made no solid attempt upon their position. The object of this feint was obviously to deter the allies from strengthening the forces intended for the assault by drawing troops from their rear.

About five o'clock a frigate near the second line on the north side was seen to smoke, and as soon as night fell it burst forth into flame. The sight of the burning ship, under such peculiar circumstances, was one of surpassing grandeur; by eight o'clock she was wrapt in flame from stem to stern; her decks fell in at ten, and before the ever-memorable 5th of September had numbered its last minutes, the fine frigate was utterly consumed. The delight of the troops at this catastrophe was expressed with shouts of joy, so great had been the annoyance which the besiegers had experienced from the enemy's ships, and so magnificent was the scene itself. During the conflagration both sides of Sebastopol were visible, every battery and object of interest standing out clearly in the brilliant light cast over the city and harbour. From nightfall of the 5th, until daylight on the 6th, the allies sent showers of shells into every work of the defence, especially into the Great Redan and the Malakoff, so that it was impossible that the enemy could repair the damage inflicted through the day by the heavy cannonade. Thus ended twenty-four hours of the heaviest bombardment ever previously known in the history of sieges.

At half-past five on the morning of the 6th the cannonade opened at once from all the line, with a crash so terrible that it seemed as if the pent-up thunders of ages had been poured down upon that devoted spot. The earth shook beneath the concussion; and those who were within the ill-fated city afterwards represented the roar of this cannonade as perfectly appalling, while the shower of missiles which fell seemed sufficient to overwhelm the whole city.

As on the previous day, there were intervals during which the fire slackened; at these periods the movements within the city could be observed, and distress and alarm seemed to pervade the garrison. The passage of troops during the afternoon over the great bridge, recently thrown across the harbour, was hurried and irregular. Men were engaged in great numbers throwing up works on the north side, and preparing for desperate defence there, as the last resource.

Tartar spies brought intelligence to General Simpson that the enemy meditated a grand attack upon the lines of the Tchernaya as the

only hope of averting an assault. There is reason to believe that this intelligence was correct; but the "infernal fire" (as the Russians called it) of the allies so engaged the garrison, and rendered preparation against an immediate assault so constantly necessary, that no action against the right and rear of the allies could be attempted.

When the sun set, the shells, rockets, and other fiery missives from the besieging lines, sped like flights of meteors over the enemy's works, and searched the recesses of the city. Throughout the night of the 5th a fire of musketry had been directed against the faces of the works to be assailed; but on that of the 6th, this was more sustained and heavy. During the 6th the enemy made a comparatively feeble resistance. On the early morning of the 7th the bombardment gave place to a cannonade, which was as terrible as if opening for the first time. The enemy opened a galling fire from their Inkerman batteries across the harbour upon the French right, sweeping the batteries of the latter, slaying many, and damaging the works. A strong wind blew the smoke from the town, accompanied by clouds of dust, into the faces of the besiegers, impeding their aim, and rendering it difficult for them to observe the effect of their shot.

At half-past three a fine two-decker in the harbour was set on fire, and continued to burn through the remainder of the day and all night, with a flame exceeding in intensity and volume that of the frigate. A fire also broke suddenly forth in the rear of the Great Redan. Late in the evening another broke out in the town over the Woronzoff Road, and another at the head of the Dockyard. The combined effect of all these conflagrations was terrible beyond description, associated as they were with the deafening roar of at least 1000 pieces of cannon, for so many were constantly engaged, notwithstanding that the number of the enemy's guns silenced was very great. When daylight died the cannonade was, as before, succeeded by a bombardment, with all its fierce concomitants. The Russians showed throughout the night a constant apprehension of assault, for they threw showers of vertical grape-shot; and notwithstanding the glare of the flames from the burning ship, and the fires in the city, they lighted up their works with fire-balls and carcasses. They repeatedly threw bouquets into the trenches of the French. Thus, until the morning of the 8th, shells and rockets fell in fiery deluge upon Sebastopol, and the roll of the musketry against the faces of the chief defences never ceased.

On the morning of the 8th the cannonade began with the day, and was delivered more rapidly and fiercely than before. Meanwhile preparations were made for the assault. On

the part of the English, detachments of cavalry were ordered up to prevent idlers from Balaklava, amateurs, officers, and soldiers, not engaged, from crowding up to particular points of observation, which would attract the attention of the enemy, and warn him that the assault was at hand. It also prevented the chance of a spy creeping up from Balaklava, from whence, by any expedient, intelligence might be communicated to the garrisons. At half-past eleven the Highland Brigade, under Brigadier-general Cameron, was posted as the reserve of the English right attack. The Guards, who had served the previous night in the trenches, were ordered out again to act in reserve. The third division was also in reserve upon the left attack. The hazard of the assault was to fall upon the light and second divisions. This was an unskilful arrangement, for these were the divisions which had served most in the trenches, and had been the hardest fought, consequently their ranks had been thinned of old soldiers, whose places were supplied by raw and undisciplined lads, not yet inured to danger, and who were, for the most part, physically inferior to the average quality of British recruits. Such of the men as were old soldiers had become so accustomed to cover in the trenches, that several engineer officers remarked upon the probability of their looking for cover too eagerly, not from want of courage, but from the habit acquired on trench service.

The English, as before related, were to assault the Great Redan, and the storming column was to consist of 1000 men; it was to be preceded by 100 men of the Rifle Brigade, and 100 from the 3rd (Old Buffs), to pick off the gunners of the enemy, and 320 men carrying 40 scaling-ladders, each 24 feet long. The command was given to Lieutenant-general Sir William Codrington, assisted by Lieutenant-general Markham; Lieutenant-generals Lord Rokeby, Sir Colin Campbell, and Sir H. Bentinck, and Major-general Sir W. Eyre were with the supports and reserves, ready to act as circumstances might require. Such was the arrangement for the English assault of the Great Redan, upon the salient angle of which the attack was to be made.

The British awaited the hour of trial with great confidence. The troops were in good health, and full of spirit. The army numbered, on the 1st of September, 48,024 rank and file, and 8986 horses; of this number the artillery comprised 6773 rank and file, including those who were with the fieldpieces, as well as those who served in the batteries. The English assault was to be given when the French flag, floating above the Malakoff, should prove that the key of the fortifications was in the hands of our allies.

Soon after seven o'clock the English soldiers were cautiously moved to the advanced trenches before the Redan, every man carrying two days' provisions, as it was deemed possible that they might have to retain, under fire of the enemy for some time, such positions as they might win. At half-past ten General Simpson took post in the second parallel, a position by no means advantageous for directing the intended operations, in case anything arose to require new directions to Lieutenant-general Codrington. Sir Richard Airey accompanied Sir James Simpson, and shortly afterwards General Jones, who was exceedingly ill, was borne thither on a litter; these three officers remained during the disastrous sequel, unable to prevent or to redeem it, helpless and useless. It was a matter much to be regretted that General Jones's illness incapacitated him from putting forth his usual vigour; but he persisted in requesting to be borne to head-quarters during the battle, notwithstanding his debility and suffering.

The French preparations were more extensive and complicated than those of the English. On the French left attack, where the 1st *corps d'armée* operated, two points of assault were selected—the Central Bastion and the *Bastion du Mât*, or Flag-staff Battery; General Levaillant was to attack the former, General d'Au-temarre the latter, upon the right flank and rear. Brigadier-general Cialdini, of the Sardinian army, was to hold his brigade of that force in reserve. The general in charge of the assailing operations upon the whole of the French left was De Salles, commander-in-chief of the first *corps d'armée*. The same signal was to serve for the assailing columns on the French left as for the English columns against the Redan.

On the French right, or Inkerman attack, there were three points of assault selected—the Malakoff, the Little Redan, and what, in military phraseology, is called the *Curtain*, by which both those works were connected together. The Malakoff was the left of those three objects of assault, and was to be assailed by the division M'Mahon, having in reserve the Zouaves of the guard, and Camou's brigade, which had distinguished itself in the battle of the Tchernaya, and was to be brought up from its post above the river to the plateau. The right of these three objects of assault, the Little Redan, was to be assailed by the division Dulac, supported by the Chasseurs of the Imperial Guard, and a brigade of the division d'Aurelle, under the command of the general of division himself. The Curtain which connected these two works was to be assailed by the division La Motte Rouge. Each of these columns was to be accompanied by 60 sappers of the *corps du génie*, 300 men with scaling-

ladders, and 50 artillerymen, to spike the guns or work them against the Russians, as the character of the success expected to be achieved might determine. These three columns of assault were to be under the command of General Bosquet, the commander-in-chief of the 2nd *corps d'armée*. The residue of the Imperial Guard was to be placed behind the Mamelon, to support M'Mahon's division, to which was intrusted the grand operation of the day.

Early in the morning, the gun-boats and mortar-vessels which had been stationed in Streletska Bay, opened fire upon the Quarantine. It appeared afterwards that this operation cost the Russians much loss of life. It had been intended to direct upon the sea-defences a heavy fire from the fleet, in order to effect a diversion, drawing off men from the batteries upon which the assault was made, but the day was so blustrous that the line-of-battle ships could not take up a position. The same cause prevented the captain of the Russian steamer *Vladimir* from attempting an exploit which he meditated—of breaking through the blockading line, and making his way to Odessa.

Before daylight on the day of assault, General Bosquet called his generals of division and brigade around him, made known to them his final orders, and said, "I have known you all for brave soldiers, and I have entire confidence in you. To-morrow the Malakoff and Sebastopol will be ours!"

At eight o'clock in the morning the miners sprung three mines before the Malakoff, charged with 3000 lb. of powder. The object of this was to destroy the subterranean galleries of the Russians. This gave great confidence to the storming column in front of that work, for deserters had reported that the Russians had wrought mines beneath the French approaches. At eight o'clock the imperial troops stood to their arms, and they heard the tidings of the approaching assault by an order of the day issued by General Bosquet. It was well suited to the temperament of French soldiers, and kindled the enthusiasm of those to whom it was directed:—

"Soldiers of the 2nd corps and of the reserve,—On the 7th of June you had the honour to strike the first blows aimed directly at the heart of the Russian army. On the 16th of August you inflicted, on the Tchernaya, the most shameful humiliation upon their relieving troops. To-day it is the final stroke—the mortal blow—that you are about to strike, with that strong hand so well known to the enemy, by robbing him of his line of defence at the Malakoff; while your comrades of the English army and of the 1st corps will

commence an assault upon the Great Redan and the Central Bastion. It is a general assault—army against army. It is an immense and memorable victory with which you are about to crown the young eagles of France. Forward, then, soldiers! The Malakoff and Sebastopol are ours! *Vive l'empereur!*"

At ten o'clock Bosquet repaired to the post which he had chosen from which to watch over the enterprise. This post was one most advantageous for his object, but most perilous for his person, as the fire of the enemy's batteries converged there. General Pelissier selected the Mamelon, Generals Niel, Thiry, and Martimprey, accompanied him. Prince Gortschakoff took post upon the Inkerman heights, and thence watched the movements in the allied intrenchments. He observed that officers and troops were in quiet and constant motion, and sent notice to the commanders of the various batteries; yet he was deceived as to its being the intention of the allies to make the assault that day. This deception was promoted by various circumstances. He knew that a large supply of powerful mortars was expected by Pelissier, and supposed that he would await the arrival of such effective auxiliaries. No reinforcements or supplies ever left France that the Russian agents at Brussels did not learn by their spies, and promptly forward the intelligence to St. Petersburg.

On the evening of the 7th the French broke fresh ground before the different attacks, which led Gortschakoff to suppose that they would not assault until they had pushed their approaches further.

During the whole morning of the 8th the cannonade was so directed as, by its irregularity, to mislead as to the real object of the allies. The hour selected was, of all others, from various causes already stated, the least likely to be selected. From all these reasons the Russian chief believed that the assault was not about to happen then. When the assault was made, the enemy was taken by surprise, especially at the Malakoff, and this was aided by the arrangement that no signals were to be given. The watches of all the generals of division and brigade were timed with that of the commander-in-chief previous to the moment for action, so that the minute-hands of their own watches might be said to give the signal for the three columns of the Inkerman attack; the English and the French left attacks, as explained before, were to be guided by the appearance of the tricolour above the ruined tower of the Malakoff.

As the clock approached twelve the excitement and suspense over all the armed lines of the allies were intense. The generals who commanded the three columns on the French

right, or Inkerman attack, held their watches in their hands, looking for the moment when the minute-hands should touch the hour of noon. The officers of the various columns stood with their swords drawn, and the men with their bayonets fixed and pieces lowered, ready to burst forth upon the enemy. A little before the moment was touched by the hands of the watches the batteries changed their aim, so as not to strike upon the spots destined for attack, but to smite the places of reserve beyond, and compel the supports to seek cover. The cannonade had smitten the embankments, parapets, batteries, the buildings of the town, and every temporary shelter which the Russians had raised to escape that "hell fire." Twelve o'clock arrived; the generals of the three French columns of the grand attack sprang upon the parapets, waving their plumed hats, shouting, "Soldiers! Forward! *Vive l'empereur!*" In an instant, like the gushing forth of a pent-up torrent, bursting its bounds, the columns rushed forward to the assault. It was an awful moment; not even the dread assaults of Badajos, Ciudad Rodrigo, or St. Sebastian, equalled the sanguinary prospect of that combined movement against the Malakoff, the Lesser Redan, and the Curtain that connected them. High above the clangour of the trumpets, and the sound of the drums beating to the charge, the excited cry of eager enthusiasm arose, and thrilled through the hearts of all.

The first brigade of the M'Mahon division had but twenty-five yards to traverse. Leading the way, that intrepid and skilful officer threw his force upon the salient of the Malakoff, and upon the left face where it joined the Curtain. The Chasseurs and Zouaves rushed upon the Gervois Battery, and immediately captured it; but they were unable to hold it, as it was swept by the fire of the Great Redan; but small parties of good marksmen found cover, and rendered effectual service. The salient of the Malakoff was stormed instantly; only a few minutes, perhaps seconds, elapsed, and the French troops were in the work. The embankments were precipitous, but they had been so ploughed with shot, and rent with shell, that they did not present any obstacle to the assailants. The French engineers were provided with ladders, which they threw across the ditch, and placing planks from one ladder to another, made bridges across the gap, over which the men went with rapidity, and easily clambered the furrowed embankment on the opposite side. The celerity of the movement was never surpassed by any troops, and was conducted with the boldest temerity. Rushing in with a shout, the tricolour was planted upon the conquered bastion. The Russians were taken

completely by surprise. A large party of officers were at dinner in a bomb-proof chamber, who seem either to have been very unfavourably situated for hearing, or to have been strangely unmindful of the excited shouts of the French, for when the Zouaves penetrated the festal chamber, those officers threw up their hands in unaffected astonishment and blank despair. The reserves of the garrison had been assembled *in the rear*, as was customary daily at that hour. Some of the officers, observing what had happened, sprang forward, calling on their men to follow; but they were bayoneted or captured by the Chasseurs, bravely resisting to the last.

The work was a closed one (as has already been stated), so that the Russians could not penetrate it from the rear but in a thin line, and against any ingress the French speedily closed the gorge, piling fascines and gabions, and digging a trench across it. In digging the earth for the trench they came upon some wires, intended as media to explode certain mines, and, cutting them, intercepted the communication, and rendered an explosion of these chambers impossible. The Russians endeavoured to storm the gorge; but the Algerine riflemen posted there shot them down as they madly rushed forward in the attempt. Some officers and a considerable body of men had, however, secured themselves in some bomb-proof apartments, and fired through the loop-holes, bringing down a number of the French; efforts to force an entrance to the passages failed, and the thought struck M'Mahon that he would smoke them out, or stifle them, after the manner in which Pelissier destroyed, or caused the murder of the Arabs in Algeria, who took shelter in certain inaccessible caves. Wood was piled against the holes, and the men from within, perceiving the intention, surrendered. The French found it difficult to extinguish the fire until they dug up earth for that purpose. In doing so, they came upon some more explosive wires, which they cut, and thus were again providentially saved from being blown up. The Russians six times endeavoured to re-capture the Malakoff, and for seven hours M'Mahon's intelligence and valour were severely tested; but while the struggle was sanguinary, the success of the captors was sure. M'Mahon was a man eminently suited to the enterprise, endowed with superior mental capacity, physical endurance, and great daring. It was some satisfaction to the British in their misfortunes on that chequered day that the captor of the Malakoff, after all, was not a Frenchman, but an Irish general in the French service. Had it been otherwise, no jealousy would have soured the heart of a single soldier in the English camp; but, having failed at the Redan

in their own attack, as the French did on all their attacks except the Malakoff, it was some pride to the English that the only victor amidst the series of bloody struggles was an Irish officer in the service of their ally.

The division of La Motte Rouge left the centre of the sixth parallel, and precipitated itself upon the Curtain, between the Malakoff and the Little Redan. The works of the French sap had not been pushed up so close to the Curtain as to the bastion of the Malakoff, and the ground was uneven. The dash of the gallant brigades was similar in spirit and celerity to that of M'Mahon. In an incredibly short time they were in upon a battery of six guns which flanked the Malakoff. The gunners instantly spiked the guns, and the engineers set about securing the position, while the storming-party continued their progress to a line of defence beyond the battery. This line was well defended by cannon, and the assailants received their contents of grape-shot at the very muzzles. Numbers here fell; but company succeeded company until the parapets were scaled, and a terrific hand-to-hand encounter commenced. A large number of the Russian gunners were sabred or bayoneted upon their own guns. The batteries were conquered. As usual, the impetuous valour of the French, so conspicuous in moments of success, carried them away. Instead of resolutely and carefully securing the vanquished defences, and waiting for fresh men and fresh orders, they dashed forward under a fire of musketry, and the 11th light infantry, with a rashness characteristic of the nation, penetrated to the faubourg.

While all was triumph along the centre Curtain and the enemy's right of the Curtain, the division Dulac stormed the Little Redan, led by Brigadiers St. Pol and Besson. They were here met by musketry and grape, but pierced their way through the iron and leaden storm, entered the work, and won it.

There were two objects of attack then presented—"the House of the Cross" and "the point." Victory still resting on their eagles, the fiery little Frenchmen carried all before them. The enemy, however, surprised and confounded, was still strong in numbers, and energetic in wounded pride and in despair. The longer Sebastopol had been held, the more did it become a motto of pride to keep it. "Your children's children," said Prince Gortschakoff to his soldiers after they were beaten, "will be proud of the name of Sebastopol." The officers, frantic at the ignominious manner in which they had suffered their vigilance to relax, and the brief and inadequate combat in which the key of their defences was lost, made prodigious efforts to re-organise the men, who freely rallied on their supports. They accord-

ingly charged forward desperately, with the rage and strength of maniacs. Against the Malakoff, as already shown, they dashed themselves in vain; they fell back, broken and scattered, as the wave which the storm impels, but which the rock receives and disperses. The imprudence of the conquerors along the Curtain and in the Little Redan afforded the chance which was bravely made available of a successful assault from the rear. At one moment a furious cannonade opened from twenty fieldpieces, from the cemetery batteries, the batteries of the north bank, and the steamers. After this fire had scattered the slain all over the works, as the blossoms of the orchard stricken by the hailstorm, the Muscovite reserves, charging from the Ravines of Outchakoff and Oupatanoff, which ended near the military harbour, entered the rear, and swept out the decimated French as with a besom of destruction. Numbers of officers had fallen under the fire, leaving the newly-installed garrison of the works less competent to hold their ground. The French engineers had begun to close the gorge of the Little Redan, and were rapidly intrenching; but had not time to accomplish their plans when the living torrent surged over the work and the workmen, rolling the French before it into the ditches, where some obstinately clung in a vain and unequal struggle, while the rest ran back in the utmost confusion to their parallels. One regiment, the 49th of the line, is represented as having been seized with panic; they turned, and fled, and no efforts of their officers could induce them to renew the attack. The only authority to which we can trace this statement is that of a person who wrote under the name or pseudonyme of "a staff officer," and whose book so abounds in inaccuracy and in unfair and partial statements that little reliance can be placed upon it. It is often very invidious to the French.

The defeat of the French in the Little Redan left the batteries there at liberty to open a flanking fire upon the Curtain conquered by La Motte Rouge, who was in turn obliged to retire with some precipitation.

General Bosquet saw these reverses, and had provided for them. He had made an opening of about fifty yards in all the parapets, so that artillery could be wheeled through, and infantry advanced in formation. These open spaces were "blinded" by gabions, and men were ready to knock them down when the passage of the infantry and artillery was requisite. Through these gaps Bosquet hastened forward two field-batteries, which, galloping up close to the defences, opened with grape upon the enemy's gunners and a large body of infantry. The first salvoes knocked over numbers of the Muscovite gunners, and cut through

their infantry; but the fire to which these batteries were exposed was so heavy, rapid, and well-aimed, that the majority of both men and horses were killed in a very short time. Finally, the French were expelled from the Little Redan and the Curtain with heavy slaughter—1000 men had fallen in the formidable struggle.

While this was going on at the French right, other events proceeded elsewhere. General Pelissier, seeing from the Mamelon that the force of M'Mahon was safe in the Malakoff, hoisted the signal agreed upon in the redoubt where he stood—the flag of France. It was promptly obeyed by the men of the left attack. General Levaillant led his division against the Central Bastion, moving forward at a run. Scarcely had this division left the trenches, when a number of large guns poured from their yawning mouths a terrible *mitraille*. Upon this point the enemy expected an assault, and was well prepared. The French were sent reeling back, a broken and bleeding remnant. Fresh troops were ordered up as soon as the assaulting division began to give way; but the latter fell back so precipitately, and in such disorder, upon the trenches, where the reserves were waiting to renew the assault, that no immediate movement was made. The "staff officer," before referred to, affirms that the trenches became choked with men, many of them wounded, and a state of crowding and disorganisation ensued, so that the men could not be got out in proper formation. However that may be, Generals Rivet and Breton leaped from the parapet, calling upon the brave to follow. They had only time to repeat the heroic invitation, when they were shot down dead some yards in advance of the parapet. The French soldiery lost all their accustomed gallantry, and refused to leave the trenches; the example of destruction they had witnessed during the advance of Levaillant's division, and the instant death of the brave Generals Breton and Rivet, paralysed them. So many officers had fallen, that orders were not understood, or not obeyed, and, finally, no longer given, and a sort of *suave qui peut* prevailed for a short time, until the guns of the attack opened upon those of the defences, asserting a superior fire. General de Salles began preparations for a renewed assault, sending off word to the commander-in-chief of the failure already sustained. Pelissier wisely prohibited any fresh attempt, and sent orders also against renewing the assaults upon the Little Redan and the Curtain, alleging that with the possession of the Malakoff he could command the place, and compel the enemy to abandon the works by his fire from that bastion.

During the afternoon, and during one of the intervals of the attempts of the Russians to re-

cover the Malakoff, a store of powder exploded near that work, inflicting some damage upon it, and spreading alarm not only in its garrison, but through the whole of the allied lines.

Thus closed the various acts of the French defeats and victory. Never during the siege did the French display more skill, but they often displayed more valour. They experienced three desperate defeats—one of these a double one, that on the Central Bastion (left attack); and for the first time during the war was a French regiment seized with panic, or did a whole French division, numerous and well appointed, refuse to meet the enemy. The victory gained was by a surprise. It was comparatively easy to keep that conquest, turning its own guns against the expelled foe; it was certainly retained only by skill and audacity, but it was an Irishman, not a Frenchman, as already remarked, by whom these qualities were so opportunely displayed.

Some episodes in the struggle had nearly been attended with serious consequences. General Bosquet, who, as has been shown, occupied a dangerous position, was surrounded by some Russian officers, prisoners, and some French officers and soldiers, in whose charge they were. While interrogating the prisoners, a shell burst close by them, killing or wounding all who surrounded the general, whose life was only saved by being thus encircled. Had Bosquet fallen at that crisis of the engagement, it might have seriously put the ultimate victory in peril, as the direction of the right, or Malakoff attack, depended upon him, as its chief execution depended upon M'Mahon.

Later in the action, Bosquet was leaning over the parapet, watching the progress of affairs, when another shell burst a few feet from the parapet; a fragment grazed his face, and carried off the shoulder-strap of Commandant Ballaud, his first aide-de-camp; another fragment struck the general himself on the right side. He fell back, stunned by the severity of the blow; he soon recovered consciousness, and, in some degree, power of speech, and commanded silence on those around him; but, on renewing his surveillance of the battle, his strength gave way, he was so shaken by the blow. He had just power to order General de Cissy to apprise Dulac that the command of the second *corps d'armée* devolved upon him, and to inform the commander-in-chief, when he sunk back, fainting, in the arms of his aides-de-camp, and was placed upon a litter, and borne from the field. The French soldiers were filled with grief, supposing him mortally wounded, and every soldier uncovered his head while the litter was borne past. Fortunately, the strife was decided before the gallant general was borne away from

the post he had so bravely taken and so skillfully occupied.

While the French were forcing their fiery way against the assailed batteries, the English were as desperately and far more unequally engaged at the Great Redan.

When the French standard danced in joy to the breeze which blew so roughly around the Malakoff, Pelissier hoisted the flag over the Mamelon, not only as a signal to his own left attack for the storming of the Central Bastion, but as the signal agreed upon between himself and Sir James Simpson for the storming of the Great Redan. This was a work far more formidable than any other in the lines of the Russian defence. The Malakoff was more important to the defence, and its capture more important to the assailants; but the difficulty of storming it under the circumstances in which the French attack stood in relation to it was far less than that of carrying the Redan under the conditions of the English attack to the latter. Admiral Sir Houston Stewart, in a letter to Lady Houston Stewart, put the comparison in this form after the defeat of our assault:—"Those who have seen the Malakoff and the Redan know well that no comparison as to the difficulty of assault exists between them. In the one case deep trenches were cut in yielding soil to within twenty-five paces of the ditch, having the Mamelon in the rear, keeping up an incessant hail of shot and shells up to the very instant appointed for the assault, and capable of containing any amount of troops in reserve, as well as a capacious *place d'armes* at the termination of the sap; in the other case, that of the Redan, was a hard rocky soil, impossible to penetrate much beyond three feet in depth, and the termination of the trench at a distance of 280 paces from the parapet. No possibility of forming any *place d'armes*, and the whole advance open to a murderous fire from batteries on both flanks of the Redan. The Redan itself, too, was perfectly open to its own rear, where 1000 men could march abreast to its defence; whereas the Malakoff, being closely fortified to its rear, was peculiarly capable of being held when once entered. And it was nobly entered, and nobly held, by our French allies, who, confident in themselves, resolutely declined to allow any portion of the British or Sardinian troops to join in its attack, although it was repeatedly urged upon them, knowing, as every one did, that the Malakoff was the key of Sebastopol, and that, if the attack on it failed, the remaining points of attack, even if successful, could not be held for one hour. Oh! let us not blame our soldiers for not holding the Redan; they gave 'material guarantees' at Alma, at Inkerman, and at Balaklava that no troops in the world can surpass them in courage and conduct, and in that brave and truly

British quality which our friends call '*solidité*,' and we know by the homely name of 'pluck.'"

When Sir James Simpson saw the signal of McMahon and Pelissier, he ordered four rockets to be thrown up from Chapman's Battery, one after another, and the assault commenced. The Rifles advanced under Captain Hammond, who soon met a soldier's death; the Buffs, under Captain John Lewis, who proved himself as gallant, and found himself more fortunate. The scaling-ladder party, of 320 men, were selected half from the Buffs, under the gallant Captain Maude, and half from the 97th, under Major Welsford, who bravely did his duty, and fell in its performance. These men were collected, early in the morning of the 8th, in the most advanced trench, the whole under the command of Major Welsford. The engineer officer was Lieutenant Ranks, to whom General Jones gave such directions as he deemed necessary, leaving the rest to the gallant lieutenant's discretion. That officer requested Major Welsford to tell off eight men to each ladder, and to cause every man to stand or sit beside his ladder until he advanced to the assault. Lieutenant Ranks was ordered to conduct the party to the best point for placing the ladders, and a small force of twenty sappers was placed under his command for the removal of such obstructions as might be presented, and armed with crowbars and axes to break through the abattis, and with picks and shovels to form what is technically called a *ramp* into the ditch. It is surprising to think of only one lieutenant of engineers, and twenty sappers, assigned to the stormers, the object being to assault one of the most powerful works of defence ever assailed! When the signal was given, the Rifles and Buffs rushed forward and endeavoured to pick off the gunners, a work in which they had little success, being themselves victims to the flanking fire which swept over the long space which they had to traverse before reaching the work. The ladder-party ran forward as fast as they could; when they reached the advanced trench several of these were left behind, the party attached to them having been in such cases nearly swept away in the progress thither. Mr. Russell affirms that the ladders were too short; but this was not the case, for each ladder was twenty-four feet long, while the depth of the ditch at the salient was only between twelve and fifteen feet deep. Mr. Russell also says that very few of the ladders were placed against the salient; but that statement is an inadvertency, for all the ladders brought up were placed there, and very few were left behind. The flanking fire of the enemy could not touch the men who placed the ladders, so that they were able to lay them against the salient. The orders of General Jones to Lieutenant Ranks were to make the descent into the ditch and the

escarp practicable. This was effected in a few moments, a "ramp" was formed, and many of the men ran up, requiring no ladders. There was not a man delayed from want of means for mounting the escarp, and no part of the disaster which ensued is justly attributable to such a cause. Brigadier-general Shirley was ill on board ship at Balaklava, but, emulating the chivalry of Sir de Laey Evans at Inkerman, he hurried up to the lines when he heard of the assault. Colonel Unett was the senior officer of the light division, in the absence of the brigadier, and he tossed with Colonel Windham for the choice of position; Unett won, and chose "the lead," exclaiming that he would "be the first man in the Redan." He fell wounded, before reaching the abattis. Brigadier Shirley was temporarily blinded by the dust, which blew about in dense clouds, and which a shot drove up into his face; he was consequently unable to proceed. The command of the detachments of the light division then devolved upon Lieutenant-colonel Bunbury, of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers. Brigadier Von Straubenzee received a contusion on the face, and was compelled to return before reaching the abattis. Colonel Handcock was shot by a musket-ball through the head, and fell dead before reaching the work; Captain Hammond met a similar fate; Major Welsford entered the work through an embrasure, at the head of the ladder-party, and was immediately killed; Captain Grove was at the same instant severely wounded. Of all the officers commanding detachments, only Colonel Windham, Captain Fyers, Captain Lewes, and Captain Maude, entered the Redan unhurt. The distance over which the men had to pass under a galling fire, which cannonaded every inch of the space, was one of the great fatalities of the enterprise. Our soldiers, bravely led by their officers, entered the salient under a fire more severe than the French encountered on any of their attacks. Nothing ever achieved by British soldiers surpassed the heroism with which they entered that grim bulwark. The Russians gave way instantly, but did not retreat from the work; placing themselves behind the traverses they took deliberate aim. The British, accustomed to the cover of the trenches, began to seek cover in the Redan, or to skirmish as men do who fire under shelter, instead of acting as stormers, and charging with the bayonet. It is the general impression that had they done so, the Redan would have been captured. It is strange how such an opinion could ever be entertained; doubtless the Russians would have been driven out momentarily, but the open space of the interior of the work was cannonaded both by guns of position and by fieldpieces from the rear, and the force of the enemy was such as

the number of men sent against the work could not have resisted, unless powerful reinforcements had been speedily sent. The men would have charged, had they confidence in their numbers or their commanders. Such were the arrangements of General Codrington, that no reinforcements were sent, and a more protracted resistance would have probably only issued in a greater loss of life. At all events, the detachments of the light division which first entered the salient would not charge, although the exertions of the officers to induce them to do so were almost superhuman.

When the parties of the second division, under General Windham, arrived through the pitiless storm of fire under which they had to pass, Windham penetrated upon the right of the parties of the light division, already file-firing and skirmishing from the angle of the salient, and being swept down by the cannon and musketry of the Russians from the rear of the work. Fieldpieces were pushed forward through the breastwork at the rear, and discharged a deluge of horse-nails and grape upon the opening. The 90th and 97th regiments behaved with great gallantry, several of the men rushing out into "the open" after their officers, ready to charge with the bayonet; but their courage was not seconded, and only increased the number of the victims. Entering upon the right of the light division, on the left face of the work, Windham led his detachments of the second division in by the embrasures, from some of which they were repulsed by flames which burst from them. There was a fearless and eager scramble to get in, Windham being the first, or among the first; immediately behind him Daniel Mahoney, a grenadier of the 41st regiment, two other soldiers of the same regiment, Killeany and Cornellis, entered along with them. Mahoney leaped into the open, shouting, "Come on boys!" and fell dead from the bullet of a Russian rifle; his compatriots, Killeany and Cornellis, at the same time fell wounded. Cornellis claimed to be the first man of the division who entered the Redan. The same scenes occurred in the second division detachments as in those of the light; the men would not charge; there was a general feeling that the place was mined, and a want of confidence in the plans of the superior officers, begotten by the calamitous mismanagement of Raglan, but still more especially of Pelissier on the 18th of June. The men felt also that it was a mockery to send so small a force to storm a work so vast, defended by such numbers. In the Redan the British officers behaved with a courage far superior to the men, and never before anywhere did English gentlemen show more intrepidity. Neither the officers nor men of the enemy displayed their usual courage. They had an awe of the English in the use of

the bayonet, or they would have swept the Redan of the handful of men opposed to them. As the Russians arrived in great numbers, they still kept at a distance, offering a severe but continuous fusillade. Windham sent three officers to Sir E. Codrington for assistance; none returned; they all fell in the effort to discharge this duty. Sir Edward, without receiving any message, might have had sense enough to send reinforcements, and still be a very foolish man. Colonel Windham, perceiving the hopelessness of doing anything with the forces he held, and fearing the loss of the Redan, resolved to go himself and obtain aid from General Codrington. Turning to a superior officer, he remarked—"If I fall, you know why I have left," and then made his way in safety to Sir Edward. Sir Edward informed him that if the reinforcements he could spare him were of any use he might have them, and told him to take with him a battalion of the 1st Royals. The brigadier replied that if the battalion preserved its formation, the Redan would be captured—a remark which he would not have made had he known the progress of affairs after he left, for as he turned towards the work, the British were leaping from the salient, pursued by the bayonets and fire of the Russians. Immediately upon Windham leaving for the trenches, the enemy, reinforced, pressed onward with the bayonet; the few British left, although unwilling to advance, were unwilling to retreat, and maintained an obstinate resistance; a fearfully bloody struggle ensued. The ammunition of the English was exhausted, but they pelted the Russians with stones, who returned this mode of warfare by hand-grape, a more formidable missile. The English officers fought and fell heroically, leaving abundant proof in death of how they had grappled with the foe. Under cover of the artillery and rifles, some of the men got away. The contest lasted an hour and three-quarters, and the British lost more men and officers than at the battle of Inkerman, when they endured the charges of superior numbers for seven hours.

One of the immediate consequences of the failure at the Redan was, that the Russians, set free there, reinforced their comrades at the Little Redan, which the French would in all probability have retained, had it not been for the loss by the English of the Greater Redan.

One of the most heroic episodes of the conflict in the Redan was connected with the conduct of a youth named Massy, a lieutenant of the 19th regiment, but who acted as captain during the assault. This young officer stood out in the open, in the hope of inducing the soldiers to follow; and there, amidst the most terrible fire, he bravely stood with a courage and dignity which excited the astonishment

and admiration of friends and enemies. Sir de Lacy Evans has been called "a living target," and this brave young officer may also claim the appellation. He has been ever since known by the honourable title (for such we may call it) of "Redan Massy." He was terribly wounded, and bore his sufferings with a fortitude worthy of his active courage. After serving his country so nobly, he returned to his native city, Dublin, and resumed his studies in the University, the fellows and students of which presented him with a magnificent sword. He is as modest and amiable as intelligent and brave. He remains, however, as every reader of this History would expect, still a subaltern.

When Pelissier perceived the failure at the Redan, he sent to Sir James Simpson to inquire whether he intended to renew the assault. The reply was, that Sir James was not in a condition again to attack that day, but that he would do so the next morning; in pursuance of this determination, the Highland division, under Sir Colin Campbell, was ordered to hold itself in readiness to perform this perilous service. Sir Colin and his brave Highlanders were proud of the honour conferred upon them, and, undismayed by the failure which had already filled the English army with chagrin and sorrow, they looked forward with pride and confidence to the morrow. Meanwhile, General Simpson directed the whole force of his artillery against the Redan; the English gunners seemed to work with vindictive fury, so fast did they pour their terrible cannonade upon the batteries, which broke and splintered beneath the ponderous shot; the guns of the enemy were effectually silenced, and the work itself, notwithstanding its magnitude and armament, suffered much.

Thus ended a day of mingled grief and triumph—the English army bewailing their gallant dead, and mortified with a sense of defeat, which officers and men universally attributed to the incompetence of those high in command.

When daylight died away, flames were observed to break forth in several directions of the city, and loud explosions succeeded one another with rapidity, sending their reverberations through the ravines, and booming far over the plateau to the sea. The curiosity of the allies was much excited by these incidents. A British engineer officer performed a feat similar to that which was achieved by Major Snodgrass in one of the sieges of the peninsular war, who crept up the breach and observed the enemy. This engineer officer ascended the face of the salient of the Redan, and perceiving that the work was entirely abandoned, reported the fact to Sir James Simpson. He did not immediately order it to be occupied, probably from the well-founded belief that it

was mined. Sir Colin Campbell, however, caused parties of his Highlanders to go in and remove the wounded. All had not been carried away before new and terrible explosions were heard in the immediate vicinity of the Redan, and at four o'clock in the morning the magazine of the Redan was exploded. The whole of the allied camps were startled; the sleepers leapt from their couches, and rushed wildly to the front, for the ground beneath them heaved as in an earthquake. In about three-quarters of an hour afterwards, the *Bastion du Mât* (Flag-staff Battery) was blown to atoms. Soon after, the roar of explosions again rushed along the plateau, and the Garden Batteries were broken, and hurled into the air. The Russians, when they resolved to abandon the south side, stored up combustibles in the houses, and set fire to them, and blew up systematically nearly the whole of the magazines, scattering in heaps of dust and rubbish the batteries behind which they had so long and so well fought. Glowing descriptions have been given of the magnificence of the scene, as the burning city fell in fragments amidst the ascending flames; but, in truth, it was not so picturesque or terrible to the eye as to the ear and to the imagination. So gusty was the night that clouds of dust occasioned by the explosions blew against the allied lines, rendering it difficult for any one to look long or attentively upon the conflagrations; moreover, the smoke was so dense, ascending in huge, deep columns, that even the flames were partly hidden from sight. On the morning of the 9th, by dawn, the scene was more striking—the grey light covered the smouldering ruins, and every well-defined object stood out darkly and grimly above the burning piles. The Russians had evacuated the city, and the last of them were seen passing the bridge across the harbour. No attempt was made to molest them, and as the last company passed, the bridge was broken down. Sebastopol was left in smouldering ruins to the conquerors.

The Russians acted in a very masterly manner in this retreat; every action was timed so nicely, that the last of the retreating force had passed the bridges when the day was sufficiently clear for an enemy to take advantage of its light. There had been no confusion, nor any apparent hurry. Until nearly morning, the troops kept up a steady musketry fire against the Malakoff, as though it was their intention to make a grand effort to recover it. Never did day open—not, even upon the doomed ruins of Moscow—upon a scene which united more the elements of the appalling and picturesque. Our troops gazed upon it with wonder and horror.

On looking towards the harbour, the fleet was

gone; even the gallant *Vladimir* was not to be seen—the ships were committed to the deep while the city was given to the flames. Thus perished the last of that magnificent sea armament, the terror of Turkey, and to destroy which was one of the leading objects of the war.

Soon after daylight, and while the allied armies crowded the heights to witness the strange view before them, proof was given that the whole work of destruction did not terminate with the hours of darkness. Fort Paul, the handsomest fort in Sebastopol, situated close to the harbour, was blown up; a slow train had been ignited, along which the fire marched with steady progress, while the retreating army passed the bridge; the moment, calculated to a nicety by the Russian miners, arrived, and Fort Paul was hurled from its foundations with a report loud as the peal of ten thousand thunders. The earth far around trembled to the shock, and whatever in magnificence of sound can awe and fill the imagination, was there.

The curiosity of the soldiery and of amateurs to “see into Sebastopol” was very great; but the military authorities, wisely anticipating this, placed a cordon of sentries round the city; this kept most out, but not all that desired to go in at any risk; and not a few, therefore, were killed and wounded by explosions during the day. The smaller mines and magazines blew up from hour to hour, making the ruins still more ruinous; imperfectly ignited aggregations of combustibles were made bare, by these explosions, to the wind, which drifted sparks upon them, and set them again in a blaze. It was, from these causes, exceedingly dangerous to visit the place; and the whole of the 9th became consequently a day of excitement, and of that excitement which arises from suppressed curiosity and an imperfect scope for inquiry, where, nevertheless, great interests are concerned, and high and legitimate feelings impel.

Throughout the day many of the soldiers, at all risks, were engaged in plunder—if it could be called so—and loaded themselves with every species of property, often incongruous and useless. “What do you want with these things, my men?” said an officer to a group of Irish soldiers. “Sure, an your honour, don’t we mane to let furnished lodgings!” was the reply. The Irish and the Zouaves exposed themselves to danger in a most reprehensible manner, scaling burning buildings, descending into stifling cellars, and, in fact, wandering into all imaginable places with the most entire recklessness of consequences. The Zouaves declared that the Hibernians were models of illicit foraging, and the Irish seemed to regard the Zouaves as persons beyond emulation. “Sure, your honour, where there is

room for a rat there is room for one of thim little Zouaves,” said a stalwart Irish Grenadier to a rebuking superior; “and how could we stale anything when they are afther emptying a place clane out?” “Troth, if the devil was asleep, a Zouave would stale one of his horns to keep his coffee in!” was the logical support rendered to his comrade by another Grenadier, anxious to devolve the entire culpability upon the ubiquitous Zouaves.

During the night of the 9th there were less dust and smoke, and as new stores of combustibles ignited, the grandeur of the scene became indeed striking; pile after pile of flame ascending to the heavens; the whole north shore illuminated; the harbour livid with the reflection of so many fires, as if itself a river of flame tossed by a storm; the Star Fort and all the bulwarks of the northern fortifications red and clear in the flash of fiery light which covered them.

On the 10th the fires all smouldered out, and Sebastopol, cleaved and broken, lay at the feet of her conquerors. One large building only remained intact—a large barrack near the Dockyard Creek. The Russians spared it, the spreading flames forsook its vicinity; and when at last the allies, entering the city, penetrated this building, they were amazed to discover that it was the hospital, and that there lay 2000 dead and dying men. The scene was such as might test the nervous power of the soldier most inured to bloodshed. There lay men in every conceivable attitude, cold in death, the maimed and bruised with the seemingly uninjured, only that life had fled. The stench struck back those who had essayed to enter first. The wounded were numerous, and writhed and groaned in their agony, as they rolled amongst the dead, or lay helpless and motionless near some mass of putrefaction. British soldiers were there, and among them the gallant and unfortunate Captain Vaughan. Oh, war, how dark thy deeds! what horror and wreck appear wherever thy bloody touch is traced!

A steamer crossed from the northern side, under a flag of truce, with an officer, who begged, in the name of Prince Gortschakoff, for permission to remove the wounded, a request at once granted: 500 Russian soldiers were handed over to those appointed to receive them. These poor fellows had remained forty-eight hours without any care, and, such as were conscious, under the horrible suspense of the fate that might possibly await them if the barracks ignited or blew up. In addition to these objects of horrible interest there were 700 bodies, most of them undergoing decomposition, found in a vast underground cellar. It was here poor Captain Vaughan of the 90th was discovered, and several English

and French soldiers, yet alive. In another part of this barrack 200 confined corpses were seen, arranged in order preparatory to burial; these were the remains of officers who had fallen during the bombardment and assault.

By degrees the dead were buried and the wounded removed on all points of the conflict, and the allies commenced the demolition of the Docks and of any buildings which remained. A description of the occurrences connected with the work of destruction continued by the allies must be reserved for a future chapter. A review of the destruction of men sustained by the belligerents is still necessary to complete the narrative. In the *Invalide Russe* the losses of the czar's army on the 8th of September were stated as follows:—

OFFICERS.	
Killed	59
Wounded	279
Missing	24
Total	362
RANK AND FILE.	
Killed	2625
Wounded	6964
Missing	1739
Total	11,328

There is every reason to believe that this statement is far beneath the fact. This, however, was but a portion of their acknowledged loss connected with the final operations of the allies to reduce the place. The fifth bombardment, and the sixth, or final bombardment, followed close upon one another, the former beginning on the 17th of August, the latter on the 5th of September. From the former date the sufferings and losses of the Russians were terrible, beyond expression; and these, taken in connection with the slaughter they experienced on the 16th of August upon the *Tchernaya*, constitute such as, in the same space of time, few armies have ever endured. The *Invalide Russe* reported the killed and wounded, during the bombardment of the 17th of August, as 1500 men. From that date to the 21st, 1000 men daily; from the 21st, the number of killed and wounded was reduced to between five and six hundred men daily until the opening of the final bombardment. During the three days of the last bombardment their acknowledged loss was 4000 men. From the 17th of August to the close of the assault, the Russian official organ admitted that about 18,000 men had been put *hors de combat*. The real amount was probably about 30,000.

The French losses from the 5th to the 9th September were thus reported by the *Moniteur*:—

OFFICERS.	
Killed	145
Wounded	254
Missing	19
Total	418

RANK AND FILE.	
Killed	1489
Wounded	4259
Missing	1400
Total	7148

This was very far below the truth. It is always the practice of the French, as well as of the Russian, army to hide their real losses in official returns. The French army certainly sustained a reduction of 10,000 men and officers from the 5th to the 9th of September. The calamities of the English could not be concealed; the reporters for the press would soon find out any tricks of concealment, and exposure and obloquy would be the result. "*No man*," said a noble lord, a general very high in rank, to the author of this History, "*can afford to offend the Times*." This salutary apprehension prevents all falsification of reports of this kind, and we may therefore rely upon the reports in the *Gazette*. They were as follows:—

OFFICERS.	
Killed	29
Wounded	129
Missing	1
Total	159
RANK AND FILE.	
Killed	361
Wounded	1914
Missing	176
Total	2451

In proportion to the numbers engaged, these were heavy casualties.

The quantity of ordnance used in this siege was enormous. From the returns we deduce this statement:—

	Tons.
Weight of shot and shell	9053
Powder	1240

The number of guns and mortars in use during the siege were:—

Lancasters	7
32-pounders	140
24-pounders	57
8-inch guns	76
10-inch guns	7
68-pounders*	7
13-inch mortars	35
10-inch mortars	35
8-inch mortars	11
5½-inch mortars	20
Total	395

A quarter of a million of rounds were fired.

The orders of the day, despatches, and letters from the camps of the conquerors, will occupy the next chapter. Their earlier insertion would have interrupted the current of the narrative.

* 68-pounders weigh 95 ewt. each; their bore is eight inches, the same as the "8-inch guns," but the latter are described by their calibre, because chiefly used for shell, their weight being too light for solid shot.

CHAPTER CI.

ORDERS OF THE DAY AND DESPATCHES IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBARDMENT AND CAPTURE OF SOUTHERN SEBASTOPOL.

"Now the allied banners float
 Above each dreaded moat,
 And victory's trumpet-note
 Rings past the Mamelon.
 Four nations' flags now sweep
 The Malakoff's high steep,
 And mirrored in the deep,
 Beneath which lie his ships,
 Buried in deep eclipse,
 With all his glory gone!"

THE orders and despatches connected with the grand event of the war have an interest belonging to them altogether peculiar, and will no doubt be perused with eager interest by every reader of the tragic history of the Eastern struggle.

The first of these to which attention is directed is a very brief and rather curt despatch General Simpson to Lord Panmure, dated the 8th of September, before Sebastopol, and intended to convey an account of the bombardment up to that morning:—

"At daylight on the 5th inst. the batteries of the allied armies opened a steady and continuous fire against the enemy's works. During the night one of the vessels, supposed to be a frigate, stationed on the north side of the harbour, was set on fire by, it is believed, a shell from a French battery in their right attack. The firing during the 6th, 7th, and up to the present moment, has continued uninterrupted, and but feebly responded to by the Russians. Another frigate was discovered yesterday afternoon to be on fire, and has been entirely destroyed. From the length of time it continued burning, it is supposed to have contained stores. About eleven o'clock last night a heavy explosion took place, but I have not as yet been able to ascertain in which part of the enemy's works. I beg to inclose the list of casualties."

Immediately after the abandonment of the south side by the Russians had been ascertained, the generals-in-chief addressed to their armies orders of the day. The following was General Pelissier's, which was the more triumphant, as it was dated from "head-quarters, Malakoff Redoubt":—

"Soldiers! Sebastopol has fallen. The capture of the Malakoff has decided its downfall. With his own hands the enemy has blown up his formidable defences, has burnt his city, his stores, and his military establishments, and has sunken the rest of his ships in the harbour. The bulwark of the Russian power in the Black Sea no longer exists. These results are due not merely to your ardent courage, but

still more to your indomitable energy and perseverance throughout a protracted siege of eleven months. Never did land and sea artillery, never did engineers, never did infantry, have to overcome equal obstacles; never have three armies displayed more courage, more science, more resolution. The taking of Sebastopol will be to your eternal honour. This immense success improves and redeems your position in the Crimea. It will allow the return to their homes and their families of those who, being entitled to their discharge, have remained in our ranks. I thank them, in the name of the emperor, for the devotedness of which they have given constant proof; and I will so arrange that their return to our native land can be speedily effected. Soldiers! the 8th of September, the day on which the flags of the English, Piedmontese, and French armies have floated together, will remain a day for ever memorable. On that day you gained for your eagles new and imperishable glory. Soldiers! you have deserved well of France and of the emperor."

General Simpson's order came forth in the name of the chief of his staff, Lieutenant-general Barnard:—

"The commander of the forces congratulates the army on the result of the attack of yesterday. The brilliant assault and occupation of the Malakoff by our gallant allies obliged the enemy to abandon the works they have so long held with such bravery and determination. The commander of the forces returns his thanks to the general officers and officers and men of the second and light divisions, who advanced and attacked with such gallantry the works of the Redan. He regrets, from the formidable nature of the flanking defences, that their devotion did not meet with that immediate success which it so well merited. He condoles and deeply sympathises with the many brave officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, who are now suffering from the wounds they received in the course of their noble exertions of yesterday. He deeply deplores the death of the many gallant officers and men who have fallen in the final struggle

of this long and memorable siege. Their loss will be severely felt, and their names long remembered in this army and by the British nation.

"General Simpson avails himself of this opportunity to congratulate and convey his warmest thanks to the general officers, officers, and soldiers of the several divisions, to the royal engineers and artillery, for their cheerful endurance of almost unparalleled hardships and sufferings, and for the unflinching courage and determination which, on so many trying occasions, they have evinced. It is with equal satisfaction that the commander of the forces thanks the officers and men of the Naval Brigade for the long and uniform course of valuable service rendered by them from the commencement of the siege."

The following despatches of General Pelissier, addressed to the French minister of war, are written in a generous spirit to his English allies. This spirit was general, but not universal, in the French army. Several of the soldiers of the latter, while plundering the ruins of the city, called out to the English soldiers, "Redan, no! Malakoff, yes! *Ingleese no bono.*" The soldiers of the Connaught Rangers actually seized upon some of the offenders, and inflicted a personal chastisement upon their satirists more ludicrous than becoming. These expressions of unpleasant feeling occurred only when the French soldiery were intoxicated, and Pelissier's despatches tended to prevent their recurrence. The first of these documents was dated the 11th, the other the 14th:—

"I shall have the honour to send you by the next courier a detailed report on the attack which has placed Sebastopol in our power. To-day I can only give you a rapid sketch of the principal achievement of this great event of the war.

"Since the 16th of August, the day of the battle of the Tchernaya, and notwithstanding repeated warnings of a new and more formidable attack by the enemy against the positions which we occupy on this river, every preparation was made to deliver a decisive assault against Sebastopol itself. The artillery of the right attack commenced on the 17th of August a well-sustained fire against the Malakoff, the Little Redan, the neighbouring defences, and the roads, in order to permit our engineers to establish defences close to the place, from which the troops might be able instantly to throw themselves upon the *enceinte*. Our engineers, besides, prepared materials for escalade; and on the 5th of September all our batteries of the left opened a very violent fire against the town. The English, on their side, kept up a hot cannonade against the Great

Redan and its redoubt, which they were to attack.

"All being ready, I resolved, in concert with General Simpson, to give the assault on the 8th of September, at the hour of noon.

"General M'Mahon's division was to carry the works of the Malakoff; General Dulac's division was to attack the Little Redan; and in the centre the division of General la Motte Rouge was to march against the curtain connecting these two extreme points. Besides these troops, I had given to General Bosquet General Mellinet's division of the Guards to support the first three divisions. Thus far for the right.

"In the centre, the English were to attack the Great Redan, escalading its salient.

"On the left, the first corps, to which General della Marmora had wished to join a Sardinian brigade, having at its head General Levaillant's division, was to penetrate into the interior of the town by the Central Bastion, and afterwards turn the Flagstaff Bastion, in order to establish a lodgment there likewise.

"General de Salles had instructions not to pursue his attack further than circumstances might render it advisable.

"Further, the fleets of Admiral Lyons and Bruat were to operate a powerful diversion by firing against the Quarantine, the roadstead, and the sea front of the fortress; but the state of the sea, agitated by a violent north-west wind, was such that neither the line-of-battle ships, nor the frigates were able to quit their anchorage. The English and French mortar-boats, however, were able to go into action. Their fire was of remarkable excellence; and they rendered us great assistance.

"At noon exactly the divisions of Generals M'Mahon, La Motte Rouge, and Dulac, electrified by their chiefs, sprang to the Malakoff, the Curtain, and the Little Redan of the Careenage. After unexampled difficulties, and a most exciting foot-to-foot combat, General M'Mahon's division succeeded in effecting a lodgment in the anterior part of the Malakoff. The enemy showered down a storm of projectiles of all kinds upon our brave troops. The Redan of the Careenage, especially battered by the *maison en croix* and the steamers, it was necessary to evacuate, after its occupation; but the division of General la Motte Rouge made its ground good on one part of the Curtain, and that of General M'Mahon gained ground in the Malakoff, where General Bosquet sent continually the reserves which I sent forward to him. The other attacks were subordinated to that of the Malakoff, that being the capital point of the defences of the whole place.

"Standing in the Brancion Redoubt (on the

Mamelon), I considered that the Malakoff was safely in our power, and I gave the signal which had been agreed upon with General Simpson.

"The English immediately advanced bravely against the salient of the Great Redan. They were able to effect a lodgment in it, and struggled a considerable time to maintain their position; but, crushed by the Russian reserves, which advanced incessantly, and by a violent fire of artillery, they were forced to return into their parallel.

"At the same moment General de Salles had directed an attack against the Central Bastion. The Levallant division had begun to establish itself in it, as well as in the right *lunette*; a tremendous fire of grape was succeeded by the arrival of Russian reinforcements, so considerable in number, that our troops, already decimated by the fire of the enemy, and whose chiefs had been disabled, were compelled to fall back on the place whence they had sallied.

"Convinced that the taking of the Malakoff would be decisive of success, I prevented the renewal of any attacks on other points, which, by compelling the hostile army to remain on all points, had already attained their main object. I then directed my sole attention to the retaining possession of the Malakoff, which General M'Mahon had been previously enabled completely to obtain. Besides, a great and critical moment was impending.

"General Bosquet had just been struck by the bursting of a shell, and his command I gave to General Dulac. A powder-magazine near the Malakoff exploded at this moment, from which contingency I anticipated the most serious results.

"The Russians, hoping to profit by this accident, immediately advanced in dense masses, and, disposed in three columns, simultaneously attacked the centre, the left, and the right of the Malakoff. But measures of defence had already been taken in the interior of the fortress, for which purpose General M'Mahon opposed to the enemy bodies of undaunted troops, whom nothing could intimidate, and, after the most desperate efforts, the Russians were compelled to make a precipitate retreat. From that moment the discomfited enemy appears to have renounced all idea of further attack. The Malakoff was ours, and no effort of the enemy could wrest it from us. It was half-past four o'clock.

"Measures were immediately taken for enabling us to repulse the enemy, in case he should attempt against us a nocturnal attack. But we were soon released from our uncertainty. As soon as it became night, fires burst forth on every side, mines exploded, magazines of gunpowder blew up in the air.

The sight of Sebastopol in flames, which the whole army contemplated, was one of the most awe-inspiring and sinister pictures that the history of wars can have presented. The enemy was making a complete evacuation; it was effected during the night by means of a bridge constructed between the two shores of the roadstead, and under cover of the successive explosions, that prevented me from approaching and harassing him. On the morning of the 9th the whole southern side of the town was freed, and in our power.

"I have no need of enhancing in the eyes of your excellency the importance of so great a success; neither will it be necessary for me to speak of this brave army, whose warlike virtues and devotion are so thoroughly appreciated by our emperor; and I shall have, great as the number is, to name to you those who have distinguished themselves among so many valiant soldiers. I cannot yet do so, but I shall fulfil this duty in one of my next despatches."

The despatch of the 14th was more full, and produced a great sensation in France. It was as follows:—

"I have the honour of addressing your excellency, as I had announced by my despatch of the 11th, my report of the capture of Sebastopol by assault. The moment for that assault appeared to have arrived. On the left our works had approached to within thirty and forty metres of the Bastion du Mât (No. 4 of the Russians), and of the Central Bastion (No. 5 of the Russians). On the right our approaches, pushed actively forward under the cover of the sustained fire of our artillery, opened since the 17th, were at no more than twenty-five metres from the salient of the Malakoff and the Little Redan of Carcening Bay. The artillery had completed in all nearly 100 batteries, in perfect order and fully supplied, presenting together 350 cannon, toward the left attack, and 250 on the right attack. On their side the English, although much impeded by the difficulties of the ground, had got within 200 metres of the Great Redan (No. 3 of the Russians), on which they directed their fire, and where they had about 200 pieces of cannon in position. The Russians, making the best use of their time, had raised by the Malakoff a second line of defence, which it was important we should not allow them to complete. Finally, the 'army of relief,' having been so signally defeated on the 16th ult. on the Tchernaya, had there experienced such serious losses, that it was not probable that it would renew the attack for the purpose of relieving the place, and throw itself upon positions which we had so much strengthened, and where we were in a condition to repulse all efforts of the enemy. It was accordingly agreed

between General Simpson and myself, that we should now make the decisive assault. The generals commanding the artillery and engineers of the two armies coincided unanimously with this opinion. The 8th of September, then, was fixed for this attack.

"As I have already had the honour to communicate to your excellency, the enemy was to be assaulted on the principal points of his extensive *enceinte*, in order to prevent him from directing the whole of his reserves against either point of attack, and also to alarm him for the safety of that part of the city on which the bridge, by which alone he could make his retreat, touched the shore.

"General de Salles, with the first corps, reinforced by a Sardinian brigade, whose assistance General della Marmora had offered me, were to attack the city; in the centre the English were to possess themselves of the Great Redan; finally, on our right, General Bosquet was to assault the Malakoff itself, and the Little Redan of Careening Harbour (Bastion No. 2 of the Russians), the salient point of the *enceinte* of Karabelnaia.

"The following dispositions had been made on each of these attacks:—On the left, the division Levailant:—2nd of the first corps, the brigade Couston—the 9th battalion of foot Chasseurs, Commandant Rogié; the 21st of the line, Lieutenant-colonel Villeret; the 42nd of the line, Lieutenant-colonel de Mallet: brigade Trochu—46th of the line, Lieutenant-colonel le Banneur; 80th of the line, Colonel Laterrade. These were charged with the assault of the Central Bastion and its lunettes, and were placed in the most advanced parallels. To the right of this was the division d'Autemarre:—the brigade Niel—the 5th battalion of foot Chasseurs, Commandant Garnier; the 19th of the line, Colonel Guignard; the 26th of the line, Colonel de Sorbiers: the brigade Breton—the 39th of the line, Colonel Comignan; the 74th of the line, Colonel Guyot de Lespart. These were to penetrate, following the steps of the division Levailant, and to possess themselves of the gorge of the Bastion du Mât, and of the batteries there erected. The Sardinian brigade of General Cialdini, side by side with the division d'Autemarre, was to attack the right flank of the same bastion. Lastly, the division Bouat, composed of the 4th of the first corps, General Lefevre—the 10th foot Chasseurs, Commandant Guimard; the 18th of the line, Colonel Dantin; the 79th of the line, Colonel Grenier: the second brigade, General de la Roquette—the 14th of the line, Colonel de Négrier; the 43rd of the line, Colonel Broutha. The division Paté:—the 3rd of the 1st corps, the brigade Beuret—the 6th battalion of foot Chasseurs, Commandant Fermier de la Prévotais; the 28th of the line,

Colonel Lartigues; the 98th, Colonel Dumesnil: the brigade Bazaine—the 1st regiment of the Foreign Legion, Colonel Martenot de Cordone; the 2nd regiment of the Foreign Legion, Colonel de Chabrières. These served as a reserve to the division Levailant. Besides these, and to be prepared for any contingencies which might arise on this side, I had brought up from Kamiesch and placed under the orders of General de Salles, the 30th and 35th regiments of the line, who had been posted at the extreme left, and strongly supported on this side the holding of our own lines.

"In front of Karabelnaia, as I have already written you, our attack was arranged in three directions. To the left on the Malakoff and its re-entering angle; to the right by the Little Redan of Careening Harbour; and in the centre by the curtain which connects these two works. The system of works at the Malakoff was evidently the most important point of the *enceinte*; its capture must necessarily lead to the ruin of all the defences of the place, and I added to the troops of which General Bosquet had already the disposal, all the infantry of the Imperial Guard.

"The left attack on the Malakoff was intrusted to General Mc'Mahon (first division of the second corps):—the first brigade, Colonel Decaen; the 1st Zouaves, Colonel Colinau, and 7th of the line, Colonel Decaen: second brigade, General Vinoy—the 1st battalion of foot Chasseurs, Commandant Gambier; 20th of the line, Colonel Orianne; 27th of the line, Colonel Adam, who had in reserve the brigade Wimpffen (consisting of the 3rd Zouaves, Colonel Polhès; the 50th of the line, Lieutenant-colonel Nicolas; and the Algerian Tirailleurs, Colonel Rose), detached from Camou's division; and two battalions of Zouaves of the Guard, Colonel Jannin.

"The right attack on the little Redan was confided to General Dulac (the brigade St. Pol—the 17th foot Chasseurs, Commandant de Ferasac; 57th of the line, Colonel Dupuis; the 85th, Colonel Javel: second brigade, General Bisson—10th of the line, Commandant Lacontrie; 61st of the line, Colonel de Taxis), having in reserve the brigade Marolles (consisting of—the 15th of the line, Colonel Guérin; the 96th of the line, Colonel Mulherbe), of the division d'Aurelles; and the battalion of foot Chasseurs of the Guard, Commandant Cornulier de Lucinière. Lastly, and under General de Motte Rouge (the brigade of General Bourbaki—the 4th foot Chasseurs, Commandant Clinchant; the 86th of the line, Colonel de Berthier; the 100th of the line, Colonel Mathieu: second brigade, Colonel Picard—the 91st of the line, Colonel Picard; the 49th of the line, Colonel Kerguern), who commanded the second attack of the centre on the face of the Curtain, having in re-

serve the Voltigeurs (Colonels Montera and Douay), and the Grenadiers of the Guard (Colonels Blanchard and Dalton), under the immediate orders of the general of division of the Guard, Mellinet, having under him Brigadier-generals Pontèves and De Failly.

"For the due placing of our troops, we divided our trenches into three lodgments, each of which was capable of containing in its most advanced portion almost the whole of the attacking division, and the reserves found room in the old trenches, which were well calculated to contain them, as were also the ravines of the Karabelnaia and the Carenage. It was essential, the more completely to deceive the enemy, that the assembling of all these troops might be effected without being discovered; accordingly, all the lines of communication leading to our advanced positions had been followed out with extreme care, and everywhere where our men might be exposed to view, the covering crestwork had been sufficiently raised to give the men sufficient depth to defile unseen.

"On the left attack, as well as on those of the right, detachments of engineers and artillery, supplied with trenching tools, were told off, to be placed at the head of each column of attack. The sappers of the engineer corps were ready, with the aid of the advanced guard of each attack, to throw bridges, of which they had been exercised in the management, and the materials of which were arranged in advance of the foremost line. The artillerymen were furnished with every necessary—hammers, punches, quick-match, &c., to be ready to spike or unspike cannon, as might be needful, and to turn against the enemy, if practicable, the pieces which we might have captured. Further, in the first battalions of each attack, a certain number of men were provided with spades and implements, with very short handles, which they would be able to carry in their cartouche-belts, to widen passages, break down dykes, reverse parapets—in a word, execute, with the least delay, the most urgent and important works. Besides these preparations, reserve field-batteries were in readiness, in order, if called for, to take part with rapidity in the battle. In the left attacks, a field-battery was placed in a quarry near to the *enceinte*, with its horses in readiness, and its gunners provided with breast-collars, to be ready to debouch at the moment required. Two other batteries (of the first division) held themselves in readiness at the Bell Tower; and lastly, a fourth was in position at the extreme left of the Lazaretto.

"On the right attacks, a reserve of twenty-four pieces of field artillery was stationed, namely—twelve guns of the former Lancaster battery, and twelve guns from the Victoria Re-

doubt. Workmen were placed at given points to be ready at the opportune moment to make roads for the passage of the artillery. To be prepared for every casualty, the first brigade of the division d'Aurelle was posted in a position to drive back, with the aid of the batteries and the redoubts existing in this direction, any attempt of the enemy against the works opposite to Inkerman. On the side of our lines General Herbillon had orders to occupy the positions on the Tchernaya, keeping his infantry under arms, mounting his cavalry, and harnessing his artillery, at the hour fixed for the assault. I had also sent to him the brigade of cuirassiers of General de Forton. General della Marmora was made fully aware of these dispositions. With regard to General Allonville, he, during the night of the 7th and 8th, withdrew his forces from the Valley of Baidar, in order to take up, near the bridge of Kreutzen, a position of highly advantageous concentration, in case the army of relief should menace us on the outward lines.

"By mutual agreement, General Simpson and I fixed upon the hour of noon for the assault. The hour chosen offered several advantages; it gave us favourable chances for suddenly surprising the enemy, and in case the Russian army of relief should have resolved to make a desperate attempt at relieving the place, it would have been impossible to complete, during daylight, any vigorous movement against our lines; besides, whatever might be the result of our attack, we should have till the following morning to consider our arrangements.

"On the morning of the 8th, the artillery of our left attack, which since daybreak on the 5th had kept up a violent cannonade, continued to crush the enemy with its projectiles: on the right attack our batteries also kept up a lively fire, but carefully maintaining the advances they had made good some days previous, and observing every movement in front. About eight o'clock the engineers exploded, on the Central Bastion, two mines, each charged with 100 kilogrammes of powder, and at the same hour they exploded, in advance of our sap, in face of the Malakoff, three *fourneaux* together, containing 1500 kilogrammes of powder, in order to break down the lower galleries of the Russian miners.

"The possession of the chain of works of which the Malakoff is the key decided the fate of the day, the other attacks were subordinate to it, and it was understood with General Simpson that the English should not throw themselves on the Great Redan until I should make the signal that we were masters of the Malakoff. At the same time General de Salles was not to advance his troops until the moment which I should indicate to him by another

signal. A little before mid-day, all the troops were perfectly in order on the chosen points, and the other dispositions had been punctually carried out. General de Salles was in readiness; General Bosquet was at the post of battle, which he had chosen on the sixth parallel; and I, with General Thiry, of the artillery, Niel, of the engineers, and De Martinprey, my chief of the staff, had arrived myself at the Brancion Redoubt, which I had chosen as my head-quarters.

"The watches had been regulated. At twelve o'clock precisely all our batteries ceased their thunder, in order to resume a more raking fire upon the enemy's reserves. The divisions of M'Mahon, Dulac, and Motte Rouge, followed their generals out of the trenches. The drums and clarions beat and sounded the charge, and to the cry of '*Vive l'empereur!*' a thousand times repeated down the line, our intrepid soldiers precipitated themselves upon the enemy's defences. It was a solemn moment.

"The first brigade of the M'Mahon division, the 1st regiment of the Zouaves leading, followed by the seventh division of the line, having to their left the 4th Chasseurs-à-pied, threw themselves upon the left face and the salient of the Malakoff. The breadth and depth of the ditch, and the height and steepness of the slope, rendered the ascent extremely difficult to our men; but they at length arrived on the parapet, covered with the Russians, who suffered themselves to be slain on the spot, and who, for want of a gun, converted pickaxes, stones, drag-nets, or anything they could lay their hands on into weapons. There a hand-to-hand struggle took place—one of those desperate conflicts in which the intrepidity of our soldiers and their chiefs alone sufficed to give them the mastery. They immediately jumped into the work, drove back the Russians who still resisted, and in a few moments afterwards the flag of France was planted on the Malakoff, never more to be wrested from it.

"On the right, and in the centre, with the same degree of energy which had hitherto surmounted every obstacle and driven back the enemy, the divisions Dulac and Motte Rouge, led onwards by their chiefs, had taken possession of the Little Redan of the Careenage and the Curtain, advancing even as far as the second line, as yet unfinished. We were now everywhere in possession of the works which had been attacked. But this first splendid success had like to have cost us dear. Being hit by a splinter of a shell on the right side, General Bosquet had been compelled to quit the field of battle. I was now obliged to give the command to General Dulac, who was ably seconded by General Liniers, staff-officer of the second corps.

"The engineers, who had marched with the columns of assault, were already at their work, engaged in filling up ditches, opening passages, and constructing bridges; and the second brigade of General de M'Mahon was rapidly advancing to reinforce them in the Malakoff. I now made the signal, agreed upon with General Simpson, for the attack of the Great Redan, and a little later, for the attack of the city.

The English had to march forward about 200 metres,* under a terrible fire of grape-shot. This space was soon heaped with dead bodies; nevertheless, this loss did not arrest the march of the column of attack, which advanced upon the head of the work. It descended into the ditch, which has a depth of nearly five metres, and, in spite of all the efforts of the Russians, it escalated the escarpment, and carried the salient angle of the Redan. There, after a skirmish which cost the Russians dear, the English soldiers found before them nothing but a vast open space, riddled by the balls of the enemy, who stood sheltered behind the distant traverses. Those who now arrived scarcely sufficed to fill the places of those who had fallen, either killed or wounded. It was not till they had supported this unequal combat for nearly two hours that the English could be persuaded to evacuate the Redan. They did it with so firm a countenance, that the enemy dared not advance against them.

"However, on the left, upon the concerted signal, the columns of Levailant's division, commanded by Generals Couston and Trochu, dashed, in a stooping attitude, upon the left flank of the Central Bastion, and the left lunette. In spite of a hail of balls and projectiles, and after an extremely sharp conflict, the onset and vigour of these brave troops triumphed at once over the enemy's resistance, and, notwithstanding the obstacles accumulated before them, they penetrated into the two works. But the enemy, driven behind successive traverses, held firm everywhere. A murderous fire was poured down from all the crests, and batteries, unmasked at the very moment, and a number of field-guns, which had been brought to several points, vomited grape, and decimated our men. Generals Couston and Trochu, who had just been wounded, had been obliged to resign their command. Generals Rivet and Breton were killed. Several *fougades* which the enemy employed produced a moment's hesitation; but at length a return to the charge, made by numerous Russian columns, obliged our troops to abandon the works which they had carried, and to retire into our advanced *places d'armes*.

* This is nearly one-third over the actual distance; the general no doubt generously put it at the highest amount, to do justice to the difficulty under which the English laboured.

"Our batteries in this part of the attack, ably directed by General Lebouff, to whom Rear-admiral Rigault de Genouilly gave, as usual, his devoted and judicious co-operation, changed the direction of their fire, and obliged the enemy to shelter themselves behind their parapets. General de Salles, causing the division d'Antemarre to advance, prepared in this interval a second and formidable attack, but we were assured of the possession of the Malakoff, and I sent word to him not to carry it into effect. The possession of this work was, nevertheless, energetically disputed.

"By means of the *Maison en Croix* batteries, of the artillery of his steamers, of field-guns placed at favourable points, and of the batteries on the north of the roads, the enemy inundated us with grape and projectiles of all kinds, and dealt havoc among our ranks. The powder-magazine of the Russian postern battery had just exploded, increasing our losses, and concealing for a moment the eagle of the 91st. A great number of the superior officers and others were either killed or wounded. Generals St. Pol and de Marolles had died gloriously, and Generals Mellinet, de Pontèves, and Bourbaki had been wounded at the head of their troops. Three times the Dulac and De la Motte Rouge divisions carried the Redan and the Curtain, and three times they were obliged to retire before a frightful artillery fire, and before the solid masses to whom they were opposed. Nevertheless, the two reserve Lancaster field-batteries came down at a trot, cleared the trenches, and daringly establishing themselves within half-range, succeeded in driving off the enemy's columns and their steam-vessels. A portion of these two divisions, sustained in this heroic struggle by the troops of the Guard, who have covered themselves with glory on this great day, established themselves in possession of the whole of the left of the Curtain, whence the enemy was never able to dislodge them.

"During these combats, renewed from the right and from the centre, the Russians redoubled their efforts to reconquer the Malakoff. This work, which is a kind of citadel of earth, 350 metres long and 150 wide, armed with 62 pieces of cannon of different calibre, crowns a *mamelon* which commands the whole of the interior of the Karabelnaia suburb, and takes in reverse the Redan which was attacked by the English. It is but 1200 metres from the southern port, which not only threatens the sole anchorage which is now left for the vessels, but also the route by which the Russians could effect their retreat—the bridge which they have thrown across the roadstead.

"The Russians also, during the first hours of the struggle of the two armies, constantly renewed their efforts. But General de M'Ma-

hon, in order to be enabled to resist these continual attacks, had received the assistance of the brigade Vinoy, the Zouaves of the Guard, the reserve of General de Wimpffen, and a part of the Voltigeurs of the Guard. He everywhere made head against the enemy, who were, in every instance, repulsed. The Russians now, however, made a last and desperate effort: formed in deep columns, they three times assailed the gorge of the work, and three times they were compelled to retire, with enormous loss before the iron energy of our troops. After this last struggle, which did not terminate till about five o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy evinced some symptoms of giving way, and their batteries alone continued, till nightfall, to hurl projectiles against us, which, however, no longer inflicted any injury upon us.

"The detachments of engineers and artillery, which during the action had been bravely and actively employed in their special mission, immediately proceeded, under the direction of their officers, to execute the urgent labours required in the interior of the work.

"In compliance with my orders, Generals Thiry and Niel caused to be adopted by Generals Beuret and Frossard, commanding the artillery and the 2nd corps of engineers, every measure calculated to enable us to consolidate ourselves in the Malakoff, and on that part of the Curtain which was in our power, so as to be enabled to resist, in case of need, any night attack of the enemy, and to be in a position to compel him to evacuate, on the following day, the Little Redan of the Carénage, the Cross-house, and all that portion of its defences.

"Those measures now became useless; for the enemy, despairing to be able to recapture the Malakoff, resolved to take an important step—he evacuated the city.

"About the close of day I had a presentiment of what was about to take place. I perceived long files of troops and baggage defiling over the bridge, and proceeding towards the north coast; incendiaries now showing themselves in every direction, removed every lingering doubt of what was going on, if any remained. I should now have attempted to advance, gain the bridge, and cut off the enemy's retreat, but the besieged were every moment blowing up their defences, powder-magazines, houses, and public buildings. These explosions would have destroyed us in detail, and on that account the design could not be put in execution. We therefore remained in position till the day dawned upon this scene of desolation.

"The rising sun now cast his golden rays upon this work of destruction, which was still greater than we could have previously conceived; the last Russian ships, which had laid at anchor in the roadstead on the previous evening, were now

sunk to the bottom; the bridge was destroyed. The enemy had only preserved his steam-ships, which were conveying away the remaining fugitives, and some infatuated Russians who sought to extend the fire through the unhappy city. But soon these men, as well as the steamers, were obliged to depart, and seek refuge in the creeks with which the northern shore of the roadstead abounds. Sebastopol was ours!

"Thus this memorable siege has terminated, during which the army which reinforced the town was twice vanquished in the open field—an army whose means of defence and attack had attained to such colossal proportions.

"The besieging army had in battery, in the various attacks, about 800 cannon, which have fired above 1,600,000 shots; and our approaches, excavated during 336 days, in a rocky soil, and presenting a development of more than 80 kilometres (20 leagues), had been effected under a constant fire from the place, and during incessant battles both by day and night.

"On the day of the 8th of September, which has shed such a lustre on the allied armies, we were opposed by an army almost equal in number, intrenched behind formidable defences, provided with above 1100 pieces of cannon of heavy calibre, protected also by the cannon of the fleet and batteries of the north side and of the roadstead, and having still immense resources at their disposal. This event will, therefore, remain as an example of what may be achieved by the efforts of a brave, disciplined, and warlike army.

"Our losses on that day (the 8th of September) consisted of 5 generals killed, 4 wounded, and 6 who had received contusions; 24 superior officers killed, 20 wounded, and 2 missing; 116 subaltern officers killed, 224 wounded, 8 missing; and 1489 non-commissioned officers and soldiers killed, 4259 wounded, and 1400 missing: total, 7551. As you may perceive, M. le Maréchal, our losses are very considerable; many of them are much to be regretted, but they are far from being so great as I had anticipated.

"Every man, M. le Maréchal, from the general to the soldier, has done his duty gloriously; and the army, of which the emperor may be proud, has deserved well of the country. I shall have guerdons to demand—many names to make known to your excellency; but this will be the object of a labour which cannot find a place here at present.

"The fleets of Admirals Lyons and Bruat were to join before the entrance into the Sebastopol roadstead, in order to effect a powerful diversion; but a violent wind blew from the north-east, which, being already very troublesome and boisterous on land, rendered the sea so stormy, that it was useless to think of the ships

quitting their anchorage. The English and French mortar-boats, however, appeared to fire with great success upon the harbour, the city, and the different maritime forts. The marines who had been landed and the marine artillerymen were, as indeed they always have been, the worthy rivals of the artillerymen in the field, and were remarkable for the steadiness and precision of their fire.

"The English army has conducted itself with its usual intrepidity. It was preparing a second attack, which would doubtless have triumphed over the unexpected obstacles encountered by the first; but the possession of the Malakoff, which was assured, rendered this second attack unnecessary.

"The Sardinian brigade of General F. Cialdini, that General della Marmora had been good enough to place at my disposal to reinforce the 1st corps, supported the terrible cross-fire which assailed us in our trenches with the stoical indifference of old troops. The Piedmontese also burned with ardour to come to blows with the enemy; but the attack on the Flagstaff Bastion not having taken place, it was not possible to satisfy the ardour of these brave troops.

"As at all times, M. le Maréchal, our wounded, and even those of the enemy, have been tended with the greatest care and skill; and we are indebted to the admirable organisation of our medical staff, and to the devotion and fidelity of those who perform its duties, for the preservation of a great number of those unfortunate fellows.

"I will not finish this report without intimating to your excellency how much praise is due, in this circumstance, as in every other, to Major-general Hugh Rose, and Lieutenant-colonel George Foley, the commissioners of her Britannic majesty to the commander-in-chief of the French army, for the numerous communications I have had to maintain during the action with General Simpson."

If it were possible to omit the despatch of the English general without defacing the order, and so far the completeness of the narrative, no loss would occur to the reader; for it is a bald, meagre, and utterly inadequate report of such great transactions. Its poverty of language and idea, compared with the magnitude of the occasion, excited at the time the indignation of the English public, who looked for an account ample in its contents, and dignified in its language. It was dated on the 9th:—

"I had the honour to apprise your lordship, in my despatch of the 4th instant, that the engineer and artillery officers of the allied armies had laid before General Pelissier and myself a report recommending that the assault

should be given on the 8th instant, after a heavy fire had been kept up for three days. This arrangement I agreed to, and I have to congratulate your lordship on the glorious results of the attack of yesterday, which has ended in the possession of the town, dockyards, and public buildings, and destruction of the last ships of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea. Three steamers alone remain, and the capture or sinking of these must speedily follow. It was arranged that at twelve o'clock in the day the French columns of assault were to leave their trenches, and take possession of the Malakoff and adjacent works. After their success had been assured, and they were fairly established, the Redan was to be assaulted by the English; the Bastion, Central, and Quarantine Ports, on the left, were simultaneously to be attacked by the French. At the hour appointed our allies quitted their trenches, entered and carried the apparently impregnable defences of the Malakoff with that impetuous valour which characterises the French attack; and, having once obtained possession, they were never dislodged.

"The tricolour planted on the parapet was the signal for our troops to advance. The arrangements for the attack I intrusted to Lieutenant-general Sir William Codrington, who carried out the details in concert with Lieutenant-general Markham. I determined that the second and light divisions should have the honour of the assault, from the circumstance of their having defended the batteries and approaches against the Redan for so many months, and from the intimate knowledge they possessed of the ground. The fire of our artillery having made as much of a breach as possible in the salient of the Redan, I decided that the columns of the assault should be directed against that part, as being less exposed to the heavy flanking fire by which this work is protected.

"It was arranged between Sir William Codrington and Lieutenant-general Markham that the assaulting column of 1000 men should be formed by equal numbers of these two divisions, the column of the light division to lead, that of the second to follow. They left the trenches at the preconcerted signal, and moved across the ground, preceded by a covering-party of 200 men, and a ladder-party of 320. On arriving at the crest of the ditch, and the ladders placed, the men immediately stormed the parapet of the Redan, and penetrated into the salient angle. A most determined and bloody contest was here maintained for nearly an hour, and, although supported to the utmost, and the greatest bravery displayed, it was found impossible to maintain the position.

"Your lordship will perceive, by the long and sad list of casualties, with what gallantry

and self-devotion the officers so nobly placed themselves at the head of their men during this sanguinary conflict. I feel myself unable to express, in adequate terms, the sense I entertain of the conduct and gallantry exhibited by the troops, though their devotion was not rewarded by the success which they so well merited; but to no one are my thanks more justly due than to Colonel Windham, who gallantly headed his column of attack, and was fortunate in entering and remaining with the troops during the contest. The trenches were, subsequently to this attack, so crowded with troops that I was unable to organise a second assault, which I intended to make with the Highlanders, under Lieutenant-general Sir Colin Campbell, who had hitherto formed the reserve, to be supported by the third division, under Major-general Sir William Eyre. I therefore sent for these officers, and arranged with them to renew the attack the following morning. The Highland Brigade occupied the advanced trenches during the night. About eleven o'clock the enemy commenced exploding their magazines, and Sir Colin Campbell, having ordered a small party to advance cautiously to examine the Redan, found the work abandoned; he did not, however, deem it necessary to occupy it until daylight. The evacuation of the town by the enemy was made manifest during the night. Great fires appeared in every part, accompanied by large explosions, under the cover of which the enemy succeeded in withdrawing their troops to the north side by means of the raft-bridge recently constructed, and which they afterwards disconnected and conveyed to the other side. Their men-of-war were all sunk during the night.

"The boisterous weather rendered it altogether impossible for the admirals to fulfil their intention of bringing the broadsides of the allied fleets to bear upon the Quarantine Batteries; but an excellent effect was produced by the animated and well-directed fire of their mortar-vessels, those of her majesty being under the direction of Captain Wilcox, of the *Odin*, and Captain Digby, of the royal marine artillery.

"It now becomes my pleasing duty, my lord, to place on record the high sense I entertain of the conduct of this army since I have had the honour to command it. The hardships and privations endured by many of the regiments, during a long winter campaign, are too well known for me to comment upon. They were borne, both by officers and men, with a patience and uncomplaining endurance worthy of the highest praise, and which gained them the deserved applause and sympathy of their country. The Naval Brigade, under the command of Captain the Hon. Henry Keppel,

aided by Captain Moorsom and many gallant officers and seamen who have served the guns from the commencement of the siege, merit my warmest thanks.

"The prompt, hearty, and efficacious co-operation of her majesty's navy, commanded by Rear-admiral Sir Edmund Lyons, and ably seconded by Sir Houston Stewart, has contributed most materially to the success of our undertaking; and here, perhaps, I may be permitted to say that, if it had pleased God that the successful result of this memorable siege should have been reported by my ever-to-be-lamented predecessor in this command, I am sure that it would have been one of his most pleasing duties to express the deep sense which I know he entertained of the invaluable assistance and counsel he received on all occasions from Sir Edmund Lyons. When, at times, affairs looked gloomy and success doubtful, he was at hand to cheer and encourage; and every assistance that could tend to advance the operations was given with the hearty good-will which characterises the British sailor. Nothing has contributed more to the present undertaking than the cordial co-operation which has so happily existed from the first between the two services.

"I cannot sufficiently express my approbation of the conduct of the Royal Engineers, under Lieutenant-general Sir Harry Jones, who has conducted the siege operations from the beginning of this year. For some time past he has been suffering on a bed of sickness, but the eventful hour of the assault would not permit him to remain absent; he was conveyed on a litter into the trenches to witness the completion of his arduous undertakings. My warmest thanks are due to the officers and soldiers of the Royal Artillery, under the command of Major-general Sir R. Daeres, who, during the arduous operations of this protracted siege, have so mainly contributed to its ultimate success. I must beg further to record my thanks for the cordial co-operation and assistance I have received in carrying out the details of the service from the chief of the staff, the adjutant, and quartermaster-generals, and general staff, as well as generals commanding divisions and brigades of this army. I must reserve to myself, for the subject of a future despatch, the bringing before your lordship the particular mention of officers of the various branches of this army, whom I shall beg to recommend to your favourable notice. I intrust this despatch to the care of Brevet-major the Hon. Leicester Curzon, who has been assistant military secretary to my noble predecessor and myself since the commencement of this war, and who will be able to give your lordship more minute details than the limits of a despatch will allow."

The Baron de Bazancourt, exceedingly boastful of the French engineering, which all through the siege was inferior to that of the English, directed attention to the report of the chief of the French engineer staff (General Niel) as a masterpiece of military reporting, giving the most comprehensive views extant of the work so triumphantly brought to a conclusion. The report was directed to Marshal Vaillant, and was as follows:—

"The fortifications of Sebastopol were stormed on the 8th of September. That assault has rendered us masters of the Malakoff, the occupation of which renders the defence of the suburb almost impossible, and enables us to cut off the communications of the town with the north part of the roadstead. After rallying several times, and resuming the offensive with a courage to which we are bound to do homage, seeing that his uttermost efforts remained fruitless, he began in the evening to evacuate the town; during the night he set it on fire, and he employed his powder in destroying with his own hands the defensive works and the great establishments which Russia had been accumulating for so many years in this fortress. He has sunk all his ships, frigates, and other sailing-vessels, preserving only the steamers; lastly, he broke up and pulled after him the bridge of boats by which he communicated with the forts of the north side, abandoning to us in this way the town, suburb, and everything else on the south side of the roadstead.

"The defence was energetic: on several points our attacks were repulsed; but the chief attack, that which insured our success, was not doubtful for an instant. The first division of the first corps, commanded at present by General M'Mahon, carried at the first onset the Malakoff work, and there maintained itself heroically, understanding that it held in its hands the keys of the place.

"I am going to give you an account of the dispositions that had been taken for diminishing as much as possible the numerous difficulties attending this terrible assault, made, not on a place invested, on a limited garrison, but on a vast fortress, defended by an army equally numerous, perhaps, as that which attacked it.

"In the attacks directed against the town our approaches had been carried to within forty metres of the Central Bastion, and thirty metres of the Flagstaff Bastion. At the attacks of the Karabelnaia suburb, the English, impeded by the difficulties of the ground, and by the fire of the enemy's artillery, had only been able to advance their approaches to about 200 metres from the salient of the Great Redan.

"Before the front of the Malakoff we had arrived to within twenty-five metres of the *enceinte* which surrounds the tower, and had carried our approaches to the same distance of the Little Redan of the Carenage. This important result was due to the incontestable superiority of our artillery over that of the enemy.

"The generals-in-chief of the allied armies had made the following arrangements:—

"The general attack of the place was fixed for the 8th of September at noon. On the morning of the 5th the artillery of the attacks against the town and that of the English attacks, who until then had husbanded their fire, were to resume it with great energy.

"Such a cannonade was never heard. We had mounted in our two attacks more than 500 cannons. The English had about 200, and the Russians more than we. The fire of the enemy damaged our trenches, but did us little harm. Ours, notwithstanding the great extent of the place, converged on it, and must have caused immense loss to the Russian army. During the last days which preceded the assault our infantry fatigue-parties were principally employed in enlarging the most advanced *place d'armes* and the defiles, and in carrying to the spot the means of crossing the ditches.

"The aim of all our efforts was the capture of the work constructed behind the Malakoff Tower. This work (called the Korniloff Redoubt by the Russians), which is an immense redoubt, a kind of citadel of earth, occupies a mamelon which commands all the interior of the Karabelnaia suburb, takes the Redan attacked by the English *de revers*, and is only 1200 metres from the south port, on which the Russians had constructed a bridge of rafts, now their only communication between the suburb and the town. The Malakoff Fort is 350 metres by 150 metres in dimensions. Its parapets were more than six metres above the soil, and in front of them is a ditch, which, before our attacks, was six metres in depth, and seven in width. It was armed with sixty-two guns of various calibres. In the front part, inclosed by the parapet, is the Malakoff Tower, of which the Russians have only preserved the ground floor, which is crenelated. In the interior of the work the Russians had raised a vast number of traverses, under which were excellent blindages, where the garrison found shelter, and beds arranged on each side in two rows, one above the other. A Russian officer of engineers, who was made prisoner, states that the garrison of this part of the Malakoff, which I have just described in order that you may judge of the difficulties which our soldiers had to surmount, consisted of not less than 2500 men.

"The Malakoff front, which is 1000 metres

in length, is bounded on our left by Fort Malakoff, and on our right by the Little Redan. This last work, which, at the commencement of the siege, was only a simple redan, was transformed little by little into a redoubt, closed at the gorge, and heavily armed. The exterior fronts of the two redoubts of Malakoff and the Carenage were connected by a curtain armed with sixteen cannons; and behind the *enceinte* the Russians had raised a second, which connected the fronts of the gorges of the two redoubts. This second *enceinte*, armed in part, had not, however, a ditch, presenting a serious obstacle.

"The rocky nature of the soil had hindered the enemy from excavating everywhere equally the ditch of the first curtain and of the Little Redan, and on several points the troops were able to pass it without very much difficulty. For passing the ditches, which had a considerable depth, we had contrived a system of bridges which could be thrown across in less than a minute by an ingenious manœuvre, to which our sappers and soldiers *d'élite* have been trained.

"The French artillery was so superior to that of the Russians, that it had extinguished the fire of nearly all the guns pointed directly at our attacks. The filled up embrasures relieved us from the fear that our columns might be assailed by grape as they issued from the trenches. The parapets were destroyed, and a part of the earth had rolled into the ditch. Finally, the Malakoff Fort had been assailed by so large a number of shells, thrown from our batteries and those of the English, that the guns which did not bear directly upon our attacks had their embrasures also filled up, and everywhere the earthworks had lost their original form; but, behind the defences situated in the first line, the Russians had preserved a large number of pieces, which we could not *contre-battre* completely, and the columns which proceeded to attack the Malakoff were exposed to the fire of numerous batteries which the Russians had raised to the north of the roadstead, and which, though fired from a great distance, were, nevertheless, dangerous.

"You are aware that ever since my arrival before Sebastopol I was decidedly of opinion that the true point of attack was the tower or mamelon of Malakoff, and that this opinion having been adopted by General Canrobert, those attacks of the right were undertaken, which were executed by the second corps. From the side of the town we had been content to extend towards the left the approaches executed by the first corps. Taking things at the point where they stood when the assault was resolved on, there was no doubt that the possession of the Malakoff Fort would lead to a decisive result; and, on the other hand, it was

to be presumed that if a failure took place on this point, success obtained elsewhere could not lead to great results. However, it was not proper to attack a place so extended upon one single point. It was necessary to obtain that division of the enemy's forces which resulted from the great development of the *enceinte* that he had to defend, and especially to make him uneasy about the town, to which the bridge led whereby he might make his retreat.

It was to satisfy these various considerations, it was to insure success, while economising as much as possible the blood of our soldiers in the terrible struggle then preparing, that the general-in-chief decided that the assault should first be made on the front of the Malakoff; that if this attack, which would be made under his personal inspection, should succeed, then, at his signal, the English should attack the Redan and the first portion of the town, so as to prevent the enemy's concentrating all his efforts against the troops that should have already taken possession of the Malakoff Fort.

The front of the Malakoff was to be attacked by three columns; the one on the left, commanded by General de M'Mahon, moving in a straight line on the Malakoff Fort by the front that faced us, and in turning it slightly on the right hand, had for its task the taking and keeping of it, cost what it might; the right column, Dulac's division, was to march against the Redan of the Careening Bay, to occupy it, and detach a brigade on its left, in order to turn the second inclosure; lastly, the central column, being the division of La Motte Rouge, issuing from the sixth parallel, having a longer extent of ground to pass over, and arriving a little later, was to carry the Curtain, to proceed then against the second inclosure, and send one of its brigades to the assistance of the first column, if this latter should have not yet gained possession of the Malakoff Fort.

"Such was the importance of these positions that we could not doubt that the enemy, if he lost them, would make great efforts to retake them. In consequence, the troops of the Imperial Guard were given as a reserve to the second corps.

"Chef de bataillon Ragon, having under his orders several brigades of sappers, marching with the first column, had to throw bridges across the ditches, see after the mines, open everywhere a passage to the columns, and, as soon as these should be masters of the fort, to close it at the gorge; and in order to oppose any rallying attack in return, to open in the rear large passages for the arrival of the troops and the artillery. Chef de bataillon Renonx, attached to the right column, and Captain Schonengel, attached to the central column, having also brigades of sappers under

their orders, had to fulfil an analogous mission.

"All the arrangements concerning the duty of the engineers in the attacks to be made on the Malakoff had been made by the General of brigade Frossard, commanding the engineers of the second corps.

"In attacking the town, in order to avoid the obstacles accumulated by the enemy at the salient of the Flagstaff Bastion, it had been decided that the principal assault should be given at the Central Bastion, between its salient and the *lunette* on the left; that the assaulting column, as soon as it should be established within the Central Bastion, should detach a part of its forces towards the gorge of the Flagstaff Battery, whose right face should then be assailed by a Sardinian brigade, which had come to take part in the operations of the first corps.

"General Dalesme, commanding the engineers of the first corps, had made arrangements for attacking the town similar to those which I have just explained with reference to the attacks of the Karabelnaia faubourg.

"On the 8th of September, at eight o'clock in the morning, we threw on the Central Bastion two mines of projection, each charged with 100 kilogrammes of powder. The explosion took place near the middle of the bastion, and appeared to cause great disorder. At the same hour we exploded, in front of our approaches to the Malakoff Fort, three mining chambers, charged in all with 1500 kilogrammes of powder, in order to destroy the lower galleries of the Russian miners, and to give security to our soldiers, who had to crowd within the trenches, under which deserters announced the soil was mined.

"At noon precisely our soldiers rushed from the advanced *place d'armes* in front of the Malakoff. They crossed the ditches with surprising agility, and, jumping on the parapets, attacked the enemy to the cry of "*Fire l'empereur!*" At the Malakoff Fort, the interior slope having a great height, those who arrived first halted an instant to form. Then they mounted on the parapet and jumped into the work.

"The combat, which had commenced with discharges of fire-arms, was carried on with the bayonet, with stones, and with the butt-ends of muskets. The rammers became weapons in the hands of the Russian gunners, but everywhere the Russians were killed, taken prisoners, or made to fly; and, in less than a quarter of an hour after the attack had taken place, the French flag waved on the conquered redoubt.

"The Careenage Redan had also been carried after a very hot struggle. The centre column had advanced as far as the second *enceinte*. Everywhere we had taken possession of the

works attacked. The general-in-chief gave the concerted signal for the attack of the Great Redan, and soon after for the attack of the town. The English had 200 metres of ground to go over under a terrible fire of grape. This space was presently covered with dead, but these losses could not stop the march of the attacking column, which advanced to the capital of the work. It descended into the ditch, which was about five metres in depth, and, notwithstanding all the efforts of the Russians, it escalated the scarp, and took from them the salient of the Redan; but after the first struggle, which cost the Russians dear, the English soldiers found before them a vast open space, crossed in all directions by the balls of the enemy, who themselves were sheltered behind distant traverses. Those who came up were scarcely sufficient to replace those who were placed *hors de combat*. It was not until they had sustained, during nearly two hours, this unequal combat, that the English resolved to evacuate the Redan.

"The attack upon the Central Bastion presented the same result. In front of the Malakoff the Russians made great efforts to reconquer the works; repeated attacks were made, but in vain. The dead bodies of the enemy were piled up in front of the gorge; but the first division remained unmovable, and in the evening we were masters of the citadel, without which the Russians could not continue their defence for more than a few days.

"Thus terminated this memorable siege, in which the means of defence and of attack attained colossal dimensions. The Russians had 800 cannon in battery, the besieging army about 700.

"In finishing this report, I ought to tell you, Monsieur le Maréchal, that the greatest harmony has never ceased to prevail between the artillery and the engineers. Whenever one of these two services could come to the assistance of the other, he did it with eagerness; and this community of views and action has given us the means of overcoming many difficulties.

"I have also had to congratulate myself in every instance on my relations with General Harry Jones, commanding the engineers of the English army. Our object was the same, and we have never differed in opinion on the means to be employed for attaining it. Already, at the siege of Bomarsund, I had the opportunity of appreciating the loyalty and the noble character of this general officer. I have been happy at finding myself again in relations with him at the siege of Sebastopol."

The following order of the day was addressed by Prince Gortschakoff to his army,

dated 30th of August, old style, corresponding with our 12th of September:—

"Valiant Comrades,—On the 12th of September last year a strong enemy's army appeared before the walls of Sebastopol. Despite its numerical superiority, despite the absence of obstacles which military science might have opposed to it in the town, that army did not dare attack it with an open force, but undertook a regular siege. Since then, despite the formidable means at the disposal of our enemies, who, by their numerous ships, constantly received reinforcements, artillery, and ammunition for eleven months and a-half, all their efforts failed before your bravery and firmness. It is a fact unexampled in military annals that a town hastily fortified, in presence of the enemy, should have been able to hold out so long against a force, the means of attack of which have exceeded everything that hitherto could have been foreseen in calculations of this nature. And with means so enormous, and of such a description, after the ruinous effects of an artillery of colossal dimensions, continued for nine months, the enemy having frequently had recourse to prolonged bombardments of the town, firing on each occasion many hundred thousand rounds, they became convinced of the inadequacy of their efforts, and resolved to take Sebastopol by a combat.

"On the 6th (18th) of June they made the assault on different sides, entering courageously into the town; but you received them with intrepidity, and they were driven back on all points in the most brilliant manner. This check forced them to return to a continuation of their first plan of siege, multiplying their batteries, and increasing the activity of their trench works and mining operations. Since the memorable day upon which you repulsed the assault two months and a-half have elapsed, during which, animated by sentiments of duty and of love to the throne and to your country, you have heroically disputed each inch of ground, forcing the assailants to advance only foot by foot, and paying with torrents of blood and an incredible loss of ammunition for each yard of ground they gained. In this obstinate defence your courage did not flag; on the contrary, it rose to the highest degree of self-denial. But if your intrepidity and your patience were without bounds, there are such in the nature of the possibility of defence. As the approaches of the enemy gradually advanced, their batteries were erected nearer the walls. The circle of fire which surrounded Sebastopol grew daily narrower, and sent death and destruction upon the courageous defenders still further into the town.

"Taking advantage of the superiority of their fire at short range, the enemy, after the

concentrated action of their artillery for thirty days (which cost our garrison from 100 to 1000 men per day), commenced that infernal bombardment from their innumerable engines of war, and of a calibre hitherto unknown, which destroyed our defences, which had been repaired at night with great labour and at great loss, under the incessant fire of the enemy—the principal work, the Korniloff Redoubt, on the Malakoff Hill (the key of Sebastopol, as a point dominating the whole town), having experienced considerable and irreparable damage. To continue, under these circumstances, the defence of the south side, would have been to expose our troops daily to a useless butchery, and their preservation is to-day, more than ever, necessary to the Emperor of Russia. For these reasons, with sorrow in my heart, but with a full conviction, I resolved to evacuate Sebastopol, and take over the troops to the north side by the bridge, constructed beforehand over the bay, and by boats.

“Meantime the enemy, beholding, on the 27th of August (8th of September), at half-past ten, the half-ruined works before them, and the Korniloff Redoubt, with its ditches filled up, resolved upon a desperate assault, first on bastions No. 2 (Korniloff) and No. 3 (Redan), and after about three hours upon bastion No. 5, and the Belkin and Schwartz Redoubts. Of these six attacks, five were gloriously repulsed. Some of the points of attack, like that on bastion No. 2, on which the enemy had succeeded in bringing guns by flying bridges, having at various times been taken and retaken, remained finally ours. But the Korniloff Redoubt, more damaged than the others by the bombardment, was taken by the French, who brought more than 30,000 men against it, and could not be retaken, after the great losses we had suffered at the commencement of this combat; for it would have been necessary to ascend in the midst of the ruins a very steep incline, and then cross a narrow ridge above a deep ditch on the rear face occupied by the French. Such an undertaking might have prevented us achieving the proposed object, and would have cost us, without the slightest doubt, incalculable losses. The attempt was the more needless, as, for reasons already mentioned, I had resolved to evacuate the place. Therefore, as the success of the enemy was confined to the sole capture of the Korniloff Redoubt, I ordered that no attack should be made on that redoubt, and to remain in front of it, to oppose any continuation of the enemy’s attack on the town itself—an order which was executed despite all the efforts of the French to get beyond the gorge of the redoubt.

“At dusk the troops were ordered to retire,

according to the arrangements previously made. The examples of bravery you gave during that day, valiant comrades, aroused such a feeling of respect in the enemy, that, despite the knowledge they must have had of our retreat by the explosion of our mines, which our troops exploded one after the other as they gradually retreated, they not only did not pursue us in columns, but even ceased firing with their artillery, which they might have continued with impunity.

“Valiant comrades, it is painful, it is hard to leave Sebastopol in the enemy’s hands. But remember the sacrifice we made upon the altar of our country in 1812. Moscow was surely as valuable as Sebastopol—we abandoned it after the immortal battle of Borodino. The defence of Sebastopol during 349 days is superior to Borodino; and when the enemy entered Moscow in that great year of 1812, they only found heaps of stones and ashes. Likewise it is not Sebastopol which we have left to them, but the burning ruins of the town, which we ourselves set fire to, having maintained the honour of the defence in such a manner that our great-grandchildren may recall the remembrance thereof with pride to all posterity. Sebastopol kept us chained to its walls; with its fall we acquire freedom of movement, and a new war commences—a war in the open field, that most congenial to the Russian soldier. Let us prove to the emperor, let us prove to Russia, that we are still imbued with the spirit which animated our ancestors in our memorable and patriotic struggle. Wherever the enemy may show himself we will present our breasts to him, and defend our native land as we defended it in 1812. Valiant warriors of the land and sea forces, in the name of the emperor I thank you for the unexampled courage, firmness, and constancy, you have displayed during the siege of Sebastopol.

“In thus expressing the gratitude your worthy commanders are entitled to who are still living, let us also honour, comrades, those who have fallen honourably for our faith and for our country on the ramparts of Sebastopol. Let us remember the immortal names of Nachimoff, Korniloff, and Istomine, and let us address prayers to the Most High that He will grant them peace, and eternalise their memory as an example to the future generations of Russians.”

The emperor also addressed an “order” to the defenders of Sebastopol, in which there was the same assumption of being on the side of God and the only true religion, which so much disgraced the state papers of Nicholas. This document proved to Europe that the czar Alexander would not, or dare not, make peace.

In truth, his people were still for war; they still believed in their destiny as one of universal empire, as a means of establishing their own Church in universal ascendancy.

"The defence of Sebastopol, which has lasted so long, which is, perhaps, unexampled in military annals, has drawn upon it the attention not only of Russia, but of all Europe. From its very commencement it placed its defenders in the same rank as the most illustrious heroes of our country. In the course of eleven months the garrison of Sebastopol has disputed with a powerful enemy every inch of ground of the country which surrounds the town, and each of its enterprises has been distinguished by the most brilliant bravery. The obstinate bombardment, four times renewed, and the fire of which has been justly styled 'infernal,' shook the walls of our fortifications, but could not shake or diminish the zeal and perseverance of their defenders. They beat the enemy, or died with indomitable courage, with a self-denial worthy of the soldiers of Christ, without a thought of surrendering. Regretting from my heart the loss of so many generous warriors, who offered their lives as a sacrifice to their country, and submitting with resignation to the will of the Most High, whom it has not pleased to crown their acts with complete success, I feel it a sacred duty, on this occasion, to express in my name, as well as in that of all Russia, to the brave garrison of Sebastopol the warmest gratitude for its indefatigable labours, for the blood it has shed in the defence, for nearly a year, of those fortifications which it erected in a few days.

"But there are impossibilities even for heroes. On the 8th of this month, after six desperate assaults, which were repulsed, the enemy succeeded in getting possession of the important Korniloff Bastion (Malakoff), and the commander-in-chief of the army in the Crimea, desirous of sparing the precious blood of his companions, who, under the circumstances, would only have shed it uselessly, decided upon passing over to the north side of the fortress, leaving only blood-stained ruins to the besieging enemy.

"Those tried heroes, the object of the general esteem of their comrades, will, doubtless, give, in re-entering actually into the ranks of the army, new proofs of their warlike virtues. With them, and like them, all my troops, animated with the same unbounded confidence in Providence, with the same ardent love for me and my country, will always and everywhere fight the enemies that attempt to touch our sacred ark—the honour and the territorial integrity of our country; and the name of Sebastopol, which has acquired immortal glory by so much suffering, and the names of

its defenders, will live eternally in the hearts of all the Russians, with the names of the heroes who immortalised themselves on the fields of battle at Pultawa and Borodino."

Her Britannic majesty anticipated the emperor, her enemy, and the emperor, her ally, in congratulatory reference to the events at Sebastopol. She caused her minister of war to address to the commander-in-chief of the British army, in her name, the following order:—

"The queen has received with deep emotion the welcome intelligence of the fall of Sebastopol.

"Penetrated with profound gratitude to the Almighty, who has vouchsafed this triumph to the allied army, her majesty has commanded me to express to yourself, and, through you, to the army, the pride with which she regards this fresh instance of their heroism.

"The queen congratulates her troops on the triumphant issue of this protracted siege, and thanks them for the cheerfulness and fortitude with which they have encountered its toils, and the valour which has led to its termination.

"The queen deeply laments that this success is not without its alloy in the heavy losses which have been sustained; and while she rejoices in the victory, her majesty deeply sympathises with the noble sufferers in their country's cause.

"You will be pleased to congratulate General Pelissier, in her majesty's name, upon the brilliant result of the assault on the Malakoff, which proves the irresistible force, as well as indomitable courage of our brave allies."

The public congratulations of the French emperor were sent to Pelissier by telegraph, and were brief and ardent:—

"Honour to you! Honour to our brave army! My sincere congratulations to all."

"The emperor requests you to congratulate, in his name, the English army for the constant bravery and the moral strength of which it has given proof during this long and trying campaign."

The sultan sent his minister of war to bear the following letter to General Pelissier, who was made a marshal of France by the decree of the emperor, September 12th:—

"The arms of the alliance have just obtained a brilliant victory, the fruit of so much bravery. In my name and in the name of my people I congratulate you—you and the brave army which the emperor, my august and close ally, has placed under your command, as I have congratulated our brave allies, the English and the Sardinians.

"Turkey, like France, is grateful to you;

and it shares the general admiration of the whole world.

"The brave children of these countries, which a close alliance binds for ever the one to the other, have, without doubt, been greatly tried; but the capture of a place, the siege of which will be one of the most splendid pages of military history, is a most glorious reward. Their country blesses their names as the Almighty has blessed their arms. I pray you, marshal, to be my interpreter to your brave army, to express to it these sentiments.

"The president of the general council of war, the general of division, Rifaat Pasha, who will deliver to you the present letter, will communicate to you verbally my most sincere congratulations to you and to your brave companions in arms.

"Whereupon, I pray God to have you ever in his high and holy keeping."

The naval despatches were as follows. Sir Edmund Lyons wrote on the 10th from on board the *Royal Albert*, off Sebastopol:—

"Of the operations on shore, which have produced the successful result of the singular and memorable siege of Sebastopol, her majesty's government will be informed by General Simpson; but it is my duty to report to the lords commissioners of the Admiralty what has taken place afloat, and on the seaboard, under my own observation.

"It had been arranged by Generals Simpson and Pelissier, Admiral Bruat and myself, that precisely at noon on the 8th instant, the allied fleets should open fire upon the Quarantine Batteries that enfiladed the approach of the assaulting columns; but, unfortunately, the weather, which had been fine for some days, changed on the morning of the attack, and a north-west gale and a heavy sea rendered it impossible for any vessels to act upon batteries situated on the lee-shore of this exposed roadstead. It will, however, appear, by the inclosed reports from Captain Wilcox, of the *Odin*, and Captain Digby, of the Royal Marine Artillery (whom, as well as the junior officers mentioned by them, I beg leave particularly to recommend to the favourable consideration of their lordships), that the mortar-vessels attached to the fleets kept up a very effective fire from their position in the Bay of Strelitzka.

"As the day closed, things in the harbour seemed to be in the same state as they were in the morning; but during the night several heavy explosions were heard, and at dawn we observed that the fortifications on the south side were in flames, and that the six remaining ships of the line had been sunk at their moorings, leaving afloat no more of the late Russian Black Sea fleet than two dismasted corvettes

and nine steamers, most of which are very small.

"Soon afterwards the enemy were seen retreating across the newly-constructed bridge, until the south side of the harbour, on which the naval and military arsenals, the public buildings, and the town of Sebastopol are situated, appeared to be completely evacuated, and then the southern portion of the bridge was hauled over to the north shore.

"It is now my pleasing duty to render justice to the admirable conduct of all whom I have had the honour and happiness to command during the last nine months of this arduous struggle, and whose duties I shared in before; for although, with the exception of the Naval Brigade in the camp, whose gallant bearing from the beginning, under the command of Sir Stephen Lushington, has been beyond all praise, and never more so than during the last two bombardments under the command of the Hon. Captain Keppel, it has not fallen to the lot of the navy, on this occasion, to perform distinguished deeds of arms such as those of their gallant brethren in the army; still, whilst straining every nerve, night and day, under very trying circumstances, to supply the means for carrying on the siege, in the glory of which they could not share, the generous cheer of encouragement, unalloyed by envy, has always been heartily given in the day of triumph; nor have sympathy and assistance ever been wanting in the hour of distress and suffering; the same sentiments have pervaded all ranks—captains, officers, seamen, and marines, all agreeing with each other in following, as I believe I have said once before, the excellent example set them by my able second in command and coadjutor, Rear-admiral Houston Stewart.

"Perhaps, in closing this letter, I may be permitted to indulge in the expression of the gratification I feel in reflecting that, under all the circumstances to which it relates, my gallant colleague Vice-admiral Bruat and I have gone heart and hand together, and that the most perfect understanding and hearty co-operation in the great cause of humanity in which we are all engaged, have invariably prevailed throughout both fleets.

The report of Captain Digby was dated the day of the assault from Strelitzka Bay:—

"I have the honour to report that, in pursuance of the orders which I received from you this morning, I opened fire from the mortar-vessels at 8.30 A.M. upon the Quarantine Battery, and a general and more rapid fire, from noon until 7 P.M., upon the Quarantine Battery and Fort Alexander. The two outward vessels were much exposed to the swell which set into the bay, rendering a large object de-

sirable; and I therefore directed their fire between Artillery Bay and the Bastion de Quarantine, where I had been informed that Russian reserves were placed.

"The force of the wind and heavy swell which prevailed were singularly unfavourable to accuracy, and the general satisfactory nature of the firing was due to the ability exercised by the officers of the Royal Marine Artillery who conducted it; and I beg to submit to your notice the names of First-lieutenant Starr, First-lieutenant Hewett, First-lieutenant Brookes, First-lieutenant Festing, and First-lieutenant Pitman, the officers employed.

"The non-commissioned officers and gunners also performed their duties in a most satisfactory manner; and I may especially mention the services of Colour-sergeant Horner, who, in the absence of an officer, undertook the firing of the *Firm*, mortar-vessel.

"Owing to the state of the weather, and the smallness of the means at their disposal, the officers in command had to overcome great difficulties in maintaining the position of their vessels; and I beg to be allowed to express my high opinion of the services of Messrs. Leet, Creagh, and Pearson, Brent, Hart, and Vaughan, (mates), who so ably performed these duties, and greatly contributed to the success of the firing."

Captain Willeox wrote, on the same day, from on board the *Odin*:—

"I have the honour to acquaint you that, acting in pursuance of your directions, and in conjunction with Captain Bachm, commanding four French mortar-boats, I opened fire from the mortar-vessels you did me the honour of placing under my command at 8.30 A.M. till 7 P.M., against the Quarantine Fort and out-works, as well as upon Fort Alexander and the Upper Bastions (where, near to the latter place, a large number of the enemy's reserve were posted), keeping their fire so completely under that only a few shot and shell were returned, and but few fired into the French battery and advanced works before us. A small number of carcasses were also thrown into the town and Upper Bastion, which produced a conflagration of some extent.

"To Captain Digby, Royal Marine Artillery, and to the artillery officer in each vessel, I must attribute the successful practice; and I am glad of the opportunity of bringing to your notice the indefatigable and zealous conduct of Mr. H. K. Leet, mate, in charge of the *Firm*, who, from being the senior officer of the mortar-vessels, has always ably carried out my instructions; and I am happy to bear testimony to the praiseworthy conduct of Messrs. J. B. Creagh, T. L. Pearson, H. W. Brent, A. F. Hart,

and Henry Vaughan, mates, in charge of the other mortar-vessels.

"I have also great pleasure in stating that no casualty occurred, and that neither the mortars or vessels were at all damaged by the heavy firing."

Captain Keppel, commanding the Naval Brigade, made the following report to the admiral the day after the assault:—

"I have the honour to inform you that, in pursuance of instructions, a vigorous fire was opened from the batteries at six o'clock on the morning of the 7th, and was maintained throughout the day. The fire was recommenced yesterday morning with increased vigour, preparatory to an assault to be made by our allies on the Malakoff, and subsequently by ourselves on the Redan.

"At noon the French were observed to start *en masse* from their trenches, and possess themselves in gallant style of the Malakoff Battery, on which the tricolour flag was hoisted, and the imperial eagles planted within ten minutes of their quitting their trenches.

"The French flag was no sooner displayed on the Malakoff, than our storming-party issued from their trenches, and assailed the salient angle of the Redan; but the enemy were by that time prepared to meet them, and, as the supporting-party advanced, a heavy fire of grape and canister was opened on them, in spite of a brisk fire kept up from our batteries on all parts of the Redan not assailed, as well as on the flanking batteries. After maintaining the footing they had gained for some time, our troops were obliged to retire, the killed and wounded left on the ground sufficiently testifying how gallantly they had fought.

"The fire from our batteries was kept up until dark, and at about eleven o'clock the enemy evacuated the Redan, after having fired a train that exploded the magazines.

"This morning's light showed how successful and complete had been the victory gained by the allied forces. The enemy had evacuated all their positions on the south side of the harbour; the town, Fort Nicolai, Fort Paul, and Dockyard, were in flames, and their line-of-battle ships had been sunk in the positions they were last seen in when at anchor.

"The conduct of the officers and men of the brigade under my command has been such as to continue to merit the high opinion you have been pleased to express of them.

"I have the honour to inclose a list of casualties for the 7th and 8th."

On the 15th Admiral Lyons addressed a letter to the Admiralty, giving further information.

CHAPTER CII.

LETTERS FROM THE CAMP RELATING TO THE BOMBARDMENT AND CAPTURE OF SOUTHERN SEBASTOPOL.—INCIDENTS DURING AND AFTER THE STORMING, ILLUSTRATING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF VICTORS AND VANQUISHED.

“Low down the billows under,
Lies now his vaunted thunder,
Every plank is split asunder—
Honour our heroes brave!
No more his cannons frown
Above his boasted town;
Bastion and fort are down,
And his proud array of ships,
And his guns with fiery lips,
Lie cooling 'neath the wave.”—*War Song.*

NEVER in the history of war have letters from the actors in its terrible exploits been read with so much interest as during the progress of the Crimean expedition. Whether on the part of the officer or the humble soldier, the views and feelings of those who participated in the strife were regarded with deep sympathy by their countrymen at home. This sympathy, which became intense after the battle of the Alma, continued all through the war; but immediately after the storming of Sebastopol there sprung up an increased and irrepressible eagerness to peruse the correspondence of the men who survived to witness the issue of the sanguinary but glorious struggle. The reader will find in the following pages letters from men of very varied position, and all expressive of the characteristics of the conflict, and of the troops who so long maintained it. Perhaps the letters of the medical men have been read with less curiosity by the public than any other; this probably arose from their being considered as non-combatants, whereas often their position was most perilous, and their conduct heroic. The following is from one of these gallant men whose name has before occurred on the pages of this History—Dr. Fair. Perhaps no medical officer had been more, if so much, in the trenches as he had been. On one occasion, while conversing with his colonel (Cuddy), a ball struck the latter, carrying off part of his coat and waistcoat, and leaving himself unhurt; and almost immediately after, the same thing happened to the other side of his coat. The gallant colonel was the first to see the signal to advance, and the first to fall on the dreadful and final day at the Redan.

“September 7th.—On coming home from a stroll to the Limekilns, whither I had gone to have another look at the often-looked-at city, I found that a clear out had been made at the hospital; the sick had been sent to Balaklava, and an order had come that officers and men were to prepare two days' rations, to breakfast at six, and parade at eight. So I made ready my

haversack by replenishing it with lint, bandages, &c.; had some beef boiled, procured bread, got my flasks filled, and turned in. Bombardment, confined chiefly to the left, going on all day.

“September 8th.—C—— awoke me about daylight; tremendously cold morning; had a cup of tea; went round hospital, and then marched off with regiment to parade-ground, where we waited a long time, having started too soon. At parade General Codrington gave a short address, informing us that we were to act as supports to the storming-party—an important duty, which he doubted not would be well performed; that we were to occupy the fourth parallel, moving gradually into the fifth, then to enter the Redan, and insure the possession of it to the stormers. So off we marched down the middle ravine. My staff consisted of Carmodie and two bandsmen, as orderlies, carrying my haversack, rum-barrel, &c. I marched beside Burke, our adjutant, at the head of the Grenadier company. As we went along, I gathered that the French were to attack the Malakoff at twelve o'clock, and that their standard planted on the tower, and the English flag on the Mamelon, was to be our signal of attack upon the Redan. On we went through the ravine to the oft-trod trenches, keeping up a brisk fire, to which the Russians replied but seldom. On the left the bombardment was kept up heavily. We jogged along till we got to the fourth parallel, then gradually moved down the approach to the fifth—now sitting on the breastwork, speaking over the coming event of the day, then moving on a little. Being with the Grenadier or flank company, I was next to the light company of the 30th, and went along, talking with its officers, among others, Colonel Patallo, who not long after was brought to me mortally wounded, and Saunders, who was also severely wounded. Gradually we reached the end of the approach, where it joins the fifth parallel, and at that corner most of us of the 55th and 30th were talking together with General Warren, all keeping a sharp look out at the Malakoff, as far

as possible, amid the rifle-bullets which were flying about from the Redan. We were now on the tiptoe of expectation, for our guns had now begun such a fire as I had never before heard—volleys of eight and ten at a time, which, being fired from behind, passed but a few feet over our heads, tearing up the earth-works of the Redan in grand style. The French, too, opened a tremendous fire from the Mamelon. At twelve o'clock exactly, 'There go the French!' was heard, and in a moment we were all up on the breastwork, thinking nothing of the round-shot and grape that came bounding and whizzing about us, throwing up earth and stones, smashing gabions, and knocking down men. It was a splendid sight to see the French rushing up the steep side of the Malakoff. We saw it but for a few minutes, as all was soon obscured in smoke; but high above we could distinguish the French standard waving over the Malakoff tower; and it was pleasanter still to see the Russians rushing helter-skelter from the works down to the Redan. It was sharp work, for at twenty minutes past twelve our signal was up—a white flag on the Mamelon. Colonel Cuddy saw it first, and rushed off at the head of his men; so we all shook hands and moved down the trench as fast as we could, for our attacking-party had passed out of the sap, and we saw them rushing on the Redan. Many a fine fellow was cut short in his career across the open by the grape-shot, which came in fearful volleys. I kept up with my regiment as well as I could, for the wounded falling around me kept me back. I bound them up, and then made a run after the regiment, till arrested by others, and thus on till I got to the end of the sap which led to the open. To go farther was useless, there being already such a crowd of wounded around; so I took up my position there, no enviable one, for grape and shot came bounding among us, wounding those beside me. Two riflemen fell dead almost on the top of me. I had plenty to do, and time passed without my knowing how it flew, I was so busy. Cure, our major, was one of the first officers who came to me, a grape-shot having broken his arm. Then Richards, one of our captains, struck on the ankle by grape. He wanted to go back, but I would not let him, nor could he if I had, for he fainted when I had him laid on the breastwork. Officers and men came crowding on, mowed down by the grape from the flanking fire which rushed over and among us, throwing up dust and stones, which dealt us no gentle raps. I was struck twice, once on the back by, I think, a grape-shot—but I had no time to look—and once on the foot, by a rifle-ball, both 'smarters,' but that was all. I was too busy to observe anything going on, so, except the first rush, I saw nothing I may

say of the attack. While I was thus hard at work among the wounded, the soldiers around cried out, 'Doctor, you must get out of the way; they are retreating!' So I looked up, and saw our men rushing helter-skelter into and over the open, to the trenches to the rear of us. I did not exactly know what to do, so I drew my sword (which, by the way, got very bloody that day, but not with Russian blood), and went on with my dressing till I had finished all about me, and then thought of moving off. I could not leave poor Richards, as we all expected the Russians to be in among us every minute; so there was nothing for it but to put him on my back and carry him, which I did till I got a stretcher, by some means or other, and raised some men of the reserve to carry him home. Then I went down to the trenches again, dressing any wounded I found on the way. While doing so, Saunders called out to me from the trenches into which he had staggered, with the knee-joint of one leg smashed, and a bullet through the other. He bore it all splendidly. I dressed his wounds, got a scaling-ladder, and sent him 'home' too. The Russians did not come out, and when I left, the city began to blaze.

"*September 9th.*—Up at daylight, and down with the regiment. I went out with the adjutant to look for Colonel Cuddy's body, which was found with the arm upraised, as if waving his sword, to go into the Redan; had a look round, then stationed in 21-gun battery all day.

"*September 10th.*—Set to work in hospital at eight o'clock; got done about five; had dinner; went round and saw a few officers I knew, and back to hospital again. My back, by this time, pretty sore with stooping. I have just been warned to go with the regiment on a bathing and washing expedition to the Tchernaya, for fear of accident; start at 7 o'clock."

The above was, of course, never intended for publication; the off-hand style, therefore, in which it is written, gives it the more interest.

The following was written by Mr. Lane from the commissariat head-quarters, Balaklava, on the morning of the 8th, a few hours before the assault, and will show what the feelings and hopes of those there stationed were while the cannon of the bombardment were uttering their fierce challenges on the plateau:—"You ask, 'Why don't we take Sebastopol?' It is not so easily done; however, we have made another attempt, and may it be successful. On the night of the 4th the French fired and destroyed one of the frigates in the harbour; and on the 5th, about 5 p.m., the whole line of batteries, French and British, opened a fire unparalleled in the world's history. If you have ever heard a line of infantry fire on a

review day, you may form some idea of the incessant war of artillery from the batteries when we opened. Balaklava and the camp was alive. You may guess what excitement prevailed, this being the last and long-looked-for opening prior to the grand assault. I, like many others, rode to the front; and at dark no pen can describe the grandeur of the scene—the flashes of the guns along the whole line, the bursting of the shells, and the rockets flying through the air, made it a sight indescribable. The attack upon the Malakoff is looked for every moment: the greatest confidence in the result prevails. I am writing this in a miserable hut, which is neither wind-tight nor water-tight, and am not, therefore, in a condition to write you a long letter."

It will be remembered that when the allies entered the hospital to hand over the wounded Russians to a steamer which had crossed the harbour with a flag of truce to receive them, Captain Vaughan, of the 90th, was found among the dead and wounded. The following letter gives the particulars of the manner in which this gallant man was recovered:—"He was found at 8 A.M., on the 10th of September, sitting on the lower step of a staircase that led to the upper floor of the building. His leg was badly broken; he had nothing on him but a flannel shirt and a pair of socks, and when first spoken to he was delirious; he appeared to be very cold, as he was shivering. I procured him water, and it was distressing to see the avidity with which he swallowed it. I procured a stretcher, and placed a feather-bed on it, and I never left him till I deposited him safely in the lines of the 90th, under the care of Dr. Anderson, the excellent surgeon of that regiment. The first stretcher did not do, and I had it changed at the Redan. His mind wandered frequently, and he then almost always spoke in French; but by speaking gently to him, and holding his hand, I was generally enabled to make him understand what he was talking about, and then he gave me a clear account of what had occurred to him. He was wounded very soon after entering the Redan. After our attack was repulsed, the Russian officers gave orders that he should be taken carefully to the rear; and while in their presence he was well treated, but, I fear, he was treated with much brutality as he was being conveyed to the rear. He complained that the men who were taking him dragged him along roughly, and that his broken limb frequently came in contact with gabions, stones, &c., giving him great pain. Upon arriving at the building where I found him, which was full of dead and dying, he appears to have been unkindly treated. His wound had not been dressed. He repeatedly supplicated for water, but no one gave him a drop. Thank

God, they were not Englishmen. It is impossible to conceal that the gallant gentleman's sufferings must have been intense, but he had a gallant heart to meet his fate, and endure the pain that God thought fit to inflict upon him."

The following letter was written by an officer to his family soon after the assault:—"The 97th led the way, and placed the ladders against the parapet of the Redan, after the Malakoff was taken by the French. The first part of our regiment consisted of 160 men, under Major Welsford, with the ladders. The major was the first to mount one, and was about to get in at an embrasure, when a gun inside was fired, and the shot took off his head. Our poor colonel, the Hon. Henry Handcock, led the assaulting-party of the 97th, which consisted of 200 men. Our present sergeant-major was with him all the time, and has since told me that before he got into the ditch he got a blow of a stone on the chest, which he did not mind. The ladder was then placed for him to mount the parapet, which he did, and got inside the Redan, followed closely by the sergeant-major. He was only there a short time, when he was struck by a bullet on the left side of the head. At the time he was raising his sword, and calling to his men to follow him. Feeling himself wounded, he said, 'I am hit, but never mind; follow me, sergeant!' He only advanced a few steps, when he fell, unconscious, from which state he never recovered. He died fifteen hours after. All speak in the highest manner of the bravery he showed, and all regret his loss very much. I cannot tell you how miserable I feel—all my companions either killed or wounded. Out of 360 men sent into action 198 are killed, wounded, or missing. Thirteen officers went into action, two only returned untouched—four were killed, and the rest wounded. Captain Hutton was only found this morning in the town, where he had been carried by the Russians in a dying state. Poor young McGregor, our adjutant, was killed inside the Redan."

Mr. McGregor, the officer referred to in the last sentence of this letter was an officer of great promise, and a most amiable and generous man. Mr. R. C. McCormick, an American gentleman, who visited the allied camps before Sebastopol, frequently mentions him in terms of respect and interest, and thus refers to his death:—"Those who have perused the details of this narrative will be prepared to sympathise with the deep regret we feel in announcing the death of Lieutenant D. A. McGregor, whose name appeared in the list of officers killed on the 8th of September during the final and successful attack on Sebastopol. The kindness of Lieutenant McGregor to the author while in the camp, and the cheerful and playful de-

meanour which he displayed while performing the part of a host amid the roughnesses and deprivations of camp-life, make one feel as though a friend, and not a stranger, had departed. Alas! thousands who played their part in the scenes recorded in these pages are now waiting, not for a call to the battle-field, but for that morning when 'the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised.'"

When officers of high rank fall in the service of their country, their names appear in the obituaries in the leading magazines and journals; but seldom is any notice taken of a poor subaltern, however heroic his conduct or his death. On that account instances are related here of the heroism of such men. Lieutenant H. G. Donovan, of the 33rd, or Duke of Wellington's Own, was one of the gallant subalterns who fell at the Redan. He belonged to a family of that name living at Ballymore, Camolin, county of Wexford, and was brother to Major Donovan of the same regiment. At the commencement of the war he was travelling in the East as a civilian, when, hearing that his brother's regiment had arrived at Scutari, he started thither, accompanied it to Bulgaria, and afterwards on to the Crimea. He obtained the colonel's permission to land there as a volunteer, and served at the battles of Alma and Inkerman. For his distinguished conduct at the Alma a commission was given him towards the end of September, 1854. He remained throughout the arduous campaign of 1855, sharing its toils and dangers, until the 8th of September, when he perished in the assault on Sebastopol. A naval officer, writing home a few days after his death, said, speaking of the attack:—"While in the ravine between our right and left attack, a soldier, one of the 33rd, called out to me, 'Captain, have you seen Mr. Donovan? he has just been carried up mortally wounded.' I immediately galloped up to his quarters, where I met the doctor, who said, 'It is all over with poor Donovan;' and on my requesting to see him, he complied; and there, in a tent, on a stretcher, lay the poor fellow, looking a brave man even in death. On my remarking to the surgeon that he was a good soldier, his reply was, 'Not a better in the regiment. I expected,' he added, 'that something would happen, as he was always the first in everything.' When I was last with him he asked me to come to a burial-ground, to look at the grave of an officer who had been a friend of his. It was the morning after the French magazine blew up, and they were digging graves for some who had been killed, when he made the remark, 'It is not very pleasant marching down here, and seeing one's grave, perhaps, digging for one.' That very day he read the service over one of his regiment who had been killed the preceding

night; little did I then expect that some one would have to perform the same melancholy duty over him so shortly afterwards."

Sir Edward Colebrook, Bart., in his journal, printed for private circulation, gives a vivid sketch of what he saw:—"The fire was now hot along the whole front, as the French attack on the left had commenced. I could see a little flag flying on the top of the Malakoff, and men passing in and out of the works, which assured us that our allies had secured their hold; but about two o'clock, when the fire slackened in our front, and the Russian works, which I had hitherto seen in dim outline, appeared in view, it became plain that our troops were again in the trenches, and the Russians in occupation of the Redan, and so ended my view of this great struggle. I lingered about the spot, and again on Cathcart's Hill, where I heard the confirmation of what my telescope had told me. We hoped for some return of success, for a renewal of the assault was expected; and one could not but feel anxious for the French, for the battle raged furiously about the Malakoff and beyond it, showing that this important position was far from won; an explosion in that direction added to the anxiety of the watchers of the scene; till wearied with anxiety and the vain attempts to penetrate the smoke, I turned back to the camp to see Major Chapman,* whose wound I had heard of. He was not on duty, but his eagerness would not allow him to remain a distant spectator, and he had been hit by a grape-shot in the leg in one of the advanced batteries. The evening was a very melancholy one; I slept in my wounded friend's tent, as he was moved to a hut. Dined with Colonel Chapman, who did not return from the first parallel, where he had been with General Simpson throughout the day, until eight o'clock. Engineer officers dropped in during the evening. Of course all conversation turned on our national humiliation. 'The French have carried the Malakoff, and we have failed at the Redan.' Chapman's opinion very decided as to the cause of our reverse—the not pushing on the assaulting columns with sufficient vigour. General Simpson's message to Pelissier regarding our failure is very characteristic:—"Tell him" (addressing General Rose) 'that we have been stopped by some d—d devilry in the Redan.' I think no one anticipated the events of the night. That the Russians would attempt to recover the Malakoff, or direct a vigorous sortie against our trenches, seemed next to certain. We, on the other hand, should certainly renew our attack on the Redan in the night or morning. Roused

* "Of the 20th regiment, doing duty with the Engineers. His wound mortified, and he died in the following week."

in the night by the explosion of the Russian works, I considered them as part of the renewed struggle, till Chapman called me up with the news of the evacuation. The sight of the burning town was one I shall never forget. 'No more trench work, sir,' were the first words that greeted me as I advanced to the front of the third division. These words from a group of soldiers expressed the universal opinion of the army, officers and men. As the morning dawned I joined Ranken,* of the Engineers, and two other officers, to take a nearer view of the now empty fortress. Dark clouds hung over the sea; the French guns kept up a dropping fire on the left, and reverberating like distant thunder, added to the solemnity of the scene, on which large masses of the Russian troops were gazing from the opposite height, while now and then the burst of an enormous cloud of smoke and dust from the town told the destruction of a fort or magazine. We rode to the Redan, but as we approached the trenches Ranken was very much affected by the line of wounded that were coming up in great numbers, and after exhausting the bottle of brandy-and-water he had with him, he proposed to me to return to camp for a large supply, in which I readily joined him, and we filled his saddle-bags with wine and brandy, the principal part of which was supplied by my friend, and some stolen by me from my friends. Ranken took his servant, and we started anew. I turned aside on my way to look at the arrangements at a spot half way down the ravine, where the wounded were transferred from the stretchers to the ambulances, and was glad to find them well supplied with tea and brandy-and-water, which an assistant was administering to the poor fellows who had been lying out all night. We passed on and met the line of mutilated objects, some with their faces frightfully disfigured, and to whom Ranken eagerly administered refreshments, for which they appeared most grateful. As we came to the advanced trenches we parted company; we were repeatedly warned of the difficulties of getting on, and my plain dress was an evident encumbrance to my friend. I therefore thought it better to remain behind, but I was rejoiced to hear afterwards that his provident care had relieved many a wounded man at the verge of the ditch. It would be unfair to judge severely the medical arrangements for such an occasion. The very nature of the conflict prevented the immediate removal of all the wounded, but there should have been an order for the immediate dispatch of refreshments to the field. I met mules on my return bringing food and water to the troops, and as

much might and ought to have been done for the wounded on the field, and not merely at the ambulance tent, a mile off, to which they could be very slowly removed. It gives an additional grace to this trait of feeling on the part of Ranken that he had led the ladder-party the day before. The Russian bridge was rapidly breaking up, and a steamer and some boats were rapidly passing to and fro to take off the remnant of the force."

The following letter from an English subaltern is very graphic in its description:—

"I have escaped five bombardments, having been in the trenches during the first and during the last, besides three intermediate ones. The last one it is wholly out of my power to describe to you. Captain M—— and I were together in the fifth parallel during the night, with seventy men. I volunteered to go, as a subaltern had to be there, and he (Captain M——) was there as being the junior of the two, and I was senior of the subalterns, the others being mere boys. We were close to the Redan, and were exposed to a continued fire of musketry from the Russians for about five hours, and our fourth parallel opened a fire from behind us; thus, being in the dark, the fire was all chance and hap-hazard, and, consequently, we were as much in danger from our own men as the enemy. The fifth parallel is too close for the Redan to play upon us, but they fired grape and bouquets from other batteries. We withdrew to the fourth at daylight. I judged from the appearance and air of things that we were in for it—that the following day would become memorable. I judged aright. At 6 o'clock a terrific volley or salvos of guns opened on the left by the French. Imagine, if you can, 200 guns and mortars of the largest calibre firing as one gun; the English in the centre did the same; the French again, on the right, the same. This frightful affair lasted three hours. The Russians applied all their resources, and they also fired fearfully. Fancy, I say, if you can, having a fire overhead. The men were cleared from all the parallels except the fourth, which was to resist any attack that might be made—an unwilling sacrifice of a few, as was thought by all, for the good of the whole. The guns having cooled, a rocket from the French, at 12 o'clock, was the signal for a recommencement, and the entire number of guns, French and English, gave a volley enough to shake the Crimea to its centre. This lasted about two hours and a-half. At 5 o'clock it commenced again, and lasted till 7. Night closed in before the high wind which was blowing cleared the earth and heavens for miles around from dust and smoke. We miraculously escaped with only about two casualties, and got out of the trenches by 9 o'clock. At 10 the following morning, every

* "It is with deep regret I have heard, since these pages were in print, of the death of this young officer by an accidental explosion."

man of the army was under arms, and the bombardment once more began and continued throughout the entire day, excepting intervals of an hour or two, for the guns to cool, as on the day previous. The 3rd division was formed in reserve, in front of the 28th camp. The corps were the 1st Royals, 4th, 14th, 18th, 28th, 38th, 44th, 50th, and 89th, and were under arms till 9 o'clock. The French had gained the Malakoff by this, while the French and English had been driven twice each respectively from the Redan and Flagstaff Batteries. By 10 o'clock flames appeared in the town at different points; by 3 A.M. it was all over in a furious blaze—a sure sign that the Russians had evacuated the town and gone to the north. Never shall I forget the sight that was presented at daybreak. The men, guessing that the town was taken, and knowing the plundering propensities of our friends the French on such occasions, sallied forth and brought away whatever they could lay hands upon. But the Russians had removed everything of any value, and what they could not remove they destroyed; therefore what was captured was only lumber. Cavalry pickets, French and English, soon formed a barrier to prevent anything being brought away. The two chairs I have sent you were taken from some one by the cavalry; and I happening to be at the spot where they were, just as they were being relieved at night, I had them brought away under nightfall. I first visited the town. What a sight! Every step you took the mind became overwhelmed at what you saw, until one's ideas were staggered. Here you saw what had been a street of gorgeous palaces; there you saw a mighty but solemn temple; yonder a ponderous line of classic buildings and terraces—all in a pile of blackened, smouldering ruins. Some houses that I entered presented an appearance which would almost grieve one to look at, for pity's sake, from their irremediable ruin and desolation. The dwellings of the upper classes appear to have been built and fitted up to the utmost degree of comfort, convenience, and chasteness. But the chaos in which everything was found I cannot describe. In what had been a drawing-room would lie the broken shaft of a column of polished marble, the Corinthian capital of which shone with burnished gold, while the upper part of its fellow still adhered to the ceiling, which it was intended to support, and the weight of which now brought the ceiling nearly down to the flooring. Close beside would be a large block of stone that had crushed to pieces a piano of extraordinary beauty and dimensions, a shot or shell having shattered it from the wall of masonry. Fragments of marble chimneypieces, gilded picture-frames, music, pieces of polished mahogany of elegant

forms, belonging to tables, sideboards, sofas, &c., were everywhere strewn about. The beautiful places of worship were all ruinous empty shells, riddled, like all the houses and buildings, with shot and shell. One thing, however, went to show that the inhabitants had long left their dwellings, probably as long ago as the first bombardment, for every house appeared to have been in the occupation of the military, from the *débris* of clothing and appointments everywhere seen. Those inhabitants, it is probable, too, who had left with the forlorn hope of ever returning, doubtless, with a true Russian spirit and feeling, spread about them what ruin and damage they could before leaving; and what they failed to do the soldiers did for them before they left.

“But, without this, our projectiles would have destroyed nearly every stone and stick. Those noble buildings which are seen from our heights, with smooth, white exterior walls and green roofs, which smile and look pleasant as a sun-bank in the distance, on approaching them are found to be cold, forbidding ruins—pierced from top to bottom in every direction. The effect of our 13-inch shell can everywhere be seen, weighing as they do 200lb., and falling from an altitude of a mile and a-half, or about 3000 yards, their concussion is equal to seventy tons. Large gaps or empty spaces, in rows or clusters of buildings, tell that a shell has penetrated the roof or wall, and descended to a depth below the foundations, and in an instant not a vestige remained—nearly every atom scattered to the winds in all directions. The mind cannot picture anything equal in point of beauty to what this city has been. It seems to me to have been a place where one would wish to live and die. The hills behind, stretching radius-like for miles, must have been a beautiful landscape before we spread desolation; while in front the sun, setting in a yellow mellowness on the watery horizon, makes it appear to be a sea of liquid gold, and the soft richness of the shining waters, reflected on a western sky, makes it illusory, and such as one reads of or fancies only in fairy scenes. But Sebastopol has been known and feared more as an arsenal; and an arsenal we found it. No one is prepared to hear of the extent of warlike resources, naval and military. As you leave the camp, and thread your way down the ravines—the ravines and valleys of death—you enter a *faubourg*, or suburban village, most beautifully situated on the slopes of the opposite hills of the Great Redan and Flagstaff Bastions; but now scarcely one stone remains on another. Leaving this, you wind at once upon the creek adjoining the great harbour; here frowns a formidable battery of ships' guns. The left of this creek is the main city, sloping up to a height of about

500 feet above the level of the sea. This is called the 'French side,' as it was commanded by the Flagstaff Battery, which the French captured. The Redan, the most formidable of all, covered the public works and the barracks—immense buildings, plain, but beautiful structures of hewn stone of marble whiteness. The immense store buildings, of the same appearance, form a grand quay, not equalled anywhere. The quay is terminated by Fort Paul, now destroyed, having been blown up by the Russians on the night of the 8th, before leaving.

"The stupendous docks I cannot describe. I never saw anything, the work of men's hands, that can bear the slightest comparison. There are six capable of receiving the largest of the colossal ships that float, and they are as neat as they are large and mighty. The man who planned these was an Englishman—a Mr. Upton, a road-surveyor. The emperor rewarded him with the rank of lieutenant-colonel; and I was told by a Russ—an English prisoner at the Monastery of St. George—that the emperor always shook him by the hand warmly whenever he visited Sebastopol. These works and buildings are held by the English, and we have shafts sunk all round the docks to blow them to destruction whenever instructions arrive to that effect from home. The guns and ammunition that have fallen into English hands are almost incalculable. Around the docks there are not less than 2000 guns, a vast number of which are of the largest calibre; and of shot there are piles of tens of thousands. The masts of the shipping, slanting upwards above the waters in all directions, suggest a train of strangely speculative ideas. The two imperial forts (Nicholas and Constantine), now enemies, frown antagonistically at each other, and the cross-fire from these over the harbour causes a reverberation that strikes with a mournful cadence upon the ear. Let this pass, that I may say a word or two upon the defences of the town. The scientific principles displayed in them surpass all that ever has been done before at sieges, and totally eclipse our best engineering tactics. I hesitate not to say—and I mean it with no malice or disparagement—but were the Russian engineer officers to see our works, they would laugh at them. The Russian works were, apparently, formed to meet any and every conceivable exigency. Their batteries were their trenches and parallels, and these parallels and trenches were their one line of batteries, forming mountain ranges which had mountains for their base. These were not altogether natural advantages, but they applied such principles of art as were best suited to whatever advantage nature offered. Our principles differed *in toto*. Could our trenches be faced about, we should

then be something near the principles upon which the Russian works are constructed. A person walking from the front can walk nicely into our works, by reason of the earth being thrown to the front, making it a simple incline or small counterescarp. The Russians knew better; they made the perpendicular towards the enemy, revetting it with gabions in order to do it effectually. Behind they had all kinds of shelter for the men and gunners, quite independent of, but contiguous to, the battery, round, square, and triangular—some open, but most of them bombproof. Behind also lay a large tract of ground, worked up to be a grand auxiliary to their operations. Tunnel-formed pits to receive our shells were numerous. Deep square pits were sunk immediately behind the batteries and in unlooked-for places, to receive our men in hundreds as they scaled the ramparts; here a hill, there a hole; a ladder placed here, steps for men there. Sharp-pointed uprights of gabions and broken bayonets stared you in the face as you looked down these pits and hollows. Disabled guns were not consigned to their graves, as ours were, but the breech of them lowered in a hole behind the batteries, with the fore part resting on wood, thus giving them an elevation of about forty-five degrees. These they fired with an overcharge by a train, and these, we now discover, sent those numerous messengers to the distance of the camps. But in front of the batteries of which I am writing they had another, a little lower down the hill; and to make this of immense strength, the earth was raised from between the two lines of batteries, both independent of each other, but of mutual assistance if required—a broad, deep ditch, of twenty feet wide, in some places fifty, and as many in depth, from the crest of the second parapet. All these were covered with an abattis of large branches of trees, with tops outwards, and a *chevaux-de-frise*. You may now fancy the difference of difficulty in the attack on their lines and ours. The difference in other things is in the same ratio. Our men lay in the trenches when they were half filled with sleet and snow, with scarcely anything to cover them—nothing but the ragged remnants of a spongy old greatcoat, not fit at best for house-flannel. The Russians had huts—no, not huts, but positively barracks—all along the line of batteries and under them, and, therefore, bombproof. Here they appear to have been very snug and comfortable. Implements of tailoring, shoe-lasts, and other et ceteras, told that each handicraftsman worked at his leisure hours, although in the trenches cards, too, were plentiful. Brandy-bottles there were plenty, and, from the label on several bottles, it showed that they had an affection for English 'Old Tom.' To stand on the summit of

the Flagstaff Bastion, you see a sight worth beholding. The whole of the works of the English and French left attack are seen at one view, besides the whole of the Southern Crimea. But a visit to the Russian lines is offensive to one's feelings and humanity; you cannot place your foot upon any loose soil but you may be standing upon the half-buried body of a dead comrade or Russian, and the stifling odour that rises everywhere makes one almost shudder."

Having presented the accounts given by those whose position and education qualified them to give a comprehensive relation of the transactions in which they were engaged, it is desirable to afford a specimen of how the poor soldier thought and felt during the conflict, and after the victory. The following letter is from a private of the 90th (light infantry) to a member of his family in England, written immediately after the assault:—"Long ere this reaches you, you will have seen the account of the storming and capture of Sebastopol. I had the honour of being in the front company of the storming-party, and was in the hottest of the fight, and still the Almighty has mercifully preserved me. On the night of the 7th instant 300 of our regiment were told off for a storming-party on the following morning; the point of attack was the Redan Battery. We paraded at 7 o'clock, A.M., on the 8th instant, and by 8 o'clock, after a short address by General Codrington, we marched down (in the highest spirits) to our most advanced trenches (which we had formerly taken from the Russians), where we remained under cover till the signal was given us to advance. The plan of the attack was for the French to attack the tower of the Malakoff, and, if they succeeded, we were to rush out of our works upon the Redan Battery. A tremendous fire was kept up from our and the French batteries upon both of the Russian positions till about half-past eleven, when we saw the French advance from under cover, and steadily gain ground upon the Malakoff. In less than a quarter of an hour they had their colours hoisted upon the furthest extremity of the battery, and the Russians running by thousands out of it, and towards the Redan. We waited for no more, but with one tremendous British cheer and a bound over the parapet, we rushed towards the Redan. It was then that the fearful slaughter commenced; the Redan Battery, which we thought was almost silenced, belched forth its murderous fire upon our devoted regiment. I had not advanced 100 yards when our poor fellows began to fall around me like hail; still on we went. I feared no danger, and I felt as cool and collected as I am at this moment. It was not till a late hour at night that we suc-

ceeded in thoroughly beating the enemy, and they fairly ran out of the town, crossed the bridge to the north side of the harbour, and left us completely masters of the town. Such a glorious day's work has not been done for many years; but, alas! our victory was dearly purchased. Out of the 300 men of our regiment told off for the storming-party upwards of 200 were killed and wounded; between forty and fifty are missing, though we know that the most of those perished in the ditch in scaling the parapet of the Redan. Our victory has exceeded our most sanguine hopes; we only expected to take the Malakoff and the Redan, but we have now possession of the whole of the town. Some few Russians are left in it, hidden in holes and corners, whom we continue to make prisoners."

In the despatches of General Pelissier and General Niel to the French minister of war, mention was made of the gallant conduct of Commandant Ragon, of the engineers, in the assault. The following letter from that officer to one of his friends is characteristic and striking. He addressed it from the Malakoff Redoubt, on the 11th of September:—"I cheerfully pay the tax you have imposed on me of a short letter to set your minds at rest. It was I, Louis Dominique Auguste Ragon, one of your oldest and best friends, who had the honour of commanding the engineers of the column of assault on the formidable work of Malakoff. I entered it at the head of the sappers, conjointly with the regiment of Zouaves of the first division of the second *corps d'armée*. We climbed the ditch like cats, dislodged the enemy, forced the lines, and carried the redoubt with an enthusiasm and rapidity perfectly French. Our standards planted on the parapet were assailed and vigorously defended for more than six hours. After this heroic struggle, our column had alone the honour of remaining masters of its conquests; the four others, two on our right and two on our left, were compelled to give way, leaving the ground covered with their killed and wounded. But our triumph sufficed to deprive the Russians of the power of holding their ground. At midnight, from the top of our conquered work, and mounted on heaps of dead Russians, we were witnesses of one of the grandest spectacles that can possibly be conceived; the town, in flames, lighted up all the roadstead, where the Russian vessels were disappearing, one after the other, beneath the waves, lurid by the glare of the fire on shore. To this terrible picture was added the successive explosions of forts, batteries, and powder-magazines, which the enemy blew up in their retreat. At daybreak we had nothing around us but ruins, with the dead and dying beneath our feet, a routed army before us on the north shore of the roadstead,

and our triumphant soldiers regarding with a gratified eye the magnificent result of their courageous efforts. The first of these explosions, to which I found myself rather too close, caused me some little injury; the whole of my epaulette was carried away, my sword was bent at the hilt, and my left arm and hip bruised, and I received a scratch on the head just sufficient to give me a right to say that I had shed blood for the honour of France in this day of triumph. I seal my letter with the seal of a Russian officer, which I obtained in the Malakoff tower, and it is a valuable spoil. I must request you to communicate this letter to my mother and to M. T—; they will be pleased at my thinking of them, and I have not now time to write to them, the courier by whom I send this being about to start immediately."

Another letter, written by a French non-commissioned officer, has the following striking remarks:—"We may thank God for having allowed us to fail in our attempt against the Centre Bastion. Had we taken it, 20,000 men would have established themselves there, pending the capitulation of the town or the retreat of the Russians. Well, according to every probability, not one of them would have escaped, and to the inevitable loss suffered in the battle would have been added the still far greater grief of beholding our heroic soldiers buried in the craters of innumerable mines. . . . The Russians were taken by surprise by our attack. Some of the officers have told us that they no longer expected us on that day; they thought the assault would be given early in the morning. The enemy's troops had just dined when ours assailed them. A sad dessert! I saw on the morrow, in the Malakoff, bowls, wooden spoons, and pieces of bread strewn by the side of these unfortunates, who had not even finished their last meal; each loaf was cut into little square pieces the size of dice; I send you one as a specimen."

The following is from the correspondent of the *Moniteur de la Flotte*, and shows what the prevailing French opinion was, at the time, of the conduct of the English:—"I have told you nothing about the English. They covered themselves with glory at the attack of the Redan. When they charged the Russians with the bayonet, there was a recoil among the Muscovites similar to that of a double-shot gun. Then masses of fresh troops unceasingly supervened, and attacked our heroic allies. One of the officers of the brigade which attacked the Redan made an observation with reference to the subject which might explain the heavy losses of our allies in this last affair. He remarked that hardly had our soldiers arrived in the Malakoff, than our engineers and artillery, duly provided beforehand for such an

emergency, immediately commenced turning the guns of the work against the Russians, closing up the breeches, placing earth-bags—in a word, appropriating for their defence the works we occupied. This was done with all the celerity characteristic of the French, and was the means of saving many lives. The Russians clearly saw they never could retake the Malakoff, for at each attack they were crushed beneath our fire, and they found our internal position stronger each time they renewed their onslaught. It would appear, according to our officers, that this was not the case at the Redan, and this compelled them to evacuate it; but I promise you that the movement which they operated at that moment was that of a troop of lions, and that the Russians took good care not to follow them."

The correspondent of the *Constitutionnel* (an officer in the French army), accounted for the English failure at the Redan in a manner at once correct in itself, just to the English, and showing the generous tone of mind on the part of the officers of the French army immediately after the assault. This letter was written on the evening of the day when the events which it describes transpired. Having referred to the surprise at the Malakoff, he observes:—"Soon afterwards the English attack the Great Redan; in vain the enemy, superior in numbers, offer a terrible resistance; our gallant allies triumph everywhere, and establish themselves in the work. The Little Redan is then attacked by our (French) troops, but the enemy, seeing the Malakoff and the Great Redan in the occupation of ourselves and our allies, throw themselves against this portion of their defences. I have yet before my eyes the enormous masses of the Russians, surging like the sea up the incline of the Little Redan. In vain our soldiers display prodigies of valour. They have not space enough to form and retain their positions. They resist, however; the fire of our batteries plunging in the compact mass of the Russians, each discharge opens lanes in it, which are filled up by the advance of fresh masses. The Russian commander was, I believe, General Chrouleff. Finally, we are compelled to evacuate this portion of their defences, but without, however, abandoning the game, and continuing to fight. The Russians then threw themselves against the Malakoff, but their formidable attack is repelled by General M'Mahon, solidly established in the redoubt. The whole mass then rushes to reinforce the column, which was all the while fighting against the English established in the Redan. Exposed to the fire of the Barrack Batteries, of the vessels, and of the forts on the northern side, pressed by the enormous and ever-increasing masses of the enemy, in a work open at the gorge, the Eng-

lish, after the most heroic resistance of about an hour, find themselves outflanked. The general-in-chief orders a column to be sent from Malakoff against the flank of the assailants of the English; this column, headed by the brave General de Marolles, throws itself forward, when behind the Malakoff a formidable explosion arrests its progress, annihilating the head of the column, together with its gallant leader. By this time the English, unsupported, can no longer hold their ground, and, after having spiked the guns and expended all their cartridges, abandon the Redan."

The following letter, from a superior Russian officer to one of the czar's organs, the *Northern Bee*, will show in an interesting manner the point of view in which the Russian generals, aristocracy, and government, wished the capture of Southern Sebastopol to be regarded in Europe. The letter was not written from the Crimea, but from St. Petersburg, upon the return thither of the writer:—"Cronstadt has been demonstrated to be impregnable. Sweaborg withstood successfully a long and severe bombardment, and Sebastopol held out a whole year. Neither of the two countries can say—"I have conquered Russia, and taken her fortress," for with their united forces combined they were but just able to take it. Besides, the enemy had many advantages on their side; for whilst Russia was attacked at her most distant frontier, and every pound of bread, every bullet, each piece of meat, and drop of brandy had to be sent by land hundreds, and in many instances, thousands of miles, through uninhabited steppes, and difficult mountain gorges, the enemy were enabled to land any given quantity of stores on any particular point by means of their numerous fleets. In the enemy's camp the intelligence of all Europe was concentrated, whilst in Russia it has existed scarcely fifty years. Notwithstanding all these disadvantages, Russia bravely withstood the attack, and her heroes have covered themselves with glory. We have abandoned only a heap of ruins, for Sebastopol no longer exists. The whole affair is reduced to this, that the enemy have gained possession of about fifty square wersts of land, where some naval establishments and part of our fleet were stationed. But with the south side of Sebastopol the enemy have not conquered Russia. This country has withstood more severe shocks, and seen more dangerous times. We have seen Russia overrun by French, Mongolians, Swedes, and hordes of other nationalities, and yet we have succeeded in repelling every invader. The fall of Sebastopol is certainly a national calamity, but it is sent by God as a judgment, to punish us for forgetting the Divine precepts in our endeavours to attempt the introduction of what the enemy call civilisation."

Incidents of the conflict, full of interest, occurred on every point where the battle, or rather series of battles raged.

When the French were repulsed from before the Central Bastion, General de Salles was maddened with rage, and made furious exertions to stay the retiring tide of his soldiery. He invoked, threatened, and upbraided—seized some, and turned them round, with their face to the enemy, but all failed to stem the torrent of retreat. While thus engaged, he seized a nice-looking youth, a recently-arrived conscript, and, flinging the lad from his grasp, he exclaimed, "You are no Frenchman!" The youth uttered a piercing cry, exclaiming, "I am no Frenchman! I am no Frenchman!" and, with the exclamation on his lips, he rushed forward, mounted the broken ramparts through a shower of grape and rifle-balls, and then fell dead within the work. The patriotism and pride of the young soldier were stung by the reproach of his general, and he resolved to seal his claims to nationality by the surrender of his life.

A group of French officers, stationed in one of the redoubts, were accosted by a common soldier, who requested a little brandy. It was offered to him, when he said, "See, gentlemen, my arm is shattered by the splinter of a shell, and I am holding it together with the other hand, oblige me by placing the flask to my lips." This the officer promptly did, and spoke kindly and encouragingly to him. As the flask was withdrawn, he said, "I lose an arm, perhaps life, but the victory is with France;" and, refusing any further assistance, he walked away to the surgeon of his corps. This spirit of self-sacrifice was extensively evinced among the officers and men of the French army.

General Bourbaki was wounded by a rifle-bullet in the breast, and, leaning on the arm of a wounded soldier, retired to the hospital after the combat, refusing every other assistance offered. Wounded together side by side in the fray, the heroic officer would accompany his poor soldier, sharing with him whatever chances of assistance surgical skill could offer. Indeed, the wounded French soldiery showed the utmost devotion to the triumph and glory of their country. On the night of the 8th many of them were being brought to the rear, when the flames burst up from the burning city, and they resisted all persuasions to allow themselves to be borne away until they had for a long time gazed upon the scene. In one of these groups of wounded men was a sergeant; he believed his wound was mortal, and refused to be carried further, begging to be permitted to die on the plateau in view of such grand results of victory. The soldiers laid down the litter, and placed his back against a large stone. After viewing for some

time the flames flinging their tokens of destruction above the ruined buildings, he said, "Comrades, I die—my life is ebbing away; this is the place to bid you farewell." He then took off his cap, waved it faintly above him, and said, "Adieu, friends!—Sebastopol is ours!—*vive la France!*—*vive l'empereur!*" This was his last effort for the honour of his country; he was soon cold and stiff upon the chill dark plateau of Sebastopol.

A gentleman, whose curiosity led him among the ruins on the 11th, found a number of French soldiers enjoying themselves in what had once been a tavern. The doors had been pulled off the hinges for firewood, and above the passage was chalked in large characters, "*Entrez sans frapper.*" The spirit of jollity indicated by this little incident pervaded the soldiers of our ally even when many of their slain comrades lay mutilated and ensanguined around them.

When the Highlanders entered the Redan to remove the wounded, among the first objects that caught their attention among the dead were several British officers, each holding in his grasp a Russian soldier or officer. One had his hand, stiffened in death, upon the throat of a Russian soldier, who lay beneath him. Another had his arms locked round the waist of an enemy of his own rank. While engaged in a furious struggle of strength, both had fallen under the discharges of grape which swept "the open" of the work. Near the centre of the space a Russian officer, partly stript, lay without any visible cause for his death. His hands and feet were beautifully white and small, as those of a lady, and his features regular and calm, and singularly handsome. He seemed as if he had laid down to sleep with perfect composure of mind and body, and that the hurricane of the cannonade had swept above without disturbing his repose.

Some of the slain soldiers of the second and light divisions clung to the parapets and slopes

as if still living, showing with what reluctance they retired, and with what desperation they had fought. A gigantic Irish grenadier, who had literally led his comrades, encouraging them by voice and gesture, as well as by personal daring, lay stretched in "the open," with a single wound in the forehead. He had been killed early in the assault; but neither shell, shot, grape, nor explosion, struck him during all the storm and wreck which had passed over and within the redoubt.

During the assault upon the Redan, a soldier of the 88th (Connaught Rangers) endeavouring to cheer on a party of the light division, who, from their disparity of numbers, were unwilling to advance, placed his cap upon his bayonet, and waved it above his head. An officer of the 77th asked his name, which he gave: "I shall recommend you for promotion," was the reply, which was scarcely uttered when the officer himself was shot down.

The wounded English soldiers bore up manfully, although their want of success at the Redan oppressed them. As some of these poor fellows were brought to the rear, they attempted to sing "Cheer, boys, cheer," but it was a faint performance. The testimony of all who conversed with the English soldiers bears out this idea, that had they been supported in their attempt upon the Redan, or had the numbers who escaped the fire which swept the space between it and the trenches, and entered the work, been at all adequate to the enterprise, they would have charged through it with the bayonet in the face of any obstacles or dangers, however formidable. Many, like young Dunham Massey of the 19th, scorning to retreat before forces, however numerous, and when victory was hopeless, turned, and faced the flaming batteries, and fell. Some, like the gallant boy (for he was no more) just named, survived, but most of them perished.

"They were true to the last of their blood and their breath."

CHAPTER CIII.

EFFECT IN EUROPE AND THE EAST OF THE TIDINGS OF THE FALL OF SEBASTOPOL.

"Ye shall live renown'd in story—
Ye, whose arms in fields of glory
Sav'd your homes and native land."—*War Song.*

No event since the battle of Waterloo produced such an effect in Europe and the world as the fall of Southern Sebastopol. In England, however, the tidings were received with mingled feelings of discontent and triumph. The nation was chagrined that English skill and English valour did not play a more conspicuous part. It was felt that the power of

Russia was broken, and at this all rejoiced. There was also deep gratitude throughout the nation to the army for its bravery and endurance under such severe tests of both; but there was great dissatisfaction with the bad generalship of the commands-in-chief, and the inefficiency of the head-quarters' staff. Generals Simpson, Codrington, and Markham, did

not meet the expectations of the people. Lieutenant-general Markham, when commander of a brigade before Mooltan, gained considerable reputation, but he did not show much ability before the Redan, which was probably attributable to his impaired health. The despatch of General Simpson was so badly written as to excite murmurs all through the country; the people could not understand from it why a failure at the Redan should have taken place, except from the imperfection of the arrangements, for which Generals Simpson, Codrington, and Markham were responsible. With a small body of troops, utterly inadequate for the purpose, General Simpson assailed the most powerful bulwark of the defence, notwithstanding the warning afforded by the failure on the 18th of June. The British soldiers were beaten out, not by the fire of the Malakoff, as might have been apprehended, for the French had previously captured it, but by the bayonet charges of the garrison, after the English had been long enough in, if reinforced, to have taken the place. The small British force was unsupported—all was confusion in the trenches; "they were so crowded" that General Simpson could not re-organise the attack. The English public could learn just sufficient to show that there had been a scramble into the place, a desultory combat when the troops entered, and a massacre of these men from want of support, because the commander-in-chief and his lieutenant-generals did not know what to do. The unwillingness of the raw young soldiers to follow General Windham when within the place, and drive the Russians out with the bayonet, was a source of chagrin to the nation, always accustomed to hear of its soldiers attempting anything where their officers led, and accomplishing everything which it was possible to accomplish by heroism. It was generally believed that want of confidence in their commanders was the chief cause of the soldiers in the Redan holding back; and a belief that the Redan was mined, and would be blown up as soon as the Russians retreated (a belief well founded), was another cause of the backwardness of the English soldiers. But while these explanations relieved the country from any fear as to the lasting bravery of its soldiers, regrets were still bitterly cherished that the conduct of the military chiefs should have impaired the confidence of the troops. The Russians at Silistria were deterred in their final assault by precisely the same influences which checked the British at the Redan, and justified the prediction of Lieutenant-general Canou, made to an eminent person before the 18th of June—"The men will lose confidence, and will finally refuse to advance."

But while England mourned in the shame of a defeat thus produced, and over the loss of so

many of her gallant sons, she exulted in the humiliation of the enemy, and the prospects of final victory and speedy peace, which the destruction of Sebastopol and the proud fleet which nestled in its harbour so naturally encouraged. Never since the year 1815 were more jubilant congratulations heard from man to man in England. In the theatres and concert-rooms of the capital, the sister capitals of Scotland and Ireland, and in the provincial cities of the three kingdoms, the people gave vent to their rejoicings by the most marked demonstrations.

The 30th of September was appointed for public thanksgiving. The day fell on Sunday, which prevented that marked expression of feeling which would have been given had a holiday been created for the occasion; but appropriate sermons were delivered, suitable to the occasion, and thanksgivings ascended in nearly all the sanctuaries of the British Isles.

Although the war had not been so popular in France as in England, the rejoicing was greater. Victory is a precious word to France, the love of military glory makes the announcement exciting, however the cause in which it is gained may be regarded by the public. Fêtes, balls, addresses, congratulations, theatrical displays, and every customary form of French triumph, showed the excitement into which all France allowed itself so freely to be carried. A grand religious festival lent its solemnities and pageant to the expression of the general satisfaction. The minister of public instruction addressed a circular to the French bishops, which ran thus:—

"The emperor, elevating his thoughts to the Supreme Judge of armies and of empires, desires you to call the faithful to the steps of the altar, to render public thanks to the Almighty. Monsieur the Prefect will concert with you such measures as shall give to the *Te Deum*, which you will cause to be sung on Sunday, the 16th instant, all the solemnity desirable."

The Cathedral of Notre Dame was selected for the ceremonial, and decorated in accordance with French military as well as religious taste. On the four columns by which the first gallery of the portico was supported the shields of France, England, Turkey, and Sardinia were emblazoned, and the colours of the four nations were hung along the base of the two towers; over each of which four green banners were hoisted, embroidered with golden bees. Crimson velvet embroidered with gold was hung round the interior of the cathedral. At intervals there were placed spread-eagles of gold. On the columns were large clusters of the allied flags. From the roof were suspended oriflammes and banners.

At mid-day on the 16th the emperor and Prince Jerome left the court of the Tuileries in a state carriage, attended by a brilliant escort, and followed by a military procession. Immediately on the empress entering the state carriage one hundred guns thundered their salutation over Paris. Along the line of route, from the Tuileries to Notre Dame, the enunciations of triumph were loud and incessant. The clangour of the trumpet, the roll of the drum, and the shouts of the people were blended; flags waved from windows and balconies, and the regimental standards were lowered to the emperor as he passed. Over every sound could be heard the great bell of Notre Dame, giving a peculiar significance to the scene and the triumph. France seldom saw a finer day—the mellow autumnal light fell richly on magnificent equipages, martial uniforms, and gaudy yet graceful flags. The whole scene was animated and sparkling, as if France went forth on her bridal day. When the emperor arrived at the church he was received by the Archbishop of Paris and the cathedral clergy. The metropolitan presented to the emperor the holy water and incense, and addressed his majesty in terms of congratulation; who replied declaring that he had come to thank Heaven for the triumph vouchsafed, knowing that his arms could not succeed, nor France be secure, without the protection of Providence. The emperor was then conducted within the church; he advanced to the foot of the altar, and bent on one knee, remaining with his head resting upon his hand for some minutes in silence, and was thence conducted to his chair or throne. In the aisles and transept the benches were occupied by the state officers and members of foreign embassies: strangely and unaccountably the ambassadors of Austria and Prussia were amongst the most prominent. Prussia, ever ready to thwart the aims and policy of the allies, was now as ready to cringe basely before their power. Among the conspicuous persons were Abd-el-Kader and his Arab suite, whose deportment was an object of curiosity, as a group of Mohammedans occupying a prominent part in a Roman Catholic temple was a novelty. The Arabs, without affecting any sympathy with the service, conducted themselves with propriety and good taste. In the side aisles the people, without distinction of rank, were admitted. When the emperor had taken his seat the *Te Deum* began, and was chanted in the midst of the most profound silence. The *Domine saluum fac Imperatorem* was sung three times. The vast assembly then knelt, and the archbishop pronounced the benediction. The emperor and his suit retired with the same pomp, and were met with even greater demonstration of enthusiasm by the people who thronged the streets.

The rejoicings at Turin, if less imposing, were quite as heartfelt as at Paris. In Constantinople the news seemed too good to be true; at first it was doubted, grave Turks shook their heads, declaring that the will of Allah must be done; but when uncertainty was dissipated by intelligence the authority of which could not be disputed, the people gave way to an exuberant joy such as seldom agitated the citizens of Constantinople. The sultan, like the other allied sovereigns, made suitable arrangements for publicly recognising the value of the conquest. The Greek inhabitants of the Turkish capital were not partakers of the general joy. Their rage was intense, and expressed indecently or vindictively, as circumstances allowed. Many attempts were made by them to assassinate French sailors and soldiers, even invalids. The Greeks of every class in Constantinople went scowling about with looks of the bitterest resentment towards the allies, especially the French. As, after the 18th of June, their delight was boundless, so now their despondency and resentment were profound. Throughout the Mussulman states feelings similar to those evinced at Constantinople were displayed. In Alexandria and Morocco, in Tunis, and even in beleaguered Kars, the tidings received an enthusiastic welcome.

The Scandinavian states showed more sympathy with the allies than any other neutral nations. In Denmark and Sweden a sober but determinedly-expressed satisfaction was evinced in various public ways; but in Norway the exultation of the whole people rivalled that of the nations by whose arms the victory was gained. No nation had so much to fear as Norway from the continued progress of Russian aggression; and it required the counteracting power of the Swedish court to prevent the Norwegian people flying to arms, and participating with the allies in the hazards and glories of the war. In Germany the courts everywhere manifested regret; even among the German princes nearly related to her majesty, there was one who had no share in the joy which filled her breast—George of Hanover was as cordially with Russia as the other German potentates generally were. The courts of Belgium, Holland, and Naples, did not partake in the rejoicings of the allies; but the peoples of most of the European nations rejoiced with France and England; perhaps the Belgians, and the lower classes of Naples and of the Swiss Sunderbund, were the exceptions. The aristocratic classes in Germany sympathised with Russia still. The *Augsburg Gazette* conveyed the true state of feeling in Germany in the following passage:—"Whoever has calmly studied the position of Germany throughout the struggle must be inevitably convinced that in the leading circles

there has existed a secret sympathy with Russia, a secret hatred for the Napoleon dynasty. From reasons caused by the unmistakeable feeling of the whole people, the cause of Russia was not openly espoused; but a tacit support was given to it by inaction, and no idea was entertained of acting against Russia. The invulnerability of the Russian army was believed so long as the Western powers were alone in the field, and the quiet hope was entertained that Napoleon III., like Napoleon I., would knock his head to pieces against this powerful adversary, and Germany reap where she had not sown; but the fall of Sebastopol has destroyed the belief and deceived that hope."

The "nationalities," as the patriots of Poland, Hungary, and Italy are termed, were much agitated by the intelligence, and indulged in hopes and fears alike groundless. Kossuth, Mazzini, and Ledru Rollin, immediately employed their pens in predicting various issues, none of which came to pass. Their vaticinations may be judged of by the following extract from their joint address to the democracy of Europe:—"The town of Sebastopol has fallen. The war between the governments of Western Europe and the czar is irrevocable and indefinitely prolonged. It is impossible for Russia to treat after a defeat, without sinking into the position of a power of the third rank; and it is impossible that the allied governments, in the face of a public opinion emboldened by victory, should offer peace on less onerous conditions. For us, therefore, the fall of Sebastopol is but as the first word of a war; the last word and *denouement* belongs to the people." The only thing proved by this paragraph is the incapacity of those men to deal with a vast European question, and their assurance in presuming to lecture the people of England, either as to political expediency, political necessity, or political ethics. For Louis Kossuth we cherish the most profound esteem and respect, as a noble-hearted, noble-minded man, and true patriot, who knows the resources, wants, and duties of Hungary; but we deny his fitness at all to enter upon the field of English politics, or to prescribe for English statesmen or the English people a political programme. The aims and the modes of attaining them, commended by him to the English people, were as impracticable as his vaticinations were false.

While such effects were produced in the allied and neutral nations by the intelligence of the fall of Sebastopol, how was it received in the cities and countries over which the czar held sway? At St. Petersburg the rage of the people was unbounded; they followed the imperial carriages in the streets, shouting, "Revenge for Sebastopol!—revenge for Sebastopol!" Lifted up in the pride of their national arro-

gance, they believed themselves able to conquer the world, and underrated the power, as they despised the rights, of all other peoples. The Emperor Alexander was represented as replying to a suggestion that negotiations for peace might now be opened, by the haughty remark—"Russia never negotiates after defeat." This was false as to the past, and destined to be so upon the disaster of Sebastopol. It was deemed politic for the emperor to take a tour in his empire, visiting its principal cities, and endeavouring to keep up the courage of his people and his troops. He accordingly proceeded, in the first instance, to Moscow, accompanied by the empress and the Grand-dukes Constantine, Nicholas, and Michael. It was announced at St. Petersburg that the emperor had gone to the ancient capital of the empire to pray for success to "the arms of the orthodox Church." This was also circulated in Moscow, and produced an immense sensation. The emperor was received with fanatical enthusiasm. He did not arrive until near midnight; but instantly the bells of the churches rang joyful peals, and the city was illuminated as suddenly as if by enchantment. The people were in earnest; the czar was the impersonation of principles dear to them—civil despotism and religious intolerance. Alexander proceeded to the glorious palace of the Kremlin. The next day he was received with great ecclesiastical pomp at the Cathedral of the Ascension, whither he went to offer prayers on behalf of the armies of holy Russia and the orthodox Church. He was received by the patriarch, who presented to him the following address, remarkable for its stern fanaticism, base adulation, and blasphemous appropriation to the czar of a passage in the 110th Psalm prophetic of the Messiah:—

"Most pious Emperor,—Does the old metropolis of your throne, to which was reserved, by special decree, the honour of receiving you with a joyous presentiment on your arrival in the world, need to express to you its sentiments when it sees in you the accomplishment of its prayers and its presentiments, and the source of new devotion for the country? It feels profoundly the high imperial grace which you have shown us, in accepting the immense burden of the empire, with the extraordinary inheritance of continuing the just war in which we are engaged; and in finding time, amid the numerous occupations of the commencement of a reign, to recall to mind your cradle, Moscow, and to accord to it the joy of your presence. But that is not all. We understand, with profound respect, the lofty reason of your arrival among us. You hasten to the hereditary sanctuary of the coronation of the czars to address your imperial prayer to Him who 'saves kings,' and with

the intercession of his saints—of Bishop Peter, who blessed the commencement of this capital, and of Bishop Alexis, who blessed your birth, and in your holy baptism received you in his arms—to obtain that ‘the Lord shall send thee from Zion the sceptre of power;’ and that your firmness shall triumph over the efforts, and your penetration over the cunning, of the enemies of Russia. Russia will understand your prayer; millions of hearts will repeat it in all the orthodox churches, and all the empire, in order to assure you power, victory, peace, health, and salvation. We address to the Lord another prayer: it is to see you soon with the sacred sign of the saints—the crown of your father and your ancestors—amid the benedictions of heaven and of Russia.”

Before the emperor left Moscow, he addressed to the civil governor of the city a document which at once shows the imperial policy and spirit, and how heavily the capture of Sebastopol was felt by the court:—

“Count Arsenius Andreievitch,—From the time that I ascended the throne of my ancestors, it has been my heartfelt wish to visit the dear and trusted ancient capital of my empire—the city in which I was born and received baptism, under the protection of the relics of the worker of miracles—St. Alexis of Moscow. Having now fulfilled this wish, I have experienced from the inhabitants of Moscow a reception which has caused great gladness to myself and my whole house—a reception such as Russia has at all times given to her sovereigns. I commission you to express my heartiest acknowledgments to all classes in Moscow. My happiness would have been complete, had not preceding events clouded these fortunate moments. It is already known, by my order of the day addressed to the Russian armies, that the garrison of Sebastopol, after an unexampled siege of eleven months—after deeds of prowess previously unheard of—after a self-denial, and the repulse of six obstinate attacks—has passed over to the north side of the town, leaving to the enemy only bloody ruins. Sebastopol’s heroic defenders have achieved all that human strength could perform. Past and present events I accept as the inscrutable will of Providence, who chastens Russia with heavy hours of trial. But Russia’s trials were once far heavier, and God the Lord sent down to her his all-bountiful and invisible aid. Wherefore let us also now put our trust in Him: He will defend Russia, the orthodox, who has drawn the sword for the just cause—the cause of Christianity. The incessant proofs of all and every one’s readiness to sacrifice property, family, and the last drop of their blood for maintaining the integrity of the empire and the national honour, delight

me. It is precisely in these national feelings and efforts that I find consolation and strength; and from my whole heart, indissolubly blended with my loyal and gallant people, I, with trust in God’s help and grace, repeat the words of Alexander I.,—‘Where truth is, there also is God!’ I remain unalterably well inclined towards you.”

From Moscow the czar proceeded to Nicolaieff, which place will be described in another chapter. There he was some time ill, and suffered great anxieties from the operations of the allies against Kinburn, to be related in due course. Thither he summoned Todtleben, to strengthen the defences, and the Grand-duke Constantine concocted measures for rebuilding the Black Sea fleet. Early in October, he issued a ukase for the increase of the army. The levy fell most onerously, as usual, upon Poland, as the province which furnished the best soldiers, and it was the policy of Russia to drain that country of its warlike youth, and thus exhaust its nationality. The Poles, having deserted in great numbers, most of those who crossed the frontiers of Prussia and Austria were bound, sent back, and either shot, hanged, or scourged to death! The sufferings of Poland were terrible. While at Nicolaieff, the czar consulted by telegraph Prince Paskiewitch, who remained at Warsaw, and as he relied upon the prince’s judgment more than upon that of any other officer in his army, the flashes of the telegraph were incessant. During the absence of the emperor from his capital, despondency hung like a cloud over the whole city; the same state of things prevailed at Moscow, notwithstanding the fanaticism of the people.

Such were the effects which rapidly followed one another after the entire ruin of Southern Sebastopol became known throughout Russia. The exhaustion of the country was greater than was known in Western Europe. A Russian nobleman, with whom the author has the pleasure of acquaintance, assured him that had the war been prosecuted with vigour after the destruction of Sebastopol, Russia must have sued for peace, on any terms, before the spring of 1856 opened for fresh naval campaigns, and subjected her in the Baltic and the White Sea to fresh blockades. The country was drained, the people depressed; the fanatical clergy began to express the apprehension that God was at last fighting against Russia, and it seemed as if the prophetic announcement was heard over that vast empire, “I am against thee, O Gog!” The scripture figure of a hook placed in the nose of a vast and ravenous monster, disappointing and restraining him, and which learned theologians and expositors apply to Russia, was certainly a

very apt expression of the providential restraint laid upon the Russian empire at the crisis concerning which we write. The spirit of the nation was as bigoted, fierce, vindictive, and aggressive as ever, but its power of mischief was reined back by an Almighty hand. The events passing within, and upon the boundaries of the empire, were mighty providential dispensations, chastising its cupidity, blood-thirstiness, and tyranny. Russia was beaten, although on some fields of the conflict, as in Asia Minor, the apathy or treachery to one another on the part of her enemies enabled her to maintain a protracted struggle. The grand

moral lesson was taught that aggressive nations act upon principles which react to their own ruin. The poet is often quoted who sang—

“War is a game, which, were their subjects wise,
Kings would but seldom play;”

but, unfortunately, subjects are as much disposed to play it out as kings. It was easier to make peace with the Emperor of Russia than with his people, and the defeat and suffering entailed upon them were retributive. Notwithstanding the energy displayed afterwards, the power of Russia for the purpose of this war fell with the fall of Southern Sebastopol.

CHAPTER CIV.

CONTINUATION OF THE BLOCKADE OF KARS.—SUFFERINGS AND NOBLE ENDURANCE OF THE GARRISON.—REPULSE OF AN ASSAULT BY THE WHOLE RUSSIAN ARMY.

“Do but behold yon poor and starved band,
And your fair show shall suck away their bones,
Leaving them but the shades and husks of men.
There is not work enough for all our hands.”—SHAKESPEARE. *Henry V.*

IN the last chapter on the blockade of Kars, the narrative of events was brought down to the beginning of September. The following letter, from the Erzerum correspondent of the French press, will confirm the general representations already given of the conduct of General Williams, and of the gallant men who co-operated with him. It is agreeable to find, from a French source, opinions corroborative of the commendations pronounced upon the British commissioner and his faithful coadjutors:—“Were it not for the presence of an English superior officer, Colonel Williams, the British commissioner, matters would have become desperate. Colonel Williams has displayed the most praiseworthy energy in preventing our men and horses dying from misery. It was he who saved the army from utter destruction. God knows how it can exist, but it actually exists, notwithstanding its privations. There are regiments which have received no pay for fourteen, eighteen, and even twenty-five months. Money, however, was not wanting. The government is not to blame. I have known it to send, on one occasion, 20,000 purses; but the crowd of needy pashas is so great, and they pay themselves so exactly, that the money disappears as it were by enchantment, and the soldiers continue exposed to all sorts of privations. You may easily conceive that Colonel Williams, who opposed that system, cannot have many friends among the authors of those robberies. They accordingly did everything they could to have him removed. The Porte has confided to him the mission of reorganising the army, of which he will probably assume the command. Baron de Schwartzburg, a German officer, has been

attached to his staff as inspector of the cavalry, with several other European officers. The intelligence from Kurdistan is unsatisfactory. The town of Mouch is said to have been reduced to ashes. A courier sent thither by M. Castagné was murdered on the way. A body of Bashi-bazouks is believed to have gone over to the Russians. The revolt appears to be most serious.”

On the 7th of September, news arrived of the battle of the Tchernaya, and the terrible defeat of the Russians, which much encouraged the English officers.

On the 10th General Williams wrote to Lord Clarendon, giving the following picture of affairs:—

“Their cavalry are employed in setting fire to the dry grass on which we endeavour to feed our horses, and for which daily skirmishes take place (up to within range of our long guns). The weather has become cold, and snow fell on the surrounding hills on the night of the 8th; but, after the equinoctial gales, we may have two months sufficiently moderate to admit of military operations. I therefore continue the work of adding to our defences. *Troupes de loup*s have been made round our intrenchments on the heights, which extend more than a mile from Veli Pasha Tabia to the English tabias; in the meantime the interior line of the town has not been neglected. In spite of the military executions I informed your lordship of in my last despatch, desertion to a serious extent occurred last night; I therefore advised the muschir to disband the regiment of rediff, from which all these desertions have taken place, to

put the officers on half-pay, and to distribute the men among the companions of the other corps. The sentence was executed this morning, to the astonishment of the officers and soldiers of this unworthy regiment; and I trust we have now struck at the root of the evil, for the general disposition of the garrison is admirable."

On the 11th of September Consul Brant addressed Lord Clarendon in terms which showed that "hope deferred maketh the heart sick:"—

"I would not wish to throw discouragement on the result of the expedition under Omar Pasha, but I cannot divest my mind of great anxiety as to its results from the effects of the climate and the nature of the country it will have to traverse in its advance on Tiflis—a country of swamps, woods, and rivers, and of small resources for provisioning an army; possessed by an active enemy like the Russians, I conceive the only chance of success against Tiflis (the safety of the army depends on its success) consists in a rapid march through the country. If the proceedings of Omar Pasha be dilatory he will lose half his men by sickness and privation, and will effect nothing. In my opinion, a much safer plan would have been to send even a smaller force by this route. The expedition has been too long delayed, and by this delay its success has been imperilled. I hope most sincerely that my prevision may prove incorrect. Everything depends on the activity and energy of Omar Pasha, and the support he may receive from his own government. If the latter be not greater than my experience leads me to anticipate, I can feel no confidence in a favourable result, and I cannot help thinking that 10,000 European troops, with 3000 or 4000 cavalry, sent to Kars a month ago by this route, would have effected more than the present expedition, even if it prove as large and as complete as it is reported to be. Saleh Bey, a miralai of cavalry, has just arrived from Kars. He is going on to Constantinople to represent, on the part of the *muschir*, the dangerous predicament in which the garrison stands, unless immediate and direct succours be sent for its relief. He says that Omar Pasha's army will require a month or more before it can move from the coast, and General Mouravieff may not find it necessary to retire from before Kars for some weeks, and then possibly he will take only his best troops, leaving a sufficient force to maintain the blockade. Now, although this force may be small, and the troops not very choice, it will answer the purpose, for the Turkish garrison cannot move a step beyond the intrenchments, because it has no cavalry, and may be said to be without artillery, the horses being so reduced in

condition that they cannot drag the guns. Thus, while there is any force before Kars supplied with guns and cavalry, the garrison cannot venture to issue from its works. The stock of provisions is so small that it will not last until the period arrives when the snow will oblige the enemy to retire to their winter quarters; so that if succours be not sent up to Kars by Trebizond without a moment's delay, the garrison may be forced to abandon the place with the guns and ammunition, and to seek its safety in retreat at any risk. This is exactly what Saleh Bey stated, and which a letter I saw from Baron Schwartzburg confirms. It may happen that General Mouravieff may think it hazardous to leave a small force before the place, not knowing exactly the resources of the garrison; or he may think it necessary to concentrate all his forces to meet the advance of Omar Pasha; still it would be most imprudent to risk the capture of Kars on a matter of opinion as to what General Mouravieff may decide on doing."

Meanwhile the indefatigable exertions of General Williams continued to inspire confidence in all around him. The following testimony to this effect was written at the time by Captain Thompson, whose own hardships and labours were such that he only arrived at home to die:—"Nothing is done without the general. He is *de facto* commander-in-chief, and we come next to him in point of responsibility and hard work. The Turkish pashas sit in their tents all day, perspiring and smoking, and we are out all day and night. It is very tiring work; but we have to remember that we are Englishmen, and with the example of *our* pasha we are not likely to forget it." The captain immediately adds:—"My scribbling was stopped by seeing about 200 Cossacks coming across the plain at a gallop to cut off our foragers. They have been rather too fond of this lately, and once or twice have been more successful than they ought to have been. However, I made last night some small rifle-pits, and sent the men down to them among the rocks under the Kara-dagh. Our foragers were desired to run under the rocks for safety, and the Cossacks followed them, thinking they had not been seen, when pop, pop went the rifles, and over tumbled some Cossacks, while the rest galloped away. We then presented them with a couple of rounds of grape as a parting gift, but they were already too far off for it to take effect."

On the 14th a Russian deserter informed Dr. Sandwith that great sickness had suddenly stricken Mouravieff's army; from his account the doctor inferred that it was cholera. The Russian commissariat was conducted in the most praiseworthy manner, the supplies of the

soldiers being abundant, sheep-skin coats and other articles of warm apparel were sent in large quantities for their comfort and protection from the cold. At that date General Williams wrote to Lord Clarendon, informing him of the want of loyalty on the part of certain portions of the rediff soldiery:—

“From my more recent despatches your lordship will have perceived that desertion is the great evil against which we have to contend. In spite of the example exhibited to the troops in the disbanding of the regiment of rediff, as detailed in my despatch of the 10th inst., we had no less than six desertions yesterday; fortunately, we recaptured two of the deserters; they proved to be men of the corps in question. They were tried by a council of war, and instantly shot. On their trial they denounced the persons (inhabitants of Kars) who had instigated them to this act of treason, and furnished them with peasants’ clothes to enable them to effect their purpose. Three of these men were seized in a house where the musket of one of the prisoners who suffered yesterday was found, together with the clothes and appointments of seven more deserters. There can be little doubt that these wretches are in communication with the enemy, as proclamations were found on the last-captured spy, offering any deserters free passage through the Russian posts to their homes. A council of war has tried and condemned these men, who will be hanged to day in the market-place; and the appointments of the seven deserters who have escaped by their agency will be exhibited on the gallows as a further proof of their guilt. Your lordship will learn with pleasure that, up to this moment, no Christian subject of the sultan has betrayed us, all those who have so justly forfeited their lives being Mussulmans.”

The disloyalty of the militia and of some of the inhabitants of Kars was not the only evidence of the want of good faith on the part of many of the sultan’s subjects, as the despatch of General Williams to the Foreign-office on the 19th proved:—

“The large force detached from the Russian army, which I informed your lordship was operating in the neighbourhood of the Soghanlidagh, was seen by my foot-messenger about eight days ago searching in the direction of Penjrood, in Geuleh, where Haji Ali Pasha and several other officers who had recently left Kars were stationed, for the purpose of pasturing the cavalry and artillery horses which accompanied them, and for seizing a favourable opportunity to get barley into our camp. Haji Ali Pasha, with his attendants, having incautiously ventured too far from these detach-

ments, was taken prisoner, and is now in the Russian camp, opposite our intrenchments. This is the second pasha who has been taken in this manner; Bahlool Pasha, the hereditary chief of Bayazid, having fallen into the enemy’s hands near Euch-Kelissa, about two months ago. I should state to your lordship that, by Prince Paskiewitch’s official reports on the last war, this very Bahlool Pasha allowed himself to be taken prisoner in Bayazid, and, while in the enemy’s hands, exerted himself as an active partizan in their favour by intriguing with and rendering neutral several of the sultan’s Turkish subjects. The similarity of the game played and playing by this man forces me to bring him to your excellency’s notice; the more so as several of the Kurdish bands of horse under Veli Pasha, during the recent unsuccessful operations of the Russian general-in-chief against Erzerum, disbanded and fled to their homes without firing a shot. Another very serious coincidence is the conduct of the principal Mussulman inhabitants of Erzerum during the late panic. There is no doubt that they would have treated with the enemy if the forts around the city had not restrained them, and prevented an attack from the Russian army. I can only conclude that, as in 1829, Russian gold was ready at hand to effect its work. The Christian notables and their flock alone (under their bishop) showed true loyalty, and I have thanked them, through his reverence, in the name of the British government.”

It will naturally strike an English reader as improbable that men holding the high position of these pashas should expect to return to a professed allegiance to the sultan after such deeds; but they had only to pay the pashas at Constantinople well to escape every punitive measure by which the Porte might be supposed to visit such treason.

On the 17th the garrison was overjoyed with what Dr. Sandwith called “glorious news.” Omar Pasha was represented as being at Batoum, with a vast number of steamers crowded with troops, and an immense transport. Forty thousand men were represented as constituting his army. Mouravieff was said to have departed from his camp with 12,000 of the blockading army for Akhiska, but Sandwith had no doubt that the enemy himself had issued this report to throw the garrison off its guard. General Williams does not appear to have believed either rumour, for in his despatch to Lord Clarendon, dated two days later, and already given, he does not mention them. He knew both Omar and the Russians better than his officers did.

On the 23rd a Georgian of some distinction deserted to the garrison. He was one Aisian Agha; six horsemen were in his retinue. In

his effort to enter the city, the Russian patrol stopped him. Agha replied to their challenge authoritatively in Russian—"Do you not know me? I am the colonel going the rounds." The patrol hesitated. Agha made the moment of hesitation available, and, with his brave followers, charged through, and entered the city in safety. His arrival was a great event, for he brought the news of the fall of Sebastopol. The tidings ran "like wildfire" through town and garrison, and acclamations of joy burst from soldiers and people. At mid-day there was a general parade, and the news was read at the heads of the various battalions. The citizens turned out, and there was a *feu de joie* of pistols, guns, fowling-pieces, Bashi-bazouk carbines, &c. A grand salute was ordered from the castle, but as soon as the first gun was discharged a regiment of Russian cavalry, with two batteries of artillery, approached the Hafiz Pasha Fort, and opened a quick fire. The officers of the garrison were astonished at this strange procedure; but the sagacity of General Williams was not for a moment at fault. He pointed out the real object—an intention to prevent the salute being heard *as a salute* by the Russian army, lest they should infer the truth, or that some other great victory was gained; for the Russian troops were beginning to despair of capturing Kars, and would have been disheartened by hearing that victory elsewhere had crowned the allied arms.

On the 26th intelligence reached the muschir that Omar Pasha's army was rapidly concentrating on the Chourouk-su, and that the "Sirdar Ekram" intended to begin his operations against Georgia with instant vigour. The muschir also received tidings that Sebastopol was partly taken, and the Russian fleet entirely destroyed.

On the 25th the cholera broke out with fearful violence; it was imported from the enemy by means of deserters. Dr. Sandwith made every effort to check its course, but it continued its ravages from day to day, until 1000 soldiers and many citizens perished by it. On this day the whole country seemed on fire, from the burning of the grass by the Russians, to prevent the cavalry of the garrison from sallying forth in quest of fodder for the horses.

On the 26th news arrived from Omar Pasha which seems altogether irreconcilable with the honour and good faith of that general in what concerned the relief of Kars. Dr. Sandwith, referring to that intelligence, thus wrote concerning it in his journal of the 27th:—"An aide-de-camp of Omar Pasha entered the city last night; the generalissimo has landed at Suchum Kaleh with 45,000 of the best Turkish, Egyptian, and Tunisian troops; the trans-

port corps was shortly expected. The aide-de-camp has been twelve days on the road."

In a private letter of General Williams, written from Kars on the 28th of September, he thus describes his hopes as excited by the Turkish general:—"Omar Pasha is most likely now on his march towards Tiflis or Akhiska, for we heard from him two days ago, telling us that he was concentrating his troops on the Chourouk-su, and that he should himself move on with the greatest possible speed, begging us to hold out twenty days. With our economy of bread we can *do much* more than that, and would have given the Russians cold fingers ere we let them inside our lines."

From these statements it would appear that not earlier than the 13th of September Omar wrote to General Williams, informing him that he had landed at Suchum Kaleh, was at the head of 45,000 men, and in twenty days would relieve Kars. Here is a threefold statement, as to the place in which the generalissimo was, the troops at his disposal, and his power within a given time, at the head of such a considerable force, to create a diversion sufficient for the relief of the garrison. In another chapter, relating the actual history of Omar's proceedings, we shall be able to show that on the 13th of September, or on any date in September, he had not the slightest prospect of relieving Kars in twenty days, and never would have sent a despatch to that effect, unless it was his intention to keep General Williams in the place until a retreat from it was impossible—unless, in fact, he partook of the desire which was cherished by the clique at Constantinople, of handing over General Williams and his British assistants as prisoners of war to the Russians. Let it be remembered that at this juncture the pashas whom General Williams caused to be sent away from Kars and its neighbourhood in disgrace, and to be tried and punished at Constantinople for their peculations, were shielded from undergoing the punishments awarded to them by the powerful interest of Omar, by whose influence they were originally appointed; and that Selim Pasha, at Erzerum, and Mustapha Pasha, at Batoum, were carrying on the same game of false promises and false representations; and it will be difficult for any one to keep in view all these facts without coming to the conclusion that General Williams was trifled with and betrayed by Omar, Selim, Mustapha, the pashas and seraskier at Constantinople, and that some others at that city, who were neither Turks nor pashas, but from whom General Williams was entitled to sympathy and support, were not displeased with the progress of this combination against him. Indeed, it is much to be doubted that if displeasure had been resolutely evinced

against these schemes by legitimate English influences at Constantinople, they would have ever been reduced to practice. Mr. Oliphant attended the camp of Omar Pasha as an amateur. He touched at Suchum Kaleh, Ghelendjik, Redout Kaleh, Batoum, Shefketail, and Trebizond, during the month of September. He met Omar at Batoum, and gives this account of the prospect of affairs then, "the middle of September:"—"I found Omar at Batoum, in a state of impatient expectancy, occupied chiefly in the reorganisation of *Mustapha Pasha's* army, and the establishment of hospitals for them. He told me that the accounts he had received of the country between Batoum and Kutais had induced him to change his base of operations to Suchum Kaleh, as by so doing he would not only secure his left flank, but find a more practicable line of march."

What prospect had Omar "in the middle of September" of relieving Kars in twenty days, when his own army was not even collected upon the shores of Asia? How could he boast of being at the head of 45,000 men, when he knew well there was not the smallest prospect of his being within many thousands of that number, and when he had already learned by personal inspection of *Mustapha's* army at Batoum that instead of 12,000 men, at which it had been computed, there were not 1000 in it, including invalids?

Mr. Oliphant, so ardent an admirer of Omar Pasha, and a personal friend of Colonel Simmons, the English commissioner in his camp, indignantly remarks on the tardiness displayed by the French commander:—"On the 1st of September General Williams writes:—'What is being done for the relief of this army?' This important question is answered, if we refer to Colonel Simmons' despatch to the Earl of Clarendon, dated three weeks later (the 21st of September), from the Crimea:—"Up to the present time General Pelissier has not signified his assent to the departure for Asia of any more of the Ottoman troops now stationed here." Two thousand had been allowed to depart three days before. Sebastopol had fallen a fortnight previous to this. The principal use of a portion of the Turkish army had been to hold some lines at Baidar. It had never been employed in the trenches, nor was it engaged in the siege. It was now becoming an actual encumbrance and embarrassment to the allied forces, encamped in so limited a space. 'It would appear to be most desirable,' says Colonel Simmons, 'for the interest of the allied troops now here that they should depart.' Again: 'General Simpson has informed me that he sees no objection to their departure. The only obstacle, therefore, seems to be, that the assent of General Pelissier and the French government has not been

given.' Here, then, we are enabled, for the first time, to arrive at some definite conclusion as to the immediate and proximate fall of Kars."

The circumstances so accurately described by Mr. Oliphant in the above quotations and comments made by him, prove that Omar Pasha could not have sincerely and honourably written, at any time within the month of September, to General Williams that he would relieve Kars, if the English commissioner held out for twenty days. It was a cruel and treacherous mockery of his situation; and if it were not an act of vindictive perfidy, it is impossible to account for it. It was so late as the 3rd of October when Omar reached Suchum Kaleh, which he must have intended to be the base of his operations when he addressed the faithless letter to which General Williams and Dr. Sandwith referred with so much unfounded hope. Omar spent a month loitering in Mingrelia when he got there, independent of the time consumed in marches and battle; and *Mustapha Pasha*, who was ordered to effect a certain movement on the Rhion in Omar's support, spent two months in marching about ten miles and back again, having employed ten thousand men in a manner which both he and Omar Pasha knew was useless, if they did not actually mean it to be so. These facts must come again under view in future chapters, when the reader will be left with ample evidence that "Omar never intended to relieve Kars," as the author of this History is aware officers who served in his army, and must have been in his confidence, have admitted. The feelings of General Williams upon the receipt of such encouraging tidings from Omar, may be judged from the buoyant style in which he depicted his own sufferings and those of the garrison, in the following extract from a private letter of the 28th of September:—"Our last enemy is cholera, which, after inflicting much loss on the Russians, came to us three days ago; but I hope it will not prove of a virulent type. We are in capital '*caif*.' For the last two days Mouravieff has been sending off his baggage to Gumri, and, even by the light of lanterns, the arabas moved on that road all last night. We still look sharp, and leave nothing to chance. Our little fellows are in high spirits, and would fight like devils if he tries a last gasp and rush. *Nous verrons*. We are all thin and bronzed from exposure and night-work. My sword-belt would not do its duty were it not shortened by many a buckle-hole; but all of us are in high spirits. The mortality amongst our horses has been, and is, terrible from sheer starvation; we can with great difficulty bury them, and employ for that purpose large detachments of infantry."

On this day General Williams sent to Erzerum, urging the preparation of provisions and stores in case the enemy should raise the blockade, which he gave some indications of being likely to do. In this the general was disappointed, in common with the muschir, and all the officers, English, Hungarian, and Turkish. Mouravieff was as daring as he was skilful, and had been acting cautiously, but effectively, to leave the impression which the garrison entertained. He did not, however, succeed in lulling the vigilance of General Williams, as the following events show:—

GENERAL ASSAULT BY THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

On the 29th a grand attack was made upon the city by the whole of Mouravieff's force. That general, having heard of the arrangements for an expedition to Georgia under Omar Pasha, and of the fall of Southern Sebastopol, naturally supposed that the armies under Pelissier and Simpson would display more enterprise than they did, and that so important a sphere of action as that of Asia Minor would receive their attention; he feared that French and British troops would be landed at Trebizond, and also be dispatched in support of the diversion contemplated by Omar; he therefore determined upon a desperate attempt to take Kars by storm. No expectation of making an assault existed in the Russian camp at nine o'clock on the night of the 28th. Preparations soon after that hour began to be made, and Mouravieff was himself all activity; the brave and energetic old man was everywhere directing, arranging, superintending. Kmety showed his just appreciation of the Russian commander-in-chief when he persisted in believing, contrary to the opinion of Dr. Sandwith, that he would assault Kars, even if obliged to raise the blockade. Mouravieff went from corps to corps, encouraging the troops, and chatting familiarly with the junior officers, contrary to his habit, and assuring them that Kars would be easily taken. He had determined that, if possible, it should be taken, for he had concerted his measures with determination at any cost to secure success, and was ready at the chosen moment to launch 30,000 men against the obstinate city. We have in a previous chapter given a general description of the place and its defences, to which our readers must refer while perusing this relation of the battle. So singular was the situation of Kars, so numerous the defences, and so peculiar the character and relation to one another, that it is very difficult to give a clear and comprehensive view of the progress of the contest. Colonel Lake, the engineer officer who, under the approval of General Williams, planned the defences, expressed the great difficulty he felt to convey

in writing a perspicuous account of the conflict; in a letter to a friend he represented it as necessary, pencil in hand, personally to describe what occurred, in order to communicate it intelligibly to others.

About three o'clock in the morning, one of the sentinels most in advance heard dull heavy sounds, as if of distant wheels. He at first supposed it to be convoy-carts, which came and went so frequently in connection with the Muscovite camp. Listening for some time, the sounds struck his ear as the familiar rumble of artillery-wheels, and he communicated his suspicions, which were confirmed by other ears. The first sentinel, putting his ear to the ground, heard the measured tramp of infantry, but it was supposed that it proceeded from the relieving-parties passing from post to post. The word passed, and the alarm was given. Kmety commanded this portion of the line of defence, occupying a central position behind, in a rifle camp, where Major Teesdale also had his tent. Kmety could hear no sounds, the night was dark, the city was silent, and all beyond was also still. The noises which were heard before were hushed, and it was evident that if they indicated the approach of the enemy, that approach was managed with extreme caution and care. Silently, quietly, but swiftly Kmety marshalled his troops, and the men peered down into the deep darkness, and listened with anxious ears, but nothing stirred which could be heard or seen. After an hour's pause a few riflemen were sent out upon a reconnaissance; they stole forward in the furtive, yet rapid way peculiar to that service, but as yet nothing could be heard. By degrees, as they lay upon the earth, the rumble of artillery and the march of men could be recognised more and more distinctly, and Kmety from his position also heard it. The word was passed, and the Zebeks prepared their pieces (*carabines à tige*), and were ready to fire upon any shape which might emerge from the gloom. The artillerymen loaded with heavy charges of grape, and all was again silent. It was a time of awful and thrilling suspense. At last the riflemen returned from their reconnaissance, if such it could be called, exclaiming that "The Giaours were coming," and at once messengers sped to every other portion of the camp. Peering into the dense gloom, a soldier, remarkable for his faculty of seeing by night, perceived the masses of the enemy coming steadily on, and exclaimed, "It is moving—it is a column of the Muscovs!" In a moment a gun was pointed, and sent out its thunder of defiance, bearing also into the closely-packed mass of the Muscovites a shower of grape. Cries arose from the wounded—a shout of triumph from the Turks, answered promptly by a cry of rage and defiance from the enemy now rushing

madly on to the works; every step was met by a plunging fire of grape, and the Russians fell fast, as the leaves of the forest stricken by the hailstorm. Kmety was at once at his post. Teesdale was going his rounds, but arrived early in the fight, and threw himself into the Yuksek Battery, to the right of the Tahmasp Redoubt, and separated from it by a line of breastwork called the Rennison line. Lake was asleep, no doubt in the sound sleep of the overworked and weary soldier, when the booming of the cannon roused him. His soldier servant told him it was but a dream, for he had slept too soundly to awake until roused by his master's call. The accustomed ear of Lake knew that these sounds were the notes of opening conflict. He was scarcely dressed, and prepared to hurry forth, when General Williams, already on the alert, called out to him that the enemy was attacking in force. Lake perceived at once that guns were firing in the direction of Kanli Battery on the extreme south of the defence, and Tahmasp on the north-west. Galloping to the former, in the hot haste of battle, he with difficulty perceived, for the dawn had not yet broke, that there was a force in front of it, but beyond range, and consisting almost exclusively of cavalry and artillery. Judging by the position taken, and the description of force there that no attack was meditated in that quarter, and that the enemy was merely making a feint, he ordered that the Russian artillery fire should not be answered, unless the troops came well within range. He then remounted, and turned towards Tahmasp, whence the flashes of the guns in the darkness were quick and fierce, and were soon followed by a roll of musketry, which told but too plainly that the enemy was close to the works. Lake afterwards declared that there was an intensity of sound in the cannonade, and in the roll of the musketry, such as he had never before heard. The consciousness of close, earnest battle, took possession of his mind. Riding to Tehin Battery (afterwards called Vassif Pasha Battery), he was enabled to comprehend more clearly the scheme of attack; he perceived that the enemy was directing his efforts upon the left of the Tahmasp line of breastwork, which was defended by Hussein Pasha, a gallant Circassian. The right of these works soon also appeared under a powerful fire; there Kmety was more immediately engaged, and Major Teesdale took post throughout the battle. The attack was soon extended to the batteries, called after the interpreter (Zohrab), Captain Thompson, and Major Teesdale (the English batteries). There was a battery behind these called Churchill Battery, named after the secretary of the general, and another named Williams Pasha Battery. The key of the place

was Fort Lake, according to Colonel Lake's idea, who planned it, although Kmety represents the Tahmasp Heights as the key of the whole defence. Mouravieff hoped to turn the Tahmasp lines, and penetrate to Fort Lake, which was connected with the English batteries, and was, in fact, a part of that line of defence. Possessing Fort Lake he could shell the town, destroy the magazines, and (having conquered Tahmasp) render the city no longer tenable. The position of the assailed became now most serious: Mouravieff had posted artillery on an eminence, which enabled him to throw a heavy fire into the Tahmasp Redoubts, and the works on its left; shot and shell fell thickly among them. No previous fire of artillery opened their way, but relying on a surprise, the Russian columns came on as they always did throughout the war, in close, dense masses. Floods of grape smote them from the batteries they were so gallantly storming. As they reached the breastworks, musketry—the long rifles of the Lazi, Minié rifles, *carabines à tige*—were directed against their very heads, sweeping down rank after rank, as the strong wind scatters the ascending smoke. The Russian officers displayed a professional pride and personal daring that was magnanimous; foremost in danger, they dashed, sword in hand, upon the bayonets of the garrison, in the hope that by the very desperation of the rush they made, an entrance would be forced for their followers. On the left flank the enemy pressed on, and attacked the position in rear; but the redoubts were closed, and Hussein Pasha, the gallant Circassian, defended the Tahmasp Battery itself, and the line of breastwork to its left, which the enemy were successful in turning. On the right of the Tahmasp range of heights, and separated from the Tahmasp Redoubt by lunettes and breastworks, was the Yuksek Tabia, a redoubt into which Teesdale entered soon after the attack. Along the front of the Tahmasp Redoubt, and the works between it and the Yuksek Battery, and beyond that defence to the right on to the heights called Shirshani Tepessi, the Russians made daring, desperate, and protracted efforts to effect an entrance; they did succeed in capturing a lunette to the left of the Yuksek Tabia, in which were some guns, but they were not able to make much use of them, and they were somewhat early in the battle driven out of that work at the point of the bayonet by Kmety in person, at the head of four companies of Rifles. The Russians turned the extreme right, as well as the left of the Tahmasp line of defence, but found that the works were all closed. They then necessarily occupied the camp in the rear, which had been Kmety's head-quarters; there they planted their standards, massed their battalions, and opened a

tremendous fire of musketry against the rear of the whole line of the Tahmasp defences. Major Teesdale skilfully turned his guns to the reverse of the Yuksek Battery, now made the front, and directed a galling fire of grape upon the camp, where the enemy had thus ranged his infantry. Teesdale worked his cannon and plied his musketry with rapidity and boldness. This effort was one of the redeeming circumstances of the battle; his guns swept down numbers as they rushed on, especially the officers, fiercely against the redoubt, which they were maddened with despair to find closed against them, as well as desperately defended.

While Teesdale, from his position at the Yuksek, on the north-west of the defence, maintained an obstinate conflict, Kmety's attention was directed to that point also, but more especially to the left of the Tahmasp range. General Williams and the muschir were at head-quarters, which were situated to the south-west of the town, and as nearly as possible in the centre of the whole defence. It was his desire, when the conflict began, that Lake should remain at the Tehin Tabia, at the other side of the river to that where head-quarters and the reserves were placed, and in a position, if possible, still more central to the points attacked. But Lake, perceiving that the enemy had stormed the English batteries on the north of the defences, repaired to Fort Lake which commanded them, and directing the heavy guns there, so as to dislodge the temporary victors, dealt also among them horrible slaughter. The necessity of Lake's presence there was obvious; for while one portion of the enemy was turning the Tahmasp range of defence, and attacking them in reverse, another powerful body, consisting of a division of infantry, and two regiments of dragoons, supported by fieldpieces, penetrated on the north beyond the Tchakmask Tabia,* and breast-work nearer to the river, and attacked that line of defence called the English tabias. These were occupied by weak garrisons, but were gallantly defended, as all agree, except, indeed, General Kmety, who was not there, and who deprecates anything done where *he* was not.

Captain Thompson was on the same side of the river as that in which head-quarters were. The captain had charge of two batteries: one, called the Kara-dagh, overlooking the road to Gumri, to the east of the city and of the defences; the other, the Arab Tabia, to the north-east. From this remote position he was enabled to render immense service, by using artillery of very heavy metal, especially one "big gun," and by the opportune dispatch

of his Bashi-bazouks (on foot), and the garrisons of his tabias to the relief of the points immediately assailed. He was, like Lake, bound fast in sleep when the sound of the cannon from Tahmasp aroused him. Galloping up to the heights of his position, he looked beyond the city and the river, which were hidden in darkness, and saw the flashes of the guns at Tahmasp, and very soon after the streaming flashes of the musketry. He could only perceive that a fierce fight was waging, but the duties of his own position kept him simply an observer. After a while he heard cheers under the English batteries, which, as already shown, were attacked soon after the lines at Tahmasp—those batteries lay much nearer to him than the latter. As day began to dawn, he was horrified to perceive that the English tabias were being stormed; he could distinctly count five Russian battalions—three regiments of dragoons (other accounts name only two), and sixteen fieldpieces; the resistance, however noble, was borne down; and the fieldpieces were actually brought into position above the gorge of the river, and began to fire down upon the town, and also in the direction of the magazine, the position of which was pointed out by deserters. At this juncture, General Williams, whose attention from his central position was directed to every quarter, and who thought of everything, sent up word to Thompson to send his men to the relief of the troops driven from the English batteries. His own promptitude and forethought were such that he needed no such orders; he had already dismounted the Bashi-bazouks attached to his command, and, together with 800 infantry, sent them across the river. While they were acting in obedience to his orders, he opened fire from his guns, simultaneously with those from Fort Lake, which opportunely directed their cannonade upon the spot, as already mentioned. Dr. Sandwith describes Captain Thompson as effecting, with one great gun, the service he now performed; this was not the case; his whole battery was directed upon the English tabias, and one gun of large calibre dealt immense slaughter among the invaders. Lieutenant Koch, under Captain Thompson's orders, opened fire also from the Arab Tabia, and sent its garrison across the river, to assist in expelling the captors of the English tabia. The fire from these batteries (Lake's and Thompson's) was murderous, and it was impossible for the enemy to occupy the tabias while exposed to it. Lake had so skilfully constructed the works, that no redoubt could be held by the foe without being exposed to a flanking fire from some other. Thompson, however, supposed that his battery did even more than it was possible to perform, as he

* This must not be confounded with Tahmasp, on the north-west of the defence, as might easily be done by English readers from similarity of name.

could not see the hand-to-hand conflict which was necessary to expel the assailants from the ground they had so bravely won. Kmety, in his account, most disingenuously tries to leave the impression that Koch, not Thompson, had all the glory of what was accomplished from beyond the river in driving the Russians out of the English tabias. This is as unfaithful as it is unbecoming. Judging from his writing, General Kmety is bitterly prejudiced against the English, and seems intensely envious of any reputation acquired by British officers—even when these officers have covered themselves with honour by their personal courage and their skill, and were at the same time his own generous upholders and intimate friends. No obligations of gratitude, no pride of personal friendship can counteract this ungenerous and unsoldierly disposition on his part. It is a pity that one so brave, and one so much honoured in the despatches of General Williams, and in the private letters of all the English officers who served at Kars, should allow this avarice of honour to eat out the generous and magnanimous emotions of a gallant soldier's heart. Even with the advice of a certain illustrious person at Constantinople, and the assistance of others as envious and less gifted, General Kmety is not sufficiently ingenious to decry the merits of others without damaging himself. He has, however, rendered services by his pen almost equal to those rendered by his sword, for he has unintentionally indicated to that portion of the English public at all cognisant of such questions, what a centre of cabal, intrigue, and envy is to be found somewhere near the British embassy at Constantinople.

Returning again to the proceedings of Lake. As soon as he saw the attack on the left of Tahmasp, he placed two very heavy guns on the Tchin Battery, and directed their fire upon the Russian artillery, which had unlimbered, and was cannonading the reverse of the Tahmasp Redoubt. From the Tchin he proceeded, as already related, to Fort Lake, which had already been engaged, but which redoubled its efforts under the auspices of the colonel. When the fire of Fort Lake, with that of the batteries of Captain Thompson, had rendered the English tabias untenable by the Russians, reinforcements arrived there from Captain Thompson, and certain reserves from General Williams. Kmety and his rifles had held the Russians at bay both on the right and left of Tahmasp. The men fought with the coolest and most unflinching courage, taking deliberate aim, nearly every shot bringing down a foe. The veteran Hungarian distinguished himself greatly on this occasion. Both Hussein Pasha and Kmety made repeated sorties upon the Russian infantry, who were pressing in upon

them from the captured camp, and, with a mere handful of men, frequently scattered many times their number. Meantime, General Williams had to watch the Russians, who menaced the Kanli Tabia, and to take care that they did not turn their feint into a real attack. By his judicious and timely orders to Colonel Thompson, he provided that every assistance which could be rendered thence should be afforded to the English tabias. He sent his own reserves to the Tchin Battery, the garrison of which was ordered up to Lake's support at Fort Lake, and gradually directed men from the Tchin Tabia to the assistance of Kmety. Kmety, in his querulous pamphlet, makes no acknowledgment of this, although he knew well that every movement was directed by General Williams, and that the line occupied by himself, from the position of Hussein Pasha to that of Teesdale, would have been certainly captured by the enemy but for the judicious arrangements by which Williams sent forward assistance. Kmety must have known from Kolman, who acted as chief of the staff to General Williams, that every movement was dictated by pencil-notes written by the general, and conveyed by Kolman to the various points where these orders were made effective. Immediately after the battle, and while he remained in Kars, and even while he remained in Asia Minor, no one was more lavish of praise, in reference to the comprehensive measures of General Williams, than Kmety; it is strange how he should become better informed when he took up his abode upon the shores of the Bosphorus. It is also unfortunate for the magnanimity of the brave Hungarian, that it is so sure a road to preferment there, to decry the independent commissioner of her majesty. Opportunity for sending assistance to Kmety did not arise until after a conflict truly terrible, and in which both sides showed the utmost gallantry. The battle continued to rage along the Tahmasp Heights and along its flanks, Kmety, Hussein Pasha, and Teesdale, performing prodigies of valour, and inspiring all beneath them with courage dauntless as their own. Their presence of mind was equal to their heroism; no confusion was permitted to arise; each stroke of artillery and volley of musketry was given with deadly precision; and the bayonet did its brave work in the grasp of resolute and steady hands. To assist Kmety by infantry was difficult, for the Russians occupied the plateau behind the Tahmasp Heights. It was by the occupants of the defences there making desperate sorties, that additional troops could find a passage from the reinforcements sent up by General Williams. The battalions which constituted these reinforcements advanced gradually, taking advantage of all the inequalities

of the ground, and placing the Russians in the vanquished camp under a double fire the most galling. A long line of wall, which had been built to shelter the camp-kitchens, formed a shelter for the reserve battalions; and from this they threw out their forces as they could, and in proportion as their fire made impression upon the Russian masses. At last, the fire of these masses slackened, the deadly rage of cannon, musketry, and rille, at close range, mowed down the enemy as the scythe cuts the field-flowers. Kmety, at the proper juncture, charged them with his infantry. The guns from Fort Lake smote them heavily. The 1-gun battery and the Yussuf Pasha Battery raked them with a cross-fire the most withering, and with perfect impunity. The hour of victory for the garrison had arrived; the astonished and baffled enemy knew not what to do. No provision had been made by Mouravieff for such a contingency as actually happened; he did not suppose that the Tahmasp works were closed in reverse, or that, in case of their being turned, victory to the assailants could be delayed. But there his battalions stood upon the plateau within the defences, yet unable to hold so much as a single lunette, whilst a blaze of vengeful fire encircled them, and death smote them on every hand. Never were troops placed in a predicament more dreadful; seldom have troops shown a more soldierly contempt of death and respect for duty. The retreat was disastrous; the vanquished squadrons, battalions, and artillery, had to run the gauntlet of the renewed and triumphant fire of all the defences within range of which they had come. The pursuing ball and grape sped along the line of their retreat, and havoc the most signal rent their columns. Soldiers and citizens sallied forth in pursuit; the wild Lazi and the sedate white-turbaned townsmen glided down the declivities in lines of exulting conquerors, strewing the slopes with the slain of the defeated. The victory was won; but the victors were not able to utilise the battle as their own valour and the skill of their chiefs would have impelled, from the total want of cavalry, of horses for their fieldpieces, and from the sickly condition of the men.

Among the fearful episodes of the bloody tragedy, one of the most sanguinary was connected with the fate of the Russian cavalry in the attack upon the English tabias. Supposing them all to be open in the rear, the troopers turned the nearest of these defences to their own line of advance, and cut down a timid Turkish colonel who had abandoned his men, and some hundred of his soldiers who followed him in his effort to escape from the tabia, where he was posted, to the stronger defences of Fort Lake. These tabias were

connected with breastworks, and the Russian Dragoons, under the idea that they were accessible, charged furiously up to them; but Lake, in his construction of these works, had protected every line of intrenchment by five rows of *troups de lousps*; the Dragoons were, therefore, received with a murderous fire—the whole line fell dead beneath it; confusion arose among them, and before they retired and re-formed, numbers were shot down; they fell helplessly under the cool, sure fire of the rifles.

The Turks, in the pursuit, dealt slaughter upon the pursued. Hussein Pasha sallied forth from the left of the Tahmasp; the intrepid young Teesdale rushed forth from Yuksek; Kmety and the troops on Rennison's lines were soon upon the track of the foe. All attempt to rally was impossible; the Russians fled with the utmost precipitation from beneath the vengeful fire of the victors. Had Williams cavalry at that moment—a single brigade—the destruction of the enemy would have been much greater, and there is no saying what the results might have been as to any further attempt to continue the blockade of Kars. His only force was about 100 ill-mounted horsemen, who did their best to make the pursuit effectual, as far as pursuit could be ventured in the presence of the powerful cavalry of the enemy.

The loss on the part of the Turks was about 1300 men, of whom 300 fell in the defence of the English tabias, and the rest in the line of defence generically called Tahmasp, which included the redoubt called Tahmasp Tabia, the line of breastwork to the left of it, that to the right up to Yuksek Tabia, and on the right of that up to the strong eminences of Shirshani Tepessi. The loss of the Russians was enormously disproportioned to that of the garrison, it could not have been much less than 15,000 men killed and wounded. Of course it cannot certainly be affirmed that the destruction was so heavy; but, upon a careful computation, it is difficult to fix upon an estimate less terrible. General Kmety gave his opinion on this point in the following terms:—"The total loss in killed and wounded on the side of the defenders was 1094, of whom 790 were either killed or wounded in the defence of Tahmasp. The number of the enemy buried by the garrison after the fight was about 6500, of whom more than 6000 fell in the attack on Tahmasp. This does not include the killed and wounded taken away by the retiring columns."

Sir William Williams thus referred in a private letter to the number of the slain:—"They literally covered the country round the field of contention. Upwards of 5000 were put under ground, so that his losses have been enormous. Mikho, a prisoner, my old servant,

saw the battle from the Russian camp, and he says *they confess* to 9500. One hundred and sixty wounded and a few prisoners remain in our hands. We have four Russian wounded officers in a house near us, and they feed and live as we do, from our kitchen."

Colonel Lake is more specific:—"I found a poor young officer of Russian chasseurs, stripped all but his shirt and drawers, sitting against a parapet, with his eye hanging out on his cheek, a ball having entered the eye, and passed out behind the ear. I bound up his eye with my handkerchief, put him on the horse of one of my orderly dragoons, and sent him down to the hospital. I have since seen him, and he is doing well; but his eye is gone, of course. He tells me he is only twenty years of age; he is rather good-looking and gentleman-like. His colonel I saw lying in the ditch of Yuksek Battery, with his horse beside him. I rode all over the field afterwards; and, if I had not seen it with my own eyes, I should have disbelieved what I am now going to tell you. We recommenced burying the dead the same afternoon: first of all our own. We lost in killed and wounded between one thousand and eleven hundred, among them several officers. Up to this time, and this is the fifth day, though we have kept several regiments constantly employed, we have not yet finished this mournful occupation. The accounts to-day show six thousand, three hundred, and odd, actually buried of the Russians. This does not include those who fell at a distance; some of whom were carried off by the enemy, and others are still lying in all directions. I rode about yesterday, and found bodies without number in various spots. We have only two hundred and odd wounded Russians in our hospital. I saw the enemy taking their wounded away all the time of the attack; and a deserter who came in to-day says that 2000 carts (which I saw) started yesterday for Gumri laden with wounded, and that two-thirds of the Russian infantry are *hors de combat*. We have seen officers' funerals going on every day in their camps; and I believe a great number of them fell during the action. The Erivansky regiment, one of their crack corps, only brought 350 men out of action. I suppose that, having besieged us for four months, Mouravieff was ashamed of going away without a final attack. Now, if he has to meet Omar Pasha, he will have to encounter a fresh army (in good spirits) of 45,000 men, his own force being considerably cut up. I believe the Russians had altogether 30,000 troops engaged, the flower of the Caucasian army. We had under 7000 engaged, not one squadron of cavalry, for most of our horses have been killed, and few remained even for our guns."

When the number actually buried, the wounded prisoners, the proportion that fell beyond the Turkish lines, the slain and wounded carried away, are all taken into the computation, a loss of 15,000 men is not too heavy to attribute to the attack. Colonel Lake subsequently came to that conclusion. He thus expressed himself in a private letter, written on the 6th of October:—"It is impossible for the Russians to get away, I imagine, for a day or two, for Mouravieff cannot leave his wounded, and many cannot be moved. He seems to be burying officers every day—dying of their wounds, I suppose. Deserters who have come in say he has lost 300 officers, among them many of high rank. They say he has 15,000 men *hors de combat*. Up to the night before last the numbers buried by us amounted to six thousand and odd. I do not know if there are any more since. Our loss in killed and wounded was 1092, exclusive of the townspeople (who lost 101), and of Bashi-bazouks, the number of whom I know not. It has been very hard work burying the dead, and many regiments have been employed in doing it since the battle. All the dead horses had to be removed."

The scene after the battle, described by other eye-witnesses, is one of the most painful ever presented as the result of conflict. Scarcely did the most murderous struggles in the Crimea leave such a wreck behind. Dr. Sandwith, who, as a medical man, was peculiarly qualified to judge of the havoc of the battle-field, thus wrote of what he witnessed:—

"I rode round the batteries soon after the action, and seldom had the oldest soldier witnessed a more terrible sight. There were literally piles of dead already stripped of their clothes by marauding soldiers, and lying in every posture; while the plaintive cries of men with shattered limbs arose from time to time from amidst these acres of defaced humanity. Every ghastly wound was there—deep and broad sabre-cuts, letting out the life of man in a crimson flood, limbs carried off by round-shot, and carcasses of man and horse torn and shattered by grape. I urged our men to carry off the wounded, but this work proceeded slowly—for the distance to the town was nearly three miles, all or nearly all our horses and mules were dead, and our ambulance corps thereby rendered useless. Suddenly a band of music strikes up; it is the rifle band, and the tune is a wild Zebek melody. At once a dozen of these mountaineers spring up from their repose, join hand-in-hand, and dance amidst the dead, the dying, and the wounded.

"After a day of hard fighting, of glorious triumph, and soul-harrowing work, the night closes in upon us long ere we had removed the Russian wounded from the battle-field. God

help them! After lying naked in a scorching sun, with shattered limbs and burning thirst, they are now exposed to a frosty night. I verily believe that the sensations of the human body are so blunted after a while as to be no longer susceptible of suffering.

"*Sunday, September 30th.*—This is no day of rest; our soldiers are hard at work with the spade, and before nightfall they have buried many thousand Russians, and removed the wounded. Some pious Mussulmans of Kars declare they saw a sacred band of 10,000 men, all clothed in green, the prophet's colour, fighting with our troops. These heavenly warriors disappeared when the Russians retreated. Yesterday and to-day the cholera has ceased—a singular phenomenon, occasioned, I presume, by intense moral emotion."

Dr. Sandwith also gave the following graphic description of the retreat and pursuit:—"About mid-day the Russian columns were seen running down the hill, their cavalry and artillery steadily protecting their retreat. A confused mass of citizens, horse and foot, followed them with the utmost temerity, firing into their retreating ranks. But where was our cavalry? where were the fierce Turkish horsemen who once overran the east of Europe? Two thousand of these horsemen would now destroy the Russian army: as it is, we are forced to keep to our intrenchments—we have no cavalry and no horse-artillery; and, with deep chagrin, we see the enemy gradually reform, and march off unmolested."

The following touching episode in his narrative of the fate of the wounded occurs in Dr. Sandwith's report of his experience subsequent to that bloody day:—"One of our wounded Russian officers is a Pole, who has had half his face carried away by a grape-shot. He regrets beyond measure the loss of a ring, on which is engraved the name *Eloise*, and declares that the recovery of this trinket, which he values beyond anything in the world, would at once cure him. Mr. Rennison our interpreter, hearing of this, produces a ring, which he has bought from a soldier, and which proves to be the identical one so much desired. The poor fellow leaps from his bed, wild with joy, on the recovery of his lost treasure, the gift of some distant well-beloved one. This wounded officer died of a paralysis a few days after this event."

The conduct of men and officers during this fierce fight was most glorious. The Turks fought so as to deserve all the commendations heaped upon them by General Williams in his despatches, and speeches made at public meetings in England after his return.

The English officers behaved with the greatest heroism; and those of them least exposed to the fire of the enemy, but who had, neverthe-

less, most difficult duties to perform, preserved the utmost coolness, and showed extraordinary vigour and presence of mind. The European officers not English—such as Kmety and Kolman, better known then as Fezy Bey, and now Fezy Pasha—behaved with great gallantry. The men who had most opportunity for distinguishing themselves by personal courage were Kmety, Hussein Pasha, Major Teesdale, and Kerim Pasha, and all these officers fought with chivalrous courage. It was not until after Kars surrendered that all the exploits of the intrepid young Teesdale were known. Twice this chivalrous youth leaped from the parapets of the Yuksek Tabia to succour wounded Russian officers, although these benevolent feats were effected under showers of bullets. It would be difficult to conceive of valour doing more than was done by Hussein Pasha and Kerim Pasha.

It is to be regretted that among the heroic men who defended Kars any differences of opinion and feeling should have sprung up; but General Kmety, as already noticed, has chosen to express discontent with the honours really his own, and conceded by all, and to claim for himself the whole honour of the defence of Kars. The general has published a pamphlet, in the introduction to which he addresses Sir W. F. Williams, finding fault with him because in certain speeches delivered by him in England he had not given to the writer his due meed of praise, and the general therefore essayed "to complete" the descriptions given by Sir William by a narrative of his own great services. Anything published on the defence of Kars by such a man as General Kmety claims notice, or we should hesitate to give it wide publicity in these pages, which by his own pamphlet it is never likely to obtain. The gallant Hungarian does not give a good reason, any more than the real reason, for publishing his little tractate. Surely it was natural that in England, among the friends of Lake, Thompson, Teesdale, Churchill, &c., General Williams should speak more particularly of the services of those officers than of Kmety, Kolman, and others, not English officers, nor in the service of England in any way. Let it be recollected that these speeches were "after dinner," a description of speech always depending upon what Dr. Brown, the great metaphysician, would call "simple suggestion"—the presence of the friends, relatives, brother-officers, &c., of the British commissioner's compatriots would naturally bring up vividly the services of these Englishmen; if General Williams were speaking after a banquet in Pesth or Warsaw, he would have suggested to him more forcibly the gallant Hungarians and Poles whose swords, at his command, so readily leaped from their scabbards against the foe.

If General Williams had neglected General Kmety at Kars, or in connection with Kars, either personally or officially, the brave Hungarian soldier might have justly felt indignant, and appealed to the British public for justice. But was this so? Are not the facts notoriously otherwise? Did not General Williams so deport himself at all times to General Kmety as to draw from the latter expressions of the warmest admiration and gratitude? And when Lord Stratford, who has, it would appear, now undertaken to take care of the Turco-Hungarian chief, did not even trouble himself about his pay, does not every reader of Blue-books know that General Williams urged upon Lord Stratford (of course in vain) that the neglected general should receive it? Failing to move Lord Stratford, who is as good a patriot as need be where patriotism comports with his own pride and power, was not Lord Clarendon appealed to by General Williams to obtain for General Kmety the just recompence of his services from the Turkish government? If Sir William Williams, in his official communication, omitted to afford the due meed of praise to the Hungarian, while he loaded the English officers with approbation, there would have been just ground of complaint on the part of the former; but this was not the case, Kmety was praised *too much*—not, indeed, for his valour, which deserves and will ever have the homage of the brave everywhere; but for his services on the whole during the eventful hours of the bloody assault of Kars. Whatever be the skill of General Kmety, the 29th of September, 1855, did not display its perfection. When at last Kars capitulated, as Kmety himself admits, Williams furnished him with the means of his escape. His honour found shelter beneath the chivalry of his commander, for such, in truth, Sir William was; and as Kmety well knows, there were other and delicate ways in which the English chief showed him consideration in the hour when flight was necessary.

The despatch of General Williams after the battle is one of the most modest official communications written in modern times. It was truthfully said of the document, by a well-known military writer, "He mentioned everybody but himself." Kmety had a prominent place in this world-spread document, as the following extract shows:—

"The intrenchments of Tahmasp, being those nearest the enemy's camp, demanded the greatest vigilance from all intrusted in their defence. General Kmety, a gallant Hungarian officer, commanded the division which occupied this eminence; he was assisted by Major-general Hussein Pasha, and my aide-de-camp, Major Teesdale, who has acted as chief of the staff. . . . The central column pre-

cipitated itself on the redoubts of Tahmasp and Yuksek Tabias, where desperate fighting occurred and lasted for several hours, the enemy being repulsed in all his attempts to enter the closed redoubts, which mutually flanked each other with their artillery and musketry, and made terrible havoc in the ranks of the assailants; and it was here that Generals Kmety and Hussein Pasha, together with Major Teesdale, so conspicuously displayed their courage and conduct. Lieutenant-general Kerim Pasha also repaired to the scene of desperate strife to encourage the troops, and was wounded in the shoulder, and had two horses killed under him."

How General Kmety could have the effrontery to complain of respectful notice on the part of the English commissioner, after such a despatch, would excite universal astonishment, if Beicos, where he wrote, was not so near the palace of the British embassy on the Bosphorus. The pamphlet of the Hungarian officer, detailing the progress of the battle, is one of the most disingenuous productions that perhaps ever issued from the press. From beginning to end he takes no notice of General Williams, and had the English pasha been hid in the heart of the city of Kars he could not have been more completely ignored by General Kmety. The fact was, that throughout the seven hours and a half during which the sanguinary fight lasted, General Williams had the whole direction of the conflict, and had it not been for his care, coolness, and promptitude, General Kmety's own imprudence, notwithstanding his heroism, would have sacrificed himself, his position, and the post he was appointed to keep. At the beginning of the contest the Hungarian soldier rashly threw his whole force into the conflict, leaving *no reserve* at his own disposal. This he admits in the following terms:—"As I was convinced that no immediate danger was to be apprehended on the right flank and rear, and that everything depended on a repulse of the first assault, I determined, perhaps contrary to the strict rule of tactics, to appear at the very outset with my full strength; I accordingly brought my reserve forward before the enemy came within gunshot range."

This tactical error was soon seen when the critical hour arrived for testing it. Instead of his rear being safe, the Russians, without resistance, fell upon his rear, and did so with comparative impunity until Teesdale turned the guns of Yuksek Tabia in reverse, making his rear his front. What would have become of Kmety and his lieutenants, had Williams and Lake not sent reinforcements during the combat, and timed them with a skill of which the Hungarian hero for once proved himself deficient?

The line of defence where Kmety's division was stationed was planned by General Williams. The way in which it was to be defended depended upon that officer's directions, and according to Kmety's own statement they were given in the following terms:—

“Hold Tahmasp as well as you can; if, in the event of an attack, you find it impossible to hold it, retire into Fort Lake, but on no account before the enemy shall have lost 2000 or 3000 men. Supports will be sent forward from the chief reserves in the town to Tchih Tabia, from Tchih Tabia to Fort Lake, and from Fort Lake to the plateau of Tahmasp.”

General Kmety did not comply with these orders strictly, for, by his rash act of “showing all his strength at first,” he left it out of his own power to retire upon Fort Lake, had that been essential. But General Williams strictly performed what was necessary according to the scheme laid down in these directions. “From Tchih Tabia to Fort Lake, and from Fort Lake to the plateau of Tahmasp,” troops were sent to reinforce those positions under the ever-watchful eye and ready hand of the muschir's adviser and the virtual commander-in-chief.

It is, perhaps, the shortest and simplest way for popular reading, to prove General Williams' comprehensive direction of affairs throughout the struggle, by quoting the words of the other officers engaged, written—not for the public, nor to meet the calumny of Kmety—but in the confidence of private friendship at the time, and when Kmety was in the habit of praising General Williams as a general and a hero! Colonel Lake thus writes:—“General Kmety, finding himself hard pressed, *now sent an aide-de-camp to me for assistance. I sent him a battalion of infantry, and four companies of picked men. On their way from ‘Fort Lake,’ they were joined by two more battalions sent up by General Williams from below.* The whole of them went gallantly forward, and put an end to the affair. They attacked the Russians on their left flank, and drove them down the hill in the greatest disorder, followed for some distance by our troops. The enemy's guns once turned round, unlimbered, and fired, and then finally retreated. Thus ended, I think I may say (as I was only a small actor in it), as decisive an affair as any one need wish to see.”

From this extract it is obvious that, but for the assistance rendered by Lake, according to the orders previously given him by General Williams, and also by the general more directly at the critical juncture, Kmety must have been crushed beneath the numbers of his assailants. No one, in reading his account of the battle, would suppose that Colonel Lake rendered any

important service, or that General Williams rendered any service at all. Kmety was, according to himself, all, and in all! He aims to create a vulgar prejudice that, because General Williams did not rush forth, and throw himself into one of the exposed batteries, his conduct was not that of a hero! How would it have been possible, if General Williams were in the Teesdale or Yuksek Tabias, that he could have chosen the time to send reinforcements to Kmety, or to Lake, or, in fact, do any act of a chief in command? He might have fought his own battery, and have left the muschir to bungle the general interests of the defence. What he did do was what good sense, duty, and honour dictated; he stood in the most central position of the defences, and issued his orders in every direction as the progress of the battle required. As before related, General Kolman acted as his chief of staff, and carried notes in pencil, by which orders were issued in every direction as they were required. General Kolman knows well that Sir William stood by his side during the battle, and issued his orders through him. Kmety and every other officer did his duty *at his post* to the best of his ability—the only failure which occurred among the European officers being on the part of Kmety himself, who not only showed his whole force at first, leaving himself without reserves, but threw himself forward to the defence of the right of the Tahmasp redoubt, although he admits in his pamphlet that it was on the left, which Hussein Pasha so fearlessly defended, that the chief danger lay. This is his own account of what he did, and why he did it:—“Although the force moving against Hussein Pasha was far greater than that against Rennison's lines, I remained to ward off the first blow against the latter, which were for the moment more exposed to danger than was Hussein Pasha. I took this course, first, because Rennison's lines, being simply a long line of breastwork, could be taken in rear; and, secondly, because the ground in front being more even, the affair must be more quickly decided, so as to leave me at liberty, if I should prove successful in beating the enemy back at this point, to concert with greater ease from hence some ulterior measures for disengaging Hussein Pasha; or, at the worst, Hussein Pasha could retire within the redoubt, and there prolong his defence, whereas, if Rennison's lines were carried, the greatest disorder would have reigned over the whole plateau of Tahmasp.”

The event did not justify his judgment; for his inability to give timely succour to Hussein Pasha nearly compromised the defence; and, but for the reinforcements sent by Lake and the general, the outflanking force of the Russians would have pressed forward from the

extreme left, achieving what amount of mischief it is impossible to say.

Captain Thompson, since no more, in a letter to a friend, October 3rd, a letter which no one could read without perceiving that he never intended it to come before the public, thus speaks of the English pasha in connection with this sanguinary day:—"I hope you think we did our duty; it was 'touch and go,'—but our fellows fought well, and will fight much better the next time. It was certainly a glorious victory, when you take into consideration the shocking difficulties we had to contend with. Our pasha (Williams) may well be proud."

What Captain Thompson says of General Williams is so mixed up with his admiration of Kmety, that the whole context must be read to perceive how these gallant soldiers really stood to one another before the intrigues of the English embassy at Constantinople threw their silken threads around the heart of Kmety:—"I am sorry to say the Turks (some of them) behaved badly, and bayoneted the wounded Russians; it was impossible to avoid it; we had but three English officers engaged, and we could not stop it. But all glory to dear old Kmety, who fought like a lion. *When he heard of the part I took in driving the Russians out of the English batteries, he rushed upon me and kissed me on both cheeks, calling me 'Mein Sohn! mein Sohn!'* and other very flattering epithets, which modesty forbids me to repeat. Dear old man! he has no wish for himself but to do something for the Turkey which saved him from the Russians after the Hungarian Revolution. He is one of the few remaining real Hungarian patriots, and I only wish I were Queen of England for one half hour, that I might reward him as he deserves. Directly after the action, our own brave general (Williams) came to where he was and said, '*General Kmety, I thank you in the name of the Queen of England for your gallantry and exertions on this day.*' Kmety told me privately, afterwards, that had he been presented with an English earldom and £20,000 per annum (a fabulous sum to him), he should not have been half so pleased. He was not touched, although in the hottest fire all the morning. His aide-de-camp was shot through the arm, but I hope it will be saved. I am sure the English government (or people) should do something for him. He is a gentleman! Although now serving on the half-pay of a colonel, many men who were in a very subordinate position two years ago are now his seniors in the service. He was selected from among them, however, to take the command of the first division in Kars, and nobly he has done his duty."

Let any person really desirous to test General Kmety's pretensions to candour, turn to his pamphlet after reading the above account of

his conduct to Captain Thompson, and mark the cold and slighting manner in which he speaks of his services. That Captain Thompson was a man of truth and honour no one doubts, and if his testimony as to the extravagant elation Kmety professed to feel at receiving the approval of General Williams is to be credited, what is to be thought of the same man when, sixteen months afterwards, he writes an account of the battle in which General Williams is not so much as mentioned? Even Major Teesdale, to whom he professed to be greatly attached, and whose conduct through the fight was most heroic, he condescendingly speaks of as a promising young officer. How different the generous and cordial spirit of the young officer to the veteran, whom he supposed to be his warm friend:—"We have now begun real work in earnest. The Russians are encamped at Zaim, and we daily, or indeed hourly, expect their nearer approach. The general has posted me on the hills above the town with the brave old Kmety, my dear friend and companion during the winter; and at present I am living in a little bell tent by the side of his. I have just returned from my first reconnaissance, and have had a peep at the Russian camp."

According to the despatch of General Williams, and the testimony of Colonel Lake, Mr. Churchill, the general's secretary, rendered most important services by taking direction of the 1-gun battery, which he worked with the skill of an artillery officer, and did great execution upon the enemy. General Kmety takes no notice of the courage, intelligence, and presence of mind of this civilian soldier, but sneers at him as a person of great use to General Williams in his civil capacity. This is a specimen of the spirit in which the Hungarian criticises every officer engaged, unless he be a Pole or a Hungarian.

All these men, English, Hungarian, Pole, German, Turk, and their Russian enemies also, covered themselves with whatever glory may cover men who in the discharge of duty show contempt of death; but the man whose presiding genius directed all within the assailed lines, and foiled the wily lieutenant of the czar, was William Fenwick Williams, whom history will ever name as the hero of Kars.

The following Russian account will be read with much interest; a different name is employed for the line of heights first assaulted, to that given to it by the British officers; but there will be no difficulty in identifying it. This brief relation of the general facts, coming from a Russian officer, is a very honourable testimony to Turkish valour, and the valour and science of the British, and other foreign officers:—"The main attack of our troops, which were put into motion on the night of the 28th

to 29th of September, with the entire storming apparatus from Tschirötlitschai, was directed against that point which is to Kars what the Malakoff, with the Korniloff Bastion, was to Sebastopol—viz., the Schorakh group of hills, with their enormously strong fortifications. The dark squares of our men moved like huge shadows silently and noiselessly over the plain. In the east at length a white streak announced the break of day, and a cold breeze came sweeping along. The action began on the Schorakh Heights, and it was here that Death gleaned the firstfruits of his harvest. General Maidel had received instructions to climb these heights, and to take the fortifications, let it cost what it might. He was closely followed by Generals Kovalevski and Prince Gagarin, with their storming columns; but a murderous cross-fire made such fearful gaps in our close masses, that even those who had got up high on the hill, aye, had even attained the edge of the fosse, were obliged to turn back. At this point, Kovalevski and Prince Gagarin were each of them hit by two balls, and General Maidel was first of all slightly and then seriously wounded. He also was obliged to leave the field. The officers were compelled to expose themselves so much in order to bring their columns through that fearful fire. Only Maidel's Caucasian battalions, under the command of Colonel Tachanoff, succeeded in penetrating into the fortified position of the Turks, and for a moment kept possession of it; but in vain were all their attempts to storm the central fortification from that point. It was in vain that a number of guns was brought up to their support; the fearful fire of the enemy prostrated both gunners and horses. The Caucasians endeavoured to hold their ground until the reserve under General Broniewski came to the assistance of their thinned ranks; but this general received a serious wound, and so did his successor in command, Colonel Ganeski. With a view to facilitate the storming, General Basin, who had joined the day previously, was ordered, in conjunction with General Baklanoff, to storm Tehakhmakh from the side opposite to us. He took three redoubts, together with twelve guns that they mounted, and eleven stand of colours and pennons, and for many hours held out against a murderous cross-fire of artillery, but without however, being able to advance any further. The Turks defended themselves most obstinately and undauntedly under cover of their works. A sultry day succeeded to the coolness of night. The struggle had already lasted five hours, and the men were exhausted. An exterminating cross-fire from the upper and lower rows of the fortress, lying one above the other like stairs, continued to devastate our infantry and artillery. At length it became necessary

to decide upon a retreat, else the army would have been entirely destroyed. This was executed in such a way that, by the skillful arrangements of General Kaufmann, all pursuit was made impossible to the Turks, who were already preparing for it. The failure of the attack is attributed to the loss of officers, but it is not to be denied that, nevertheless, our troops did their very utmost; but the Turks fought with an invincible obstinacy. At the calling over of the muster-roll in camp, more than a third, (some say a good half) were wanting of those who, the night before, had stood in the front before the storm began. The whole of the following day was occupied in collecting the killed and wounded, and we now stand in our former blockading position. Many officers who are only slightly wounded have remained in front, so as not to leave their regiments quite without officers, or merely under command of subalterns. The emperor's body regiment of Carabineers (Erivan) has suffered most of all; all its officers (thirty-two) have been either wounded or killed: the next is the Grand-duke Constantine regiment of Grenadiers, which has lost three commanders of battalions killed, while four other majors received wounds or contusions; in addition to them the regiment is minus twenty-eight officers killed and wounded."

On the evening of the battle General Williams wrote a brief despatch to the English foreign minister, announcing the victory, and recommending the English officers to his notice, in whose power it was to do so much to promote the advancement they so well merited. In that despatch General Williams greatly underrated the losses of his own army, and still more that of the enemy, for it was impossible so soon to estimate the full extent of the carnage. It is not necessary, therefore, to furnish the document, as in another despatch, dated October 3rd, the general transmitted an accurate and detailed account of the transactions and results of that sanguinary day:—

"Your lordship will perhaps recollect that in my despatch of the 28th of June I stated that the Russian general, after his second demonstration against the southern face of our intrenchments, which is flanked by Hafiz Pasha Tabia and Kanli Tabia, marched south, and established his camp at Bugah Tikmé, a village situated about four miles from Kars. Knowing that General Mouravieff served in the army which took Kars in 1828, I conceived his last manœuvre to be preparatory either to a reconnaissance, or an attack upon the heights of Tahmasp, whence the Russians successfully pushed their approaches in the year above cited.

"While, therefore, the enemy's columns were in their march towards Bugah Tikmé, I

visited those heights with Lieutenant-colonel Lake, and, after studying the ground, decided upon the nature of the works to be thrown up; these were planned and executed by Lieutenant-colonel Lake with great skill and energy. I inclose for your lordship's information a plan made by that officer of the town and its neighbouring heights, which are situated on the opposite side of the river of Kars-chai, over which three temporary bridges had been thrown to keep up our communications. As all verbal descriptions or bird's-eye views of ground convey but an imperfect idea of any locality, I beg to inclose a sketch made by Mr. Churchill, which will, I trust, tend to elucidate my description.

"Your lordship will observe that, while our camp and magazines in the town were rendered as safe as circumstances would allow, the hills above Kars commanded all, and were, therefore, the keys of our position. The intrenchments of Tahmasp, being those nearest the enemy's camp, demanded the greatest vigilance from all intrusted with their defence. General Kmety, a gallant Hungarian officer, commanded the division which occupied this eminence; he was assisted by Major-general Hussein Pasha, and my aide-de-camp, Major Teesdale, who has acted as his chief of the staff.

"Throughout the investment, which has now lasted four months, the troops in all the redoubts and intrenchments have kept a vigilant look-out during the night, and, at their appointed stations, stood to their arms long before day-dawn. In my despatch of the 29th ult., I informed your lordship of the arrival of the news of the fall of Sebastopol, and of the landing of Omar Pasha at Batoum. I also acquainted your lordship with the fact that the Russian general was engaged in sending off immense trains of heavy baggage into Georgia, and showing every indication of a speedy retreat. This in nowise threw us off our guard, and Lieutenant-colonel Lake was directed to strengthen many points in our extensive and undermanned lines, and among other works the tabia bearing my name was constructed.

"At four o'clock, on the eventful morning of the 29th, the enemy's columns were reported to be advancing on the Tahmasp front. They were three in number, supported by 24 guns; the first, or right column being directed on Tahmasp Tabia, the second on Yuksek Tabia, and the third on the breastwork called Ren-nison Lines. As soon as the first gun announced the approach of the enemy, the reserves were put under arms in a central position, from which succours could be dispatched either to Tahmasp or the English lines. The mist and imperfect light of the dawning day induced the enemy to believe that he was about to surprise us; he advanced

with his usual steadiness and intrepidity, but on getting within range he was saluted with a crushing fire of artillery from all points of the lines. This unexpected reception, however, only drew forth loud hurrahs from the Russian infantry as it rushed up the hill on the redoubts and breastworks. These works poured forth a fire of musketry and rifles, which told with fearful effects on the close columns of attack; more especially on the left one, which, being opposed by a battalion of 450 Chasseurs, armed with Minié rifles, was, after long and desperate fighting, completely broken, and sent headlong down the hill, leaving 850 dead on the field, besides those carried off by their comrades. The central column precipitated itself on the redoubts of Tahmasp and Yuksek Tabias, where desperate fighting occurred, and lasted for several hours, the enemy being repulsed in all his attempts to enter the closed redoubts, which mutually flanked each other with their artillery and musketry, and made terrible havoc in the ranks of the assailants; and it was here that Generals Kmety and Hussein Pasha, together with Major Teesdale, so conspicuously displayed their courage and conduct. Lieutenant-general Kerim Pasha also repaired to the scene of desperate strife to encourage the troops, and was wounded in the shoulder, and had two horses killed under him. The right column of the Russian infantry, supported by a battery, eventually turned the left flank of the intrenched wing of the Tahmasp defences, and while the Russian battery opened in the rear of the closed redoubt at its salient angle, their infantry penetrated considerably behind our position.

"Observing the commencement of this movement, and anticipating its consequences, Lieutenant-colonel Lake, who had taken the direction of affairs in the English tabias, was instructed to send a battalion from Fort Lake to the assistance of the defenders of Tahmasp, and at the same time two battalions of the reserves were moved across the flying bridge and upon the rocky height of Laz Jeppé Tabia. These three reinforcing columns met each other at that point, and, being hidden from the enemy by the rocky nature of the ground, confronted him at a most opportune moment. They deployed and opened their fire, which stopped and soon drove back the enemy's reserves, which were then vigorously charged with the bayonet, at the same moment when General Kmety and Major Teesdale issued from the redoubts at Tahmasp, and charged the assailants. The whole of that portion of the enemy's infantry and artillery now broke, and fled down the heights under a murderous fire of musketry. This occurred at half-past eleven, after a combat of seven hours. In this part of the field the enemy had, including his reserves,

twenty-two battalions of infantry, a large force of dragoons and Cossacks, together with thirty-two guns.

"While this struggle, which I have attempted to describe, was occurring at Tahmasp, a most severe combat was going on at the eastern position of the line, called the English tabias. About half-past 5 A.M., a Russian column, consisting of eight battalions of infantry, three regiments of cavalry, and sixteen guns, advanced from the valley of Tchakmask, and assaulted those small redoubts, which, after as stout a resistance as their unavoidably feeble garrisons could oppose, fell into their hands, together with the connecting breastworks, defended by townsmen and mountaineers from Lazistan, whose clannish flags, according to their custom, were planted before them on the epaulments, and consequently fell into the enemy's hands; but, ere the firing had begun in this portion of the field, Captain Thompson had received orders to send a battalion of infantry from each of the heights of Kara-dagh and Arab Tabia to reinforce the English lines. This reinforcement descended the deep gully through which flows the Kars River, passed a bridge recently thrown across it, and ascended the opposite precipitous bank by a zigzag path which led into the line of works named by the Turks 'Ingliz tabias' (the English batteries). Their arrival was as opportune as that of the reserves directed towards Tahmasp, which I have had the honour to describe in the former part of this despatch. These battalions, joined by those directed by Lieutenant-colonel Lake, gallantly attacked and drove the Russians out of the redoubts at the point of the bayonet, after the artillery of the enemy had been driven from those lines by the cross-fire directed from Fort Lake and from Arab Tabia and Kara-dagh, by Captain Thompson. This officer deserves my best thanks for having seized a favourable moment to remove a heavy gun from the eastern to the western extremity of Kara-dagh, and with it inflicted severe loss on the enemy.

"After the Russian infantry was driven from the English redoubts, the whole of the attacking force of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, retreated with precipitation, plied with round-shot from all the batteries bearing on their columns. During their temporary success, however, the enemy captured two of our light guns, which the mortality among our horses from famine prevented our withdrawing from their advanced position. He also carried

off his wounded and many of his dead; yet he left 363 of the latter within and in front of these intrenchments, and his retreat occurred at least an hour before the assailants of Tahmasp were put to flight. During this combat, which lasted nearly seven hours, the Turkish infantry, as well as artillery, fought with the most determined courage; and when it is recollected that they had worked on their intrenchments, and guarded them by night throughout a period extending to nearly four months, I think your lordship will admit they have proved themselves worthy of the admiration of Europe, and established an undoubted claim to be placed among the most distinguished of its troops.

"With regard to the enemy, as long as there was a chance of success, he persevered with undaunted courage, and the Russian officers displayed the greatest gallantry. Their loss was immense; they left on the field more than 5000 dead, which it took the Turkish infantry four days to bury. Their wounded and prisoners in our possession amount to 160, while those who were carried off are said to be upwards of 7000.

"As the garrison was afflicted with cholera, and I was apprehensive of a great increase of the malady, should this melancholy duty of the burial of the dead be not pushed forward with every possible vigour by our fatigued and jaded soldiers, I daily visited the scene of strife to encourage them in their almost endless task; and I can assure your lordship that the whole battle-field presented a scene which is more easy to conceive than to describe, being literally covered with the dead and dying.

"The Turkish dead and wounded were removed on the night of the battle. The dead numbered 362; the wounded 631. The townsmen, who also fought with spirit, lost 101 men.

"His excellency the muschir has reported to his government those officers who particularly distinguished themselves—a difficult task in an army which has shown such a desperate valour throughout the unusual period of seven hours of uninterrupted combat."

Such are the facts connected with one of the most sanguinary battles ever recorded; but it did not decide the fate of Kars; valour within was ultimately defeated by treachery without, and Kars and her brave garrison were doomed to obtain more generous consideration and more honourable treatment from the foe thus terribly chastised than from the ostensible friends too confidently trusted.

CHAPTER CV.

BLOCKADE OF KARS CONTINUED.—SUFFERINGS OF THE GARRISON AND CITIZENS.—HOPES OF RELIEF DISAPPOINTED.—CAPITULATION.

“Has hope, like the bird in the story,
Which flitted from tree to tree
With the talisman's glittering glory—
Has hope been that bird to thee?”—MOORE.

AFTER the battle both armies were much exhausted. The infantry of Mouravieff had suffered dreadfully; nor did his splendid and numerous cavalry altogether escape. Such as came into action were as much cut up as the infantry. The army of General Williams was not in a condition to undertake any active operations, and therefore the blockade quietly assumed its previous form. General Kmety has hazarded the opinion that it was in General Williams' power to have struck a severe blow against the Russians had he been sufficiently vigilant and active! However strange such language may sound concerning General Williams, that we do not misrepresent General Kmety the following extract from his treatise on the battle of Kars will prove:—“The Turkish army, profiting by the enthusiasm which prevailed, and taking advantage of the inequalities of the ground and the darkness which reigned during the early part of the night before the rising of the moon, should have undertaken an attack on the night after the victory by several light movable columns, directed from different sides upon Ainali, to surprise the enemy's troops, which, some 3000 or 4000 strong, after having been beaten back from the Ingiliz tabias, had retired to that village, and were there encamped. This camp was distant more than four hours' march from the main camp at the enemy's head-quarters near Tchivilli Kaya, whereas it was only one hour and a half distant from us. The enemy's troops echeloned between these two camps had been withdrawn immediately after the battle to his head-quarter camp; no support, therefore, could have come to Ainali for four hours. The want of horses for our artillery is no excuse, for by night, and on broken ground, we required no guns, and we had three battalions of rifles. The usual order and discipline could not have reigned in the enemy's camp after so bloody a day, on which so many of his superior officers had fallen, and encumbered, as it must have been, with wounded. Moreover, we were elated by success, whilst the enemy was correspondingly depressed. According to the information in the hands of the defenders, the enemy's total effective force round Kars, after deducting his losses in the battle, was believed not to exceed some 15,000 infantry and 10,000 or 12,000 cavalry, including the troops at Ainali. The

effective force of the defenders at this time within the intrenched camp might have been some 17,000 or 18,000 men, of whom, as will have been seen by the recital of the battle, a considerable portion had not been engaged. The defenders were not half so much fatigued as the enemy, the whole of whose infantry must have been in movement throughout the preceding night. By dispersing the camp at Ainali, the victory would have been utilised, and the least result would have been that the enemy would not have had sufficient force to continue his blockade, shutting us up within a circumference of ten hours' march. By omitting this enterprise, the glorious victory remained unfruitful as to any result it had upon the war, as must be the case with all victories which are not, as General Clausewitz says, ‘immediately used in the military household.’ The general in command of the Russian army underrated his foe, whereas the general in command of the Turkish army overrated his.” Of course the general in command of the Turkish army was the *muschir*, but virtually that army was commanded by General Williams, and this shot was levelled solely at him. It is difficult to be persuaded that Kmety seriously meant all he wrote, unless we accept a different estimate of his generalship to that which we desire to hold. Kmety can hardly have been so far blinded by envy, or such influences as Beicos afforded so much scope for, as to believe that it was in the power of General Williams, even with the *muschir*'s concurrence, to adopt such a course as the Hungarian general represents as having been feasible. The Russian camp at Ainali was not one of easy access; it was situated on an elevation, the ascent to which was steep and precipitous. It was not possible for General Williams, even if his troops had been fresh, to take the camp at Ainali by a *coup de main*, and before he could have made any impression the Russian artillery and cavalry would have been thrown forward in their whole force, for cavalry could have operated efficiently upon the ground. Kmety represents only a portion of the Turkish troops as having been engaged in the battle. It is certainly true that they were not all actively concerned in the conflict of the 29th, but all had been exhausted either by combat, watching, or working in the intrenchments, and were in no condition to at-

tempt the camp at Ainali. If Williams had succeeded, there can be no doubt that the next day Mouravieff would have retaken the post, and no advantage whatever would have accrued to the garrison of Kars. If, however, this had been a fault of General Williams, it is strange that Kmety took so long a time to find it out. Why did he not suggest it? his rank entitled him to do so. But if he had done so, and that the matter was as certainly against the English general as it is in his favour, the last man in the world entitled to come forth as the censor of the British commissioner was Kmety. What the conduct of Williams was to him let Kmety's own words bear witness; they are addressed to the commissioner:—"On your arrival at Kars in the autumn of 1854 you relieved me from the outpost duties, which had been intrusted to me with the irregular corps during nine months, without the intermission of a single day, and in which my strength and constitution had necessarily suffered severely. You placed me, at my request, in command of a division of the army, and you supported the exercise of my authority in that position with all the weight of an influence such as no other European officer ever enjoyed in this country. At length, when the word 'Surrender' was uttered for the first time, you enabled me to leave the beleaguered garrison on grounds personal to myself. For all this my acknowledgments are due, and far be it from me to withhold them."

It need scarcely be said that these acknowledgments, although far beneath what is due by Kmety to Williams, are simply made to give an air of candour to his aspersions, and so to point the shaft of his envy. The facts were, that Kmety, while at Kars, wrote to Erzerum, entreating General Williams to go to the former city, and representing it as a *sine quâ non* to the success of the defence. Then and afterwards, his protestations of respect and gratitude to the commissioner were boundless, and well they might be; Williams used every influence he possessed to secure justice for the gallant Hungarian from the Turkish government, and to save him from the consequences of neglect on the part of the British ambassador. That he did so sincerely, the following despatch of the commissioner shows, and, happily, his generous efforts were attended by success. The letter was addressed to Lord Clarendon on February 13th, 1855, and was one of the first acts of friendship performed by Sir William to his ungrateful protégé:—

"I beg to bring to the especial notice of your excellency the services rendered by Ismail Pasha (General Kmety) to this army, prior and subsequently to my arrival at its headquarters. At the battle of Inje-Dereh he was

one of the few who endeavoured, by personal bravery, to encourage the soldiers when abandoned by their officers. Since that battle, General Kmety kept the outposts, and was the eye of the army until it went into winter quarters; and he is still the officer in charge of the advanced posts of Kars.

"In despite of these services, General Kmety does not receive the pay due to his rank of *ferik*, nor has he had a decoration accorded to him for his personal gallantry. I trust, however, that through your excellency's influence both these claims will be attended to at the *seraskierat*; he is one of those men who abstain from complaints or intrigues, and I make this appeal in his favour without a request on his part."

The last act of friendship performed by Sir William to General Kmety was in keeping with the first; the relation of which we shall anticipate here, so as to require hereafter only a passing notice. When, eventually, Kars was about to be surrendered, and the Hungarian very properly preferred flight to falling into the hands of the Russians, Williams handed him his purse containing all he had except one guinea, which he afterwards added, and went himself a prisoner penniless into the Russian camp. Few men who wear the uniform of a soldier of any nation could turn upon the hand of a benefactor who had thus nobly acted.

After the battle of the 29th, Mouravieff did not abandon his purpose of reducing the garrison by hunger, and General Williams looked forth eagerly for help, which was promised from various quarters, but sent by none. At one time the garrison was sure of an effectual diversion by Omar Pasha; at another they expected direct help from Erzerum, by the hand of Selim Pasha; then rumours of a landing of allied troops at Trebizond, or Batoum, would insinuate their influence within the circle of the defence; but all proved deceptive—like "the bird in the story, which flitted from tree to tree," hope displayed her talisman only to dazzle, allure, and disappoint. The cholera, of which there was a temporary cessation, probably, as Dr. Sandwith thought, from the intensity of the emotion which prevailed, reappeared with increased fury, and the hospitals were filled; so that while the men-at-arms desired another battle, in the expectation of inflicting upon the enemy more signal defeat, the doctor dreaded it, lest he should be unable to tend the wounded in addition to the sick. The privations to which citizens and soldiers were now exposed may be inferred from the distribution of food, which amounted per day to eleven ounces of bread, and soup which contained only a little more than an ounce and two-thirds of nutri-

tious matter. On the 7th of October, the state of things was truly horrible; the irregular Lazistan soldiers had, in many instances, crept into houses from which the citizens had been removed by death, and were found dead there of hunger or of the pestilence. The people and the troops died very fast; so that the responsibility of General Williams was sufficient to appal the bravest heart that ever beat within an English breast. During the night a thunderstorm burst over the city; houses, soldiers, and inhabitants were struck by the electric fluid, adding another dreadful feature to the aspect of prevailing horrors. It seemed as if the hand of some avenging angel had poured a vial of wrath over the suffering city.

The next day, while mourning and desolation reigned around, a peasant made his way into the city, and revived the desponding hopes of all by the announcement—alas, untrue!—that Omar Pasha was near to Akhiska. On the 12th of October, General Williams addressed Lord Clarendon, referring to the obstinacy of Mouravieff, notwithstanding his defeat:—

“He still blockades us closely, and the erection of huts in his camp this morning shows that he intends to continue this course.

“He knows that all our cavalry horses, and the great majority of the artillery horses, are dead of starvation, and that we cannot take the field; he is also aware that cholera inflicts severe losses on us, which are aggravated by the difficulty we have of burying the horses.

“Under these circumstances I address these few lines to your lordship, with a hope that such representations may be instantly made to General Omar to act with vigour and decision against Georgia; otherwise, in spite of our brilliant victory, we must ultimately fall into the enemy’s hands.”

Consul Brant informed Lord Clarendon that he was “greatly disappointed that, notwithstanding the arrival of Omar Pasha in Georgia, and the terrible defeat of the Russian army on the 29th of September, General Mouravieff has not withdrawn within the Georgian frontier, and can only attribute this to his conviction that Omar Pasha will not march on Tiflis this winter, and the certainty that the Kars army cannot molest him, because it has no horses for its artillery, and no cavalry, and therefore must of necessity remain within its intrenchments.”

On the 13th the often-revived hopes of the garrison again flickered into fitful life, by intelligence concerning Omar Pasha. A villager entered the lines, and stated that it was known through the country that Omar had taken Kutais, and was marching on Akhiska! Omar’s name was an *ignis fatuus*; his expedition was much in character with the wayward

appearances of that natural phenomenon. Lord Stratford wrote the same day from Constantinople to his government:—

“In answer to my inquiries at the Porte, I am assured that nothing further has been received from Omar Pasha; that the passage of troops and the conveyance of provisions are in progress, though slowly, in consequence of the limited command of transport for those purposes.

“It is impossible not to apprehend that the many changes of plan, the exigencies of our operations at Sebastopol, and heavy demands on the transport service, concur to diminish the hope of relieving Kars.

“In reply to my earnest solicitations that a peremptory order should be immediately sent to the commanders at or near Erzerum to attempt the introduction of provisions into Kars at every risk, I am assured by the scraskier that orders to that effect are already on the road.”

It is more than probable that “peremptory orders” were sent to “the commanders at or near Erzerum;” but they were of a nature the opposite to that which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe mentions. Selim Pasha, who commanded there, never intended to do anything for the relief of Kars, any more than Omar Pasha. To ruin the English pasha, and check the interference of English officers, was, in the opinion of the pashas, true patriotism, which harmonised with what they conceived to be their own interests.

The columns of the *Nord*, the *Northern Bee*, and the *Invalide Russe*, at that time represented the condition of Kars as hopeless, and ridiculed the idea of help from Omar or from Selim, which showed that Mouravieff knew well with whom he had to do, and gave his government correct information. The 14th brought another report about the wandering Omar; he was then represented as unable to reach Akhiska, and as having marched direct upon Tiflis. By the 17th the cholera began to abate, after having carried away 1000 of the troops, and a much larger number of the townspeople. Starvation became imminent, and but for the ingenuity of General Williams and his talented secretary, Mr. Churchill, the garrison would have been compelled to surrender. By various stratagems, the store of food was eked out, and the unflinching English pasha held firmly by his post. Still he turned with anxious heart and hope towards Erzerum, and towards Omar Pasha. At last the pangs of hunger became unendurable; grass was torn up wherever it appeared, that the soldiers and people might feed upon the roots. Around the lines flocks of vultures hovered, contending with the dogs of the city for the corpses

scratched by the latter from the shallow graves. On the night of the 21st about sixty Lazistans attempted to fight their way through the Russian circle of pickets; half the number were slain, the rest, many of whom were wounded, escaped to the hills. Still desertions continued; some of the deserters were slain by the enemy; others were arrested, and shot by order of drum-head court-martial. Some corn was found buried deep under the houses; and onions were occasionally smuggled in by the peasants.

On the 22nd and 24th tidings arrived calculated to cheer the garrison; but ended, like their predecessors, in delusion. Dr. Sandwith relates these particulars in these terms:—

"October 22nd.—Glorious news arrives, and, like a gleam of sunshine, raises our drooping spirits. We hear that Selim Pasha has landed at Trebizond, with an army of 20,000 men, and that he is marching straight on to Erzerum. We now feel confident of being relieved, since the road from Trebizond, although a difficult one, is, nevertheless, quite practicable for an army. All the artillery and siege-guns now existing in Erzerum and Kars have been conveyed by that route. During times of peace, too, an army of muleteers, with the whole western commerce of Persia, passes to and fro; and the land, in consequence, is largely cultivated for corn and barley. Besides this good tidings, we hear that Omar Pasha has taken Kutais, and is marching straight for Tiflis.

"October 24th.—A peasant who has found his way into camp from Erzerum, having been eight days on the road, brings confirmation of the fact of Selim Pasha's advanced guard being at Baiburt."

Nothing was farther from Selim's thoughts than any attempt to relieve Kars, or assist the English pasha in any way whatever. In this way October closed; nothing done, or sincerely attempted, for the relief of Kars. Some of the English officers who were attached to Omar Pasha's army, in their zeal to serve him, have also taken part with Selim, and written letters to the English newspapers, declaring that if Selim had marched his forces against Mouravieff, the Turkish general and his army would have been annihilated. It was not, however, expected that Selim should fight a battle with Mouravieff, upon which the fate of Kars was to depend; but that he would so operate as to compel the Russian chief to concentrate a large portion of his forces to oppose Selim, and thus leave an opportunity for throwing provisions into the town, of which there were still stores at Olti; but Selim would not stir; his object was that of Omar, and of the seraskier at Constantinople, and of the whole tribe of corrupt pashas whose peculations had been stopped by

the English general; that object was his political destruction, which the fall of Kars would, they supposed, secure. To this end it became necessary to encourage General Williams to hold out, under promises of immediate succour, until his army should become so exhausted that they could not effect a retreat in co-operation with any relieving force that might manœuvre for that purpose. The English reader may judge of the mode in which this infamous scheme was carried out by the following extract from the journal of Dr. Sandwith, written on the last day of October:—

"October 31st.—A post comes in this morning from Selim Pasha, who is already at Erzerum with his advanced guard, awaiting the arrival of his other troops. At Baiburt, he says, his soldiers loudly demanded to be led on to the relief of their comrades by forced marches. He does not give the number of his army, lest his despatch should be read by the Russians; but he tells us his troops are numerous and first-rate. We have now but to wait for a fortnight, and our relief is certain."

Had Selim shown as much honesty and courage as he displayed capacity for treachery and intrigue, Kars would have been saved.

At the close of October Colonel Lake wrote to his friends as follows:—"To-day we have news that an army has arrived at Erzerum, and will march instantly to our succour. God grant it may be so, and that we may be able to attack the enemy in the open. We are totally unable to extricate ourselves without assistance of some kind. Our great object now is to keep up the spirits of the troops, and hitherto we have succeeded tolerably well. I cannot at all make out why Mouravieff has not sent in all our private letters, and can only conclude that politics were touched upon in some of them. I suppose they have been the round of all the Russian camps, and I hope the readers have been edified. I have still, as I have always had, a presentiment that we shall finish this campaign gloriously. We have assuredly learnt to place our entire trust and confidence in Him who never deserts those who do so, for we have received not the very smallest atom of assistance from man. We have been left as a ship about to founder, which it is considered impossible to save, and therefore useless making any attempt to do so. The world may judge hereafter, when all is known, how far we have been well treated. As Omar Pasha has not thought proper to come direct to our assistance, his coming at all has been of no kind of use to us. Whether he is to blame for this or not, time will show. I shall write again when a post goes; but I almost despair of our getting one either out or in. We are expecting a fall of snow every

day; but we have no longer the same piercing cold wind which we had a week ago. No more cholera, I am thankful to say; it was very severe while it lasted."

November opened gloomily for the garrison of Kars; the second day twenty soldiers were brought to the hospital under the influence of poison, caused by eating the roots of *Hyoseyanus Niger*, which they had devoured while grubbing up the roots of grass. The cases were not mortal.

On the 3rd the enemy, in considerable strength, entered the village of Shorak, beneath the Tahmasp Batteries, with the object of removing the timber of the houses for firewood. Three heavy guns opened upon them, by which they were driven out, carrying away their wounded, and leaving twenty slain behind them.

Mouravieff despaired of reducing the town, and would have raised the siege; but certain Armenian fanatics corresponded with him, and encouraged him to remain; several of these were detected and hanged. On the person of one of them was a letter to the Russian general, in which was written, "Wait a little longer; the troops are starving; the pashas are fighting among themselves; they will soon capitulate." General Williams had placed too much confidence in the professions of loyalty made by the Greeks and Armenians, who, except in rare cases, favoured Russia, in the hope of advancing their religious ascendancy by her power.

The discovery at the beginning of November of a large depot of coffee and sugar, tended to revive the drooping spirits of those upon whom the responsibility of feeding troops and people devolved. A few of the remaining horses, unfit for carriage, were slaughtered, to make horse-broth for the hospitals, which was the means of restoring many of the famishing invalids. These supplies only lasted a short time, and the children began to die very fast for want of nourishment; many women also perished, and it was no uncommon thing to see a corpse at intervals in passing from post to post.

On the 3rd of November General Williams communicated with Consul Brant, urging him to send copies of his letter to Lord Clarendon, Lord Stratford, and Sir James Simpson:—

"I have told the English officers to join Selim and Veli Pashas in their advance. The enemy came to-day with twelve battalions and two batteries, and 500 carts, to destroy the village of Shorak, and carry off the wood of the houses. He was driven off by our artillery with loss; he set fire to it and withdrew. Urge on the relieving army, and also increased activity in sending troops from Constantinople. The enemy has struck his tents and hutted his army. The village of Shorak was under the Tahmasp Tabia, and the danger of the enemy's

attempt, and his want of wood, either for firing or for sheltering his troops, may be guessed by the large force employed. The troops expected to join Selim Pasha are very slow in their movements; although the muschir declares he has notice of their embarkation at Constantinople from the seraskier pasha, no information of their arrival at Trebizond has been received. The Russians hutting their troops indicates the severe cold in tents, and, possibly, either their wish to be prepared for a hasty retreat, or their determination to remain where they are for a longer period. It would be difficult to divine their true motive, but I would fain hope it may not be the last, for if so the garrison will eventually be forced to yield to famine. The season has singularly favoured the Russians by the snow and bad weather coming so late this year; but I think it cannot be delayed, under any circumstances, beyond the end of this month."

While thus sternly placing the realities of his dreadful situation before the proper official persons, it is astonishing to find with what buoyant courage he addressed his private friends:—"We hope to see Selim and Veli Pashas soon, with a succouring force from Erzerum, but have not heard from Omar Pasha for seven weeks. The enemy has taken down his tents and hutted himself; the nights are now getting frosty and biting. I hope we shall yet bother Mouravieff; but depend upon one thing, we will stick to our posts like 'bricks.' We want *cheers* from England, *hatred* from Russia, but *pity* from no one. There is not a long face at my table, we trust in Providence. All our recent posts have been captured by the enemy—I mean those from Erzerum and England; and we are consequently in utter darkness as to political and domestic intelligence. If snow falls it will greatly embarrass the enemy; but, at the same time, interfere with the advance of our succouring armies. Let the worst come, we have saved Asia, for no army can, at this season, advance towards the south without imminent risk of being buried in snow."

On the 10th of November Consul Brant received a communication from the muschir, ordering peremptorily the pashas at Erzerum to advance:—"Our affairs are desperate. Let Selim Pasha's force, with that of Veli Pasha, excepting those intended to garrison the forts of Erzerum, march upon Kars immediately. Let Mehemet Pasha seize and put at the disposal of the military pashas the whole land carriage of the country. If Selim Pasha has not arrived, let Tahir Pasha send him an express instantly with this message."

After every means by which his courage could be roused, or his shame awakened, or his soldierly generosity touched, had been used

with Selim by Consul Brant, Majors Stuart and Peel, and Captain Cameron, he reluctantly fixed upon the 13th for his departure. It is evident that he never intended to keep this promise, for on the 18th of November Consul Brant wrote to Lord Stratford as follows:—

“I have the honour to inform your excellency that a peasant from Kars brought me to-day a few lines from General Williams, of the 12th. The general evidently seems to be in the belief that Selim Pasha has received the troops promised, of whose arrival at Trebizond, however, we have heard nothing, and his excellency has requested both Major Stuart and myself to entreat your excellency to hasten their expedition. A colonel arrived with a long letter from his excellency Vassif Pasha to Selim Pasha. The precise contents of this letter I do not know, but the object was to urge on his excellency to the relief of the garrison. Selim Pasha inspected his troops yesterday, and they mustered between 5000 and 6000 infantry; most of the cavalry were on duty at the outposts; they will amount to nearly 2000, chiefly regulars, and besides these, they could collect 1500 or 2000 Bashi-bazouks, if not more. The troops are in good health, well armed and clothed, and have lately received four months' pay, and I have no hesitation in saying that such a force under an active and brave general could relieve Kars; but I have seen enough of Selim Pasha to have discovered that he is neither active, nor energetic, nor brave, and I have long feared that he would not advance. He has a new excuse for delay every day; to-day it was, that he must wait a change of weather. It is much finer than we had any reason to expect at this season, beautifully clear, though a little cold at night, and I can only say that as finer weather cannot be expected before next summer, it is evident his excellency will not leave Erzerum. . . . The Russians cannot have many troops before Kars, I should think not more than 22,000, and they are discouraged, and have no heart to fight; but in the camp it is said that General Mouravieff is of so obstinate a character that he will never abandon the siege, even though he should risk his own life and the destruction of his whole army by a desperate assault, or by frost or famine. He has put his troops into huts, which are well constructed, and having plenty of firewood, they can stand the frost for some time yet, and too long, alas! for the safety of the garrison at Kars, which in the last extremity can do nothing but surrender; for, without cavalry, and without horses for their guns, they could never, I imagine, cut their way through the enemy, who is still superior in numbers, taking into account his numerous cavalry and artillery.

Omar Pasha is too slow in his movements to hope anything from him. About twelve days ago his excellency was still on the coast, and, although he had gained a victory, I suppose he will require time before he can resume his advance.”

The day after the consul thus wrote to the ambassador, General Williams addressed the following affecting letter to the former:—

“Tell Lords Clarendon and Redcliffe that the Russian army is huddled now, and takes no notice of either Omar or Selim Pashas. They cannot have acted as they ought to have done. We divide our bread with the starving townspeople. No animal food for seven weeks. I kill horses in my stable secretly, and send the meat to the hospital, which is now very crowded. We can hold out, and try to retreat over the mountains *via* Olti. Have provisions sent in that direction ere the 18th day after this date. We shall carry three days' biscuit with us.”

In the meantime the cry of distress rose high in Kars, and many desertions took place. These were, however, for the purpose of escaping into the country, seldom with the intent of joining the enemy. Selim continued to send lying despatches to the muschir, averring the certainty of speedy succour, while he was making excuses for not moving, to Consul Brant and Majors Stuart and Peel. The following entry in Dr. Sandwith's journal confirms this view of Selim's behaviour:—

“November 12th.—Colonel Lake, who has been on duty all night, comes into my room early this morning to thaw himself. He brings good news. A despatch has arrived from Selim Pasha himself, addressed to the muschir, which announces that his advanced guard has defeated a Russian *corps d'armée* sent from Bayazid to check his advance, and that he is marching straight for Kars. No more details appear. We calculate that he must be near *Vezin Kale*, and is about three days' march from us. This good news puts us in high spirits.

“November 16th.—A report comes in this morning at daybreak that guns have been heard in the direction of Ardahan, and that the Russians are leaving their camp. A thick fog lies between our camp and theirs, increasing the suspense. The people of Kars are called under arms, and scouts are sent out to see what occurs. Meantime a thrill of joy and excitement runs through the population at the idea of the near approach of a succouring army. These hopes are, however, doomed to disappointment—the report is a false one.”

A sortie in conjunction with an advance by Selim Pasha was prepared, and the troops, weak with hunger, rallied immediately at the prospect of battle, but no force with which to form such a combination appeared.

The prejudices of the people against the flesh of horses or asses caused the loss of many lives from famine while yet those animals might have been slaughtered for food: at last, even these prejudices gave way before the cravings of hunger, and buried animals were dug up and eaten.

On the 20th of November the possibility of a retreat across the mountains was discussed; but there were no horses, nor were the men equal to a march of more than a few miles; 2000 soldiers were in hospital, and if it had been possible to move, there were no means of bringing up artillery. Twelve thousand Russian cavalry would have made quick havoc of such a retreating army.

On the 21st a fall of snow indicated the approach of the stern winter of that climate, and the soldiers lay dying and dead from cold and hunger in every part of the camp. On this day General Williams wrote his last letter from Kars, which was to Consul Brant, requesting him to send no more written communications, as the blockade was so close that they were sure to fall into the hands of the Russians.

On the 23rd, before dawn, the Russians threw shells into the camp near Kanli Tabia. The troops were called to arms, but only six or seven men were able to respond. Dr. Sandwith declared that twenty Russian soldiers might have taken any of the batteries had they known the helpless condition of their defenders. At six o'clock that morning a despatch was received from Selim Pasha, who had the cold-blooded perfidy and cruelty to make false representations concerning assistance, deceiving his superior officer and the garrison even in the misery which he knew they endured. Selim sent word that he was to have "left Erzerum for Kars on the 16th, and would hasten on." A little note in cipher from Consul Brant was borne by the same messenger, which flatly and truthfully contradicted this deceptive communication. Mr. Brant's note was in these terms:—"Selim Pasha went advance, although Major Stuart is doing his utmost to make him. Omar Pasha has not advanced far from Suchum Kaleh. I fear you have no hope but in yourselves; you can depend on no help in this quarter."

This communication decided the fate of Kars. On the 24th General Williams called the pashas and British officers together, and informed them of the message which he had received. They unanimously declared that retreat or further resistance were alike impossible, and the general sent his aide-de-camp, Colonel Teesdale, with a flag of truce, to the Russian commander, to request an interview on the next day for the purpose of negotiating terms of capitulation.

Before this was undertaken, it was deemed necessary to provide for the safety of Kmety and Kolman by other means, for the Russians might hand them over to Austria. As recorded in a former page, General Williams gave to the Hungarian his last guinea, and he and Kolman sallied forth to cut their way through the Russian lines. On the 27th they arrived at Erzerum; and Consul Brant, in his despatch, thus represented the account which Kmety gave of these transactions:—

"When General Williams learnt on the 23rd, by a communication from Consul Brant, that Selim Pasha would not advance, he saw that all hope had vanished. The soldiers were dying by 100 a day of famine. They were mere skeletons, and were incapable of fighting or flying. The women brought their children to the general's house for food, and there they left them, and the city was strewn with dead and dying. Under these circumstances, the general called together all the pashas, and asked them if they thought their soldiers could resist longer, or could possibly retreat. They all declared either an impossibility. The next day General Williams sent Major Teesdale, at 2 p.m., to General Mouravieff's camp, to ask him to appoint an hour the following day for an interview, to treat for a surrender. At sunset Major Teesdale had not returned, and General Kmety and General Kolman left with a guard of Kurds to cut their way through the Russian patrols. They passed several, and at last were stopped by one, and separated, and it was twenty-four hours before they rejoined each other, and in three days and nights they reached this in safety. General Kmety does not know more than above-stated as to terms, but he says the garrison being in so distressed a state it must submit to any conditions General Mouravieff chooses to dictate."

It will be recollected by the reader that Major Stuart, Major Peel, and Captain Cameron, were attached to the troops under the command of Selim. Upon the surrender of Kars, Major Stuart became the senior British officer in Asia Minor, and the duty devolved upon him of informing the British ambassador to the Porte of the circumstances which led to the catastrophe as far as cognisable by him. The following despatch, written by that officer to the ambassador, justifies the views expressed in this chapter of the conduct of Selim Pasha:—

"It appears that on the 23rd inst. the general received a letter, dated the 12th inst., from Erzerum, informing him that the assistance so long expected from here could not be afforded. This assistance had been boastfully promised by Selim Pasha, the *muschir* in command, im-

mediately after his arrival here in the latter end of October, and the general was holding out from day to day in expectation of it, having long since ceased to hope for anything from Omar Pasha. On the morning of the 24th he called together all the pashas holding commands in Kars, explained to them the position in which they stood, and asked them severally if the troops were in a condition to attempt to cut their way through the Russian lines. The answer from all was that it would be impossible, owing to the debilitated state of the men, and the absence of all discipline among them.

"At this time there were but six days' provisions in store, at the rate of half a pound of bread a day per man; the hospital was crowded; the dead from exhaustion numbered seventy or eighty a day; many had become idiotic, and all were in a state of extreme emaciation; add to these evils the daily desertion of whole platoons, and the utter demoralisation that prevailed throughout.

"With respect to the townspeople, matters were, if possible, worse. All cried to General Williams for relief; and every day his quarters were beset with women, who flung their starving children on his steps to die.

"Under these circumstances, it was the unanimous opinion that no alternative remained but to propose a surrender. What terms will be granted remains to be seen.

"This disaster, my lord, might have been averted had there been a man of energy and ability in command of the troops here, but these are qualities which are rarely to be found among Turkish generals. The Russians have now at Kars 20,000 effective troops, of whom one half are cavalry, and by the surrender of that place they gain seventy field-guns, and sixty-six garrison guns, with 500 rounds of ammunition, 20,000 stand of small arms, including 2000 excellent Miniés; while we lose 15,000 men, including General Williams and his immediate staff."

On the 25th the interview between Generals Williams and Mouravieff took place. At first the Russian general seemed disposed to demand an unconditional surrender, but General Williams expressed his determination to perish with the garrison in preference. He found in Mouravieff a magnanimous enemy. Dr. Sandwith gives the following account of the interview:—"If you grant not these' (*i.e.* the terms proposed), exclaimed the general (Williams), 'every gun shall be burst, every standard burnt, every trophy destroyed, and you may then work your will on a famished crowd.' 'I have no wish,' answered Mouravieff, 'to wreak an unworthy vengeance on a gallant and long-suffering army, which has covered

itself with glory, and only yields to famine. Look here!' he exclaimed, pointing to a lump of bread and a handful of roots, 'what splendid troops must these be who can stand to their arms in this severe climate on food such as this! General Williams, you have made yourself a name in history, and posterity will stand amazed at the endurance, the courage, and the discipline which this siege has called forth in the remains of an army. Let us arrange a capitulation that will satisfy the demands of war without outraging humanity.'"

The terms of capitulation ultimately agreed upon were honourable to both armies:—

I. The fortress of Kars shall be delivered up intact.

II. The garrison of Kars, with the Turkish commander-in-chief, shall march out with the honours of war, and become prisoners. The officers, in consideration of their gallant defence of the place, shall retain their swords.

III. The private property of the whole garrison shall be respected.

IV. The rediff (militia), Bashi-bazouks, and Laz, shall be allowed to return to their homes.

V. The non-combatants, such as medical officers, scribes, and hospital-attendants, shall be allowed to return to their homes.

VI. General Williams shall be allowed the privilege of making a list of certain Hungarian and other European officers, to enable them to return to their homes.

VII. The persons mentioned in the articles 4, 5, and 6, are in honour bound not to serve against Russia during the present war.

VIII. The inhabitants of Kars will be protected in their persons and property.

IX. The public buildings and the monuments of the town will be respected.

November 27th, 1855.

This document was inclosed in the last despatch of General Williams, which was appropriately directed to Lord Stratford. There is a dignity, manliness, and pathos, in the despatch which must have penetrated the heart of Lord Stratford, however cased in officialism. It is dated from the Russian camp near Kars, on the 29th:—

"From the various despatches in cipher which I have addressed to your lordship through Mr. Brant, the intelligence which I have now the misfortune to announce must have been expected by your lordship.

"I had received direct promises of succour from Selim Pasha; and Omar Pasha's operations, until I knew that his movements were directed towards Suchum Kaleh, had buoyed me up in my determination to hold out to the last moment; this intelligence from the generalissimo reached me on the 24th instant by

the same post which brought me positive news from Mr. Brant of the indisposition or inability of Selim Pasha to advance further than Kuprikoï. We had, up to that date, suffered from cold, want of sufficient clothing, and starvation, without a murmur escaping from the troops. They fell dead at their posts, in their tents, and throughout the camp, as brave men should who cling to their duty through the slightest glimmering of hope of saving a place intrusted to their custody. From the day of their glorious victory, the 29th of September, they had not tasted animal food, and their nourishment consisted of two-fifths of a ration of bread and the roots of grass, which they had scarcely strength to dig for; yet night and day they stood to their arms, their wasted frames showing the fearful effects of starvation, but their sparkling eye telling me what they would do were the enemy again to attack them. We had now lost nearly 2000 men by starvation; and the townspeople also suffered, and would have died by hundreds if I had not divided the bread of the soldiers among those who had bravely fought by their side. I therefore begged the muschir to call a council of war, which, on being told that we had only six days' rations, came unanimously to the conclusion that nothing was left to us but a capitulation; and that the debility of the men, and total want of cavalry, field-artillery, and ammunition-mules, rendered any attempt to retreat impossible. The muschir then deputed me to treat with General Mouravieff, and I consequently waited on his excellency on the 25th instant. He at first seemed determined to make prisoners of all who defended the place; but as the rediff, or militia, and the townspeople, formed a large portion of the infantry, I made a successful appeal to his humanity, which, coupled with the obvious measure of destroying our artillery and stores, to which we should have had recourse previously to an unconditional surrender, brought about the convention which I have now the honour to inclose for your lordship's information, without the expression of unavailing regret.

"I have only to add that the stipulations were carried into effect yesterday; that myself, my officers, and the regular troops composing the last garrison, amounting to 8000 of all arms, are prisoners of war, and that the irregulars, numbering 6000, have marched towards their respective homes. I and my officers are to march for Tiflis to-morrow, there to await the decision of the emperor as to the place of our abode in Russia."

The terms of the capitulation were honourably carried out. When General Williams announced the intelligence, the garrison and

citizens were overwhelmed with grief; but all felt the necessity of surrender. Under date of November 28th, the journal of Dr. Sandwith dramatically describes the preparations for delivering up the city. The soldiers staggered forth scarcely able to walk, so reduced were they by hunger. Others dashed their muskets to pieces, exclaiming—"Thus perish our pashas, and the curse of God be with them! May their mothers be outraged!" Some of the officers broke their swords, and heaped curses on the Porte, and even on the sultan himself. The reverence of the Turks of every rank for their padishaw is great, and therefore Dr. Sandwith might well write of these indignant curses as "awful words, the like of which he had never heard so much as whispered before." The citizens also joined their murmurs against the government, and their curses upon the pashas. The author last quoted represents them as gathering in groups, and saying—"God is great! And has it come to this? Is Islam fallen? *Tai, vai!* (alas, alas!) and do my eyes behold it? Would to God we had never been born! Would to God we had died in battle! for then had we been translated to heaven, then had we been purified and acceptable. The Giaours are coming, and our arms drop from our hands! God is God, and Mohammed is his prophet. How has the All-merciful forsaken his children, and delivered us up to be a prey to the spoiler!" Thus are the sounds of grief and indignation heard from each turbaned warrior, 'while woman's softer soul in woe dissolves aloud.' Let us draw a veil over this distressing scene; scarce was there a dry eye that witnessed it, while grey-bearded soldiers sobbed aloud. In the midst of these lamentations General Williams rode through the camp. At once the citizens crowded round him, kissing his stirrup, and praying for blessings on his head. '*Néréyé, néréyé?*' (Where, where are you going, pasha?) they asked. 'I am a prisoner,' he answered. 'Let us go with you; we will follow you,' was the universal cry. '*Veeliams Pasha choek adam dur!*' (Williams Pasha is no end of a man), was the sententious remark of a grey-beard, and he was voted quite right."

It is no exaggeration to say that the majority of citizens and soldiers would have preferred death to capitulation. Even the men who were ready to escape under the pressure of hunger, would have gallantly perished in the redoubts rather than have surrendered to the Muscovs. It required some tact to prevent insubordination, which would have inevitably led to the destruction of these poor fellows. At last the moment arrived when the troops were paraded to ground their arms and march forth. Deep dejection marked

every countenance, and an expression of mingled shame and indignation. Yet so prostrated were the soldiers by famine, that nearly four hours were consumed in marching out to the Russian camp. The men were compelled to halt every half hour in order to recruit their strength, and, short as this march was, eighteen fell dead from over-exertion. The muschir rode at the head of the troops; on one side of him General Williams; on the other Colonel Lake. The latter officer, recording the circumstances, relates them with all the graphic force of one who had witnessed what he relates:—"At the head of the army rode the muschir, General Williams on one side, and myself on the other. We did our utmost to keep up his spirits, though we as much needed consolation as he did. He groaned most piteously, and declared that he was an old man, and that it was very hard upon him that he should be taken prisoner. At intervals, however, his natural kindliness of heart shone forth from this cloud of sorrow, and somewhat lightened his load of misery. 'What right have I to complain,' he exclaimed, 'when English officers, who have fought so hard, and suffered so much for me, are carried away into captivity far from their homes?'"

When the dismal procession reached the ruins of an old Genoese church, it halted, and the Turkish troops surrendered themselves prisoners of war. The muschir, with the commissioner and his staff, rode on to the quarters of the Russian chief, where they were received with the greatest kindness and hospitality. These excellent qualities were exercised also towards the Turkish soldiery, who were fed with excellent bread and soup, which, from the voracity with which it was partaken, proved fatal to some. Finally, the captive English and chief Turkish officers were sent into Georgia, with the exception of Dr. Sandwich, who, as a non-combatant, had his liberty, of which he availed himself by at once leaving for Batumi, choosing his route over the wild hills of Lazistan. He passed through many hair-breadth escapes, but by a series of happy providences, and his own courage, reached a place of security, and finally bid farewell to Asia Minor. General Williams and the other prisoners arrived at Tiflis, where they were not much impressed with anything but the inhospitality of the inhabitants, who were, for the most part, ignorant and bigoted in the last degree; any intelligence possessed by the community seems to have been confined to the Russian officials, the priests, and the ladies, who far surpass their lords in education. It was not much to the credit of Omar Pasha that Williams got to Tiflis before he did, nor to the credit of the Porte that their

muschir reached the capital of Georgia, not as a conqueror, but as a prisoner of war. The captives were separated, and sent into the interior of Russia to different destinations. The dangers incurred by some of the prisoners in these journeys were very great, and appear not easily reconcilable with the generosity for which they give their captors credit. They surely might have been detained at Tiflis until the severity of the winter had passed away. In Russia they experienced much kindness, both from the officials and the inhabitants, and were treated with every consideration until peace restored them to home and friends.

In a former chapter notice was taken of the murmurs of the pashas and the Turkish government as to the impolicy of defending Kars. Many officers in England have caught up this idea which the commissioner with Omar Pasha in Mingrelia has been rather industrious in circulating. It is astonishing how any person, at all conversant with the topographical character of the theatre of war in Asia Minor, and the relative conditions of the Turkish army of Anatolia, and the Russian army of the Caucasus, could come to any other conclusion than that General Williams took the only wise course open to him in order to save Asia Minor from being overrun by the enemy. The importance of the intrenched camp of Kars, and more especially as the key of Asia Minor, cannot be overrated; its position within thirty miles of Gumri or Alexandropol, on a road practicable for heavy artillery, and by which the ammunition, warlike stores, and provision of the invading Russian army would have been conveyed to Erzerum and the more distant provinces of that important, indeed, most important, region of Turkey, would render its capture indispensable to the advance of any general worthy to command and to conduct such an enterprise. The first act of Paskievitch's drama during the last war but one, was to capture Kars, and after a bloody struggle he succeeded in three or four days. He then found himself master of the road to Erzerum, and his victorious march from that city to Bayburt is told in the history of that war. After the campaign of 1854, and when the Turkish army lay in a partially executed and ill-planned intrenched camp, General Williams reached its head-quarters at Kars, and from its great capabilities of defence, he at once determined to preserve it, and render it the key of Asia Minor. When it shall be known that in consequence of finding rock on the surface, there was in no part of the defensive works executed by him a ditch over which a half-grown boy could not have leapt, the natural capabilities, combined with judicious flanking defence, can be fully appreciated by the bloody struggle it sustained against the finest army Russia sent

into the field during the last war. Indeed, as long as Kars was held, no army of the enemy could penetrate, and be secure of its communications with its grand magazines and fortress of Gumri. The English commissioner always conceived that a division of Mouravieff's army might be detached from the blockading force to capture Erzerum, assisted by the Erivan division, which had in the preceding campaign captured Bayazid, and was kept out of the plain of Passin by the division under Veli Pasha, who was sent from Kars after General Williams' arrival in that camp to take the command of that force. After the commissioner had lodged the troops in their winter-quarters in Kars, he proceeded to Erzerum, and planned and executed those forts which, together with the lines in the Dévéboyonou (the pass which separates the plains of Passin and Erzerum), he knew could resist any attack of a detached force from the grand army blockading Kars. Veli Pasha was ordered to look well to his advanced posts, and to fall back the moment he found himself menaced by Mouravieff's detached division, combined with that of Erivan, which, from the nature of the pass of Toprak Kaleh, he could single-handed resist. This was the first combination executed by Mouravieff, and it signally failed. Veli retired before the magnificent cavalry of Dondokoff, which formed the advanced guard of the expeditionary force—got into his position in Dévéboyonou—assisted the Erzerumbees to man the forts which General Williams had armed with a battering-train, and which his efforts and remonstrances had got up from Trebizond the preceding year—and showed such a face that the expeditionary column returned to Kars after destroying the magazine of flour and biscuit at Yenikoi, and which those scoundrels, whom Lord Stratford allowed to insult the commissioner, had persisted in dropping there instead of carrying on to Kars. Veli Pasha then resumed his position on the road to Bayazid—Erzerum was saved, and Kurdistan retained in its duty to the sultan—the immense agricultural wealth of the plains of Erzerum, Erzingan, down to Trebizond and Samsoon, preserved; and vast supplies from those ports were shipped for the allies, then combating before Sebastopol, consisting of corn, barley, and cattle, also great numbers of mules and bāt-horses. Now, any man who with the eye of a general will examine the ground about the city of Erzerum, together with the various passes leading into its extensive plain, cannot estimate its resistance to such a magnificent army as that of General Mouravieff at more than fourteen days. He had 10,000 splendid cavalry, which, while the Turks were blockaded or assaulted, would have made themselves masters of the country. What resistance could

have been offered by 1500 wretched and dispirited horse? Nothing was more wonderful, and at the same time consoling, in connection with the blockade of Kars, than the reflection that even in the hour of deep distress these 10,000 cavalry could make no attempt to molest the garrison in their lines, not even after the battle of the 29th of September, when they had only fifty horsemen left! What bitter regrets arise from this fact—that if General Williams had only had the provisions lost at Yenikoi, he could have delivered the place to the allies instead of the Russians. Whatever their partisans may say and think of those who at the "*eleventh hour*" were sent to relieve the city by a diversion in the rear of the besiegers, its fall is to be ascribed to that man who at the first hour of the watch refused to the English commissioner that countenance which would have enabled him to surmount all his difficulties. On the day of disaster, there stood the remnant of that magnificent Russian infantry, with its whole cavalry untouched, and its artillery uninjured, but without the power to move one step from its supplies of Gumri, and but too glad to retrace its steps into Georgia. Who after this will hazard his military reputation by denying that Kars was the key of Asia? Had Russia overrun Armenia in June and July, how would the war have ended?

With regard to Omar Pasha's late acts, there cannot be much divergence of opinion. The allies wished him to operate from Trebizond, where he would have found land carriage, and a road over which a battering-train had moved the preceding year, and all the food of Armenia for his army—and the stores of Erzerum were immense; but put all this out of the question, he went to Redout Kaleh, and there plainly demonstrated by this more advanced movement that he was in a most serious manner disquieting the enemy, and subsequently by his retrograde march to Suchum Kaleh, that he never intended to succour the besieged—even those who have not been somewhat behind the scenes may easily come to this conclusion.

The views thus expressed as to the selection of Kars as the key of the defence of Turkey in Asia are sustained by Colonel Lake, when, after the event, he was enabled to regard it in the light of a perfect experience:—"It was, moreover, consoling to think that the prolonged resistance we had succeeded in making had not been without good results. Had we abandoned Kars, and fallen back upon Erzerum, as, shortly after the victory of the 29th of September, we could so easily have done, we should have yielded to the enemy so strong a spot—at a time of a year when there was still some opportunity for further operations—that Asia Minor must have been almost entirely in his

power. As it was, we held the place until the season was too advanced to admit of his effecting anything."

Such ideas were not confined to the defenders of Kars. They were entertained by Mouravieff himself, and by the officers of his army. Even at Constantinople all who might venture to express an independent opinion, who were neither afraid of the padishaw nor the great padishaw of diplomacy by whom England was represented, placed the matter in this light. General Mansfield, who might from various circumstances be supposed somewhat under the influence of the English embassy and the Porte, thus wrote to Lord Clarendon:—"If I may be allowed to offer an opinion on the real cause of the disastrous issue of the Turco-Asiatic campaign, I should say that it must be found in the nature of the alliance, which absorbed all the really available means of action—whether French, British, or Turkish—in the invasion of the Russian soil, to the exclusion of attention to the hostile operations on Turkish territory. The contest pursued in the former required every practicable means to insure success, perhaps, it may be said, even military safety. The garrison of Kars performed a great duty in arresting the march of the Russian columns till the resources of the allies could be turned to Asia, either in consequence of a development they had not already reached, or of liberation from the Crimea. Some months since I ventured to predict in private conversation that we should have to be satisfied with such an issue of the operations of the last year; and that, assuming the allies to be prepared to take advantage of what has been thus achieved by the devoted garrison, we should have no reason to be disappointed when viewing the two theatres of war as one comprehensive whole. I have no reason to depart from the opinion then expressed. With regard to the proceedings of the embassy, I may be permitted to add that, after a disposition was shown to enable Omar Pasha to go to Asia, no effort was spared to expedite his movements; and that if events had marched with the same rapidity as the wishes of his excellency, we possibly might not now have to lament the surrender of Kars."

It is difficult to determine whether the last sentence of this despatch was intended to shift blame from the ambassador to Omar Pasha, or only to let both down gently; but, whatever the polite endeavours of General Mansfield in this way, the pages of history will assign to his lordship a full share of the responsibility. During the entire time of the British commissioner's presence in Asia, he was discouraged and thwarted by the man whose powerful influence should have sustained him at every step. Let one instance suffice to exemplify

this, apart from the direct story of the fall of Kars. When Eseed-deen-shere Bey, the celebrated Kurdish rebel, broke into open revolt, the prompt and sagacious conduct of General Williams saved Kurdistan from civil war, and Turkish Asia generally from the consequences which, at that juncture, must have attended the continuance of the revolt. Yet, so far from receiving the commendation of the jealous ambassador, the general was censured by him openly before the Turkish government, while to his own government he was described as a man apt to take unauthorised courses. Unauthorised indeed they were, for had he waited for intelligible or practical directions from the embassy at Constantinople, or until the muschir received such from the Porte, he might have waited until the Russians marched into Erzerum, or Eseed-deen-shere Bey ruled absolutely insurgent Kurdistan in co-operation with Mouravieff. It will be recollected that, after the campaign of 1854, Veli Pasha was detached from Kars to occupy the passes leading to Hassen Kaleh and Erzerum *from Bayazid, near Ararat*. During the winter, and when Williams was struggling at Erzerum, he heard of the revolt of this great chieftain at Zezera Ben Omar, on the Tigris; and the consequence was that Veli Pasha's column was ordered by the authorities of Constantinople to march upon the rebels by Monsh and Bitlis; *that movement uncovered this road*, and if the rebellion had not been suppressed by the ingenuity of the commissioner, all Kurdistan would have been in a blaze, and Veli could never have resumed his position to cover Erzerum and play his part in the coming campaign. Accordingly, General Williams at once determined, at this critical moment, to take upon himself the responsibility of sending an agent to Eseed-deen-shere Bey, *to offer him, on the part of England and the allies, his life and property* if he would surrender himself to the English consul at Mossul: he did so, and thus saved a great disaster. If that correspondence should be called for by a member of the House of Commons, Lord Stratford would shine forth in a manner more remarkable than attractive.

The treatment received by General Williams was similar to that of which the brave and ill-used Guyon had been the object. Lord Stratford seemed to view that wise and intrepid general with the utmost jealousy. Although an Englishman, and with military talents which the world acknowledge to be of a very high order, which he desired to devote to the service of Turkey and of the alliance, his lordship refused him all countenance. We have seen private letters from Guyon to his friends, that have never been published, which would move the coldest and sternest heart to sympathy. The British ambassador refused

to present to the sultan this noble English general, while at the same time he presented a celebrated French cook! Whatever may have been the merits of the latter, in his way, they were not of so much importance to the Turkish empire as the soldier whose genius baffled Austria and Russia on the plains and in the passes of Hungary, until the treachery of Georgoy paralysed his arm and thwarted his skill. It was to Sir William Williams, in opposition to the coldness and *vis inertiae* of Lord Stratford, that Guyon was indebted for the interposition of the English Foreign-office, as far as that was extended. Guyon regarded Sir William with a warm personal friendship, from the sympathy which one noble nature feels to another, and this was increased by the personal kindness and official services of the latter. Guyon, who had commanded armies, would have acted as a general of division in the army to which Sir William was attached. The gallant Anglo-Magyar fell a victim to cholera at Constantinople soon after the war was closed.

Who shall say that the eloquent satire of the *Manchester Examiner* was not deserved, notwithstanding its severity, when in the following terms that journal depicted the causes which rendered the struggle of General Williams unsuccessful?—"The fall of Kars at length figures in an explanatory Blue-book of 356 pages, and, to speak the simple truth, we never read a more damaging document. The damage is distributed pretty equally over the reputation of nearly everybody concerned, always excepting General Williams. How Kars fell is no longer a mystery. Given the corruption, the stupidity, the diplomatic snobishness, the professional jealousy, the clashing counsels, the ill-judged parsimony, and the inexplicable obstinacy which all bore their part in bringing about the catastrophe, the mystery would have been if Kars had not fallen. The parts in this grand piece of tragedy were ingeniously conceived and admirably supported. Everybody did his best. It was a web of destiny from beginning to end. The fate of Macbeth was not more surely sealed, after his interview with the witches, than the fate of Kars was sealed after it was committed to the sinister auspices of Lord Redcliffe. Kars fell—the only wonder being

that it did not fall sooner; and it fell a sacrifice to the most shameful tissue of incompetence, littleness, and intrigue that ever sported with the policy of nations. We never advocated the measures out of which this disaster sprang, but we trust we are not the less competent to estimate the vices by which it was consummated, or to denounce the men by whom they were displayed. It was not Mouravieff who conquered Kars; if one man more than another is entitled to the glory of that achievement it is Lord Redcliffe, and we cordially leave the triumph in his hands: he is, no doubt, proud of his laurels."

It is pleasant, after dwelling upon the sorrowful story of the fall of Kars, to be able to relate that all its British defenders ultimately reached their homes in England; but, alas! even this bright page has its shadow—for the gallant Captain Thompson reached his mother's house to die: worn out by toil, and captivity spent in illness, and with a home-sick heart, his constitution was broken.

The British government and people received General Williams with acclamations. The queen conferred upon him a baronetcy, by the title of "Sir William Fenwick Williams of Kars," associating his name in the baronetcy of England with the scene of his wisdom and of his glory. In the House of Lords, Earl Granville pronounced a eulogy upon the general and his staff, to which that illustrious body heartily responded. The House of Commons granted him an annuity of £1000 for life. Finally, he was appointed Governor of Woolwich Arsenal.

The remaining operations around Erzerum were unworthy of notice. Selim Pasha was very well satisfied with his part in producing the surrender of Kars, and had no wish to be disturbed, or to disturb any one at Erzerum. Still he made a show of activity, as long as the snows did not effect a blockade of Turks and Russians. Mouravieff could do nothing—the season was too far advanced; and before spring could furnish him with an opportunity to attempt fresh exploits, negotiations for peace suspended all active operations. Before concluding the history of the war in Asia, some chapters will necessarily be devoted to a narrative of Omar Pasha's expedition in Mingrelia.

CHAPTER CVI.

EXPEDITION OF OMAR PASHA FOR THE RELIEF OF KARS.

"It was a glorious sight,
 When the sun started from the sea,
 And in the vivid morning light
 The long blue waves were rolling free!
 But little time had I to gaze
 Upon the ocean's kindling face,
 Or mark the breakers in the bay—
 For other thoughts were mine that day.
 I stood upon the topmost tower:
 From wood, and shaw, and brake and bower,
 I heard the trumpet's blithesome sound—
 I heard the tuck of drum;
 And, bearing for the castle mound,
 I saw the squadrons come."

PROFESSOR AYTOUN.

THE feeling prevailing among the officials at Constantinople, at the beginning of September, was alarm lest the loss of Kars should incense Great Britain, and prevent the Porte from receiving the remaining instalments of the Turkish loan. They had learnt that the garrison at Erzerum was itself intimidated, and could offer no help to that at Kars. Lord Stratford thus wrote to the Earl of Clarendon, after a long interview at Constantinople with Omar Pasha:—

"It would appear, from the pashas' observations, that they attribute this approaching disaster primarily to the mismanagement and neglect of affairs by the late government, and look upon Redschid and Riza Pashas as especially culpable.

"It would appear, also, that they are very much grieved and disappointed at the time which has been lost in endeavouring to recover their position, and save the garrison of Kars; and that the cabinets of Paris and London, as well as the military authorities in the Crimea, have not considered the subject in that serious aspect in which it presents itself to the Porte, but have objected to the propositions which have hitherto been made with a view to retrieving their position and preventing the disaster.

"Omar Pasha has authorised me to state, as his opinion, that he feels satisfied that the effect will be very shortly felt, probably within a few weeks, by the advance of the enemy's cavalry, which is very numerous, and by a prohibition which he will impose upon the inhabitants to prevent all articles of provision from being brought to Trebizond, Samsoon, and Sinope, for exportation for the use of the allies.

"Some of the Kurds, it appears, have already joined the Russians, and probably a decisive success at Kars will take effect on the Persians.

"The result will be that a great part of the Asiatic dominions of the Porte, with its resources in men, money, and provisions, will be lost, for a time at least, to the Turks.

"The loss of revenue will be most seriously felt by the Turks in the prosecution of the war; and Omar Pasha appears to think that there may even be difficulty in keeping the soldiers of the army of Roumelia together, as they have been in great measure recruited in Asia; and hearing that their country is open to the Russians, without any force, however small, to oppose their progress through it, they will naturally, if not sent, seek to desert, with the hope of saving their families from the hands of the enemy.

"The whole of these considerations, which press with great weight on the Porte, cause Omar Pasha more than ever to desire to make a decided movement, with the least possible loss of time, with the troops, according to the proposition which I forwarded to your lordship in my despatch of the 16th inst.

"For this reason he hopes to obtain the assistance of France and England for the conveyance of his troops, and for provisioning his army; for he says that without it the Turks alone cannot perform the operation within a reasonable time, and therefore the small force, 6000 men, in Erzerum will be dispersed, making, with the garrison of Kars, a loss of 22,000 men to the common cause, besides a numerous artillery.

"From the turn affairs have taken, he appears to consider it questionable where the point of disembarkation should be, but must leave its determination to the development of events, and to the movements which the Russians may hereafter decide on making."

On the 5th of September Lord Clarendon received the following despatch from the English commissioner with the Turkish army of Omar Pasha:—

"I have to inform your lordship that Omar Pasha has stated to me that he will not be able to leave Constantinople for five or six days, as he is occupied in making the necessary arrangements for the expedition to Asia, and his presence here is absolutely required to complete them.

"I yesterday was present at a meeting at the Capudan Pasha's, at which the seraskier and Omar Pasha were present, and when the necessary orders were given for carrying the following arrangements into execution:—

"According to the calculations then made, the Turkish sailing fleet, consisting of six ships, is capable of carrying at one time 5950 men or 1360 horses. The steamers belonging to the government, seven in number, of which three have been recently purchased, with five others, which the government have either hired or are on the point of hiring, are capable of carrying at one time 10,450 men and 2060 horses.

"Orders were therefore given for these ships, the greater part of which have already proceeded to Sizopolis or Varna, to embark three batteries of artillery, with *materiel* and horses complete, and to fill up entirely with baggage-horses, which will proceed at once, the sailing-vessels towed by steamers, to Batoum. They will then return, and load entirely with infantry.

"Omar Pasha hopes thus to land 15,000 men and 3420 horses in Asia in two trips of the Turkish fleet alone, the operation occupying from three weeks to a month, or for each voyage from ten days to a fortnight. This calculation, however, may differ very much from the reality if the weather should prove to be tempestuous, and prevent the sailingships from being towed.

"The baggage-horses and artillery being landed, the pasha hopes that, so soon as the infantry arrive, he will be able at once to advance with the troops already there, so as to take them out of the unhealthy climate of the coast, and to make some slight demonstration before the arrival of the rest of his troops from the Crimea.

"The pontoon-train and remainder of the baggage-horses will follow, according as the means of transport are found.

"Omar Pasha is most desirous that assistance should be given by the allies in conveying the troops and their *materiel* from before Sebastopol, and baggage-horses from Sizopolis; and he considers the most practicable way in which this could be done would be by allowing the English fleet to convey the troops on from before Sebastopol to Asia, after having conveyed the contingent to Balaklava to replace them.

"The pasha intends himself to go to the coast of Asia to examine the positions, and obtain information, before the first ships can arrive and disembark their freight."

In reply to this the noble lord thus wrote, under date of the 7th of September:—

"The account of the arrangements proposed

by Omar Pasha for the relief of the army in Asia, which is contained in your despatch of the 26th ult., is inconsistent with subsequent statements which have reached her majesty's government.

"In your despatch you report that Omar Pasha reckons upon taking a portion of the Turkish troops from before Sebastopol, and replacing them by General Vivian's contingent. But it appears by a despatch of later date, from General Simpson, that Omar Pasha has given it as his opinion that General Vivian's contingent would not be fit to take up a position before Sebastopol until next spring; and in consequence of that opinion, and by reason of General Simpson's protest against having the contingent sent to him, which protest was founded upon Omar Pasha's opinion, her majesty's government have determined that the contingent shall not go to join the army before Sebastopol."

The "Blue-book" does not contain the despatch of General Simpson to which Lord Clarendon refers. It was probably telegraphic, and intended as a private communication. From the account which the foreign minister gives of it, the English general's unwillingness to risk any inconvenience to promote the expedition was obvious, but it was rendered still more so by the reply of Colonel Simmons. If this reply was correct in its statements (and the Blue-book furnishes us with no material for doubt), then General Simpson either acted very unfairly or very foolishly in urging the objections to which it was necessary for Colonel Simmons to reply. The vast magnitude of the undertaking about to be hazarded at Sebastopol—the final bombardment and assault—has been pleaded as an excuse for the general's unwillingness to part with any portion of the disciplined Turkish troops, and perhaps this is the solution of the mystery.

After the fall of Southern Sebastopol the English commander was more willing to part with these Ottoman troops; but even then Pelissier resisted with an *animus* which creates a suspicion that the French, for some reasons of their own, had no wish that Kars, where they had no glory, should be rescued. The British throughout the war regarded its great objects with a more single eye and stern sense of duty than their powerful ally appeared to do.

To the despatch of Lord Clarendon, Colonel Simmons replied in such terms as deprived General Simpson's objections of all force. It was dated Kamara, whither the pasha and the commissioner had returned, and was written on the 23rd of September, and received at the English Foreign-office on the 3rd of October:—

"I have to acknowledge the receipt of your

lordship's despatch of the 7th inst., in which your lordship observes that the account of the arrangements proposed by Omar Pasha for the relief of the army in Asia, which is contained in my despatch of the 26th ult., is inconsistent with subsequent statements which have reached her majesty's government.

"In that despatch I had reported that Omar Pasha reckons upon taking a portion of the Turkish troops from before Sebastopol, and replacing them by General Vivian's contingent; but it appears, by a telegraphic despatch of a later date from General Simpson, that Omar Pasha has given it as his opinion that General Vivian's contingent would not be fit to take up a position before Sebastopol until next spring, and in consequence of that opinion, and by reason of General Simpson's protest against having the contingent sent to him, which protest was founded upon Omar Pasha's opinion, her majesty's government have determined that the contingent shall not go to join the army before Sebastopol. On this subject I beg to inform your lordship that this opinion was given by Omar Pasha in a letter to General Simpson early in the month of July, on the subject of the completion of the contingent, and before he was aware of the critical position of the army in Asia.

"He then stated that he was strongly of opinion that General Simpson could not contemplate making use of the contingent in the open field (*en rase campagne*) in front of the enemy until the officers and soldiers had become acquainted with each other, and until the officers had learnt sufficient of the language to inspire confidence in the soldiers, and to command them in the field before the enemy. The pasha then went on with a proposition to evacuate Shumla of all other troops, and to give up the hospitals, barracks, stores, &c., to the contingent for the winter, and to complete that force by directing 10,000 men from the army of Roumelia and Shumla.

"Before this letter was sent by the pasha, Lord Raglan had on several occasions asked me whether I thought it would be possible to make use of the contingent to hold the lines of Balaklava, so that the whole of the British army might be made available for the siege of Sebastopol or for field operations; and, upon consulting Omar Pasha upon the subject, he told me that he saw no objection to it if his lordship considered it absolutely necessary, although no doubt it would be better for the formation of the contingent if it could be assembled together in a garrison-town like Shumla.

"Soon after the above proposition was made by Omar Pasha, information arrived of the condition of the army of Kars, and he proposed to take the troops hence to Asia, as reported in my despatch of the 15th of July. This propo-

sition would not have interfered with that as to the contingent, but the generals in conference refused to accede to it."

In the letter of Colonel Simmons, written to Lord Clarendon from Constantinople, he intimated that Omar Pasha would proceed to the coast of Asia Minor, and decide upon the best place for disembarking his troops. This the generalissimo did. Mr. Oliphant found him at Trebizond early in September. He was then upon the point of embarking for Batoum, which at that time had been fixed upon in the ever-wavering councils of Constantinople as the best spot for the debarkation, and it was the generalissimo's intention there to await the arrival of his troops. Events, however, determined him after some time to return to the Crimea, where he was at the date of Colonel Simmons's last despatch. None of those battalions upon which the pasha calculated had arrived, except those which it had been in his own power to order from Bulgaria. He in consequence murmured openly against the conduct of the French, throwing the blame upon Pelissier, and declaring that at that late period of the season he could not save Kars by a diversion in the rear of the Russian army. He had for some time solicited that three battalions of rifles might be allowed to leave (about 2000 strong), but Pelissier offered an effectual opposition. Sebastopol had now fallen, but the French general remained inflexible, although Simpson was no longer unwilling that the Turkish troops should depart, and expressed his opinion that they could be spared.

Before landing on the Asiatic coast Omar Pasha had proceeded from Bulgaria to Sebastopol, which he left on the 6th, two days before the final assault, but such was the jealousy displayed towards the Turkish chief by the allied generals that they did not even inform him of their intention to offer the assault, although the troops over which he held an independent command might have been called upon to take part in some way in connection with the achievement.

At the middle of September the Turkish general declared without reserve that he had no notion what the number of his troops would be, or when they might be in a condition to leave. Officers who served with Omar Pasha in Turkey and the Crimea, men whose military skill none dispute, have stated to the author that no officer could serve under the Turkish chief without being sensible of his military genius. How disgraceful, then, the treatment to which he was subjected by the mean jealousy and selfishness of those whose duty to the cause of the allies demanded of them a more honourable, prudent, and generous course.

When Omar arrived at Batoum great was his astonishment to find that instead of a *corps d'armée* of 12,000 men there were only 300 effective soldiers, and perhaps three times as many half-naked and sickly men. The interest of the pashas in concealing from their government the reduction of the numbers under their command operated disastrously at Batoum, as elsewhere.

It was not until the 29th of September that Pelissier would allow the Turks to leave the neighbourhood of Sebastopol, and it was the middle of October before the dilatory transports landed them on the Asiatic coast. Some have supposed that even then, had Omar landed his army at Trebizond, marching by Erzerum, he might have relieved Kars. The remarks of Mr. Oliphant on this point are deserving of perusal:—"That to embark an army in the Crimea, to transport it across the Black Sea, to disembark it again at the worst port upon that sea (where it is often impossible, for a week at a time, to communicate with the shore); to make the commissariat arrangements necessary for a large army on a long march; to organise a land-transport corps which could move, and therefore very different in its character from that which, after the exertions of a year, at this moment hampers our own army; to march this force for a distance of 180 miles over a road which Curzon, Sandwith,* and other travellers have described as one of the most impracticable in the world, and over two mountain-passes, at a season of the year when they are often blocked up with snow; and lastly, to arrive in a condition capable of coping with a hostile army, perfectly fresh, and 40,000 strong—I say that it appears to me that to have accomplished all this in the short space of six weeks, would have been an achievement worthy, to say the least of it, of a greater general than this war has hitherto produced."

Had the Turkish army debarked two months earlier at Soujuk Kaleh, Mouravieff would have been compelled to withdraw his army from before Kars to cover Tiflis; while the occupation of the pass of Suranim by the invaders would have secured the conquest of Imeritia, Mingrelia, Gouriel, and Abkhasia, and at the same time a movement by Selim Pasha upon Akhaltzick, would have preserved Omar's line of communication from any interruption in that direction.

Soon after the pasha left Trebizond, the news arrived of the fall of Sebastopol. The excitement was perhaps nowhere more unbounded; for scarcely any city was more interested in the humiliation of Russia, which had done everything power and ingenuity could

effect to injure the commerce of that place. The whole Turkish population, the French and British consuls, sailors, military, and visitors, gave vent to their exultation. The city was a blaze of decorative light; rockets pierced the sky, cannon thundered repeated salutes; occasionally small arms gave forth a *feu de joie*, and an enormous blazing torch was borne in procession through the city. Trebizond, always picturesque, whether viewed from the neighbouring heights beneath the pale moon or golden sunlight, was so when lit up with fitful illuminations. The Greeks literally howled with mortification and vindictiveness, until their manifestation of ill feeling obtained for them certain demonstrations which warned them to keep out of sight.

The Turkish chief remained some time at Batoum, where his green tents were pitched, and his forces gradually collected. The place itself, although occupying a position of some importance, was nothing better than a long, narrow, filthy, straggling street, having little merchandise except these three things, which are to be purchased everywhere—"vegetables, tobacco, and Manchester calicoes." The only mercantile persons visible were Armenians, who are always to be met with in an eastern city, upon whatever scale its trade or commerce may be conducted. Military men—British, Turkish, Lazistans, Egyptians, Tunisians, Albanians, French, Hungarians, Poles, and Prussians—crowded the dirty and contracted thoroughfare. Some officers of all nations were attached to the army of Omar, and many of his soldiers were Egyptians and Tunisians; some of the former were as black as negroes, and in all respects might be mistaken for such. They already complained of the cold, and betrayed symptoms of being unable to endure the climate.

The people of Anatolia were heartily disposed to the cause, and many of the peasantry presented themselves, armed only with their dirks and pistols, as volunteers for the campaign. Perhaps the most active, noisy, eccentric, jovial, and good-humoured members of this Babel were the English sailors, some of whom made the streets resound with snatches of Dibdin, and who paid compliments to the shrinking damsels of the place, more hearty and audible than intelligible to those for whom they were intended.

Omar Pasha was busy organising, and appeared to be anxiously expecting his troops, who, alas! came too slowly. He sent Mustapha Pasha, who commanded at Batoum, and had destroyed his army, a prisoner to Constantinople, to be tried for his delinquencies. When his crimes were punished (?), he was sent back with enlarged authority. He had probably bribed the chief pashas at Constantinople with

* Dr. Sandwith believed the route to be practicable for an army—so did Williams and Lake.

a portion of his ill-gotten gains. His subsequent conduct was even worse than his previous proceedings had been; for instead of co-operating with Omar Pasha, his only object was to take care of himself, and loiter about doing nothing for the object of the expedition, unless, indeed, this was the sort of co-operation Omar desired. The dilatory proceedings of the allies still caused delay; the British transport service, which has the credit of bearing the troops of Omar to Asia, did but little in that or any other way, and the French did nothing: Turkish means of transport were, for the most part, employed, and the service was efficiently conducted.

It was agreed on all hands that Batoum was an unsuitable base of operations for the expedition. Redout Kaleh, further north, was deemed at Constantinople the best point of support; and the defenders at Kars, and the consul at Erzerum, were also of that opinion. But Omar, for some reason which has never been satisfactorily explained, chose Suchum Kaleh, nearly eighty miles further north. Redout Kaleh was pronounced to be a dangerous harbour, where it was difficult to land troops; and the line of march from it to Kutais, upon which it was necessary for Omar to advance, whenever he might fix his point of departure, was deemed nearly as impracticable as that from Batoum. Mr. Oliphant, who examined portions of the route from Batoum and Redout Kaleh, supports the view taken by the generalissimo. Colonel Simmons and Colonel Ballard maintained this view also, long after the fall of Kars proved the abortiveness of Omar's attempt. Many were of opinion that the pasha, chagrined by the treatment he had received from the allied generals in the Crimea, never intended to save Kars. General Williams, Colonel Lake, and even Mouravieff, the Russian commander-in-chief, took this view. An officer, whose opinion is much to be respected, who knew Omar well, and the views of honour which prevail among Turkish pashas, observed to the author—"Omar Pasha is an able and courageous general, but he did not intend to relieve Kars." Another officer of eminence, to whom the author mentioned this opinion, replied—"Had not Omar intended to relieve Kars, he would never have clamoured at the Crimea and at Constantinople as he did for an army to be sent to Georgia." It seems as if both these officers were right. Omar at first was earnest in urging the relief of Kars, or, at all events, to obtain a command in Asia for himself; but finding that his views were thwarted, and himself slighted by the English and French generals, and being probably jealous of the fame acquired by the defence which General Williams had sustained, he determined to keep out of the way by making

Suchum Kaleh his point of departure. It is certain that when Mouravieff heard that he had chosen that place as his post, he ordered his army to be halted, and gave up all fear for his communications, and of any interruption to the blockade. At all events, to Suchum Kaleh the army proceeded from Batoum, and thither the new arrivals for the expedition were directed. Mr. Oliphant, after describing the principal street and its buildings, thus recorded his impressions of the general aspect of the place:—"At right angles to this street is an avenue, about a quarter of a mile long, leading to the hill upon which the Russian hospitals were formerly situated. From here I used to watch troops disembarking, collecting on the quay, pitching their tents, or going through their drill. The plains were covered with people and cattle, and as a party of wild Abkhassians come galloping in from the mountains on their wiry ponies, they pull up with astonishment upon the brow of the hill, and gaze wonderingly at the scene below; for they see the plain that was so solitary, and the town that was deserted a month ago, now alive with an active population; and as they listen to the roll of the drums, or watch the glitter of the bayonets in the sunshine, they perceive in them the indications of the change which is about to take place in the destinies of their country."

On the 3rd of October, soon after sunrise, a salute of nineteen guns from the Turkish men-of-war announced the landing of the general to take the command of the army intended for the invasion of Georgia. He landed amidst the acclamations of the troops who were drawn up to receive him. The bands played, the vessels were gay with flags dancing in the morning air, and the little army was in fine order, and full of hope and confidence, inspired by their hitherto victorious chief.

One of Omar's first acts was a stroke of political sagacity. The great man of the place was Prince Michael; he was married to a relative of the Princess Dadian, the chief person in Mingrelia, who received royal honours, and was invested with great authority. It occurred to Omar that if Michael, whom he knew to be at heart in the Russian interest, could be committed to the service of the sultan, it would compromise him with Russia, and compel his loyalty to the Porte. Omar accordingly, with great pomp, made him governor of the district, and commanded the obedience to him of all the neighbouring chiefs, who were assembled to take part in the ceremony.

The pasha spent some time examining the neighbourhood, while the remainder of his army was arriving. In these excursions he was aided by the officers of his staff, Mr. Longworth, Mr. Oliphant, and other Englishmen. By this means he conciliated the Abkhassians;

he also endeavoured to open a confidential intercourse with the Circassian tribes, who were, however, too mistrustful to be made extensively useful in any combinations against the enemy. Indeed, both Abkhassians and Circassians proved an encumbrance to the army in its subsequent operations. A body of Abkhassian irregular horse was organised, which, as soon as the Turkish army entered Mingrelia, so plundered and molested the people whom it was to the interest of the sultan's service to conciliate, that it was disbanded. A squadron of Circassian irregulars proved as formidable to their friends as their Abkhassian co-religionists had been found. When some of their chiefs had been flogged, and even degrading punishment had failed to check their persecutions and robberies, this force also had to be broken up. So much may be related in anticipation, to show how impossible it was for Omar to add to his forces by any local levies or volunteers. After many delays, for which the Turkish chief does not appear to have been responsible, he commenced his march from Abkhassia upon Mingrelia. The country was very impracticable, and offered a very circuitous route towards Kutais as compared with that from Soujuk Kaleh, between which place and Tiflis there was a road practicable for artillery; but Omar and his officers considered it, for a portion of the way, strategically dangerous; and Mr. Oliphant, in his relation, supports their views, he having reconnoitred that road for a considerable distance.

The *Assemblée Nationale* described as follows the route actually taken:—"There exists from Suchum Kaleh to Tiflis a strategical road, which forms the western line of the chain of communications opened by the Russians to the south of the Caucasus, and which, after having crossed two rivers of small importance, the Kedor and the Gadisea, encounters the Ingour at Sougdidi. A distance of seventy English miles separates Sougdidi from Kutais. Between these two towns, but nearer to the second than to the first, is the fortress of Khoni, erected on the spot where the roads meet from Redout Kaleh to Tiflis. Before this fort runs the Tcheni-chai, or the Hippius of the ancients. The next intelligence will acquaint us if the Russians have attempted to arrest the progress of the Turks, or have retired on Kutais. The river Rhion flows to the east of that town, whilst the road followed by Omar Pasha approaches from the north-west. If nothing has been attempted to stop the Turks, Omar Pasha might be before Kutais on the 15th of November; but it is very improbable that the Russians will abandon without defence the capital of a province and a strategical position of high importance. Were he even to seize upon it by a *coup de main*, it is

doubtful if he will be able to push his advantage further, in consequence of the lateness of the season. Between Kutais and Tiflis there exists, near Suran, a mountain passage 4000 feet above the level of the sea, whilst the passage of the Rhion will likewise have to be forced." Upon this it may be remarked that there are nearer twenty than two rivers, of which a general must take note, between Suchum Kaleh and Kutais, as any good map will show, and as European travellers who have traversed the ground aver. The *Assemblée* overlooked the fortress of Ruchi, about six miles beyond Sougdidi, which was at least as important as that of Rhion.

The policy of making Suchum Kaleh the point of departure has been severely censured by some of the best judges on such matters, while others unhesitatingly justify the selection. As to Batoum, Colonel Simmons, the British commissioner with Omar's army, and who, it must be confessed, writes as the *alter ego* of the Turkish chief, has given his opinion against that place as a base of operations. Sir W. F. Williams, writing on the 31st of October from Kars, thus noticed Batoum, and the probability of operations by Omar in that quarter:—"Rumours of the operations of Omar Pasha also reached us, and I hope he is at least acting like a brave and resolute man. Batoum is but four days from Kars, and six for the march of troops; but if he operates manfully in any direction I shall be content."

Upon this Colonel Simmons animadverted as follows:—"No road is in existence by which troops can march in 'six' or more days from Batoum to Kars. The distance is indeed no more than 105 miles as the crow flies, and Omar Pasha had reason to believe that there was a mule-track, or rather a mountaineer's path; but he knew that it had to cross a chain of mountains near 10,000 feet in height, and, at the season to which his expedition had been delayed, covered with snow, and through the gorges of which, as he was informed, not even a mule could carry his load with any safety. This route has since been explored by a British officer, whose report, it is said, fully confirms the opinion of Omar Pasha and those whose advice was taken on the subject of his Asiatic expedition, which, allow me to add, he undertook 'like a brave and resolute man,' undeterred by the obstacles and delays thrown in his way, and removed in great measure by his zeal and energy, and hoping against hope to rescue his sovereign's forces from the fatal position in which they were placed by the strategy of others. Omar Pasha's opinion, however, be it right or wrong, was based upon the best information accessible to him, and upon which, being personally unacquainted with the country, he

could place reliance. If any authentic or positive information had been received from General Williams with respect to the route by Batoum, it would have immediately set at rest the much-debated question as to the point from which the relief of Kars should be attempted; but it appears his knowledge of this route must have been derived subsequently to the commencement of the blockade of Kars, for on the 15th of August, 1855 (p. 170 in Colonel Luke's book), after stating that an army could march from Redout Kaleh to Tiflis, he expresses a hope that a demonstration will be made in his favour in that direction."

Lieutenant-colonel Caddell, who was then a subaltern officer in the Madras army, and a field officer in that of Turkey, has also published his opinion; it is in the following terms:—"Batoum was still unhealthy, and Omar Pasha did not wish that the seeds of disease should be sown among his best troops while waiting an unlimited time for their comrades. Besides this, an operation straight towards Kars, which might have been feasible, though hazardous, in summer and autumn, became impracticable as winter drew nigh, and it would have been madness to trust to the passes being clear of snow in November, when the neighbourhood of Kars itself is described as being covered to the depth of a foot so early as the 9th of September. Suchum Kaleh was therefore chosen as a rendezvous. It was equi-distant from Kars with Trebizond, and near to Tiflis, to which a direct road led in rear of the Russian blockading army. It was the beginning of November before Omar Pasha received sufficient men to garrison Suchum Kaleh and Chimeherra, and to push on with an army of 23,000 men through Abkhasia, across the Ingour, into Mingrelia, thus turning the formidable lines of intrenchment constructed by the Russians on the only road leading inland through the broad morass from Redout Kaleh. The destruction by the enemy of all the bridges across the numerous rivers and streams, the pacification of the occupied provinces, and the difficulty of provisioning his force with only 1500 baggage-animals, caused delay in his progress, and December had arrived before he had reached the banks of the Skeniscal, a few hours' march from Kutais. It was utterly impossible to cross this river, then navigable and in full flood. Kars had already surrendered, and, as his army was exposed to severe privations, Omar Pasha made a leisurely retirement towards the coast. The whole of the operations were too late; but that was not Omar's fault. Had a flotilla of gun-boats pushed up the Rhion, and provided the means of crossing, a considerable further advance might have been made."

To the criticisms of this sort, published by the friends of Omar Pasha, especially Colonel Simmons, General Williams makes the following reply:—

"On the arrival of Omar Pasha to take command of the army which was intended to relieve Kars, he wrote to the Muschir Vassif Pasha, by the hands of an aide-de-camp, telling him that 'if we stood firm for twenty days he would relieve us.' At that moment I was not aware that Lieutenant-colonel Simmons was with the head-quarters of the generalissimo; but had I supposed him to be there, I should naturally have hoped for at least a line from my brother commissioner, more especially as he was an officer of the sister corps of engineers, brought up at the same military college, and could not be ignorant of my position, although I was, from the nature of things, utterly uninformed of his. It can easily be imagined that we waited anxiously and worked hard during those twenty days in expectation of the succour which Omar Pasha knew while promising that he could or would not render. Selim Pasha played the same game from Trebizond, telling us that he had an army sufficient to relieve us, and that his men were burning for the advance. We therefore held on to the hopes inspired by these two generals until famine had reduced the strength of our devoted little Turks, and rendered impossible all chance of marching and cutting their way over the mountains; and I will venture to say that as long as a soldier of that garrison survives, the names of those two men will be execrated.

"In speaking of Omar Pasha with respect to Turkey, Lieutenant-colonel Simmons calls it 'his adopted country.' I will give some idea of his patriotic sympathy by informing the reader that, in answer to my despatch to the generalissimo, congratulating his excellency, as the acknowledged head of the sultan's forces, on the glorious victory of the 29th of September, I received a reply simply and without comment, acknowledging the receipt of my communication, thus exhibiting to the gallant and enduring garrison of Kars the deep interest felt for them by their generalissimo. On this great occasion, too, I should have hoped for a line from my brother commissioner. He knows whether or not he was by the side of Omar Pasha when the generalissimo received this welcome news. I am altogether ignorant on that point.

"It is not worth while discussing with Lieutenant-colonel Simmons how far Omar Pasha could have penetrated towards Kars from Batoum; but I will express a clear opinion that the moment he ceased to operate as, in my humble opinion, 'a brave and resolute man' should have done—that is, towards Kars and the centre of Georgia—our fate was

sealed; and the instant that General Mouravieff heard he had chosen the remote port of Suchum Kaleh, the Russian general felt himself relieved from his disquietude, and made up his mind to hut his army, and thus insure the capture of Kars by famine. This opinion is fully supported by that of General Mouravieff himself, expressed to me and to my aide-de-camp with characteristic frankness. The able and veteran general laughed, and said—'As soon as I found Omar Pasha at Suchum Kaleh, I had no doubt of the result of the campaign;' adding, 'I was much obliged to Omar Pasha for going in that direction.'

"I have not the smallest wish to enter into the field of 'animosity' or 'controversy' with Lieutenant-colonel Simmons, but, at the same time, I cannot pass over without remark his lamentation about 'that fatal position in which they were placed by the strategy of others'—that is of course intended for me. In a work now preparing for the press by competent judges, the question of the necessity of defending Kars at all will be discussed. In the meantime, Lieutenant-colonel Simmons, and those who think with him, can cling to their opinion, that it ought not to have been, and that the risk of abandoning that stronghold should have been hazarded; I, and those who served with me, on the contrary, will hold to our view—namely, that by keeping the Russian army occupied before Kars, only twenty miles from their own frontier, till the snows of winter prevented their taking a single step in advance, even after the blunders of Omar Pasha and the imbecility of Selim Pasha had put that fortress into the possession of the enemy, we had fulfilled a wise purpose, and saved Asia Minor from being overrun, as also the allies from the dire necessity of sending English and French troops from Sebastopol to its rescue."

Such is the character of the dispute as to the route chosen by Omar for the relief of Kars.

The Turkish army began its march in high spirits, flushed with confidence of victory, and intensely anxious to meet the enemy.

The presence of the Duke of Newcastle caused no small excitement in the expeditionary army. His grace felt so keenly the public displeasure with his administration at the War-office, that he visited all the coasts of the Black Sea, to investigate personally what had been done amiss, and what might be amended. The duke took several trips into the interior from Suchum Kaleh, led by his active and inquisitive spirit, his admiration of the incomparable scenery, and a desire to try "the wild sports of the *East*," which, as the guest of Prince Michael, he for a short time enjoyed.

From the outset of the expedition it was evident that, so far as the officers were concerned, everything must depend upon the energy and skill of foreigners, for the Turkish pashas took everything as leisurely as if no important interests depended upon the enterprise.

The advanced-guard of Omar's army consisted of the Rifles, and was commanded by the gallant and intelligent Colonel Ballard, an officer who held inferior rank in the service of the Honourable East India Company.

The property and persons of the country people of Abkhasia and Mingrelia, when that dominion was entered, were scrupulously respected, except so far as the vagabond Abkhasian and Circassian irregular cavalry insubordinately violated the commands of the commander-in-chief.

The Turkish army arrived at the Ingour without molestation from enemies, or any serious impediment. Its further proceedings we reserve for another chapter.

CHAPTER CVII.

PASSAGE AND BATTLE OF THE INGOUR.—SUSPICIOUS DELAYS BY THE TURKISH GENERAL, AND HIS ULTIMATE ADVANCE TO THE SKENISCAL.

"Description cannot suit itself in words
To demonstrate the life of such a battle."—SHAKSPEARE.

WHEN the advanced guard reached Ertiseal, which is about twenty miles from Shemsheraï, a halt of some time was ordered, and the troops were rested and refreshed. This force consisted of nineteen battalions of infantry, of which three were Rifles, who were considerably in advance of all the rest of the army. Some irregular Abkhasian cavalry were attached to these nineteen battalions. While these troops reposed, Colonels Simmons and Ballard, with Mr. Oliphant, proceeded to the banks of the

Ingour, and reconnoitred the enemy, who had constructed stockades on the opposite side. The enemy did not become aware that day, nor the ensuing night, of the proximity of the Turkish Rifles. Lieutenant-colonel Ballard having expressed an opinion that Mr. Oliphant could be of service by sketching the enemy's positions, he did so without detection for a considerable part of the next morning; at last Mr. Oliphant and his attendants were discovered, but no annoyance was offered. The

description given of the position by this intelligent draughtsman is substantially as follows:—The river was divided into two channels, each about thirty yards broad, by a narrow, rocky island. The opposite bank was densely wooded, and trees had been felled and interlaced with those which were standing, in such a way as to form a most formidable-looking stockade for more than a mile. At one point there was an earthwork, where thirty or forty soldiers were collected together.

While the opposing detachments were surveying one another with mutual curiosity, shots were exchanged at random lower down the river. Colonel Ballard advanced with two companies of his Rifles, and opened a dropping fire, to which the enemy briskly replied. No casualties occurred on the Turkish side, except that a nephew of Prince Michael, a boy ten years of age, was wounded by a musket-ball in the leg. This ended the reconnaissance. The Russian commander made this very small affair the subject of a lying despatch, in which he said his fire compelled the enemy to retreat.

The weather at this juncture favoured the operations of Omar Pasha. It was frosty at night, but the days were lovely—equal in serenity and sunshine to the loveliest English autumn weather. This enabled the Turkish chief to effect his measures without loss of men or horses.

The next day, Oliphant and Ballard were again early engaged in reconnoitring the enemy, who was on the alert, and by his rifle practice made reconnoitring a less pleasant amusement than the day before. The Turkish rifle practice was excellent, and the Russians could be seen carrying away their fallen men. Mr. Oliphant, however, desirous to promote the interests of the army, found his sketching neither safe nor agreeable, but gallantly persevered, like a true Englishman. He rendered a still further service by discovering a ford. Omar Pasha determined to erect two batteries upon points which commanded it; these being opposite the Russian stockade, rendered it necessary to perform the work under cover of darkness. Engineer officers were scarce in the Turkish army, so that Colonel Simmons gave Mr. Oliphant a lecture on the erection of batteries, and sent him to Skender Pasha, better known as Skender Bey, for the men necessary to accomplish the work. Supposing him in the darkness to be an officer, a regiment and two guns were placed at his disposal. He made his battery, and at early dawn was informed that the Russians were approaching the river-bank in force. Mr. Oliphant did not know what orders to issue in such an eventuality, nor how to order them, if his military knowledge had been sufficient, for he did not

understand military terms in the Turkish language. Happily, the supposed Russians were rows of piles upon the river's bank, and Colonel Ballard arrived opportunely to terminate the temporary command of the amateur.

Skender Pasha, who led what might be called the fighting division, was an old man, and a Pole, who had served in many European armies; he was a brave and skilful officer, and had received eighteen wounds, many of them in the service of Turkey.

The whole of Omar's army rapidly arrived upon the Ingour; it consisted of thirty-two battalions of the line, four of rifles, one thousand cavalry, twenty-seven fieldpieces, and ten mountain guns. The whole did not exceed 20,000 men, a force inadequate to any great undertaking, even if no natural obstacles had intruded. Detachments to the amount of 10,000 men were left to protect the depots at Godova, Shemsheraï, and Suchum. At night, orders were issued to extinguish all lights, especially camp-fires, from which the soldiers concluded that the morrow would witness a struggle on the Ingour.

On the morning (the 6th of November) the Sirdar Ekreni (as Omar Pasha was called) summoned at daylight his chiefs of division, and gave the necessary directions. In an hour the whole army, except the division under Skender Pasha, was marching parallel to the river in a westerly direction. Their orders were to turn the Russian position at Boukhe, and cross the river lower down where a ford had been discovered. The morning was beautiful, bright, and balmy, as August in the sweet south of England; the country was still rich in foliage, the gigantic oak and beech had not yet cast their leaves, although the mountains wore their hoary crowns, as if demanding the reverence of the invaders; the valleys echoed to the stirring strains of the bands, or to the timely beat of the Turkish drum, and the tramp of marching battalions. Hope and courage gleamed from every countenance. War has its pomp and beauty; it has also its glory, for its records are rich with noble and heroic acts—but death is often busy beneath the unfurled banner, and spares not the noble and the brave. Among those buoyant battalions destined to conquer the passage of the Ingour, not a few, ere the shadow of evening should fall over the fair landscape, would lie in bloody burial, and one among the gayest and bravest of the host, far away from his English home, would be numbered among them.

The advance continued about seven miles, when the whole force debouched upon a plain commanding a view of the river for a considerable distance: here the sirdar inspected his army, and a flush of pride and confidence might be seen upon his manly face. The first

orders issued were to Colonel Ballard, to take three battalions and a-half of his Rifles (nearly all under his command) and four fieldpieces, and make his way across to the island, from which a ford was supposed to conduct to the Russian bank. Several peasants had given their services, more or less reluctantly, as guides to this intricate manœuvre. Ballard gained the island, which he found thickly wooded, and, throwing out skirmishers, he advanced by a narrow path in the direction pointed out by his guides. The path lay through the wood for two English miles, and was terminated by an open plain; the moment the Rifles emerged from the copse, they were greeted by a fire of artillery and musketry. The former came from a battery upon the opposite bank, distant about 600 yards; the latter from a wood which skirted the other side of the plain upon which they had emerged. Across this Ballard and his Rifles impetuously dashed; the enemy fled, and the conquest of the wood was made without loss, except from the fire of the battery, which swept the grassy plain over which Ballard and his men had charged. Dashing through the wood, accompanied by Mr. Longworth,* the civil commissioner of her Britannic majesty, the colonel sought the expected ford, but he, or rather his general, had been betrayed—there was no ford! Ballard then made such dispositions as the nature of the ground allowed for opening fire with his fieldpieces and rifles upon the battery, which swept with grape the precincts of the river and the copse. Colonel Simmons had meanwhile turned in quest of another path, by which the troops in immediate support of the Rifles might avoid the heavy fire of grape and musketry sweeping the open space between the two thickets: assisted by Mr. Oliphant, the colonel was successful. Meantime Omar Pasha brought up the artillery himself, which he posted, under the direction of Colonel Caddell, upon the open space, so as to reply effectually to the Russian battery, which had been partly disabled by the riflemen of Ballard, whose shots entered the embrasures, dealing death among the men who worked the guns. The native Turkish officers, especially those of higher rank, already began to display cowardice, as many men had fallen—100 of the Rifles alone had been placed *hors de combat*. For three hours the battle of Rifles and artillery had been engaged on this particular point, and the loss of life among the enemy was great, as could be seen from the Turkish position. The ammunition of the sharp-shooters beginning to fail, the 4th regiment was sent to their sup-

port, whose colonel, a very old Turk, was as brave as a lion, and led his men rapidly forward, shouting "*Allah! Allah!*" For several hours longer this battle was maintained with evident disadvantage to the enemy, yet the battery was not silenced. Omar Pasha directed a division to cross over to another island; thence to a third, where they were separated from the Russian bank by a very narrow but deep and rapid stream: into this they plunged under a galling fire from the enemy. One hundred and fifty men were lost in the passage. The gallant Turks gained the bank, the defenders of which did not receive the shock of the bayonet, but fled into the woods which skirted their rear. While the Turks were drawing up upon the bank, a loud cheer from the direction of the battery was heard, followed by another and another; the brave fellows left behind on the island had also found their way across, and stormed the formidable redoubt. The passage of the Ingour was effected—the enemy was routed, leaving more than 1200 men dead along the bank of the river and in the contested work, which was choked with the slain, men and horses. It was especially remarkable how large a number of the latter had been destroyed. Osman Pasha, an old Turk, Ferhad Pasha (a German officer named Stein), Isaac Bey, a Circassian chief, Colonels Simmons, Ballard, and Caddell, Mr. Longworth, Mr. Oliphant, had all distinguished themselves, and among all, none more than the aide-de-camp of the British military commissioner, Captain Dymock, who fell mortally wounded, and was buried where, in the hour of victory, he received his death-stroke. His grave was dug between two magnificent trees, and over it the pendent branches of a wild vine clinging to both, formed a natural and beautiful arch.

The way in which the attack upon the battery was conducted was in this manner:—The battalions left behind on the island by Osman Pasha found a ford higher up the river, through the efforts of Colonel Simmons. The ford was deep, and several of the men were carried away in the stream. On gaining the shore, they left a portion of their force in reserve, and to cover their retreat if necessary, while the main body advanced upon the battery unobserved, until within 600 yards. A Russian column then immediately charged them; but this column was received by so heavy a fire that it hesitated, and momentarily fell back. At this instant a second column fell upon the flank of Colonel Simmons' troops. The colonel, ordering Dymock, and his interpreter, Hidaiot, to charge through the first column into the battery, he faced the second column with another portion of his party. Simmons had but few men with him, and the contest was

* This gentleman was attached to the staff of the dauntless Guyon, during the Hungarian war of 1848, and found refuge in Turkey when the Hungarian struggle was suppressed by the combined Austrian and Russian armies.

terrible against an enemy numerically superior. The struggle with the column which opposed Dymock was also fierce; fifty Turks fell dead in a few minutes. Dymock's horse was shot while he was cheering on his men in the most daring and chivalrous manner; as he rose, and was again leading his men on foot, he received a musket-bullet in the breast, and fell back mortally struck. Hidaiot took his place, emulating the valour of the fallen English hero. The interpreter was a Pole, and wore a cap and cloak in Russian style, so that he was scarcely distinguishable from a Russian officer, which for many years he had been. He led on the Turkish soldiers to the battery; but they were outnumbered, hemmed in on all sides, and their ease seemed desperate, when Hidaiot, pitching his voice above the clamour of the strife, shouted in Russian—"Fly, my children, you are surrounded; whole regiments of the infidels are coming through the wood." The Russians, either supposing the command to come from one of their own officers, or deeming it a warning from one who was a captive in the hands of the attacking Moslems, took to flight, and the battery was entered, a loud cheer from those who so fortunately profited by the stratagem announcing the capture to the detachments which had crossed elsewhere. Not more than fifty prisoners were made, and these were nearly all Tartars from the Crimea, or volunteers from Abkhasia or Kurdistan. They represented the force opposed to Osman's to have been 15,000, consisting of regular troops, Georgian militia, and Mingrelian and Imeritian volunteers, who were the first to run away.

The medical men, Dr. Edwards and Mr. Gower, showed great courage and humanity, attending to the wounded under the heaviest fire. The Turkish loss did not much exceed 400 men. The battle was one of singular animation, diversified movement, and hard fighting. The chivalrous Hidaiot showed his tenderness as well as heroism; as soon as he entered the battery he touched the guns with his sword, exclaiming, "These are my capture," and then returned upon the track of the attack to find Dymock, whom he raised and supported in his arms, where the brave youth breathed out his life.

The night after the battle was excessively cold, and the wounded Turks and Russians suffered extremely. It was dark before the battle was quite over, and many of the Russians lay in the woods, unable to move, or even call for assistance. Efforts were made to save as many as possible, who were carried to the bivouac-fires of their conquerors, and tended carefully and kindly.

After the battle of the Ingour, the Turkish army remained for forty-eight hours in their en-

campment, a delay advantageous to the enemy. The excuse for this inaction was want of supplies in consequence of deficient transport; but Omar had 2000 horses, and might easily have laid the country under contribution for labour. Indications seemed already to be given that he was in no hurry. During this delay a visit was paid to head-quarters by Mr. Danby Seymour, whose publications have made him famous in the political and literary world.

After the second day's delay, Colonels Simmons and Ballard reconnoitred the country, previous to an advance. The next important place on the line of route to Kutais was Sougdidi, about twelve miles from the camp. The reconnoissance was gallantly made with two battalions of Ballard's Rifles, and nearly the whole of the cavalry. From the position of the army winding paths, through brushwood and forest, conducted to the main road, which led from the coast to Sougdidi; this road was in excellent order, broad and smooth, and lay through extensive plains of clover, carrots, thyme, and fern. Omar could have been in no difficulty for food or fodder, and need not, on such grounds, have delayed an hour. Along this road, and in the by-paths from the river towards it, dead bodies of men and horses showed that the Russian retreat was not unattended with disaster, and that the battle had inflicted upon them even heavier losses than their opponents had supposed. Some Mingrelian militia fired upon the Turks from the woods, and some even from the fields by the high road; they did not wound a man, but several of their numbers paid with the loss of life the penalty of their temerity. Sougdidi was deserted, except by a few militiamen, who were made prisoners. The Russians had retired three hours' march nearer to Kutais, and fixed their head-quarters at a village where, the Mingrelian militiamen reported, large stores of provisions were deposited. It is surprising that Omar Pasha did not, by rapid marches, act upon the intelligence thus gained for him by the British officers, and push on to the route of the dispirited enemy, now reduced greatly in numbers, and to the capture of such valuable stores, for the Russians would not have had time or courage at that juncture to have carried them away. No immediate advantage seems to have been taken of the reconnoissance, except to capture a large stock of poultry from the cottages and farm-houses—a very acceptable prize.

The English officers, attempting "a short cut," lost their way in the darkness of the succeeding night, but unexpectedly struck upon the Turkish camp, which they entered without a challenge—so deficient was the vigilance of the Turkish pashas and beys, and, consequently, of their soldiery. The Turkish army

had now left Abkhasia, and were fairly in Mingrelia, a province under Russian protection, but nominally subject to the Princess Dadian. The province of Lamoursachan, which had just been left, was a disputed territory, that princess and the chiefs of Abkhasia alike claiming sovereignty there. The Russians, who never had any treaty-claim, or claim of conquest, but were called in to mediate, took possession of the revenues of the province for the czar, and installed him as protector.

On the morning of the *third* day of useless and criminal delay after the battle of the Ingour, the sirdar ordered his troops to advance upon Sougdidi, to the consternation of the country people, whose terror and horror of the Turks could scarcely be exaggerated, while they treated the English, Polish, and German officers with the greatest respect, and as fellow-Christians. There need be no wonder at this hatred to the Osmanli, who were only known to the inhabitants of these northern parts of Asia Minor as cruel and inexorable bigots and tyrants. Wherever the British officers went on the coast, and in the Turkish part of Abkhasia, they found some Christian slaves, who were treated with brutal oppression. In one place six Poles, who had deserted from the Russians, and were entitled, on grounds of policy as well as humanity, to kind treatment, were sold as slaves, subject to a barbarous and unrelenting bondage. The liberation of such poor captives was not always so prompt as the British officers desired. Dr. Sandwith relates a touching story of his own liberation of a Polish slave in the neighbourhood of Erzerum, when, as a non-combatant, Mouravieff permitted the doctor to retire from Kars after its submission.

On the march of Omar to Sougdidi, the vagabond Abkhasian cavalry plundered the people, and offered violence of every sort when for a moment out of sight of the regular troops. Arrived at Sougdidi, after a march which betrayed no haste, Omar found no opposition, and entered the town in triumph.

Sougdidi is the capital of this fine province, and is beautifully situated; all the peculiarities of the scenery in the inland neighbourhoods of the Caucasus, so often referred to in these pages, were here in perfection. The city itself was vacated by troops and people, so that the Turks found ample quarters. The town consists of a few streets, which are arranged at right angles to a square in the centre, where the Greek church and its dependent buildings appear to advantage. Prince Gregoire, a relative of the reigning princess, occupied a wooden house, which was large and ornamented, and might remind the traveller of the mansions built by persons of property in the north of England, on the model of the old wooden houses still to be seen in Lancashire. The chief building in the

square was the palace of the Princess Dadian, a splendid pile, although one wing only was perfect, the rest being more or less advanced towards completion. The princess had fled to a castle in the mountains. The internal grandeur of this palace astonished the British officers and amateurs. Furniture the most costly, upholstery the richest, unique chandeliers, tasteful articles of *vertu*, pictures by eminent artists, ancient and modern, contributed to the elegance and grandeur of the deserted royal abode. The grounds were laid out with care and skill, and at great expense; even at that season flowers of every hue and form decorated profusely the delightful gardens. Orchards, orangeries, greenhouses, surrounded this fairy dwelling. The lawns, parks, and pleasure-grounds, stretched away among gentle undulations and along the sides of bold hills, rent with ravines, which were thickly planted. Fowl of every variety and beauty had their appropriate place, and herds of fine deer adorned the upland and the sward. Omar placed sentries in the palace and grounds, and all entrance was forbidden, even to his officers. By this means plunder was prevented, and the game was not injured, for no shooting was allowed. It was a very fine place, and so Omar seemed to think, for he was in no hurry to leave it. No person could suppose, while day after day he lingered there, that the relief of Kars was the uppermost idea in his mind. Supplies could not have been the object in view; for it was better that the game, and poultry, and cattle of an enemy should minister to the wants of an army, than that Asia Minor should be prostrate at the feet of the czar's lieutenant. But independent of any provisions to be had on the spot, Omar was only four miles farther from his place of support than he had been after the battle of the Ingour, although he had thence to march twelve miles to Sougdidi. Here, however, he dallied for more than a week, when every day was precious to his enterprise, and when every day he tarried added to the exasperation of the people upon whom the brutal Abkhasian cavalry perpetrated every violence. Many a beautiful girl was seized, thrown over the horses of these ruffians, and borne away a captive to Abkhasia, to be transferred thence as an object of barter further south, among the Asiatic or even European Turks. In one week sixty persons were thus kidnapped. Omar had at last to send these wild and scoundrel troopers to their homes. Better far for the Mingrelians to lose every trace of independence, and become subjects of the czar, than be subjected to the mildest forms of Turkish rule; this was their own opinion. They hated Turks and Russians, but they regarded the former with personal loathing and religious horror. The weather continued lovely; Kutais could

have been reached with safety; and had Kutais been occupied, Mouraviëff must have fallen back from before Kars. Kars undoubtedly fell because Omar would not advance upon Kutais, nor advance "manfully," as General Williams said, "in any direction." It was desired at Constantinople that the intrusive and incorrupt English pasha, who sought to revolutionise the profitable usages of pashas and other functionaries in Armenia, should be allowed to fail; so that the allies might be led to believe that the native pashas were at least as efficient as foreigners, and that the salvation of Asiatic Turkey did not depend upon the genius of an Englishman. Omar, when he first clamoured for relief to the army of Asia, may have been sincere, or he may have desired both to get away from the restraints and jealousies to which he was exposed in the Crimea, and to achieve something independently upon a more promising field of action. When he landed at Suchum Kaleh, he had no intention to relieve Kars, or he would never have loitered on the conquered field of the Ingour, or dallied in the pleasant quarters of Sougdid. Mr. Oliphant, a friend of Omar Pasha, and who justifies, when it is possible, all his proceedings, makes this admission—"That every day was of the utmost value was subsequently proved by the fact that, if we had arrived upon the banks of the Skeniseal two days earlier, we should have reached Kutais in twenty-four hours afterwards."

On the 15th, nine days after the battle of the Ingour, the army began its forward march;—its progress since the battle had been at the rate of *an English mile and a quarter per day!* Skender Pasha, at the head of the advanced-guard, led the way, gradually, as he advanced, throwing out Ballard's Rifles, to make sure that no unlooked-for attack should impede his march. The country people refused supplies even for money, and Omar would not allow the troops to make forced purchases at any price, even when hungry; for notwithstanding the delay, *ostensibly* for supplies, the commissariat was still badly provided. To the English and Polish officers the people readily parted with their fruits and dairy produce, requiring a moderate remuneration, or showing a hospitable courtesy. Along the line of march the scenery was such as might be supposed to bless Eden—

"Ere man had fallen, or sin had drawn
Twixt earth and heaven her curtain yet.

Hill and dale, wood and water, cultivated and wild prospects, in ever-changing variety, welcomed the eyes of the martial wanderers. The rich and wide vale of the Chopi, extending to the base of the Caucasus, brightened by the river, which wended its silvery current amidst its green meadows or yellow stubble-field, lay

stretched beneath the gaze of the wanderers. On the hill-sides—amidst the rich and clustering foliage not yet fallen, but bronzed in every tint with which Autumn with his golden and sunny fingers touches the woods and fruits—were little villages nestling beneath bold and jutting crags, or extended along the undulating slopes. In the distance, as if watching over the fair scene, now pressed by the feet of sacrilegious invaders, Mount Elbruz lifted his hoary brow, white with the snows of unnumbered ages, and turbaned with the fleecy drapery of heaven. What a realm to fight for! Who could clank a fetter in that glorious land! One might well apostrophise it as a poet of our time apostrophised his country—

"When nature embellished the tint
Of thy hills and thy valleys so fair,
Did she ever intend that a tyrant should print
The footsteps of slavery there?"

The further bank of the Chopi was reached by the advancing Turks, and the banner of the crescent and star was planted where the vestiges of Christian ruins seemed still sacred, as well as venerable, in their decay. Skender Pasha, always brave and adventurous, pushed on "two hours" in advance—a Turkish march is always computed by hours, not miles or leagues, and many hours are often required to pass over a few leagues. Mustapha Pasha pitched his tents in another direction; and as cannon was heard by the main body of the army that night, considerable alarm was expressed, as it was not known whether Skender or Mustapha was engaged.

On the 17th the march was renewed. Immediately after leaving Chopi the high road from Redout Kaleh to Kutais and Tiflis was reached. This was an excellent macadamised road, smooth as a bowling-green; there were neither enemies nor impediments to prevent a rapid march that day; the general contented himself with going a few miles. The direct road was not taken, short as the distance traversed actually was. Omar alleged that he must keep as near the sea as possible to be within a day of his supplies, and keep up communications with Redout Kaleh. If it were so important to keep within a day of his supplies, it had been as well for him to have stayed with them altogether—he would have been still nearer to the coast by encamping within sight of it, and the lives of brave men would have been spared, which were sacrificed in the battle and the retreat. He did *not* "operate manfully in any direction," not from want of courage or capacity, but from want of will—he was a party to the plot at Constantinople for humbling the English pasha at Kars.

The encampment after the pleasant little promenade of the 17th was at Choloni, and was, like that of the previous position, exceed-

ingly picturesque; it occupied a hill-side, which commanded the plain of the Rhion, and looked towards the snow-clad mountains of Uzurghetti. The evening was serene and beautiful; every object could be seen in its mellow light, far far away over river and plain to the glorious mountains, where the people might sing with David, as expressed in the happy paraphrase of Milman,—

“For the strength of the hills, we bless thee,
Our God, our father's God!”

While Omar Pasha enjoyed the *otium cum dignitate* above the Rhion, he received intelligence that the Russians were only three hours distant. This was very near for an inferior and beaten army to take up its quarters in a country so practicable for pursuit; but the Russians regulated their promenade by that of the army which it would be a great stretch of courtesy to call their pursuers. As the Turks strolled on, the Russians strolled off, leaving Mingrelian militia and irregulars to watch and bring them news; while the peasantry were duly instructed to give such answers to the inquiries of the Turks as would be most likely to mislead them. Only the previous night the Russians had been encamped also upon the Rhion, at Choloni.

On the 18th the advance was resumed; the line of march was suitable for cavalry, artillery, and baggage, but the river had to be forded repeatedly at its various windings, the Russians having in their leisurely retreat broken down all the bridges behind them. The peculiarity of the scenery during this day's progress was the frequent recurrence of high conical hills, grandly wooded, and with monasteries of the Mingrelian Church crowning their summits. These buildings were not of stone, yet they had architectural symmetry, and were picturesque exceedingly. Omar never had an easier or pleasanter march in his campaignings, and no doubt Colonel Simmons found him a pleasant companion, and his own work light and agreeable; what sense of responsibility the British military commissioner entertained, who but himself and his other self, the sirdar, could say?

The troops found a new camping-ground upon a spot as charming as any they had as yet occupied; it was at Sakharbet, on the river Ziewie. Just under the encampment, at the bend of the river, was a cataract, whence the waters took their last bound from the higher grounds into the plain which they helped to fertilise and beautify, until they sought the embrace of the Rhion. The plain irrigated by the Ziewie was very lovely; meadow-land and grain fields were surrounded by woods, through which the spires of the Christian churches peeped, as if the forest trees were the sentinels of religion and liberty,

within whose encircling guardianship the sanctuaries of the fair realm stood calm and safe.

Skender Pasha here vented his anger at the delay in terms of loyal indignation. For this indignation the commander-in-chief allowed the brave Pole plenty of leisure, for the spot was so pleasant, that a couple of days were consumed there, in the military occupation of coffee and pipes, by the grand pashas and their astute but, in this case, faithless chief. While the advanced-guard saw field and forest, rock and hill, and the clear azure heaven reflected in the placid water of the Ziewie, or watched its dancing foam hurrying with joyful leap from the rocks to the calm current below, the main body of the army came straggling along—their pace might have left the impression that they were pilgrims journeying to some shrine of the prophet, if it had not been for all “the pomp and glorious circumstance of war,” which clung to them. Seldom had an army such an important mission, and so glorious an opportunity of fulfilling it, Providence favouring them at every step, and never were duty and opportunity more shamefully slighted. Meanwhile the English officers and amateurs rode about the country, and were well received by the inhabitants, who, at the sight of a Turk, either fled with their goods, or prepared for resistance. The impressions concerning the people created by these rambles were exceedingly favourable. They wished to be free from Turks and Russians, and cherished a vague idea that the English would land and give them liberty. It was evident that the people would have flocked around the standard of Victoria, whose name was a word of reverence and hope.

Skender Pasha continued to go on five miles in advance, while the Turks loitered at the last station, and the brave Pole took post upon the river Techoua, one of those beautiful streams which stretch their silvery network over the green vesture of Mingrelia.

From this place Ferhad Pasha made a reconnaissance as far as the river Skeniscal. The Russians had just succeeded in leisurely placing the river between Ferhad and themselves; a few, however, of their Cossacks, lingering on the Turkish side, were killed or captured. Ferhad was a daring soldier, and often incurred great peril in his adventurous reconnaissances.

While the Turks occupied these pleasant quarters, a spy, in the costume of a Mingrelian peasant, was caught, who proved to be a Russian officer, and was accordingly shot. He was a man of family, and aide-de-camp to a Russian general.

Skender employed his troops in constructing bridges over the Ziewie and Techoua, wondering what delayed the sirdar, and burning for the order to proceed. While thus occupied, the rainy season commenced. Omar might

have been at Kutais before a drop of rain had fallen. Now the heavens, so calm and clear during the whole march, began to lour; thick, dense piles of black cloud rolled along the whole horizon; the forest trees rustled with the peculiar sound which presages a storm, as if an unseen spirit passed among their foliage; the rivers flowed darkly by, as if no more in fellowship with the gay soldiers that had wandered on their banks; the scream of the wild birds sounded at once harsh and melancholy, as if anger, fear, and grief disturbed them, and, flying nearer the earth, their wings flapped heavily, and with a distinctness of sound, such as those who have watched birds when pre-luding a storm could not fail to recognise. Occasionally a gush of wind rushed down from the mountains, and swept the valley, as if the wing of a great spirit passed over it, and all was again calm—so calm that a consciousness pervaded the mind that it would soon be terribly interrupted: it was as if Nature felt suspense, and awaited the announcement of the war of elements which was about to break above the war of armies.

These portents did not last long: suddenly as they appeared they were lost in the events they portended; a terrible storm burst forth from the mountains, and—

“The live thunder leapt from crag to crag;”

the whole heaven seemed changed to a mighty sea rolling above the earth, but speedily to break upon it in a deluge, such as, ages past, submerged the world, leaving only those everlasting hills above the surge when the ark rested upon Ararat. After the first big drops fell as a warning, the rain descended in a flood, and smote the earth; the rivers were soon swollen into mighty rushing tides, and the whole country became one vast morass. The bridges built by Skender were at once swept away, the tents of the soldiers were permeated, or thrown down, and the whole army was placed in the most pitiable condition. The sufferings of the soldiery were considerable; springs gushed up in some of the tents, and the men slept and lived in mud; their condition was a counterpart to that of the troops in the Crimea during the memorable winter of 1854. Skender, by indefatigable exertions, constructed another bridge across the Techoua, in advance of the main body of the army, but it was insufficient for either artillery or cavalry. Some pontoons were lashed together, and designed to carry across the guns; it was hoped that the troopers might find a ford. Such was the state of affairs when the rain ceased, and fine weather promised again to set in. Accordingly, after a fortnight's idleness on the banks of the Ziewie, the main body of the army were ordered, on

the 2nd of December, to advance once more. The day's march terminated at the village or town of Sinakia; this was a short measure of progress, although the late rains rendered the ground less practicable for an army. The villagers fled at the approach of the Turks, leaving all their doors padlocked, which were of course broken open, and the houses made available for quarters. Scarcely had the first detachments reached the village, when a storm broke hoarsely over the country, and the rain descended with much of its previous force.

On the 3rd, at daylight, the advance was resumed. The Techoua was crossed by the bridge and by the pontoons, described before as made by Skender, who was in advance of the army upon the banks of that river. A ford was found, over which the cavalry passed; the guns were let down the steep banks, and ferried across on the pontoons; some guns and infantry passed by the ford, but the main body of the foot soldiers went over the frail bridge in single file: had the enemy been posted on the opposite bank, the passage might have been disputed successfully. Cossack horse watched the process from the hills, but retreated before a party of Circassian cavalry. It was mid-day before the army was on the march; the day was fine but cold, and many of the men had their clothes wet through. That night the army camped amidst fields of Indian-corn and stubble by the side of a small river, the soldiers knee-deep in mud, even in their tents. The next morning saw them on their onward way by dawn; nearly every mile there was a river to ford, causing delay, and at such a season causing the men much cold and suffering. Health was, however, maintained through the army, and the weather held up. The rivers Abasha and Skeniseal offered formidable barriers to further progress. About two miles from the latter the army encamped, and were in the presence of the enemy, who appeared in force beyond the Skeniseal, and seemed doubtful of his strength to resist the passage. The “Sirdar Ekrem” rode along the line of tents, telling the soldiers that on the morrow they should once more be engaged with the enemy. The soldiers answered by shouts of “*Inshallah!*” Omar seemed himself again at the prospect of meeting the foe, although he appeared by his dilatory proceedings hitherto as in no haste to find him. That night tidings reached the sirdar that the Russians considered the ground unfavourable to oppose the passage of the river, but that two miles further, near the town of Mehranie, there was a position of strength, where they would resist his further progress at the hazard of a general battle. It was further stated that Bebutoff had arrived with reinforcements, and that an action as formidable as that of the

Ingour was at hand. At this juncture we must leave the sirdar and his army, and in another chapter relate the issue of the campaign. Before doing so, however, by presenting the following extract of a despatch from Colonel Simmons to Lord Stratford, the reader will be enabled to judge of the light in which the prospects of the army were regarded at headquarters, or, at all events, the light in which it was desired to place them before the British ambassador. Lord Stratford did not receive this letter until after the fall of Kars:—

“I have to inform your lordship that the army broke up from Sougdidi on the 15th inst., on which day the communications were opened between the advanced-guard at Chopi and Redout Kaleh, where Omar Pasha has formed depots for provisioning the troops. The distance from Redout Kaleh to Chopi is about eighteen miles, along a road in a great measure macadamised, and, consequently, the provisioning of the troops will be much facilitated.

“The advanced-guard is now at Sinakia, on the Tikour, the main body being at the village of Taklit (marked Seklami on the map), on the river Sieva. The army is now detained, while provisions are being brought up from Redout Kaleh, and a depot formed here, the distance from the sea being about thirty miles. As soon as this depot shall be formed, probably in two days, Omar Pasha proposes collecting his army, which is now echeloned along the road from the Tikour to Sougdidi, and then moving on again *en masse*.

“The troops have been echeloned in this manner to facilitate their provisioning. In the meantime, a reconnaissance has been pushed on to the Skeniscal, which separates Mingrelia from Imeritia; and it appears that the Russians have entirely evacuated this province. In their retreat they have destroyed all the bridges, and even large culverts on the road; they have abandoned several positions temporarily fortified, and especially the position of this camp, where there is a strong intrenchment, which was thrown up last year, covering a large extent of ground, and naturally of great strength. In it were enclosed temporary barracks and a depot of provisions. Both have been destroyed by fire, as also have a range of temporary barracks at Chopi, and considerable magazines and stores at Cheta, and at Sinakia on the Tikour. In fact, the further the Turkish army penetrates the country, the more evident is it that the Russians have miscalculated their powers of resistance; and the results of the success of the 6th inst. become more apparent. Their losses on that occasion must have been great, and may be moderately estimated at from 1600 to 1800 killed and wounded.

“I am happy to inform your lordship that the very strict measures taken by Omar Pasha to prevent pillage have met with very great success. The Abasians, who at first caused so much fear to the inhabitants of Mingrelia, and had commenced committing great havoc among them, stealing even children, have been sent back to their own country, some of them after receiving severe chastisement from the Turkish military authorities. The few Circassians that remain are held in check; and as to the troops themselves, I do not think, although they have generally found the villages deserted, the whole army have plundered to the value of £10, and to that extent only in articles of consumption. The result is, that as the army advances in the country, the villages are less deserted, and I do not despair of the army even deriving some little benefit from the resources of the country. These, however, are not numerous, and will be confined to hay and Indian-corn for the horses, and a small supply of meat, with some few bāt-horses. The country, however, as the army proceeds to the eastward, improves and becomes more cultivated.

“I have to inform your lordship that, according to reports received, the Russians in retiring have burnt their gun-boat flotilla on the Rhion. In fact, everything appears to indicate now their inability to resist for any length of time on this side of Kutais. It is not improbable, however, that in order to gain time for the removal of their sick and stores, they may oppose the passage of the Skeniscal.

“I would further observe to your lordship that this army, which numbers in all about 40,000 men, will require strong available reinforcements, if they are to maintain their position at or in front of Kutais against the Russian army, after it shall be reinforced by Mouravieff's army from before Kars.

“The Turkish general, as his army is at present disposed, has not much more than 20,000 to meet the enemy in an advanced position. He has been able to make no use of the force of 10,000 men which formed the army of Batoum, under Mustapha Pasha, before the diversion in favour of the army of Kars was in contemplation, that force being very much disorganised by mismanagement and weakened by disease. Some little has been done to re-establish it, and probably 6000 men may be counted upon from it in the spring. The remainder of Omar Pasha's army consists of 15,000 men from before Sebastopol, and 15,000 men from Roumelia, strong detachments of whom it has been necessary to leave to protect the magazines at Suchum Kaleh, and Shemsheraï, to hold Sougdidi, and to maintain the communications of the army, so that when the army reaches Kutais, it will not much exceed 20 000 men.”

CHAPTER CVIII.

RETREAT OF OMAR PASHA FROM THE BANKS OF THE SKENISCAL, AND TERMINATION OF THE MINGRELIAN CAMPAIGN.

"His retreat was one of suffering, privation, and fatigue, but he met with no disaster in arms, and in various combats taught the enemy to beware of his sword."—SIR WILLIAM NAPIER.
English Battles and Sieges in the Peninsula.

IN our last chapter we left the sirdar and his army on the banks of the Skeniscal, forming plans for crossing, expecting a general action, and watched by their adversaries. The state of the weather was such that every ditch in the country was filled with water, every stream was increased to a river, and the Skeniscal was a mighty flood, rolling its vast volume impetuously onward to the lower levels. Strenuous efforts were made by Omar and his lieutenants to find a ford, but in vain; while the rain fell fast, and the storm howled morosely over the country which had erst smiled so gaily, and dazzled its conquerors with its beauty. A body of Russian cavalry were not deterred by the inclement weather from crossing a ford higher up, and attempting a surprise upon the left flank of the invaders. The Rifles were on the alert, and punished the enterprising horsemen. The officers suffered severely in seeking a ford, and in reconnoitring the enemy, especially Skender Pasha and the English, whose activity always brought them into any existing peril. Ballard and his Rifles, while seeking a ford, were fired upon by the Russians from the opposite bank. This fire was not returned, as it would have been a useless expenditure of ammunition, and, if men fell, a useless expenditure of human life. A great issue could not be effected by such a desultory musketade. Finding that their shots were not answered, the Muscovs ceased skirmishing, moved nearer to the river, took off their hats, politely saluted the English officers, and appeared to watch with some curiosity their efforts to discover a ford. The rain continued to pour down, the river and all its tributaries to rise, and the storm now beat upon the flooded country as if it were a tempest-smitten sea. The ducks bought from the country people were swimming around the tents, and found scope for their aquatic amusement even within the marquees of beys and pashas. The condition of the army became intolerable; to advance was impossible, to remain encamped in flooded fields, at a season when every evil which beset the expedition would necessarily become aggravated, would have been to sacrifice the whole army—a retrograde movement became imperative. Omar was *too late*; the weeks which he loitered on the Ziewie, the week he delighted himself with the palaces of the Dadians, and the days spent on the battle-field of the Ingour and elsewhere, now visited him

with retribution; he was encircled with the increasing rigours of an advancing winter, and in the presence of an enemy strongly reinforced, well acquainted with the country, and to whom all its supplies were open.

On the morning of the 8th of December the sirdar saw the necessity of giving the order to retreat. The foreign officers and Turkish soldiers received it with chagrin and murmurs; the Turkish pashas seemed to receive it as glad tidings: their hearts were never in the expedition, any more than those of the sirdar and the British commissioner. If it were impossible to advance, it was extremely difficult to retire: weary marches and bitter hardships were in prospect; the supplies which had been the pretext of so many delays were short; and the enemy, fording the river much higher up, would, with their numerous cavalry, hang upon the rear of the dispirited and retreating host. Such were the reasonings and speculations of men and officers, and no risk could have been proposed to them which they would not have received as an alternative to such a retreat. The depots which, during the delay at Ziewie, had been formed there, were being rapidly cut off by the swelling of the rivers in the rear, and the provisions in camp were inadequate. It added much to the mortification of the army to know that, had they been able to cross the Skeniscal, they could have had water communication with Redout Kaleh, where boats were laden with provisions ready to be sent up.

In the evening of the first day's march news arrived of the fall of Kars. It cannot be urged with any candour by the apologists of the sirdar that he begun his retreat because he knew Kars was lost, although this has been attempted by some officers whose conduct in the expedition was heroic and useful. Omar was baffled by the rising of the Skeniscal, having by his delays on the march exposed himself to such a chance.

So impeded was the journey that the retreat was conducted at the rate of about a mile an hour; it was very difficult to bring off the artillery. The rascally pashas and beys were generally so far in advance of their men, that the soldiers were in a great measure left to themselves, and confusion necessarily ensued. Had the Russian cavalry shown what is vulgarly called "pluck," they might have cut up several of the battalions. The vigilance and bravery of Ballard's Rifles, who composed the

rear-guard were such as to leave the enemy little inclination to molest them. On arriving near the banks of Abasha the troops were camped, Skender Pasha bearing the onus of restoring order. Soon after the halt he rode up to the rear-guard, and asked for two companies of Rifles to reconnoitre under Mehemet Ali Effendi, one of his aides-de-camp. Mehemet had not long disappeared with his companies when a sharp firing was heard, and four companies of Rifles were ordered to his support. Mehemet had been attacked by Georgian militia, numbering three times as many as his Rifles; he fell back firing; the Georgians behaved most cowardly, keeping up a distant and innocuous fusillade, and retreating hastily when the supports arrived, but not before twelve of their number were slain. An Arab distinguished himself on this occasion, who was no less a personage than Bou-Maza, the lieutenant of Abd-el-Kader, the celebrated Arab chief. Bou-Maza had made his name familiar to men by his heroic achievements against the French in the neighbourhood of Algiers. He afterwards offered his services to his padishaw, and obtained the rank of bey. He had just arrived, and joined the army of the sirdar, attended by a negro, who, like himself, was splendidly mounted upon an Arab charger; four beautiful Persian greyhounds were also a part of his strange suite. Bou-Maza and his negro galloped up to within a few yards of the Georgians, and there calmly but rapidly loaded their long rifles, firing into the scattered ranks of the militia, who in vain concentrated their fire upon them. *It is probable that most of the Georgians who were hit received their wounds from these two adventurous Africans.

The next morning the passage of the Abasha had to be encountered; the difficulties were many, for the waters rolled in a rapid and mighty torrent. Scarcely had the rear-guard cleared the banks, when the Cossack horse rode down to their encampment of the previous night; but they kept timidly out of rifle-range. The march from the banks of the Abasha was even more toilsome and painful than that of the previous day; the rain fell very fast; horses dropped down dead; the men, haggard and care-looking, lagged in considerable numbers behind; hunger began to pinch the host, and in this plight they arrived in the afternoon on the banks of the Techoua. It was necessary, if possible, to effect the passage; the river was more flooded than when it was crossed so cleverly under the auspices of Skender Pasha in the advance. By dint of labour and perseverance, and profiting by their previous acquaintance with the fords, the opposite bank was reached, before night would have increased the danger, or deferred the enterprise. The encampment was more miserable

than tongue can describe; the Georgian militia hung upon the right flank, and one sentry was shot. The morning dawned upon as wretched-looking an army as ever suffered the horrors of an ill-timed retreat. Omar Pasha was deeply dejected; the intrigue to which he had lent his great influence was now retributively telling upon himself; ague and rheumatism were preying upon all ranks of the army, and it seemed as if nothing short of a miracle could save them. They sadly answered the description given by the great poet:—

“ Desperate of their bones,
Ill-favour'dly become the morning field,
Big Mars seems bankrupt in their beggared host,
And faintly through a rusty beaver peeps.”

In fact, the army was fit for nothing but battle; like the English, the common Turkish soldiery, when they have confidence in their officers, will turn and meet an enemy with spirit, enthusiasm, and success, even in the most disastrous retreat, and when retreat itself seems beyond their strength. A divine anger kindles in their spirits when they believe their cause is just, and the enemy comes on even at the greatest advantage; they can snatch victory from a powerful foe in the hour of famine or most disastrous strategical retreat. At Sinakia the Circassian horse encountered the Georgian militia; a skirmish ensued, a man on each side fell, the Rifles entered the street of the village, and the militia ran away. Before they fled they captured a corporal, whom they murdered, and left his head before the door of one of the principal houses in the place.

The retreating army reached the banks of the Ziewie, where Omar had allowed them to amuse themselves for a fortnight, when the hill-sides were sunny and covered with wild flowers, which also dotted the plains, and caressed the limpid river as it glided by the banks which they adorned. How changed now!—the river was a torrent, and the flooded fields presented a wide-pread prospect of dreariness and desolation. During the night spent upon the Ziewie the Georgians and Cossacks moved stealthily upon the right flank of the army, and endeavoured to pick off the sentries—they had simply their trouble, and a long night's exposure to the inclement weather, as their reward; but as day dawned they were more successful—two sentries were shot within forty yards of the doctor's tents. The supplies at this period were rice and biscuit; there was plenty of water to drink, but nothing else. The irregular cavalry of the enemy closed up within range of the rear-guard, and skirmished, cutting off foragers, and constituting almost a pursuit. The commissary horses were nearly starved; half of them had perished already. A little bad tea, and a very little tobacco, con-

stituted the luxuries of the superior officers. Thus woe-worn and weary the army arrived at Choloni, where the sirdar resolved to take up his winter-quarters, for which he considered that the formation of the country and other circumstances offered advantages. He took up his own quarters on a hill beneath that on which was situated the monastery; from this point he had a commanding view, while so gentle was the eminence, and so well sheltered by a greater elevation, that he found some protection against the wintry winds. Sickness now prevailed extensively; the biting rheum, wasting ague, and fever, made serious inroads upon the health and the efficiency of the army; hardly a man but was reduced so much in strength that he was not fully competent for military duty, and might with propriety be classed as an invalid. Scarcely had the retreat terminated upon Choloni than the rain ceased, and the sun gleamed out fitfully but cheerily. The army was encouraged by seeing the valley of the Rhion smiling in sunshine once again. The bands of the regiments were brought into requisition, and that of the sirdar, which was a good one (more than could be said for any connected with the regiments), turned out in front of head-quarters, and performed many pleasant pieces. The sun did not bestow constant favours at Choloni; these gleams of light and warmth were followed by a rapid fall of rain, and storm rattled upon the hill-top above the sirdar's quarters, lashed the Rhion, and swept the plain with its previous fierceness. The soldiers' tents became literally knee-deep in water, which, when the rain for any time intermitted, subsided into mud. In this state the camp continued during the rainy season.

On the 16th Mr. Longworth, the English civil commissioner, and Mr. Oliphant, left Choloni for Redout Kaleh. As they left the camp the first object that met their eye was a soldier who had sunk into a ditch with hunger, and was drowned. Others perished on that and the succeeding days from cold and famine, although supplies now began to reach the army tolerably fast. Death was busy in the hospitals; in fact, the whole encampment was an hospital. Along the road from Choloni to Chorga Mr. Longworth saw the draught-bullocks lying dead in numbers, and their drivers, from Bulgaria, emaciated, and ready to sink by the way-side. Horses also lay in numbers, dying or dead, and the soldiery engaged in the transport service were so wretched and ill that they would have bid death welcome. When Mr. Longworth and his companion arrived at Chorga they could obtain no refuge until they dispossessed some pigs of their shelter; and her Britannic majesty's commissioner in civil matters, attending the

Turkish army in Mingrelia, took up his abode with his companion in a sty. The next day these gentlemen went on horseback to Redout Kaleh; part of the road lay between the river and a morass, and here the Russians had thrown up earthworks to obstruct the advance of Omar Pasha, had he invaded Mingrelia by way of Redout Kaleh; these works could have been stormed one after another, but could not have been turned, unless a flotilla of gun-boats ascended the river. It is but justice to Omar to say that he had heard of these works before he determined on abandoning Redout Kaleh as a base of operation, and was partly influenced in doing so by this circumstance. Whether these obstructions, taken into connection with the disadvantages of the port of Redout Kaleh, were sufficient reasons for choosing Suchum Kaleh, and the so much more circuitous route from it, is an open question among military men; but Omar's delays on the route he did take admit of no apology.

On the 17th Colonel Simmons, the British military commissioner, left the camp and set out for Redout Kaleh, *en route* for England, attended by his aide-de-camp, Captain McIntyre. Colonel Hinde soon followed his example, so did Colonel Caddell and others, until Colonel Ballard was the only British officer who determined to weather the winter with the troops. He stayed with his brave Rifles, who had so well followed him in march, and skirmish, and battle.

While the troops remained at Choloni, an affair disgraceful to the Dadian family occurred at Sougdidi. One hundred and eighty Turkish invalids were left there. Prince Gregoire, brother of the Princess Dadian, gathered 500 Georgian and Imeritian militia together, and forced all the peasantry of the neighbourhood to take up arms, under the threat of burning their homesteads. He entered the town at night at the head of this incongruous body of assailants, and attacked the little garrison of sick men. Before any alarm reached the unsuspicious Turks, four of their number were put to death, and thirty-two made prisoners on their sick-beds. The remainder flew to arms, and assembling on the square before the palace of the princess, repelled the attack, charged their assailants with the bayonet, and drove them out of the square. The enemy retreated through the narrow streets; from their numbers they were so massed that the Turks were enabled to pour in upon them a deadly fire, killing sixty, among whom were eight beys: the wounded were twice as many, but most of them contrived to escape. The gallant little Turks then barricaded the approaches to the square, and sent a peasant friendly to the English to Omar Pasha for relief, but offering bravely to defend the post to the last man.

Gregoire, unable to dislodge the Turks, attacked a bey who had joined the invading army; this chieftain had many retainers, and armed them in a strong castle, where he fortified himself and defied the prince, but at the same time sent word to Omar that his situation was one of danger. Skender Pasha, ever on the alert for fighting, undertook the relief of the bey, and of the little garrison at Sougdidi; taking with him a regiment of cavalry and a battalion of Ballard's Rifles, which the colonel accompanied, being, like Skender himself, always eager for a gallant adventure. The enemy was at this time within a few miles of the camp, and Skender, placing Ballard and his Rifles in ambush, advanced with his cavalry against Gregoire. The prince, despising so small a force, charged Skender, whose horsemen simulated flight, until they had decoyed the enemy into the ambush; a volley of rifle-balls smote the pursuers, 100 fell, and many horses; the rest fled panic-struck, and dispersed. Skender then rode to Sougdidi, and arranged matters there in accordance with his instructions.

The protection which had been previously afforded to the palace and property of the Princess Dadian, who acted in Mingrelia as queen-regent for her son, was removed after the treacherous attack of Prince Gregoire, which, it is alleged, her only other brother countenanced and aided. The princess played a double game: she sent a lady of her suite to negotiate with the sirdar when he was a conqueror; she connived at the attack upon the invalid Turks when the sirdar had retreated, and the star of Russia was in the ascendant. Her brothers would never have dared to arm the peasantry, or lead the Mingrelia militia without her permission, however they might as civil or military officers of the czar have felt themselves at liberty to lead Georgian militia or regular troops. Accordingly, the sirdar withdrew his protection, and the furniture, pictures, and other valuables of the princess were carried away, and, it is alleged, appropriated to Omar Pasha's own use. However this may be, the Russian negotiators at the close of the war, among many other impudent things done by them, claimed compensation for the injury inflicted on the property of this princess, alleging that the sirdar upon the advance of his army despoiled the princess of her valuable goods. The Russians found various anonymous writers in England to take their side on this as on every other question. Perhaps the most competent living witness upon the subject is Captain McIntyre, and his statement of the whole matter is as follows:—"I believe that, with one other exception, I am the only English officer now in the country who was present at the occupation of Sougdidi, and I myself assisted in posting the guards to protect the

property of the princess. Subsequent to the greatly-to-be-lamented death of Captain Dymock, at the passage of the Ingour, I had the honour of serving till the close of the campaign as aide-de-camp to her majesty's commissioner, Colonel Simmons, I had, consequently, an opportunity of hearing the orders of his highness Omar Pasha (for in the Turkish army orders are not usually given in writing), and seeing how those orders were carried out. I will not trespass further on your space than by saying that the conduct of the Turkish army was most exemplary, even during their retreat; and it is a well-known fact that a retreat is much more trying to discipline than an advance. The Russians stated that the damage and removal took place during the advance of the Turkish army, and therefore claimed compensation. Such was not the case. I myself am a witness of the strictness with which the palace grounds and whole town of Sougdidi were guarded, and soldiers were even punished for helping themselves to the tempting fruit in the deserted orchards close to their camp. Guards were left by Omar Pasha for the protection of the princess's property from her plundering neighbours, the Abkhasians; and this protection was given till her own relatives led a treacherous and murderous night attack on the small detachment left for that purpose. This conduct on their part justified any amount of retaliation. The right or wrong of the question depends entirely on dates. What would have been wrong and quite contrary to the wishes and orders of his highness Omar Pasha previous to the above-named outrage was perfectly justifiable, if not even necessary, as a lesson to those who had proved themselves incapable of appreciating the kind protection afforded them and their property."

Colonel Caddell, who, as before shown, commanded Omar Pasha's artillery, confirmed the representations made by Captain McIntyre. Whoever may be right as to the time when the princess was deprived of her paintings and works of *virtu*, and whoever became the possessor, there can be no doubt that the palace was utterly sacked some time after the advance, and that the double-dealing of the princess merited from the sirdar a severe chastisement.

Skender Pasha repeatedly proposed to his commander, while at winter-quarters, the desirableness of harassing the enemy by cavalry expeditions, and he urged upon the general the policy of permitting him to carry out the following plan: that he should take the whole of the cavalry, each man to carry seven days' provisions and no tents, and if any of his men were wounded, they should be left where they fell; no prisoners were to be taken—which looks very like a proposal to give no quarter. Neither this nor any other of the many pro-

posals of Skender for active operations against the enemy was sanctioned by the sirdar. It was in vain that the restless Pole showed that the enemy might be annoyed and harassed greatly, and made to suffer much loss by a judicious employment of the cavalry force, supported occasionally by light infantry and light field-guns. At last, the camp itself was threatened by the Russian cavalry and native militia, and it was necessary for Omar to request the aid of the active and daring Pole. Accordingly, on the morning of the 23rd of December, Skender issued forth to reconnoitre, and he seldom reconnoitred without meeting with the enemy, attacking him, and crossing swords with some of his horsemen. On this occasion he found four battalions of militia and a number of mountain guns, posted so as to command the rear of the Turkish army. They occupied a village, and the country on either side was thickly wooded. Skender, having found that he could not efficiently operate with his cavalry, and although by no means as cautious as he was brave, sent for reinforcements of infantry; they arrived—a skirmishing fire of Minié musketry was opened upon the militia, who found it more hot than agreeable, and prepared to retire, drawing off their guns. Just at this juncture Skender ordered a bayonet charge; a flock of geese appearing on the scene, the hungry Turks charged them instead, and Skender was left to dash in alone, sword in hand, among the enemy, and cut his way out as he best could. His soldiers were equally successful; they secured large numbers of the geese. Skender was liberal of blows and curses for this offence; but the gallant Ottoman Rifles despised the militia, and thought them likely to run away without a charge, which the geese were not so inclined to do, whose capture at the same time was in their opinion more important than that of a whole army of militia. The Rifles were greatly astonished that the intrepid Skender did not see things from the same practical point of view as themselves. However, they had no objection to charge the militia also, and lowered bayonets for that purpose, some of them having geese dangling from their firelocks, while many had tied them to their belts. Amidst the cackle of such geese as had not expired, and the laughter of their victors, the charge upon the militia began. The militia, to do them justice, retired in order, and the Rifles were commanded to pour in a close volley; but hunger and contempt for their enemies again interfered with duty, for the militia had a large flock of sheep quietly feeding by the village, no doubt driven there by the people for security,—the Turks directed the volley at the sheep, and with loud cheers rushed upon the flock. The Turks were right—the sheep were killed and carried away,

or driven into camp; the volley that slaughtered the sheep frightened the militia, who fled in all directions, and the soldiers set fire to the village, to save any further trouble in the way of dislodging the garrison. Skender was very severe, but the Rifles returned, boasting of their achievement; they had conquered geese and sheep, while the militia were driven away without the trouble of shooting many of them; their little stronghold also was reduced to ashes. Skender, who was very serious in everything, especially in the matter of fighting, was amazed to find that his complaints only excited the amusement of the victors, and that the Rifles told the story themselves without any compunction, or incurring any disapprobation: they understood the quality of their adversaries, and acted accordingly.

December closed in great severity; the rain gave place to snow; the cold earth was the resting-place of the poor Turks, except when they collected the wet leaves (not yet decomposed), to make of them miserable beds. Horrible were the sufferings of this army, which were yet more increased as the new year opened with a severity of weather intensified by frost. Omar did his best with his means to shelter, feed, and tend his brave Turks, but his supplies were miserably defective, for which the authorities at Constantinople were responsible.

Early in January the sirdar moved his headquarters to the neighbourhood of Redout Kaleh, which, after all the objections previously raised to it, became his place of support.

Tidings having arrived that there was a road between Sougdidi and Kutais, which was in excellent condition, and lay through forests, which had concealed it from the army in its advance, Skender Pasha was sent with the cavalry and several battalions of infantry to reconnoitre. Notwithstanding the intense cold and the snow, Skender pushed his way to Sougdidi, reconnoitred the surrounding country, punished partisans, fell upon unsuspecting militia, burnt their houses, and returned in triumph.

Nothing more was accomplished worthy of record. The unfortunate expedition failed in producing any general effect, except to reveal more fully the corruption and intrigue at Constantinople, and the dangers of a divided command in allied armies. It had some personal consequences that were important, for it disclosed more thoroughly to western Europe the character of Omar Pasha, both as a man and a general, and vindicated the military genius, while it indirectly exalted the personal character, of Sir William Williams. Omar proved himself to be a general—such as a gentleman who served with him both on the Danube and in Mingrelia described him in conversation with the author—"capable of laying down an

excellent plan of campaign, but of indifferent capacity for working it out." On the Danube he was seconded by officers, Turkish and British, of great talent, especially by General Cannon (Behram Pasha), a memoir of whom will appear on another page. Omar had the misfortune to regard all competitors for military glory with jealousy. If a lieutenant of his own served him well, executing the plans of the commander-in-chief with more ability than the commander himself could have carried them out, Omar never rested (if he had the power) until that officer was got rid of from his army. In this manner his irrepressible jealousy operated to the disadvantage of his own command. Nor did he regard the exigencies of the sultan's service, in his efforts to drive away from his armies all whom he supposed might earn a rival's share in the glory of their achievements. Sir William Williams was intended to be the victim of this irrepressible envy, therefore Omar never marched upon Kutais, and therefore Kmety found it his interest, apart from the desire to please the jealous English ambassador, to run down all the talented Englishmen who served in Kars. Providence defeated alike the envious obstructions of the Turkish generalissimo and the British plenipotentiary, for only by famine were the heroes of Kars subdued, and that might have been averted if the English ambassador had done his duty, or the clique of pashas, whom Omar and his powerful friends protected, had not intrigued to bring it about; so that the fall of Kars and the captivity of the English officers enhanced their glory—that became all their own which Omar and Selim and their treacherous confraternity might have shared. Had Omar "operated manfully in any direction" when he landed on the eastern coasts of the Black Sea, Russia would have entered upon negotiations for peace under far less favourable circumstances than ultimately was the case; she would have found herself deprived of territory in Asia as well as Europe at the juncture of negotiations. Other terms could have been wrung from her more favourable to the future. We should have seen Asia Minor settled for years, probably for ages—perhaps for ever. As matters were left, we believe it will yet be necessary that the Sepoy and the Cossack meet in the deadly rivalry of England and Russia for oriental influence. We firmly believe this, notwithstanding the argu-

ments of learned and the sneers of witty men, who know the difficulties of the regions to be traversed by the armies of the rivals. Before the recent war broke out, the author of this History ventured to predict to an eminent minister of the czar, that before long the two empires would be engaged in conflict. The minister laughingly and half-angrily replied, "But where will their forces meet?" Our opinion then was that they would meet on both the European and Asiatic confines of Turkey; and whether or not they again meet in conflict upon the same theatres of action, they are surely destined to fierce and protracted warfare in another direction. By way of Persia and Central Asia events will bring the forces of the two empires nearer and nearer, until the moment arrives for the collision which will shake the Eastern world. All the "impossibilities" that have been urged have received from us a careful consideration; and we stand not alone in the above opinion, but are supported by men of experience and intellectual power. Nor will the day be very distant; new material agencies will be brought into play by both empires, which will hasten the hour of concussion beyond all present calculations; still, as a distinguished English statesman remarked when addressing a Russian ambassador who suggested the possibility of what is here assumed as certain, "Whenever it occurs I have no fear for the result." Among the agencies which Providence uses to upheave the stagnant mind of nations, and force them into circumstances compelling mental activity, is the rivalry of great empires. That the oriental world will be permitted to sleep on as it does, for ever, we do not believe; and that the jealous efforts of those two vast, powerful, and ambitious empires are intended to bring rapid civilisation and advancement through all Asia, from Pekin to Teheran, from Teheran to the Caspian and the Caucasus, there are many indications which thinking and observing men can hardly overlook. That the time should soon come, all must desire, even although the preliminaries of a peaceful civilisation should be made by the dread accessories of war. However it may please God to bring it about, or permit the policy of European governments to promote it, it becomes all dutifully and hopefully to say,—

"Haste, happy day, which we so long to see,
When every son of Adam shall be free."

CHAPTER CIX.

FINAL OPERATIONS IN THE BALTIC.—GREAT DESTRUCTION OF RUSSIAN PROPERTY, AND CAPTURE OF RUSSIAN SHIPS.—RETURN HOME OF THE FLEET.

"Home! there's a storm in the whistling blast,
Home! the sun is sinking fast;
The wild bird is rocking in his nest;
Sinks on the moss the deer to rest.
Now for the fireside's cheerful blaze,
Songs of mirth, and tales of days.

Home, home!"—SIR HENRY R. BISHOP.

THE bombardment of Sweaborg, the history of which was given in a previous chapter, was the great feat of the naval campaign in the Baltic of 1855; yet it is possible that more injury was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of ships, boats, stores, and houses in the desultory operations of the fleet. During the latter part of July, and the beginning of August, Captain Otter of the *Firefly* struck by infernal machines among our illustrations. On the 1st of August Captain Otter destroyed the telegraph, while being used for making signals. He then captured the *Eides*, off Wasklött, laden with 228 barrels of tar. The vessel was a fine barque of 300 tons burthen.

The port of Brandon was much used for ship-building; and on an island, separated from the mainland by a very narrow channel, there were barracks, a custom-house, and extensive magazines. Captain Otter manned his boats, and sent them to the island, under the command of Lieutenant Ward. He found some of the magazines empty, but they were generally filled with naval stores—such as salt fish, biscuit, pitch, tar, resin, coal, spars, masts, anchors, cordage, sails, cables, boats, hawsers, hemp, tow, and a vast quantity of deal planks for ship purposes. While Lieutenant Ward was taking possession of these stores a deputation from the inhabitants of the town arrived upon the island, requesting that the town and all private property might be spared. They were informed that certain naval appliances, especially sails, must be surrendered, and they at once communicated with Mr. Wolf, a merchant of Wasa, whose property they were alleged to be. That gentleman refused to make any surrender, preferring to risk the destruction of the town, and many of the inhabitants, to foregoing his own claims for compensation upon the Russian government in case the property was destroyed. Captain Otter determined to fire the magazines; but as they were of very combustible material, and the wind blew on shore, the citizens apprehended a conflagration of the town, and begged delay

until a change of wind would afford them some security against such a catastrophe. The captain consented, and the citizens were grateful for his humanity. The captain also permitted them to remove all their property from the island, unless such as the government might use for military or naval purposes. On the 3rd of August, Lieutenant Burstal captured a schooner, and reported the discovery of two brigs and two barques in a creek less than two miles off. The captured schooner was brought to close in, and sailors were employed to load her with tar, spars, and planking. In the evening a fire of musketry was opened from the shore upon the sailors at work upon the island, upon the schooner, and upon the *Firefly*. The time conceded by Captain Otter had been employed in sending for some militia in the neighbourhood, and preparing for an attack. Thus all acts of clemency were repaid by treachery—the Russians, like the Asiatics, never kept a compact longer than suited their convenience, and never understood the clemency of an enemy, regarding it only as a proof of weakness of resource, or irresolution of mind. The Finns were faithful and grateful, but the authorities were Russians, and acted as Russians always did throughout the war—perfidiously. The *Firefly* replied to the musketry of the town by shot and shell, which swept down houses, destroying combatants and non-combatants together. Of this circumstance the government of St. Petersburg afterwards made use, in order to represent the English as making barbarous war, suppressing the fact that the guns of the *Firefly* replied to the musketry of the town, and that a compact had been made with the inhabitants of mutual abstinence from all hostility, excepting the destruction of the stores. For two hours the musketade was kept up from the town, although it must have been obvious to the authorities that its only result could be the loss of a few Englishmen, while a retaliation terrible and effective would be provoked. A man and a boy were wounded on board the *Firefly* by spent balls, twenty-five of the inhabitants or militia engaged were killed, and nearly as many wounded. During the night the Russians in the town were reinforced by a strong body of riflemen, and batteries were

erected. Next day one of these batteries of four guns was silenced, and the magazines and stores fired. This was done under showers of rifle-balls, and shot and shell from a battery previously masked by trees. For more minute details of the occurrence the reader is referred to Captain Otter's report. The whole transaction exemplified the necessity of dispatch in all operations against the Russians, and of entering into no negotiations involving delay, however dictated by humane considerations. Captain Otter should have proceeded at once to the destruction of all the stores on the island, and have effected it by his landing-party, before the enemy could place additional guns or send for troops. The simple circumstance of Wolf, the merchant, having refused to deliver up the sails, should have awakened the suspicion of the captain; for whatever his own interests might be, that person would hardly have set them against the lives and property of a whole community; it might have been supposed, by a less sagacious commander, that the refusal indicated the expectation of a defence. Had the inhabitants not sought delay for the ulterior purpose ultimately evinced, they would not have waited to consult Mr. Wolf, but have surrendered his property, and indemnified him either as a community or through the government. Whatever talent our officers in the Baltic campaigns, both of 1854-5, may have exhibited, the facility of being easily imposed upon, and induced to adopt dilatory measures, was very conspicuous. A list of the captures effected by Captain Otter will be found appended to his report.

The despatch of Admiral Dundas concerning these exploits was dated off Nargen, on the 22nd of August, on board the *Duke of Wellington*, and does justice to the ability and zeal of Captain Otter and the other officers concerned:—

"I have the honour to transmit, for the information of the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, a letter from Captain Warden, of her majesty's ship *Ajax*, enclosing a report detailing the proceedings of Captain Henry C. Otter, in her majesty's ship *Firefly*, before Brandon, the seaport of Wasa, in the Gulf of Bothnia, which are highly creditable to that officer, and to the officers and crew under his command; and I beg leave to recommend to the favourable notice of their lordships the gallant conduct of Lieutenants Edward Burstal and John Ward, as well as that of Mr. John A. Bull, second master, and Mr. James W. Salter, the gunner, on the occasion."

The following is Captain Warden's report to the admiral, from on board the *Ajax*, in Fogle Fiord, August 22:—

"I have the honour to lay before you the accompanying report of Captain Otter, of the *Firefly*, of his proceedings between the 27th of July and the 11th inst., at Brandon, in the neighbourhood of Wasa, while temporarily occupying that part of the station, together with a list of vessels taken and property and vessels otherwise destroyed; and I desire to draw your favourable notice to this report, as it bears witness to the zeal and energy of Captain Otter in the performance of this service."

On the 11th of August Captain Otter made his very luminous report to his senior, Captain Warden, off Korsoren Beacon:—

"I beg to acquaint you that after leaving Fogle Fiord, on the 27th ult., I communicated with her majesty's ship *Harrier*, and his imperial majesty's corvette *D'Assas*, on their stations, and on the evening of the 31st dispatched her majesty's ship *Driver* to you from Noorskas Light. At 10 a.m., on the 1st of August, I anchored her majesty's ship *Firefly* half a mile outside of Korsoren Beacon, and with the two paddlebox-boats and the gig, accompanied by Lieutenant Ward and Mr. Bull, pushed on to the south-east; on our way we got information of a large bark at anchor to the eastward of Wasklöt, and also that there was a military force in the neighbourhood. On arriving within two miles from Brandon a telegraph was observed on a small island in Korsahm Fiord, signalling with three large balls, and on pulling in towards it two men in a boat pushed off from the land with a flag of truce; fortunately I did not fire, for the flag was so large I mistook it for the boat's mainsail, and concluded they were trying to escape. This very improper opportunity of using a flag of truce could not be recognised, and I ordered the telegraph to be cut down, but released the men and their boat. No time was now to be lost, as the signal had been answered from the main; I therefore pushed on with all expedition, and on rounding the east point of Wasklöt observed the object of our search in the mud, which, with little difficulty was got off, and towed out of range of any guns that could be brought to bear. The prize proved to be the *Fides*, of 300 tons, with from 200 to 300 casks of tar on board. At midnight two Russian deserters came on board, and stated that the troops had moved off to Wasa on seeing the boats approaching, thinking an attack was contemplated on that place. At 8.30 a.m., on the 2nd of August I returned to the *Firefly*, and immediately got under weigh for Korsoren Fiord, but the navigation was so difficult that it was not until 5.30 p.m. I came alongside the prize. At 8.30 p.m. I weighed and proceeded towards Brandon, the sea-port of Wasa, and a great ship-building place; it had immense magazines

on an island, separated by a very narrow deep-water channel from the town, with a custom-house and barracks. At midnight I anchored within 400 yards of the town, and sprang the broadside to enfilade the channel and protect the boats which were sent under Lieutenant Ward to examine the magazines. Some of them were opened, and found to be empty; others contained coal, tar, resin, salt, spars, anchors and cables, boats, salt fish, hawsers, and numerous piles of 3-inch deals, but no sails or rigging, as we were led to expect. On a few of the principal inhabitants joining us on the island they were told that the sails of the bark must be given up, and they immediately sent to Wasa to Mr. Wolf, a wealthy merchant and shipowner, but he refused. I therefore determined to burn the magazines; but, as the wind was blowing directly on the town, I agreed to wait a reasonable time until a change took place, and gave the inhabitants notice that they were at liberty to remove anything from the island that belonged to them, except ship's stores. For this forbearance they expressed themselves very grateful. Towards the afternoon Lieutenant Burstal brought in a schooner, and reported having discovered two fine barks and two brigs in a creek a mile and a half distant. As the wind was still on the shore, and the destruction of the town inevitable had the magazines been fired, I directed the schooner to be hauled close into the island, and a working-party to put some casks of tar and deals into her. Everything had the appearance of security; ladies were walking about the beach, parties of pleasure sailing round the ship, and the people employed taking their property from the island. At 8 p.m. I landed to communicate with the first lieutenant, and had just visited the sentry placed on a building platform when a heavy fire of musketry from different parts of the town was opened upon the working-party and the ship, and was immediately replied to by the latter with shot and shell, which appear to have done great execution. The deck of the schooner was so enfiladed that it was impossible to get on board for the arms, and, had it been practicable to do so, not a man could be seen from her to fire at. Providentially, all escaped on board uninjured, and Mr. Bull having returned in the paddle-box-boats, with a fine bark in tow, a fire from the four guns and rifles was kept up so hotly that in about an hour and a half the fusillade from the shore nearly ceased. At midnight I moved the ship into a better position for sinking the schooner, and the bows being nearly driven in by the shot, I proceeded to the destruction of the bark and two brigs before the enemy could rescue them. This was successfully performed with the assistance of the second master, Mr. Bull and Mr. Salter, gunner. It was

ascertained afterwards, from two different sources, that the enemy had twenty-five killed, and from four to eighteen wounded; the injury appears to have been inflicted chiefly by the first three shots, while the troops were drawn up abreast of the ship. On our side I am thankful to report that no more serious casualties occurred than a man and a boy being struck with spent balls. During the 6th and 7th the weather was so wet and boisterous that it was impossible to act against the enemy, but I ascertained during the night that reinforcements had arrived to the amount of 200 or 300 sharp-shooters and Cossacks, with several guns. On the morning of the 8th, the weather being moderate, I took up a position 1500 yards from the magazine, and the same distance from a battery of four guns, and opened fire upon the latter, which, not being returned, I commenced firing red-hot shot at the magazines. At 2.30 p.m. smoke began to issue from the houses, and Lieutenant Ward, having volunteered to try and cut out the schooner, pushed in with the paddle-box-boat, and with great gallantry drove the soldiers three times out of the woods, but ultimately was obliged to retire before an overwhelming force secreted in the custom-house; the boat was struck in many places, but I am thankful to say not a man was hurt. At 8 p.m., the principal magazines being all in a blaze, and their destruction inevitable, I closed the battery to 1000 yards; but still receiving no return (though both guns and soldiers could be seen), and the ammunition being nearly expended, I was backing out, when suddenly several heavy guns, from an elevated position masked by trees, opened fire, chiefly with shells, and at the same time the whole force of riflemen—and the power of these weapons may be imagined when I mention that a ball cut through a spar on the bridge, two inches thick, at a distance of 1500 yards. It is with the greatest pleasure I have to speak of the coolness of the officers and men at this trying juncture; the narrowness of the channel and shoalness of the water (at the most $2\frac{3}{4}$ fathoms) rendered it injudicious to attempt turning the *Firefly* round, and she was slowly backed astern $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile before she was out of range, an evolution which, from the lightness of the wind, was not performed under forty minutes. I cannot conclude without mentioning how much I am indebted to the first lieutenant, Mr. Edward Burstal, who so materially assisted in inflicting this serious blow on the enemy's property."

The following is a list of vessels and property belonging to the enemy taken or destroyed by her majesty's ship *Firefly*, from the 1st to the 11th of August, 1855:—

"The *Fides*, bark, 300 tons; cargo, 228 barrels of tar; cut out of Wasklöt, near Bran-

don. The *Precioso*, bark, 420 tons; cargo, none; cut out of Wasklöt, near Brandon. A bark, 300 tons; cargo, none; burnt in a creek near Brandon; pierced for twenty guns; not quite finished. A brig, 230 (?) tons; cargo, none; burnt as above. A schooner 230 (?) tons; cargo, none; burnt as above. A flat, 15 tons; cargo, firewood. A boat, 10 tons; cargo, salt. A sloop, 20 tons; cargo, 8 tons of salt and 5 bales of cotton. The Island Smöltan, near Brandon, having 50 to 60 magazines, containing coals, tar, resin, salt, spars, boats, &c."

On the 8th of August there were several minor enterprises conducted subsidiary to the operations before Sweaborg. The following reports of officers to the rear-admiral will sufficiently explain. They are both written by Captain Wellesley, of the *Cornwallis*, on board that ship off Stora Miolo. The first is dated August 9th:—

"I have the honour to acquaint you that, in compliance with your memorandum of the 8th instant, on observing the mortar-vessels open fire this morning, I immediately weighed in her majesty's ship under my command, in company with the *Hastings* and *Amphion*, and proceeded to attack the forts at the south-east end of Sandhamn. Our attack was more particularly directed against the battery on the south-eastern entrance, and another on Storholm; but, on arriving within long range, a general fire was opened from the whole of the batteries on the south side of Sandhamn. A very brisk and extremely well-directed fire was kept up from the ships, which did considerable damage to one of the batteries on Sandhamn, and one or two of the guns were silenced for a short period, but no permanent effect was produced. At 10.50, therefore, considering that the object contemplated in your memorandum had been attained, I made signal to discontinue the engagement, and anchored the ships in the positions they left this morning. I deem it my duty to represent to you the effective co-operation I received from Captains Caffin and Key, as well as the steadiness and activity of the officers and crews of the ships engaged. I beg to enclose a list of casualties."

The second of these "reports" was dated on the 10th:—

"I have the honour to inform you that, in further prosecution of your order of the 8th instant, I dispatched last night after dark, under the direction of Lieutenant Tattnell, senior of the *Cornwallis*, the barges and pinnaces of this ship, the *Hastings*, and the *Amphion*, each armed with rockets, to endeavour with them, if possible, to set fire to a frigate moored

head and stern in Kung's Sound. Moored as she was down under the land, with only her lower masts in, she was quite invisible; but the boats maintained a very well-directed fire in her direction, which, although not effecting the object of setting her on fire, drew the attention of the enemy, whose batteries, as well as the frigate, opened fire on the boats, without, I am happy to say, any casualty to them. I regret, however, to add that in the pinnace of the *Hastings* two men were wounded—one severely—by a rocket bursting in the tube. I beg to inclose a list of the officers employed on this occasion, and to express to you how much pleased I was with the manner in which Lieutenant Tattnell carried out my orders, and with the zeal and activity of the other officers and men employed."

Captain Wellesley represented, in a post-script to his report, that the bursting of the rocket was occasioned by its inferior construction—another instance of the way in which our men were sacrificed by the peculation or incompetency of the offices at home.

At Biorneborg, in the Gulf of Bothnia, a very daring feat was accomplished in the middle of August, by the *Cuckoo*, *Harrier*, *Tartar*, and the French steamer *D'Assas*. Biorneborg is situated upon an arm of the sea twenty miles inland. It was well protected by earthworks and about 2000 troops. The boats of the little squadron had to pass certain shallows under fire of the batteries; this was effected, and they neared the town. The burgomaster rowed out to meet them, and offered to deliver up the shipping if the town were spared. This condition was acceded to, with the proviso that a certain steamer, of the existence of which there was information, should also be given up. The burgomaster affected not to know anything of such a steamer; but, finding the allies inexorable in their demand, admitted that it was up beyond the town, and he pledged his honour that if they retired without inflicting damage on the place, the steamer should be speedily sent after them. This was also agreed to; the boats' crews then boarded seventeen craft of various sizes, and, after removing from them a few useful articles, they were burned. Soon after the allies retired, the steamer followed; she was a beautiful vessel of 130 tons burden; she was delivered over to the allies, who retained her. In this way damage was done to the enemy along all his coasts upon the Baltic, to such an extent as would take many years of industry to repair.

The following notice of the return home of the *Cuckoo*, and her services, and those of the *Harrier*, appeared in a Portsmouth paper at the latter end of the following November:—
"The *Cuckoo* gun-boat, Lieutenant-commander

Augustus G. E. Murray, arrived at Sheerness from the Baltic at 1 P.M. on Friday. She put into Hull in consequence of meeting with heavy gales from the south-west, and being in want of coals. She left at Elsinore on the 1st instant, the day of her departure, the *Basilisk*, 6, paddlewheel steam-sloop, commander Robert Jenner. During a gale of wind, when the *Cuckoo* was in the Gulf of Bothnia, she lost all her anchors and cables a few days previous to her leaving for England. She succeeded in procuring a steam anchor and chain cable from the *Pembroke*, 60, screw steamship, Captain George H. Seymour. Commander Murray reports that the winter season had set in very severely, and quite three weeks sooner than it did last season. The *Cuckoo* has taken and destroyed twenty-seven sail of merchant vessels and transports of the enemy, each vessel averaging 200 tons. These vessels were destroyed in consequence of there not being a sufficient number of seamen or officers to put on board to send them to England. The *Harrier*, 17, screw steam-sloop, Commander A. Storey, has taken and destroyed a still greater number of the enemy's vessels of a similar class. The machinery and hull of the *Cuckoo* are reported to be in a very defective state from continual service for the last seven months, she having run over more than 30,000 nautical miles. She is to be taken into dry dock No. 5 for survey and repairs. She was the first vessel fitted as a gun-boat on the breaking out of the war."

Up to the middle of August Admiral Baynes blockaded Cronstadt, while Admiral Seymour cruised in the Gulf of Bothnia. After that date Seymour was relieved by Baynes, who continued to harass the enemy while the weather permitted. These two officers, during their commands in that gulf, destroyed 80,000 tons of the enemy's shipping. When Admiral Baynes left Cronstadt the large vessels were removed from the blockade, in consequence of the uncertainty of the weather. The *Royal George*, *Orion*, *James Watt*, *Colossus*, *Cæsar*, *Cressy*, *Majestic*, *Hogue*, *Blenheim*, *Nile*, *Centaur*, *Impérieuse*, removed to a safer anchorage off the island of Leskar, lower down the gulf. A light squadron remained in front of Cronstadt to watch it. The Russians were somewhat emboldened by the departure of the ships of deep draught, and sent out their gun-boats, in the hope of enticing the allies to follow them into shallow water or within range of the batteries; shots were constantly exchanged, but at too great a distance for mutual injury. The enemy were enabled to send out their light craft with impunity, as the fleet of gun-boats were, except in a few cases, no longer serviceable. Their construction was defective, and the severe test to which they had been

subjected during the bombardment of Sweaborg had exhausted their efficiency. During this month many telegraphs were destroyed along the coasts, rendering rapid communication between the capital and the seaboard of the provinces more difficult.

After the bombardment of Sweaborg, Dundas and Penand established their head-quarters at Nargen, where they continued during the remainder of the campaign.

In September very little was effected, and the weather became increasingly menacing; thunder-storms were frequent, and the cold at night became intense. All the ships were removed from before Cronstadt, except the *Colossus* and *Impérieuse*.

The *Nile* and the *Bulldog*, under the command of Captains Mundy and Gordon, discovered seventeen schooners, in a creek in Biörkö Sound, which they sunk, while a rifle-fire was directed upon them from the shore. Off the island of Oesel, Captain Gordon burnt or sunk, in one day, twenty-one small coasting craft, which were employed in bringing cargoes of salt from Sweden; the prisoners were liberated; their account of the sufferings to which the activity of the fleet, and the closeness of the blockade, had inflicted upon the people of the coasts was heart-touching, and this was the more to be regretted as the Finns were friendly to Great Britain. During the latter part of September the block-ships returned home. On the 20th, an unfortunate accident happened to the *Hastings*, 60, screw-ship, which got on shore at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. This arose from the force of the currents not having been accurately calculated, but no blame was incurred by the officers. On the 8th of October the gun-boats were sent home. Between the 13th and 18th, a reconnaissance was made in the Gulf of Pernau, during which several more barques were destroyed, and a fire opened upon the batteries of Gamla Karleby, by which some little loss of men and material injury were visited upon the enemy. Admiral Dundas visited Bomarsund, and directed the ruins to be dug up, in order to bring away certain guns which it was believed the Russians had buried there; few of them were of any service; one was "a monster mortar," but no longer available for war. The *Eden* transport was sent home with 83 heavy guns dug out of these ruins.

From information received by Captain Hall, of the *Blenheim*, he was led to suspect that when the enemy blew up (in 1854) the Gustafsvearn forts off Hango Head, certain serviceable guns were cast into the sea. Upon making an experiment, he discovered that such was the case, and he succeeded in raising twenty; some of these weighed seventy-five cwt. They were coated with paint to preserve

them, so that, upon the retirement of the allies, they might be taken up. The general state of affairs in October was indicated accurately in the following letter from a resident at Kiel:—"We have at this moment in port no ship of war of the allied fleets. The 60-gun ship *Hastings* was the last we saw on her return to England. The French frigate *Perseverance*, which we expected here with 400 prisoners to be landed at Libau, proceeded directly by the Sound to Elsinore, without calling at Kiel. The weather this year greatly favours the prolonged stay of the fleet in the Gulf of Finland. In 1854, at this period, the squadron commanded by Admiral Napier was compelled to quit the gulf, in order to avoid the strong gales which prevail there in September and October, and consequently render its navigation most dangerous. The allies have not had this year to deplore the loss of a single vessel, and there is every reason to hope that before the frost sets in the fleet will have retired without sustaining any casualty. A few vessels laden with coal, and coming from England, entered Kiel some days ago. There exists here no depot of provisions for the fleet, which is regularly supplied with them from Elsinore. The coal lately forwarded from England is for the use of the ships on their return from the Baltic."

During this month Cronstadt, and other important positions of the enemy, were reconnoitred by Admiral Dundas and his officers. Twenty-four ships of war were counted at Cronstadt, which would have sallied out had the allies withdrawn or relaxed the blockade.

November opened coldly and boisterously, yet still the weather was finer than it usually had been on these waters. Snow-storms were however frequent, and compelled the admirals to make new arrangements for the location of their ships. Many vessels laden with good cargoes remained in German ports, ready to make a voyage to the ports of the enemy when the fleets should retire. The plans of the admirals were so laid that many of these ships were captured when their commanders supposed there was no enemy to apprehend. Admirals Dundas, Seymour, and Penaud prepared to return home, but Admiral Baynes was ordered to maintain the blockade with unremitting vigilance to the latest moment the weather would allow. He chose Faro Sound and Elgsnaben, in the waters of Sweden, as his chief stations, because of the comparative security these places afforded. His squadron was well fitted for its work, being composed of excellent steamers of light draught.

A letter from Nargen, dated the 10th, depicted the state of affairs as the month advanced:—"Since my letter of the 6th the weather has been most beautiful, and still

promises to be fine. No movement has been made towards leaving this anchorage, but I think it most likely that the commander-in-chief, with a part of the fleet, will start for Kiel this evening or to-morrow morning. Admiral Baynes will remain behind, with twenty-three frigates and small vessels to continue the blockade up to the last moment. Early on Thursday morning, the *Euryalus* and *Magicienne* went on a trip of observation up the gulf as far as Hogland, and returned on Friday without meeting or seeing a single boat's-sail, so completely are the waters forsaken. The *Fulcon* has arrived from the Gulf of Bothnia, and the *Driver* has been sent to supply the ships cruising near Hango with fresh provisions. The *Locust* leaves to-day for Dantzic, whence she will carry next week's mail to Kiel."

After the date of the letter just quoted the fleets began to return, and made Kiel their rendezvous. A letter written from that place on the 15th describes the bustle in the harbour, and the increasing number of the returning ships:—"The *Duke of Wellington*, bearing the flag of the commander-in-chief of the Baltic fleet, arrived here at 5 p.m., yesterday, and saluted the Danish flag this morning at nine o'clock with twenty-one guns, which was returned. She left Nargen on Sunday morning at eight, in company with the *Majestie* and *Firefly*, leaving behind her Admiral Baynes and his squadron, and the French ships *Tourville* and *Duquesne*. This morning the *Firefly* made her appearance, and at noon the *Majestie* steamed into the harbour, followed at 1 p.m. by the *Tourville*, carrying the flag of Admiral Penaud, and the *Duquesne*. It is reported that the *Royal George* will sail for England this evening, but at this time (2 p.m.) she has made no movement."

The admirals were, however, checked in their homeward career by telegraphs from their governments. A letter from Hamburgh to the *Independence Belge*, written on the 22nd, thus accounts for the delay:—"All the English and French ships of war which have arrived at Kiel from the Baltic were still lying at that port on the 22nd ult. The two admirals, it appears, have been instructed to remain at that anchorage by their respective governments until further orders, in consequence, it is generally believed, of a negotiation still pending between the Western powers and the two northern courts to obtain leave for a considerable portion of the allied squadron to winter in one of the neutral ports of the Baltic. Should the cold, however, continue as rigorous as it is at present in the north, the navigation must soon be interrupted in the narrow arms of the sea which the fleets have to traverse before entering the North Sea, large masses of

ice floating already in the Belt. The naval force stationed at Kiel mounts nearly a thousand guns, and has still on board an immense quantity of war material, projectiles, and Congreve rockets, which were not used during the last campaign. The fleet is supplied with provisions by contractors residing at Kiel, who daily furnish 10,568 rations. This will give an idea of the number of sailors and marines on board the squadron."

Before the close of November, however, the chief admirals left Kiel for England and France. Admiral Baynes remained until near Christmas; but as he could not cruise in frozen seas, his squadron also returned. Thus ended the Baltic expedition of 1855. It did not give satisfaction to the country, and yet it was felt most keenly by the enemy. One of his principal strongholds and naval depots had been subjected to a terrible conflagration, while many of his sailors and troops were slain and wounded in its defence. A vast tonnage of mercantile shipping had been destroyed, and naval stores, the full value of which can hardly be estimated. Loss and humiliation had been inflicted upon Russia, and the blockade of her ports had been so effectual as to destroy her direct commerce during the whole season. She was indebted to Prussia for whatever trade she could conduct in the Baltic, and that power acted in 1855 as in 1854, selfishly as to her own interests, and perfidiously and unjustly to the allies. Under the guise of neutrality she was the partisan of the foe, and was treated too leniently by the Western governments.

Certain important lessons were taught by the two successive failures in the Baltic, as the English public persisted in regarding them, whatever injury the enemy might have suffered. It was made obvious that, to produce any effect beyond blockade and the destruction of coasting-ships, gun and mortar-vessels must to a great extent be employed. The impolicy of dilatory proceedings, on the ground of humanity, became apparent. To strike at once whenever an opportunity offered, and not to allow any pretext for delay which Russian commanders or citizens might resort to, was shown to be the only effectual way to make war upon Russia. The danger of relying upon the good faith of the Russian officials, military or civil, had been exemplified whenever they were trusted. Prompt, energetic, active, vigilant warfare was alone suitable; the Russian character, national and military, rendered any other on the part of the allies absurd. Whatever the merits of the two admirals by whom our great Baltic fleets were commanded, and they were many, neither were fit for so large a command. Napier had proved himself a skilful and daring officer in a limited command, but although badly used by the Admiralty, and especially by Sir

James Graham, he was evidently not sufficiently informed of the nature of the task he undertook, nor did he prove himself equal to its magnitude. The command of naval expeditions of such great importance should have been given to men who had proved themselves not only efficient in limited commands, or individually brave, but whose experience in handling large fleets had been such as to justify their selection. Whatever other lessons the country had learned, it had observed with painful certainty that the Board of Admiralty was not constituted so as to secure the honour and safety of the country. Its proceedings had been slow, vacillating, and by no means free from influences calculated to impair the just discharge of its duty. The preparations during 1855 to sustain and increase our naval power had, however, been very great, proving that even under a bad system of management, and when personal favouritism was allowed to prevail, where merit only ought to be considered, our naval resources were enormous, and capable of being rapidly developed when force was required to be put forth.

An analysis of the official *Navy List* at the beginning of 1856 presented these results. The British fleet consisted of 456 ships, comprising steam-yachts not armed with cannon, 1-gun mortar-boats, and every other description of vessel, to the line-of-battle ship of 131 guns. There were on the 1st of January, 1856, 301 vessels in commission, nearly all steamers, the large sailing-ships being rapidly set aside. The following was the staff of the fleet on the 1st of January, 1856:—

Flag officers (22 in commission)	319
Captains (active)	396
Captains (retired)	164
Captains on reserved list	50
Captains of Greenwich	4
Commanders	569
Ditto, reserved list	205
Ditto, retired list	349
Lieutenants of Greenwich, and Naval Knights of Windsor	14
Lieutenants	1178
Ditto, on reserved list	784
Marine officers	435
Masters	322
Ditto, reserved list	144
Inspectors of machinery	3
Chief engineers	125
Mates	198
Second masters	116
Chaplains	159
Naval instructors	90
Medical officers	592
Ditto, retired	308
Paymasters	511
Assistant ditto	178

The following ships and vessels were added to the fleet, or their construction was begun during the year 1855:—

STEAM LINE-OF-BATTLE SHIPS.

	Guns.	Horse-power.
Donegal	101	800
Victor Emanuel	90	

STEAM-FRIGATES AND CORVETTES.

	Guns.	Horse-power
Bacchante	51	600
Ariadne	31	300
Diadem	30	800
Doris	32	800
Pelorus	20	300

STEAM GUN-VESSELS.

	Guns.	Horse-power.		Guns.	Horse-power.
Lapwing	6	200	Margaret	2	60
Nimrod	6	350	Manly	2	60
Roebuck	6	350	Mastiff	2	60
Victor	6	350	Mayflower	2	60
Weser	6	160	Mistletoe	2	60
Recruit	6	160	Nightingale	2	60
Alacrity	4	200	Opossum	2	60
Assurance	4	200	Parthian	2	60
Cormorant	4	200	Partridge	2	60
Coromandel	4	200	Peacock	2	60
Osprey	4	200	Pheasant	2	60
Renard	4	200	Pickle	2	60
Ringdove	4	200	Plover	2	60
Sparrowhawk	4	200	Porpoise	2	60
Surprise	4	200	Primrose	2	60
Vigilant	4	200	Procis	2	60
Wanderer	4	200	Prompt	2	60
Albacore	2	60	Quail	2	60
Amelia	2	60	Rainbow	2	60
Azoff	2	60	Raven	2	60
Banterer	2	60	Redbreast	2	60
Beacon	2	60	Ripple	2	60
Beaver	2	60	Rocket	2	60
Blazer	2	60	Rose	2	60
Bouncer	2	60	Sandfly	2	60
Brave	2	60	Savage	2	60
Brazen	2	60	Seagull	2	60
Buffalo	2	60	Sepoy	2	60
Bullfinch	2	60	Shamrock	2	60
Bullfrog	2	60	Sheldrake	2	60
Bustard	2	60	Skipjack	2	60
Camel	2	60	Spanker	2	60
Carnation	2	60	Spey	2	60
Caroline	2	60	Spider	2	60
Cabin	2	60	Staunch	2	60
Coechafer	2	60	Surly	2	60
Confounder	2	60	Swan	2	60
Crocus	2	60	Thrasher	2	60
Delight	2	60	Tickler	2	60
Dove	2	60	Tilbury	2	60
Earnest	2	60	Violet	2	60
Erne	2	60	Wave	2	60
Escort	2	60	Whiting	2	60
Fervent	2	60	Wolf	2	60
Fly	2	60	Angler	2	20
Foam	2	60	Ant	2	20
Forester	2	60	Blossom	2	20
Forward	2	60	Cheerful	2	20
Goldfinch	2	60	Club	2	20
Griper	2	60	Daisy	2	20
Growler	2	60	Decoy	2	20
Hasty	2	60	Dwarf	2	20
Haughty	2	60	Fidget	2	20
Havoc	2	60	Flirt	2	20
Herring	2	60	Gaddy	2	20
Highlander	2	60	Garland	2	20
Hyena	2	60	Gnat	2	20
Insolent	2	60	Midge	2	20
Julia	2	60	Nettle	2	20
Kertch	2	60	Onyx	2	20
Leveret	2	60	Pert	2	20
Lively	2	60	Pet	2	20
Louisa	2	60	Rambler	2	20
Mackrel	2	60	Tiny	2	20

The Abundance, screw steam-vessel (flour-mill).

The Bruiser, iron screw steam-vessel (flour-mill).

The Bustler, paddlewheel steam tug-vessel, 100 horse-power.

The Chasseur, screw steam smithy.

The Gulnare, surveying tender.

The Hearty, paddlewheel steam tug-vessel, 100 horse-power.

The Helen Faucit, paddlewheel steam-vessel.

The Hesper, screw steam store-ship, 120 horse-power.

The Indian, surveying vessel.

The Landrail, paddlewheel steam tug-vessel.

The Mullet, paddlewheel steam tug-vessel.

The Nimble, paddlewheel steam tug-vessel.

The Pera, iron screw steam lighter.

The Redpole, paddlewheel steam tug-vessel.

The Steady, paddlewheel steam tug-vessel.

The Sultana, paddlewheel steam tug-vessel.

The Wallace, iron paddlewheel steam tug-vessel, 100 horse-power.

The Wye, screw steam tank-vessel, 100 horse-power.

The above were placed upon the *Navy List* during 1855; but the preparations for 1856 added prodigiously to the power thus held by the Admiralty. Naval authorities represented that had the war continued, as many more ships would have been added to the *Navy List* during 1856—vessels the construction of which had been commenced before 1855. Certain new arrangements for the general efficiency of ships were promulgated—such as that 50-gun frigates were to have commanders added to their staff, and that all gun-boats were to be commissioned as independent commands, and not to be mere tenders to other ships, as in 1855; while for their general effectiveness, each was to consist of a crew of 36 men and officers.

The especial preparations for a renewed naval expedition in the Baltic, in the spring of 1856, began as soon as the fleet of 1855 had returned.

The following list may be taken as an accurate representation of the power which, had the war continued, would have been employed against Russia on her Baltic coasts. It was the determination of the authorities to attack Sweaborg and Cronstadt, if any prospect of success should exist, when all possible appliances of war were prepared. This list is exclusive of gun and mortar-boats, the number of which had not been determined:—

	Guns.
Wellington	131
Royal George	102
Conqueror	101
Nile	91
Exmouth	91
James Watt	91
Cæsar	91
Orion	91
Algiers	91
London	90
Rodney	90
Cressy	80
Centurion	80
Majestic	80
Colossus	80
Brunswick	80
Sanspareil	71
Blenheim	60
Hogue	60
Edinburgh	60
Ajax	60
Russell	60
Hawk	60
Hastings	60

FRIGATES, &c.			
	Guns.		Guns.
Impérieuse	51	Cruiser	17
Euryalus	51	Harrier	17
Arrogant	47	Falcon	16
Amphion	34	Magicienne.....	16
Retribution	22	Archer	14
Pearl	20	Eurolas	12
Tartar	20	Seahorse	12
Pyldes	20	Rattler.....	11
Cossack	20	Forth	12
Esk	21	—	—
			433
24 sail of the line	1951		
19 frigates, &c.	433		
		Total	2384 guns.

Happily, there was no occasion for this vast armament—negotiations for peace were opened in time to prevent its employment; or, if Cronstadt were not absolutely impregnable, with the vast flotilla of vessels adapted for shallow waters which would have been sent out, there was every likelihood of its destruction. At all events, another season would not have closed in the Baltic without a struggle there of a most sanguinary character, and in which, humanly speaking, Russia must have chiefly suffered.

CHAPTER CX.

OPERATIONS ON THE SHORES AND WATERS OF THE SEA OF AZOFF DURING THE AUTUMN AND WINTER OF 1855.

“Wherever vessel spreads a sail
We rule the stormy sea.” *Norse Sea-song.*

THE proceedings of the allies in the Sea of Azoff during July, however honourable to those engaged, and however detrimental to Russia, did not accomplish the object intended, except temporarily. It had been hoped that the supply of food from those regions for the garrison of Sebastopol would have been entirely cut off, but this was not the case; fish and corn were still transmitted by the road along “the spit,” and by another route inland. It was determined early in September to renew with vigour the attacks along those shores, and if possible annihilate the resources of Russia there. Admiral Lyons had obtained correct information that new stores were being rapidly collected, and would, as opportunities offered, be sent on to Sebastopol; he resolved, therefore, to place the means at Captain Osborn’s disposal for the destruction of those supplies.

On the 1st of September a rumour prevailed at Balaklava that the Russians were preparing for a grand attack upon the garrisons at Kertch and Yenikale, so that the *Himalaya*, which had only just come round from Kazatch, was watered from the other ships in the harbour, and sent to Kertch and Yenikale with succours of various kinds. It was afterwards discovered that the rumour was groundless. The Russian cavalry were, however, busy in attempting to drive away the flocks from these neighbourhoods, and the troops brought by the *Himalaya* were usefully employed in protecting them.

On the 21st a cavalry combat took place at two villages called Koss-Serai Min and Seit Ali, about fifteen miles from Kertch. The Cossacks were collecting the arabas in the neighbourhood for the transport service of the Russian army, but a detachment of the 10th Hussars and the French Chasseurs d’Afrique disturbed their

proceedings. The affair on the side of the allies was mismanaged, so that one troop of the 10th Hussars was left unsupported, and exposed to a most unequal combat, losing half its men. The malarrangement seems to have been wholly chargeable upon the officer in command of the French Chasseurs, who did not carry out his own plans, which were strictly observed by the British. The following extract of a despatch from General Simpson sufficiently explains the transaction:—

“I have received a letter from Lieutenant-colonel Ready, 71st regiment, commanding her majesty’s troops at Yenikale, reporting the proceedings of a trifling affair, in which a detachment of the 10th Hussars, in company with the Chasseurs d’Afrique, were engaged on the 21st inst. with the Cossacks. Colonel d’Osmond, commanding the French troops at Kertch, received information that the Cossacks were collecting and driving away all the arabas from the neighbourhood, and as he determined to endeavour to prevent this, he invited the assistance of the English cavalry to co-operate with the Chasseurs d’Afrique. For this service Lieutenant-colonel Ready ordered two troops, commanded by Captains the Hon. F. Fitz-Clarence and Clarke, of the 10th Hussars. The Cossacks were supposed to have assembled their arabas at two villages, named Koss-Serai Min and Seit Ali, equidistant from Kertch about 15 miles, and from one another 6½. Captain Fitz-Clarence’s troop was ordered to the first village, and Captain Clarke’s to the latter. At each of these villages they were to join a troop of the Chasseurs d’Afrique, who had preceded them. On arriving at Koss-Serai Min Captain Fitz-Clarence found both troops of the French dragoons, and immediately sent off an order to

Captain Clarke to join him that night; the letter was unfortunately not delivered until the following morning. In complying with this order Captain Clarke, whose troop consisted only of 34 men, fell in with a body of about 50 Cossacks, which he immediately charged and pursued; but, as they were soon reinforced by upwards of 300, he was forced to retire upon the village with a loss of his sergeant-major, farrier, and 13 men taken prisoners. Captain FitzClarence's troop, with the Chasseurs, the whole under the command of the officer commanding the French troops, having seen a large body of the enemy, skirmished with them at some distance, and moved in the direction of the village of Serai Min, where, after having joined Captain Clarke's troop, the whole force commenced their march upon Kertch. At about the distance of half a mile from the village they were attacked by a large body of Cossacks, who were, however, beaten back by repeated charges. The loss of the 10th Hussars consisted of—2 privates, supposed to have been killed; 1 wounded; 1 troop sergeant-major, 1 farrier, 13 men, 15 horses missing. From information that has since been received the Cossacks were supported, within a quarter of an hour's march, by eight squadrons of Hussars and eight guns. Colonel Ready informs me that nothing could exceed the coolness and courage of the troops in the presence of such overwhelming numbers of the enemy, who were only kept at bay by their steady movements."

On the 24th of September an expedition was undertaken against Taman (on the opposite shore of the strait of Kertch). The object of this was partly to harass the Russians, partly to destroy any stores or materials of war which might exist there, and also to procure forage, and wood for fuel and huts, which were supposed to be stored up there. The naval portion of the enterprise consisted of the *Minna*, *Lynx*, *Snake*, *Arrow*, and *Harpy*, with nine French gun-boats. The English vessels were under the command of Captain Hall, of the *Miranda*; the French gun-boats were commanded by Captain Bonet, of the *Pomone*. The troops were 300 British of the 71st Highlanders, under Major Hunter, and 600 French marines under Captain Dall, of that service.

About noon the troops effected a landing at Phanagoria, situated upon an inner bend of the Taman shore. Cossacks in great force were in observation, but the fire of the gun-boats covered the landing. Phanagoria was evacuated, and the troops took possession. Sixty-six guns and four mortars, which were spiked, and a considerable store of medicine, were the fruits of the capture. Taman speedily fell into the possession of the invaders, where eleven

unservicable guns, a store of fire-wood, and a store of drugs constituted the booty. The allies removed a large quantity of wood for fuel, planks for building, the medicines, the old guns, and a few other valuable things, and then consigned whatever was inflammable to the fire, both at Phanagoria and Taman.

The day previous to that on which these operations were performed Captain Osborn conducted a separate enterprise, intended to facilitate them. He proceeded towards Temriouk, the only other fortified place on the Taman peninsula, having under his command the *Vesuvius*, *Curlew*, *Ardent*, *Wrangler*, *Beagle*, *Faney*, *Grinder*, and *Cracker*. At daybreak on the 21th he was before Temriouk, and was joined by the French captain, De Cintré, with the three steamers *Milan*, *Caton*, and *Fulton*. The shallowness of the water prevented even the boats from reaching the place, and the Russians kept up an incessant cannonade from the shore, where they were strongly posted—artillery, infantry, and Cossack horse. Osborn, foiled by natural obstacles, could not destroy the defences nor disperse the troops, but was able to accomplish the important object of cutting off the communication between Temriouk and Taman, thereby preventing any succour from the garrison of the former to those of the latter. The line of communication was by a bridge which spanned a channel connecting Lake Temriouk with the Sea of Azoff. This bridge Osborn destroyed, otherwise 2000 soldiers would have been dispatched to frustrate the operations of the allies on the other points where they were successful. Two tricolour flags were found at Taman, which it was supposed the Russians had made some time early in the year, to effect an occasional *ruse* by hoisting false colours, when they had hopes of navigating these waters.

The following despatch of Rear-admiral Lyons shows his appreciation of those services:—

"I transmit, to be laid before the lords commissioners of the Admiralty, the copy of a letter from Captain Robert Hall, of the *Miranda*, senior officer in the Straits of Kertch, detailing the proceedings of an Anglo-French naval and military expedition to Taman and Phanagoria on the 24th ult., for the purpose of depriving the enemy of his means of sheltering troops in the ensuing winter, and in order to procure materials for housing our troops at Cape St. Paul and Yenikale.

"I also inclose, for their lordship's information, a copy of a letter from Captain Osborn, of the *Vesuvius*, detailing the proceedings of an Anglo-French attack on Temriouk, which, by previous arrangement, was made simultaneously with that on Taman and Phanagoria.

"Both expeditions were conducted in a most satisfactory manner, and were accomplished with the loss of only one man wounded. Three of the 71st regiment and three of the (French) infantry of the marine were taken prisoners, in consequence of their own imprudence."

The inclosure from Captain Hall was as follows:—

"I have the honour to report that, according to your directions of the 25th of August, I put myself in communication with Captain Bonet, of his imperial majesty's ship *Pomone*, commanding the French naval station here, relative to an expedition to destroy the Russian establishments at Phanagoria and Taman, and also arranged with Captain Osborn that a simultaneous attack should be made on Temriouk by the Azoff squadron.

"On the 24th ult., at daylight, the military part of the expedition, under command of Major Hunter (71st), embarked, consisting of 300 of the 71st Highland Light Infantry, carried by the *Sulina*, and 600 French, of the Infantry of the Marine, placed on board six gun-boats of that nation, and at 8.30 the flotilla proceeded.

"Arriving at Taman at noon, swarms of cavalry were seen near it and Phanagoria, and a strong body marched into the powerful earthwork at the latter place.

"The gun-boats appointed to cover the landing immediately opened fire, and in a short time forced the enemy to retire, leaving the troops to land without opposition at the spot previously agreed upon, about a mile east of Phanagoria.

"By 4 P.M. we were completely established in the fort, in which the fieldpiece of this ship and four light mountain howitzers from the *Pomone* were placed in position. A large body of cavalry, numbering at least 600, continuing drawn up in front of Phanagoria, were dispersed by some Lancaster shells, beautifully thrown from the *Lynx* and *Arrow*.

"During the night a small body of the enemy fired upon our sentries, and wounded a seaman of the *Miranda*.

"The buildings within the earthwork were found to be much more extensive than was anticipated, consisting of a large hospital, some storehouses, and two very large powder-magazines, in perfect order, but quite empty, composing, with the houses of the *employés*, a very considerable establishment: sixty-six guns, chiefly of 6, 9, and 12-pounders, and four cohorn mortars, were lying disabled within the work.

"The storehouses were all empty except one, which contained some hospital necessities, and the dispensary, which contained some

medicines, which have been preserved for the use of the squadron.

"Taman was found to be completely deserted, and the houses quite empty. A large magazine of flour and another of corn were fired by the Russians before they retired, and eleven iron guns, 30 and 36-pounders, which were found buried at Taman, and were said to have been a present from the Empress Catherine, have been destroyed by us. Considerable bodies of the enemy's cavalry hovered about during the time of our being occupied in taking down and removing the materials of the building, but did not approach within gunshot.

"I regret to have to report that they succeeded in cutting off three stragglers of the 71st and three of Infantry of Marines.

"I have much pleasure in bearing testimony to the zeal and activity of the officers and men of the squadron, especially of Lieutenant Aynsley, commanding the *Lynx*, who, during my absence, superintended the duties of the squadron afloat; and of Lieutenant Fitzroy, of the *Miranda*, who had the direction of the disembarkation, &c., of the troops, as well as the shipment of the wood, &c., for removal to Yenikale. Nothing could exceed the good feeling and cordiality existing between the officers and men of our allies and our own.

"On the morning of the 31st, every building at Phanagoria and Taman which could shelter an enemy having been destroyed, and large quantities of the material removed to Yenikale and St. Paul's, the troops re-embarked, and returned to their quarters at Kertch and St. Paul's."

The report of Captain Osborn was to this effect:—

"I have the honour to report that, in pursuance of arrangements made with Captain Hall, her majesty's ship *Miranda*, I proceeded, on the 23rd of September, to harass and keep in check the enemy's troops at Temriouk, while the allied squadron at Kertch attacked Phanagoria and Taman.

"On the 24th of September, at daybreak, we arrived off Temriouk Lake, and were there joined by the French steamers *Milan*, *Caton*, and *Fulton*.

"We failed in reaching the town with our boats, the lake proving too shallow for even those of the lightest description. Up to noon, however, we kept a large body of horse, foot, and artillery in the town, the latter opening a sharp but harmless fire at us to prevent the destruction of a fine brig which was secreted just inside the lake's entrance. Weighing from thence, the squadron, accompanied by that of our gallant allies, under Capitaine de frégat de Cintré, proceeded to cut off the communication between Temriouk and Taman by the narrow

belt of land lying north of the lakes. In this we perfectly succeeded; for at 1 p.m. a heavy column of troops, with nine field-guns, were discovered on the march, proceeding towards Taman. Opening fire on them at 2500 yards, we stopped their march; and after suffering severely, as it appeared to us, they retreated upon Temriouk, the *Wrangler*, with her Lancaster guns, keeping up an effective fire upon them to an extraordinary distance. Some of the enemy's riflemen, who with much gallantry fruitlessly endeavoured to keep the beach, and save a quantity of forage, must have lost a number of men by the admirable shell-practice of the French squadron. While this was doing I detached the *Ardent*, *Beagle*, and *Cracker* to watch another favourable part of the neck of land. Lieutenant Campion was fortunate enough to discover that the road lay over a fine wooden bridge, which spanned a channel connecting the Sea of Azoff with Lower Temriouk Lake.

"The bridge was 180 feet long, and thirty feet wide, composed of strong wooden piles, and sleepers at each end, and four pontoons in the centre, the whole well planked over, and apparently much used. It was evidently the route of communication between Temriouk and Taman, except by the very circuitous round of the extensive lakes. The burning of this bridge effectually stopped the garrison of Temriouk, who could not be under 2000 men, and some ten or twelve guns, arriving in time to resist the landing at Taman.

"I therefore weighed, as the weather was threatening, and have since driven in and destroyed the Cossack post which had been established in this neighbourhood, and to watch our garrison at Yenikale.

"Two French flags (tricolors) were found by Lieutenant Strode at one of these posts, the Russians having left them, as well as some of their arms, in making a hasty retreat. I am unable to say under what circumstances they could have got into the enemy's possession.

"Throughout these operations I have received the greatest assistance from Commander Rowley Lambert, of her majesty's ship *Curlew*, and the zealous exertions of the officers and men of the squadron generally.

"The *Recruit* has been left to watch the Straits of Genitschi, and Lieutenant Day, her commander, alone, on the nights of the 18th and 21st of September, passed the enemy's pickets there, and waded up to their gun-vessels and guards in the channel. His reconnaissance confirms my opinion of their perfect readiness to resist an attack in that direction. I am sorry to say the exposure and excessive labour have caused Lieutenant Day to be laid up with a severe attack of illness.

"The two Russian fishermen taken at the

mouth of the Don having quite recovered from the effects of their wounds, I caused Commander Rowley Lambert to proceed with them on the 23rd inst. to Arabat Fort, under a flag of truce, for the purpose of offering to land them there, if General Wrangel wished. The offer was accepted, and the prisoners landed.

"The squadron is now proceeding to Genitschi to complete ammunition from the *Durham*; and I am in hopes that the weather, which may be shortly expected by general account, will enable us to do more service in the coming month than that of the present one."

The military report was made to Sir Richard Airey, the quartermaster-general, by Lieutenant-colonel Ready, who, although not in the action, as lieutenant-colonel of the 71st regiment, was the official organ of communication:—

"I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency General Simpson, that three companies of the 71st regiment, under the command of Major Hunter, 71st regiment, embarked at Kertch on Monday last, the 24th inst., on board her majesty's ship *Minna*, at an early hour in the morning, and proceeded, in company with her majesty's gun-boats *Lynx*, *Snake*, *Arrow*, and *Harpy*, together with about nine French gun-boats, conveying six companies of French infantry, to the opposite coast, and arrived about 11 A.M. opposite Taman, the line of gun-boats extending a short distance to the eastward of Phanagoria. The landing commenced shortly afterwards to the eastward of Phanagoria, covered by the fire from the gun-boats. There was no resistance offered, and the place had been evidently but lately evacuated. A few mounted Cossacks and infantry were the only people we had seen up to the time of landing, and who were driven from Phanagoria and Taman by the well-directed fire from the gun-boats. When the disembarkation was completed (which was effected without accident), the force moved upon Phanagoria, and took quiet possession of the fort and buildings, and established itself there. A few stores were found still in the place, but (with the exception of an hydraulic press and some medicines) of no particular value, consisting principally of hospital bedding and some clothing and accoutrements. There were, however, upwards of sixty-two pieces of artillery (9 and 12-pounders apparently) and four mortars, all rendered unserviceable. As the force entered Phanagoria a strong party of Cossacks appeared on the hill-side, about one and a half or two miles from the town, increased from time to time until their force appeared to amount to about 600. The gun-boats *Lynx*, *Arrow*, and *Snake*,

immediately opened a fire upon them, as did also some of the French boats. The practice from these boats was most admirable, and the Cossacks immediately withdrew beyond the crest of the hills, leaving only a few videttes on the neighbouring ridges. Early on the following morning the men were employed in collecting wood for fuel and hutting, the night having passed quietly, with one exception, the enemy having taken advantage of the darkness to approach our lines, and opened fire upon our sentries; our troops were instantly on the alert, and the Cossacks retired. One man, an English sailor, serving at a fieldpiece in the works, was slightly wounded in the heel. The quantity of wood for fuel and for hutting is something considerable, but the exact amount can scarcely be arrived at yet, but I hope to have the whole embarked by Saturday."

While the allies were thus engaged, it appears that a demonstration was made in their favour in another direction, or else the Russian authorities, for some purpose of their own, invented the following story. We have not found any authentication of it, but it is so circumstantially told, and, as there is no apparent motive for a fabrication, it is here recorded as it appeared in a Russian journal, under the head of "Caucasian Demonstration:—" "Major-general Filipson, the ataman of the Tschernomora Cossacks, gives the following additional particulars of the expedition of the allies to Taman and Phanagoria:—" "Simultaneously with the appearance of the allies, a numerous body of mountaineers assembled at Gastogaja. On the 1st of October, at four o'clock in the morning, they advanced against the Dschiginski Battery. The enemy, among whom there were two columns of regular troops (probably Turks), took possession of the bank of the Cuban at the spot where the ferry is, and opened a violent fire of small arms. On the bank of the Cuban and Dschigi, which lies somewhat higher, the mountaineers stationed two pieces of artillery, with which they commanded the Dschiginski Battery. The action lasted two hours, until at length the enemy relinquished his purpose of forcing a passage over the river, and withdrew to Gastogaja. We hear that Sefer Bey, pasha of Anapa, was the leader of the mountaineers in this action, in which about 4000 men, cavalry and infantry, with two guns, each drawn by six horses, took part. At four o'clock in the afternoon of the same day smaller troops of mountaineers showed themselves near Fort Warenikoff. Single horsemen approached the fort, and examined it with their glasses. Towards evening, however, they all retired in the direction of the river Psebebs, where their watchfires reddened the sky the whole night long. On the following

day about 3000 mountaineers approached the fort again, and fired upon it, without their fire being returned by the Russians. It was not till the 3rd of October, when the mountaineers repeated the same manœuvre, that they were received with grape and canister, which soon induced them to withdraw out of range. This detachment is said to be under the command of the son of the pasha of Anapa, Karabatyi Sonoko."

With these exploits the month of September terminated. October opened upon the renewed activity of Captain Osborn's squadron, for the weather was favourable. In command of the *Vesuvius*, *Curlew*, *Recruit*, and *Ardent*, he steamed to Biéloserai Spit, and found that the Russians had constructed earthworks, planted batteries, dug rifle-pits, and erected breastworks. The *Recruit* was ordered to dislodge the riflemen from the pits, but was not successful, while they kept up a steady and dangerous fire. Nevertheless, the little steamer succeeded in destroying seven boats and five fishing stations. During this service her crew were menaced by a large force of infantry and cavalry. Lieutenant Day, one of the most enterprising and daring officers of the service, greatly distinguished himself, as did his second master, Mr. William Parker. Unfortunately an 8-inch gun exploded on board the *Recruit*, by which Lieutenant Day was injured in the foot. The unexpected explosions of guns, shells, and rockets, the imperfection of fuses, of small arms, and even of the side-arms supplied to the men of both services, were very frequent; these dangerous misfortunes arose from official carelessness or corruption at home, for which there was no remedy but the direct action of the national will, through the legislature, upon the public offices, and the chiefs of departments.

On the 20th of October the *Ardent*, sailing further east to Krivaia, or Crooked Spit, found the shores lined with infantry and cavalry, ready to dispute any landing; she, nevertheless, destroyed three boats. The destruction of boats along these shores was necessary, for if vessels in distress took shelter under the land, the enemy had plenty of troops to board them; the destruction of the boats deprived him of the means of doing so.

On the 24th of October, the weather particularly favouring, Osborn resolved to bring in the *Vesuvius* so close to Biéloserai that he could dislodge the riflemen from their pits. The marines and "small-arm men" of the ship effected a landing; they were commanded by Lieutenant Chetham H. Strode, Mr. R. R. Armstrong, mate, and Mr. Farquharson, midshipman. The enemy would probably have been cut off, but for his superior knowledge of the paths through the swamps, where it would

have been hazardous and useless to have pursued. The British destroyed all the posts erected for the shelter of soldiers, which had only just been reconstructed—they had been previously destroyed by Captain Osborn. Near the town of Alti there was a very large fishing establishment, which, and the material found in it, were committed to the flames. Eleven large boats were destroyed. At the same time the *Reeruit*, and her spirited commander, Lieutenant Day, were busy at Mariopol, where they consumed two large establishments for curing fish. There were several fine launches, mounted on land-carriages, so constructed that they could be brought inland or along the coast; these were broken up. The efforts of the Russian government to maintain the fisheries on these coasts proved that they were deemed important for the supply of their garrisons, especially at Sebastopol.

During these proceedings on the northern spits, Lieutenant Commerell accomplished in the Putrid Sea one of the most daring feats of the war. The lieutenant was cruising in command of the gun-boat *Weser*, when he learned from some fishermen that near the Crimean shore of the Putrid Sea, on the bank of a river, a large amount of corn and forage was stacked, ready to be removed for the use of the garrison of Sebastopol. To cross the Spit of Arabat in the day time was impossible, and to have crossed it in force by night would have risked the success of the undertaking. Accordingly the lieutenant and four men dragged a small boat, which they had previously taken as a prize, across the centre of the Spit of Arabat into the Putrid Sea, crossed it, and arriving at the river's bank, he left two of his party in the boat, while, attended by the other two, a petty officer and a seaman, he forded the river, passed along its bank two miles and a half, and discovered the stacks of wheat, barley, and hay. They set fire to these in so many places as to leave no chance of failure, and the whole were eventually consumed, amounting to more than 400 tons. As soon as the stacks were ignited the Cossack guard were alarmed, and both infantry and cavalry began a pursuit. Not less than thirty mounted men pressed upon the fugitives, who would have been certainly captured, but that their way lay through deep mud for the last 200 yards, whither the cavalry were not disposed to follow, especially as the retreat was then covered by the two men in the boat, who kept up a determined rifle-fire. While crossing the mud bank the seaman sank exhausted, when the petty officer, William Rickard, bravely rescued him, and bore him along, although himself nearly exhausted. The brave fellows reached the boat, re-crossed the Putrid Sea, escaped over the Arabat Spit, and

regained the *Weser* without injury, although the pursuers kept up a fire of carbines and musketry, and the men of the signal-station and guard-house on the spit sallied out also in quest of the mysterious enemy. Lieutenant Commerell was promoted to be commander, and Rickard, the quartermaster, was rewarded with a medal for distinguished service, and a gratuity of £15 a year; promotion also was promised him as soon as he was able, by a course of suitable preparation, to claim it. There is no duty from which our gallant soldiers and sailors ever shrunk, and if judicious and just rewards were always thus conferred, the tone of the service would be raised still higher, and a boundless spirit of chivalry and enterprise encouraged. There would be no difficulty in procuring volunteers for the army and navy in the most perilous wars, if the men felt that their courage and warlike aptitudes would be appreciated, and that in wounds and sickness they would not be uncared for. The following despatch of Admiral Lyons was occasioned by these transactions:—

“The accompanying copy of a letter from Captain Sherard Osborn, of the *Vesuvius*, with its several inclosures, will place the lords commissioners of the Admiralty in possession of a detailed account of the active and energetic proceedings of the squadron in the Sea of Azoff, under the command of that valuable officer.

“The enterprise which was undertaken and so successfully carried out by Commander J. E. Commerell, of the *Weser*, in crossing the isthmus of Arabat, and in destroying a large quantity of forage on the Crimean shore of the Sivash, reflects great credit on that officer, and adds still further proofs of his having deserved that promotion which their lordships have lately been pleased to confer upon him. The gallantry of William Rickard, quartermaster of the *Weser*, deserves to be particularly mentioned; and I beg leave to recommend him to their lordship's favourable consideration for the medal and gratuity for distinguished service.

“Lieutenant George F. Day, commanding the *Reeruit*, has also displayed his usual activity and zeal in harassing the enemy on the north-east coast of the Sea of Azoff; and I regret to find that his foot has been severely injured by the recoil of a gun.”

Captain Osborn's letter, referred to in the above despatch, was as follows:—

“I am now returning westward towards Genitschi, having been employed with her majesty's ships, *Curlew*, *Reeruit*, and *Ardent*, since the 9th of October, 1855, along the north coast of this sea as far as Taganrog.

“On Crooked Spit, as well as Biéloserai, or

White House Spit, the enemy had established a large force in the remains of the old fishing establishments, and constructed a series of rifle-pits and breastworks, from which they opened fire upon any of our vessels taking shelter under those points; and as the enemy had a number of boats with them, with which they could easily board a vessel in distress, I thought it right to destroy the latter and dislodge the men. The *Recruit*, Lieutenant George F. Day, came in collision with them on the 15th instant, and, although he could not dislodge the riflemen, he succeeded in destroying seven launches and five large fisheries, in spite of the enemy's cavalry and infantry. Lieutenant Day, I am sorry to say, received a severe injury of the foot by the accidental explosion of an 8-inch gun; but he speaks in high terms of the satisfactory manner in which Mr. William Parker, second master of the *Recruit*, executed the service entrusted to him.

"On the 20th of October the *Ardent*, Lieutenant Hubert Campion, drove in a large force of cavalry which attempted to prevent him approaching Crooked or Krivaia Spit, and he likewise destroyed three boats.

"On the 24th of October the weather was sufficiently favourable to enable me to get the *Vesuvius* close enough to force the enemy from their rifle-pits upon the Biéloserei Spit. At 1 P.M. the small-arm men and marines of this ship landed, under Lieutenant Chetham H. Strobe, Mr. R. R. Armstrong, mate, and Mr. H. D. R. Farquharson, midshipman, supported by the ship and boats. Directly the enemy saw their escape threatened they beat a rapid retreat, although fully 150 in number, and effected their escape by a superior knowledge of the paths through the swamps. Lieutenant Strobe then destroyed their posts, which had been recently reconstructed; they were eight in number, and calculated to house 200 men; besides these, eleven fine boats and an extensive fishery were set fire to near the town of Altı.

"The *Recruit*, Lieutenant Day, at the same time destroyed, in the neighbourhood of Mariopol, two large fisheries, and some fine launches, mounted on regular travelling land-carriages, and in the evening we were complete masters of the only portion of the coast the enemy have attempted to re-establish themselves upon; and, as the frosts have already set in, I am in hopes that they will not be able to recover their ground before next spring. The extraordinary efforts made by the enemy to prosecute their fisheries upon this coast are the best proof of their importance. They sometimes move down 200 or 300 soldiers, who escort large launches placed upon carriages and arabas drawn by oxen laden with nets and gear, as well as fishermen to work

them. The fish, directly they are caught, are carted off into the interior; and when it is remembered that we have destroyed some hundred and odd launches upon one spit alone, some idea can be formed of the immense quantity of fish consumed on this coast; and in proof of its being a large item in the sustenance of Russian soldiers, I would remind you that hundreds of tons of salted and dried fish were found and destroyed by us in the first destruction of the military depots at Genitschi in May last.

"This report is closed at Genitschi, where I had the satisfaction of learning, as the inclosed letter from Lieutenant Commerell will show, that he had succeeded in destroying a large collection of forage and corn at the entrance of the Salghir or Kara-Su Rivers. The zeal and enterprise displayed by Lieutenant Commerell on this occasion, as well as whenever any service has to be performed, are most conspicuous; and his judgment in seizing the only good opportunity that has occurred for some time to cross Arabat Spit and traverse the Putrid Sea, deserves to be particularly called to your notice. The quartermaster, William Rickard, praised so highly by Lieutenant Commerell, was one of my boat's crew. I fully concur in the high character given of him."

Lieutenant (commander) Commerell made the following report to Captain Osborn:—

"I have the honour to inform you that on the evening of the 10th instant I determined, in obedience to your discretionary orders, to launch a boat across the Spit of Arabat, and destroy large quantities of corn and forage stored on the banks of Kara-Su and Salghir Rivers, on the Crimean shore of the Sivash; the proximity of a guard-house and signal-station, also the distance the corn lay from the beach, rendered anything but a night surprise impracticable. Having left the *Weser* in charge of Mr. Haswell, second master, and, accompanied by Mr. Lillingston, mate, a quartermaster, and two seamen, assisted by a party, we hauled a small prize-boat across the spit, embarked in her, and at half-past 4 A.M. reached the opposite side. Landing with the petty officer and one man, I forded the above-mentioned rivers, and at a distance of about two miles and a half from the boat arrived at the corn and forage we were in search of, stacked on the banks of the Salghir River, evidently for transmission by water, as the river was perfectly navigable for barges, the sides being cut, and towing-paths on either bank. In a short time the forage and corn, amounting to about 400 tons, were totally destroyed, not, however, without alarming the guard, and from twenty to thirty mounted Cossacks, who were encamped in a village close at hand. On our retreating, we

were so hard pressed by them, that, but for the circumstance of the last 200 yards being mud, and the cover of rifles from Mr. Lillingston and a man who remained in the boat, we could hardly have escaped capture. Having recrossed the spit, we returned to the *Weser* by 8 A.M.

"I must bring to your notice the excellent behaviour of the small party who accompanied me, more especially that of William Rickard, quartermaster, who, though much fatigued himself, remained to assist the other seaman, who, from exhaustion, had fallen in the mud, and was unable to extricate himself, notwithstanding the enemy were keeping up a heavy fire on us, at the distance of thirty or forty yards, as we crossed the mud."

Lieutenant Day made his report to Captain Osborn in these terms:—

"I have the honour to forward you a report of my proceedings since leaving her majesty's ship *Curlew* at this place on the 15th. According to my orders, I steered for my cruising-ground between the Dolga Bank and Whitehouse Spit. When off the latter place, observing a number of men and boats engaged in fishing, and also that many large fishing storehouses had been built since my last visit here on the 14th of last month, I hauled close in to the shore, anchoring the *Recruit* about 700 yards off, with the intention of landing with my boats, and destroying all I could, as soon as I had driven back the troops, who were coming down in great numbers, both cavalry and infantry, to prevent us. The former we soon disposed of; but the latter, scattering themselves about in twos and threes, threw themselves on the ground, creeping along so that we could not see them to stop their advance with our shells from the ship. I therefore resolved to land at once, in hopes, by the quickness of our movements, to get our work over before they could possibly close on us. Unfortunately for me, I regret to say, that whilst directing the pointing of an 8-inch gun to where I believed some of these riflemen to be (just as I was on the point of going into the boat to land), the gun, from some unaccountable cause, went off, and, in recoiling, the whole weight of both gun and carriage came down on my left foot, injuring it very severely, and breaking several bones, which, I fear, will lay me up for some time. I was thus rendered incapable of landing, so sent Mr. Parker, second master of this ship, on shore, in charge of the boats and landing-party, who succeeded in carrying out my instructions as to the destruction of all the boats there (seven in number), many new fishing-nets of great length, five large new fishing-establishments, full of quantities of fishing-tackle and other gear. This service he

performed in a most gallant manner, and much to my satisfaction, as they were the whole time exposed to a very smart and annoying fire from the enemy's concealed infantry (at a very short distance), who, in spite of our fire from the ship, had managed to creep down close to them, favoured by the inequality of the ground and the long grass, so that our party had to make a long *détour* (covered by a hot fire of rifles from the *Recruit*), to prevent them being cut off, and to get to their boats. The Russians kept up a constant fire of rifles from the lighthouse, in which they had succeeded in lodging themselves, upon the boats, and then upon the ship, which we returned with rifles only, and I think to some purpose, until we weighed and shifted further out. Not a man was hit, though the ship and boat were many times. As I did not wish to injure the lighthouse, I did not attempt to fire, so as to dislodge them with shot or shell from the guns.

"The 17th I stood along the spit to see if any more boats or nets could be found along the shore where I could destroy them, as also to drive away a number of troops I saw hidden behind some banks, and at the same time to try and set fire with carcasses to a number of new stores built on the broad part of the spit, high up, but too far off for me with my small force to attempt to land and destroy. I could see no more boats; but their perseverance in thus rebuilding these houses, boats, and nets, with the fact of so many troops being there to protect them, tells its own tale, that they must be much in want of provisions."

Some dissatisfaction had been expressed in England that the fort of Arabat had not been taken by Captain Lyons, when he so successfully performed the earlier operations in the waters of Azoff; as had the enemy been completely mastered at both ends of the spit, and garrisons appointed, the communications of the enemy would have been more effectually interrupted, and as much strategically effected as by the wide-spread losses entailed by subsequent and desultory operations. It is but just to the gallant Lyons, who so early met a glorious death, to record Captain Osborn's opinion, which is contained in the following letter:—"I will trespass no further upon your space than to express my regret that your correspondents—much more British officers—should have lent themselves to further the propagation of Russian fictions, by asserting that the squadron under the late Captain Lyons did little or no damage to Arabat Fort. It was, as far as my memory serves me, silenced, the magazine blown up, and had not the allied squadron more important work to do at Genitschi or Taganrog, the place would have been sum-

moned; and I believe it had but to be summoned to surrender. Although, having no men to spare, General Wrangel's 12,000 men would have forced us to have been rapid in our movements, and perhaps given the enemy a better victory than that of Arabat: all we can pray is that they may never win a better one."

The month of November began with finer weather in this sea than is usually known. Admiral Lyons sent orders to Captain Osborn to attempt the destruction of vast stores of corn, the harvest of the surrounding country, which were collected at Glofira and Gheisk, to be conveyed over the frozen snow and ice during the winter to Sebastopol, and along the great military roads, to supply the army of Asia. A number of gun-boats, which had served at Kinburn,* having returned to the admiral's head-quarters, he dispatched them as reinforcements to Captain Osborn, who proceeded to attempt the extensive task assigned to him. On the night of the 3rd, he anchored his squadron off the Liman, and made his arrangements for the action he resolved to commence on the morrow. As the captain was enabled to observe a very large force of the enemy, it was necessary so to plan his attack as to distract the attention of the assailed, and render it difficult for them to use the advantage of their greatly superior numbers. The plans of the commander were skilfully laid with this object in view, and as skilfully executed by the officers to whom he committed their execution. At daylight on the 4th, the flotilla, towed by the gun-boats, moved on to the appointed work. At half-past six o'clock they were off Vodina, within three miles of Glofira. Along the shore at Vodina there were immense ranges of corn-stacks, and nearly as many stacks of dry billets to be sent for fuel to the army at Sebastopol. These were strongly guarded by Cossacks. Shots from the gun-vessels dispersed them, and Commander Kennedy (the second in command of the squadron) was sent in with the ships' boats containing landing-parties, who fired the dry corn and stacks of wood, the flames ascending from which soon spread the alarm along the shores of the Liman, and a large force of Cossacks galloped up from Lazalnite, just as Commander Kennedy and his men re-embarked. The promptitude of the British at once destroyed the property of the enemy, and enabled them to escape a charge of cavalry most opportunely. The next object of the assailants was the corn and fuel stacked at Glofira. When the flotilla arrived there, the officers were perfectly astounded at the vast stores of harvesting—food, forage, and fuel—

which lined the shores. To the south and east of the town, for two miles, the stacks were arranged near the water's-edge ready for immediate transport. Between the houses long ranges of stacks were also visible. The destruction of the property here could not be effected by a surprise, as at Vodina, nor without a severe combat, for the enemy was intrenched, and commanded the spit with rifles and musketry. Dismounted Cossacks and Hussars lined the cliffs, carbine in hand, prepared to offer as it appeared a stout resistance; and regular infantry and militia took up advantageous positions among the houses of the town. Measures were adopted to sweep the flank of the intrenchment, and to throw into it Shrapnel-shell; attacks on various points were well concerted and well timed, so that the enemy did not know where to concentrate his defence. Carcasses were thrown against the stacks, but these missiles were so badly constructed that they did not produce the effect expected from them, although this description of combustible, if properly made, would have been peculiarly suitable for the occasion. Accordingly, Captain Osborn played upon them with shell and rocket, and the ranges of stacks were soon in conflagration. Lieutenant Campion, with Mr. Verey, gunner, charged at the head of the marines, and drove the enemy from the intrenchment with slaughter; at first, the numbers of their antagonists offered a formidable obstruction; but Lieutenant Day, and his blue-jackets came on in support of Campion, and the trench was gallantly won and a small brass gun captured. The enemy, however, retired fighting, placing themselves behind ricks, and stores, and wherever they could find cover, keeping up a constant fire of musketry upon the British. These, pursuing their advantage, charged with bayonet and cutlass, driving the foe from one defence to another, and firing stacks and stores successively, as the enemy were driven beyond them. The Russians were badly armed, and were inexpert in the use of musketry, or our men must have suffered severely—only one man reported himself wounded. While the action raged on these points, Commander Kennedy reached the portion of the attack assigned to him; finding it impossible to climb the cliffs, he threw rockets, shells, and carcasses, and soon set fire to everything near the shore. One government building of large size, situated in the rear, was beyond his range; but a landing-party must have scaled the cliffs under a fire of musketry, met a superior force with the bayonet, and possibly received the charge of a very large body of Cossack horse, who were on their road from Gheisk, but kept in check by the guns of Lieutenant Ross, of the *Weser*, who threw his fire across their path. The amount of property

* The operations of the Kinburn expedition will be related in a future chapter.

consumed by Mr. Kennedy was enormous; the ricks and stores were seen blazing all night, illuminating sea and shore, and making the flotilla seem as if sailing on a sea of fire. For an extent of more than two miles along shore the conflagrations raged fiercely, and could be seen from vast distances by the Russian troops and people.

For many hours the men of the squadron had been constantly engaged working the boats, firing the ricks, or combating with the enemy; many of them wading to and fro in the water, the temperature of which was intensely cold; but all manifested the utmost alacrity to do their duty, and the greatest ardour to meet the enemy.

Soon after dawn on the 6th the squadron weighed, and steamed up the Liman until they reached Gheisk. Here the scene that was presented excited the unbounded astonishment of the crews. Vast as were the stores at Glofira, they were small compared with those at Gheisk and its neighbourhood. Along the steppe, for four miles, the stacks were ranged in some places four deep, and in some six; these stacks consisted of wheat, rye, barley, straw partly chopped, hay, logs of wood, billets, planks, &c. At the skirt of the steppe, and on the spit near the town, were timber-yards, boat-houses, net-manufactories, and fish-stores, of immense dimensions.

The arrangements of the attack were similar in character to those which had proved so successful at Glofira. Parties landed in different places, considerably apart, and not exactly contemporaneous, the gun-boats securely covering the landing. The same officers who had distinguished themselves in all the other operations under Captain Osborn, here also showed their worth, and the captain himself was conspicuous for skill and courage. As soon as the small detachments landed, at considerable distances from one another, they literally placed themselves behind a curtain of smoke and flame, so that the enemy could not detect the plan of operations, and were hurrying to and fro, discharging musketry into volumes of smoke, behind which there were no assailants. Baffled in every direction, the Cossacks charged madly about, always arriving at particular points of action in time to see the burning property, but too late to catch the apparently ubiquitous tars, who were at those moments setting fire to other combustible material in some different direction. From the water the movements of friends and enemies could be distinctly seen, and measures to defeat or elude every movement of the latter easily taken. By 2 P.M. the stores of Gheisk were utterly destroyed, and the crews all re-embarked. Captain Osborn did not act as our commanders in the White Sea or in the Pacific,

or as, to some extent, they acted in the Baltic, especially in 1854. He immediately proceeded to accomplish what remained to be done. He took part of his squadron down to Glofira the same afternoon, to effect the destruction of the large store which had escaped him on the preceding day. There he found that by great exertions the troops and people had extinguished many of the fires. The half-consumed ricks were again ignited, and the large store-house was also destroyed. The troops had all hurried off to Gheisk, where they remained, not expecting that another visit would be paid so soon, nor supposing that the work of destruction would be renewed with such promptitude. More minute details of these actions, and the opinions of the commanders as to their importance and consequence, will be seen in the despatches which are here appended. Admiral Lyons wrote thus to the lords of the Admiralty:—

“Their lordships are aware that when the small gun-boats were no longer required at Kinburn, I sent them back to Captain Osborn, to afford him the means of destroying at the latest period of the season the harvest of this year, which I understood to be collecting in the neighbourhood of Gheisk-Liman for the purpose of being transported, in the winter months, partly to the enemy’s army in the Crimea, over the frozen Gulf of Azoff, and partly to his army in the Caucasus, by the military road.

“The enclosed copy of a letter from Captain Osborn will show their lordships that in this, as on many former occasions, he has fully justified the confidence I have placed in him. The skilfulness of the arrangements made by him, and the admirable manner in which they were executed by himself, by Commander Kennedy, of the *Curlew*, and by the officers and men under their orders, completely frustrated the efforts of the large force that was brought against them in defence of the stores, which the enemy appears to have considered safe from any naval attack, in consequence of the shallowness of the water.

“The effects of this brilliant enterprise, in the destruction of so much corn and forage at the commencement of winter, cannot fail to be severely felt by the Russian armies both in the Crimea and the Caucasus.

“Commander Kennedy, in reporting his large share in the proceedings of the day in the command of the *Curlew*, states to Captain Osborn that at one place alone the rows of stacks were six deep, and extended two miles, and it appears that, for economy in transport and storage, the straw was cut near to the ears of the corn. As the ice is now forming on the shores of the Sea of Azoff, and the squadron is with-

drawn, I feel it to be due to Captain Osborn to record that, under circumstances of great difficulty, occasioned by unusually tempestuous weather, he has most ably continued through the summer, and brought to a successful close in the autumn, operations novel in their nature and extremely detrimental to the enemy, which commenced auspiciously in the spring under the direction of the late Captain Lyons, of the *Miranda*; nor is it too much to say that both commanding officers were supported throughout by as dashing and as intelligent a band of young officers, seamen, and marines, as ever shone in the British navy."

Captain Osborn thus reported to the commander-in-chief:—

"After dark, on the evening of the 3rd inst., the squadron under my command was assembled, and anchored in sixteen feet water off Gheisk-Liman, and I made arrangements for the morrow to operate against the extensive collection of corn, forage, and fuel belonging to the enemy, stacked along its shores, so as to distract the attention of the large force which, from previous observation, I knew to be in the neighbourhood.

"Under Lieutenant Ross, of the *Weser*, I placed the *Curlew* in the temporary charge of Lieutenant Miall, and the *Ardent* in charge of Mr. Tilly, second-master, each vessel having sufficient men left in her to weigh an anchor or fight a gun, and man a few boats, giving orders to Lieutenant Ross to close in on the northern side of Gheisk, and to be prepared to co-operate with me inside the Liman. The *Vesuvius* I left in the offing, denuded of every available person; and embarking officers and men, as in the annexed list, from the *Vesuvius*, the *Curlew*, the *Weser*, and the *Ardent*, with their boats, we left at daylight, towed by her majesty's gunboats—the *Reeruit*, Lieutenant G. Day; the *Boxer*, Lieutenant S. P. Townsend; the *Cracker*, Lieutenant J. H. Marryat; the *Clinker*, Lieutenant J. S. Hudson.

"By 6.30 A.M. the flotilla was off Vodina, three miles north of Glofira. Here long tiers of corn-stacks and much fuel were stored along the coast, with a Cossack guard for its protection. I immediately detached Commander Kennedy with the boats, covering him with the gun-vessels, and in a short time all was in flames, and the party cleverly re-embarked at the moment that a large body of Cossacks rode up from Lazalnite.

"The town of Glofira became the next point of attack. It was greatly changed in appearance since visited by Captain Rowley Lambert in July last. Corn-stacks, for some miles in extent, might now be seen along its southern and eastern face, placed close to the water's edge ready for transport, and between the rows of

houses tier on tier were to be seen. An intrenchment had been cut along the edge of the cliff commanding the spit; large bodies of dismounted cavalry were seen lining it, and armed men showed in the rear of every house. To endeavour to flank the defences, as well as destroy the corn-stacks stored on a high hill east of Glofira, I dispatched Commander Kennedy, with the boats of her majesty's ship *Curlew*, a paddlebox-boat and cutter of the *Vesuvius*, the whole towed by the *Clinker*, Lieutenant Hudson, with orders to turn the spit end, and then attack in that direction, after giving a certain time to allow the enemy's attention to be divided by the other attack. The gun-boats *Reeruit*, *Grinder*, *Boxer*, and *Cracker*, opening fire on the intrenchments with Shrapnell-shell, and on the corn-ricks with carcasses. As the enemy could only be dislodged from the extreme west, and the carcasses did not answer well, and, moreover, endangered the whole town, I dispatched Lieutenants Day and Campion with the small force of marines available, a howitzer boat, and two rocket-boats, to aid more effectually in carrying out my object. Lieutenant Campion, with Mr. Verey, gunner, charging at the head of the marines, supported by Lieutenant Day and the seamen, all being under a sharp fire of musketry, succeeded in driving the enemy, with considerable loss, out of their trench-work, and captured a small brass piece, and then steadily forced them back, with loss, from store to store, until the whole of the vast quantity of corn, stacked ready for thrashing and transport, was in flames.

"The gallant manner in which Lieutenant Campion led the marines deserves to be brought under your notice. Seeing the enemy collecting a number of men, ready to charge our men if they advanced beyond a ravine on the east face of the town, I recalled my force, and had the satisfaction of seeing all embarked, with only one man wounded.

"The vessels off Gheisk were now seen to be engaged, Lieutenant Ross, of the *Weser*, having placed them in capital positions; and, as the enemy moved down large bodies of troops, especially cavalry, to resist his landing, and opened fire on him, he very unwillingly had to fire on the town to dislodge them. The proceedings of Lieutenant Ross were ably executed, and he fully succeeded in keeping in check a heavy body of cavalry, which might have much incommoded the small force under Commander Kennedy, who, by the most strenuous exertions, had reached his position, and, finding the cliff too steep to scale in the face of a large number of troops, who were firing on him from its crest, he very judiciously executed the duty I had entrusted to him with the gun and the carcass rockets of the ships' boats,

setting every store in flames, except one large government building considerably in the rear.

"Commander Kennedy speaks in the highest terms of his party, for the shallowness of the water obliged the crews of the boats to be rowing and wading through the water from noon until midnight, the season, too, being now very cold. Throughout the night the stores were burning fiercely, a sheet of flame extending fully two miles; but the town of Glofira, except where the troops had used the houses against us, remained untouched.

"At an early hour on the 6th of November we weighed and proceeded into the Liman, steering towards Gheisk. The valuable services of Mr. George Perry, acting-master of the *Vesuvius*, and Mr. Parker, second-master of the *Recruit*, came here into play; and at an early period I had the satisfaction of seeing all the gun-boats anchored just in their own draught of water, within long gun-shot of the east extreme of Gheisk and the neighbouring steppe, along the edge of which, for four miles, corn and hay were stacked in quantities far beyond what I had conceived to be possible, and at the base of the steppe, as well as that part of the spit commanded by the town, timber-yards, fish-stores, boats, &c., in numbers were accumulated.

"To attack upon as many points as possible was, I thought, the only way to foil the troops that had now had thirty-six hours to prepare for us; the gun-boats *Grinder*, *Boxer*, *Cracker*, and *Clinker* were left to cover the landing-party. To Lieutenant Ross, of the *Weser*, I signalled to prepare to land, and divided the force in the Liman into three bodies: the left, under Lieutenants Day and Townsend, consisted of boats and men of *Recruit* and *Boxer*; the centre I intrusted to Commander Kennedy, having under him Lieutenants Hamilton, Campion, Marryat, and Mayne, with all the boats of the *Curlew*, *Ardent*, *Grinder*, and *Cracker*, and port rocket and gun-boats of the *Vesuvius*, in charge of the officers named in the margin;* the right division, under Lieutenant Chetham Strode and Lieutenant Hudson, consisted of the starboard gun-boats of the *Vesuvius*, and those of the *Clinker*, together with some marines, Mr. R. Farquharson, midshipman, in charge of the latter. Lieutenant Ross, on the west side of Gheisk Spit, had the boats and small-arm men of the *Weser*, with a small force from the *Curlew* and the *Ardent*, under Lieutenant Miall and Mr. Tilley, second-master, in readiness to co-operate. The different parties pulled in and effected a landing at appointed places, fully a mile apart; the Russian troops, within light breastworks, attempted to prevent them, but failed, and in a few mo-

* "Mr. Armstrong, mate; Mr. Scott, gunner; Mr. Verey, gunner."

ments a screen of flame and smoke, rolling from our men towards the enemy, prevented the latter seeing where or how to manœuvre in order to cut off any of our small detachments. On the right and centre the enemy mustered strongest, and at one time observing a column of some 1500 Cossacks moving rapidly off the left, I directed Commander Kennedy, who by that time had connected his fires with those of Lieutenant Day, to re-embark all but the marines, and with them to proceed to his right, and I reinforced him with the marines of the *Recruit* and the *Weser*, under Lieutenant Campion. This answered perfectly; the enemy arrived too late to save anything on the left, while our men steadily worked towards the right division, under Lieutenants Strode and Ross, who, in spite of a heavy but badly-directed fire from the houses on the heights, steadily held their ground, and effectually destroyed a great accumulation of materials for boats and ship-building, fish-stores, cavalry camp-gear, and granaries. When everything but the town of Gheisk was destroyed, I ordered the embarkation to take place, and detached some boats to cover Lieutenant Ross, between whom and his boat the enemy were throwing a body of men, whom, by their uniform, I believed to be regular infantry.

"By 2 p.m. everything was finished, and all the parties safely re-embarked on board their respective gun-boats, the casualties amounting to only six men wounded in all, one of them dangerously, and another severely. Nothing further being left within our reach in Gheisk-Liman, except the store of corn which escaped on the previous day at Glofira, I therefore ordered Commander Kennedy, with the moiety of the boats, to return to their respective ships, and remained with the *Recruit*, *Ardent*, *Boxer*, and *Cracker's* boats to finish what had escaped east of Glofira. On the 6th the weather, which had favoured us most providentially, changed, fogs and strong breezes came on; but directly I was able, the rocket-boats and carcasses were again employed upon Glofira, until the fires extinguished yesterday were relighted, and another extensive accumulation of corn in flames; I then weighed, and returned to the *Vesuvius*, reaching her the same afternoon.

"I despair of being able to convey to you any idea of the extraordinary quantity of corn, rye, hay, wood, and other supplies so necessary for the existence of Russian armies both in the Caucasus and the Crimea, which it has been our good fortune to destroy. That these vast stores should have been collected here, so close to the sea, while we were still in the neighbourhood, is only to be accounted for by their supposing that they could not be reached by us, and judging by the position the squadron, under the late Captain Edmund Lyons,

took up in May last, the Russians had established a camp and fortified their town only to meet a similar attack.

"During these proceedings we never had more than 200 men engaged; the enemy had, from the concurrent testimony of Lieutenants Ross and Strode, and from my own observation, from 3000 to 4000 men in Gheisk alone. Where every officer exerted himself to the utmost, and did all, and more than I expected of them, it would be invidious for me to mention one more than another; it was their coolness, zeal, and example, that rendered steady many of the younger men who for the first time were under fire; and, but for their general intelligence and zeal, the enemy would have easily frustrated our operations. The zeal, good conduct, and gallantry of the men were deserving of every praise.

"Commander Kennedy, my second in command, gave me the most valuable co-operation, and from him, as well as the reports of the other officers, I feel justified in placing before you the names of the following warrant-officers and men who, under fire, behaved remarkably well, viz.:—Mr. Richard Verey, acting gunner of H.M.S. *Ardent*; Thomas Kerr, gunner, Royal Marine Artillery, H.M.S. *Vesuvius*; Peter Hanlan, A.B., H.M.S. *Curlew*; David Barry, A.B., H.M.S. *Craeker*.

"The inclosed plan, illustrative of our operations, by Mr. George Perry, acting-master of the *Vesuvius*, will, I trust, be of use, and I beg you will allow me to call your attention to the unvarying zeal of that officer."

After these transactions, rumours were circulated in the fleets and armies on the waters and shores of the Euxine and the Sea of Azoff that a great enterprise was about to be undertaken somewhere on the coasts of Azoff, or that on several points operations of magnitude were to be attempted. Frequent correspondence and telegraphic despatches upon this subject passed between Sebastopol, Paris, London, Constantinople, Eupatoria, Kertch, and Yenikale; but nothing was determined. While these discussions were proceeding, dense fogs gathered over the Azoff; storms swept it from its northern shores to the straits. The estuary of the Don was frozen, and it became no longer possible for Osborn to keep his squadron on service there. Nevertheless, in very bad weather his light steamers made their way through the buffeting winds, snow, and sleet, looking into every port, and making sure that the commerce of the enemy was stopped, and that his transport arrangements had been rendered abortive. The gallant captain retired to Kertch, and placed himself once more under the personal superintendence of the commander-in-chief. The termination of his

separate command was announced to the admiral in terms of manly modesty, in unison with his actions. The document was transmitted to the lords commissioners by Admiral Lyons, with a suitable encomium from himself. These official papers appropriately close our narrative of the naval operations in that sea. The despatch of the admiral was written from the *Royal Albert*, Kazatch Bay, December the 1st:—

"I request that you will lay before the lords commissioners of the Admiralty the inclosed copy of a letter from Captain Sherard Osborn, of the *Vesuvius*, dated the 24th ult., informing me that, as the formation of ice had commenced in the Sea of Azoff, and as he had been informed by both M. Gopcevitich, the Austrian merchant charged with the shipment of corn in Austrian vessels, and by the Russian authorities at Mariopol, that all chance of neutral vessels obtaining cargoes this year was at an end, he had withdrawn to Kertch with the squadron under his orders, after assuring himself that no merchant vessels remained in that sea.

"I have so frequently had occasion to bring the merits of Captain Osborn under their lordships' notice, that it is perhaps unnecessary on the present occasion that I should say more than that he has maintained his high character up to the close of the service upon which he was employed for six months, and he brings under my favourable notice the gallant and zealous support he has received from first to last from the officers and men under his orders."

The letter in which Captain Osborn resigned his command of the squadron of the Sea of Azoff was as follows:—

"Being now, in accordance with your instructions, on my road to rejoin your flag, I have the honour to report the close of operations in the Sea of Azoff, and the proceedings of the squadron in that sea subsequent to my last letter, dated off Gheisk, 7th of November, 1855. On the 7th I received your instructions, with notices relative to neutrals quitting the Sea of Azoff on the 20th of November, 1855. The weather became most severe, and I could only succeed in serving the notices upon the authorities on shore at Mariopol. But on the 8th of November the shipping anchored off Mariopol were duly warned, and on the 9th those of Taganrog likewise. A gale of extreme violence from the eastward blew continually from that date until the 18th of November. I then immediately served a notice upon the neutral shipping in Berdiansk. There, from M. Gopcevitich, as well as previously at Taganrog and Mariopol, we learnt

that the Russian authorities had kept the neutrals in quarantine ever since their arrival, and that the likelihood of cargoes being procured was almost at an end. A Russian officer at Mariopol laughed at the idea of the neutrals believing they would get wheat this year, and told Commander Kennedy, whom I sent in there with a flag of truce, that the neutrals must stay the winter.

"Under these circumstances, looking to your wishes and instructions upon the subject, it became a cause of great anxiety for me, lest, by the sudden commencement of winter, or intentionally, the neutral vessels should fail to quit the sea on the 20th of November. I therefore, as the ice had begun to make, and the temperature to fall rapidly after the 13th, dispatched all the squadron to Kertch, except the *Ardent*, *Snake*, and *Clinker*, and with them proceeded up the Gulf of Azoff. We arrived off Mariopol on the 19th, and found all neutrals had sailed for Kertch; and on the 20th I sighted Taganrog, and found the roads empty, all the vessels that were there having likewise left. The ice already extended on either hand some miles from the shore, the Don appeared to be frozen, and every indication of winter having set in in that neighbourhood was apparent. At Mariopol the river or harbour was frozen, and much ice lined the coast as far down as Biéloserei Lighthouse, the temperature at mid-day as low as 29° Fahrenheit. From thence I separated the squadron, so as to examine the whole coast, from Canitchi to Yenikale Lighthouse, most minutely, and not a single boat of the smallest description was to be seen.

"In surrendering into your hands the prominent position in which you have been pleased to employ me for the last five months—that of senior officer of a detached squadron—allow me, sir, to express, most respectfully, my deep sense of the honour you conferred upon me, and the grateful recollection of the unvarying kindness, confidence, and consideration I have experienced at your hands; without it I feel I never should, as I trust I have, succeeded in carrying out your views and instructions.

"Next to that, let me again remind you that my anxiety to execute your plans has ever been an easy task, supported, as I have ever been, by the gallant and zealous exertions of every officer and man serving in this squadron; I know not how sufficiently to express my approbation of their conduct. And it is not the less pleasing part of my duty to assure you of the kindly co-operation I have

ever received from the officers of the French navy serving in the Sea of Azoff. Among those more especially known to me, I feel justified in mentioning Lieutenant Cloné, commanding the *Brandon*, Lieutenant La Juchette, of the *Fulton*, and Lieutenant Vidal, of the *Caton*."

During the remainder of the winter the troops occupying Kertch and Yenikale found no occupation. The way in which the houses had been dismantled, through the wantonness of the French soldiers, and the neglect of their officers, caused much inconvenience to the garrison, especially at Kertch. Drunkenness became very general, to the great injury of the men, and perplexity of the officers, who found every plan for its suppression inadequate. The French gradually departed, and the three garrisons, Kertch, Yenikale, and Fort Paul, were occupied by the British-Turkish contingent, and some of the sultan's army. The regular English regiments also departed. These garrisons were well defended, the Turkish contingent being in a high state of discipline, so that the apprehensions were not shared there which were felt elsewhere,—that the Russians would cross the frozen Sea of Azoff in such numbers as to recapture these places. The sea was not for any great length of time so frozen as that large bodies of men could pass over; and if it had been, the Russians were not in a condition to make such an attempt. The garrisons of the three fortresses numbered 20,000 men, and the straits of Kertch were generally sufficiently open for ships to enter and bring supplies. The grand error of the naval and military campaigns of the Sea of Azoff during the season seems to have been, that the Spit of Arabat was left in possession of the enemy. Arabat and Kaffa should have been occupied. For the omission the commanders, naval or military, in the straits and within the Sea of Azoff, were not responsible—they performed their mission; the neglect lay with the chief authorities in the Crimea. The Russians took advantage of this want of foresight, and, notwithstanding all the destruction with which their coasts were visited, they still had hoarded grain inaccessible, overlooked by their enemies; and along the Spit of Arabat, throughout December and the early months of 1856, these stores were perseveringly conveyed to the army at Sebastopol. Negotiations prolonged the armistice which winter began, until peace terminated the struggle.

CHAPTER CXI.

EUPATORIA DURING THE AUTUMN AND CONCLUDING WINTER MONTHS OF 1855, AND TO THE TERMINATION OF THE WAR.—MEMOIR OF BEHRAM PASHA (LIEUTENANT-GENERAL CANNON).

"I wonder much, being men of such great leading as you are,
That you foresee not what impediments
Drag back our expedition."

SHAKSPEARE. *Henry IV.*

ALTHOUGH an account of Eupatoria, and a circumstantial record of events there to the summer of 1855, have been already given, it will be desirable to insert here a brief sketch given to the author by a Turkish gentleman who was acquainted with that place and the course of the war there. This is one advantage of serial publications—that additional information concerning events previously related can be supplied at various intervals, without impairing the consecutiveness of the narrative.

Eupatoria is a town of 14,000 or 15,000 inhabitants, composed of Tartars, Greeks, and Russians. It has a considerable export trade in grain, onions, hides, wool, dried meat, and tallow, &c. The town is irregularly built, but it contains some good houses and public offices. Up to the arrival of the allied armies in the Crimea, in September, 1854, no fortifications whatever existed. On the approach of the fleets conveying the troops, Eupatoria was at once evacuated by nearly the whole of the population, and occupied without resistance by small detachments from the three forces, English, French, and Turkish, whilst the main armies took a southerly direction, and landed at Old Fort in September. The Russian armies found themselves so fully occupied before Sebastopol, that they had no time to molest the small garrison left at Eupatoria; and it was decided upon that the Turkish army under the command of Omar Pasha, then in the principalities and along the Danube, should occupy that place, with the view of creating a diversion upon Simpheropol in favour of the allied armies before Sebastopol. The first body of these troops, under Behram Pasha (General Cannon), were landed at Eupatoria early in December, 1854, and before the month of March had expired, 60,000 Turkish soldiers, 6000 horses, cannon, carts, &c., had marched through Bulgaria to the coast in the depth of winter, took shipping, crossed the Black Sea, and were safely landed at Eupatoria; scarcely an accident happened during the whole of these arduous operations, although executed in these stormy regions at that inclement season. No sooner, however, did the Russians see the object of the allied commanders in thus occupying Eupatoria by the Turks, than they commenced assembling their forces in the immediate vicinity. Active preparations were

taken by the Turkish commanders to throw up field-works to meet the threatened attack, which was made on the 17th of February, 1855, when Omar Pasha commanded in person. The onslaught took place early in the morning, and was chiefly directed against a battery constructed under the direction of Behram Pasha, but not completed, and from the cemetery at the right of the town. This battery successfully resisted the attack of the enemy, whose forces amounted to 40,000 men of all arms, with 100 guns, and, as Colonel Simmons states, amongst them some 32-pounders.

No movement was made from Eupatoria till early in April, when Omar Pasha took with him 15,000 men to join the allies before Sebastopol. It will be remembered that a bombardment was commenced on the 9th of this month, and uninterruptedly kept up for ten days. During this attack, it was expected that the Russian reserves would attack the allies on their right flank, by crossing the Tchernaya; had this happened, the Turkish troops were to have opposed them. The attack of the allies on Sebastopol proved fruitless, and Omar Pasha returned with his troops to Eupatoria; but he could not be induced to make a movement against the enemy, whose convoys of provisions were almost daily seen passing within a few miles of the town. In June a brigade of cavalry, under the command of General d'Allonville, composed of two regiments of English dragoons, and two of French, were sent to Eupatoria. That gallant officer soon made a demonstration against the enemy, and captured a convoy of provisions. The Russians kept him at a distance afterwards.

Omar Pasha again returned to the allied camps before Sebastopol, taking with him nearly 20,000 men; but neither there nor at Eupatoria did the Turkish troops afterwards take an active part in the combat in the Crimea.

Achmet Pasha remained in command at Eupatoria until the conclusion of the war, his troops suffering much from starvation and neglect—the money of the Turkish loan being too late in coming after the fall of Sebastopol. Omar Pasha carried with him 20,000 men to Mingrelia from the Crimea, where he commenced his fruitless campaign in favour of the besieged garrison of Kars.

The above outline of events at Eupatoria, and connected with the army of Eupatoria,

as it was fruitlessly sent from one place to another, only requires filling up in its latter portions, to put our readers in possession of the remaining history of the war in that part of the Crimea.

During the summer, the neglect of the army at Eupatoria, by the Turkish and allied authorities, was unfortunate. The conduct of Omar Pasha was most reprehensible. He had been urged by the commanders of the Western armies to operate so as to obstruct the Russian convoys; he pleaded want of cavalry at one time—want of forage another—then want of transport; and to these excuses was added the allegation that the country was so destitute of water, he could not move ten miles into the interior. Yet the Russian army found fodder and water, although they had not, like Omar, the sea behind them, with ships of war and transports to convey whatever was required.

When the autumn set in, and the contest around Sebastopol became closer, the importance of Eupatoria as a base of operations became more pressing upon the consideration of all the conflicting powers, and after the fall of Sebastopol, still more so than ever. Omar had been represented as the “stone of stumbling” to operations hitherto; but when he directed his attention to the Mingrelian expedition, and another Turkish general held charge of the garrison, matters were not much improved, no well concerted and well combined plan of operations against the enemy was brought into action. The general relations of the contending forces in the Crimea, and the affinity which the army at Eupatoria had to those relations when Sebastopol fell, were placed at the time in the following light by Colonel St. Auge, in an article published by him in the *Journal des Débats*:—“It is known that the Russian army occupies a circle of steep heights on the right bank of the Tchernaya, the centre of which is M’Kenzie’s Farm, situated on the high road to Simpheropol by Bagtché Serai, with their right wing at the ruins of Inkerman, towards the northern forts, and their left above Tchorgoum towards the Valley of Baidar. It is known also that the principal positions of their line are guarded by intrenchments and redoubts. During the siege, a division, that of General d’Allonville, composed principally of cavalry, occupied the Valley of Baidar, the extreme right of the French army. At present it is a corps of 30,000 men, which acts against the left of the Russians, and which has just driven it from the heights of Ourkussa, a village three leagues to the north-east of Baidar. There is on this point a tolerably good road which leads to M’Kenzie by the village of Chamli. Our corps of 30,000 can thus arrive on the Tchoulou, above Tchorgoum, where the Piedmontese are, and menace in the rear

the line of the Russians. It appears to result from these facts that the French generals wish to constrain the enemy to evacuate their positions, either by manœuvres, or by an attack on the front whilst the turning corps attacks them on the flank or the rear. At the same time the corps of Eupatoria, reinforced by 20,000 men, who may make it an army, can menace by the flank the communications of the Russians between Simpheropol and Perekop. So it is that the results of the taking of Sebastopol are developing themselves. The corps of occupation of Eupatoria, which was 35,000 strong during the siege, is now of imposing force, and can henceforth assume the offensive. A new despatch of the Russian general-in-chief of the 26th (September) states that already 33,000 men of that army have taken the field, menacing the right flank of the Russians. According to some German journals, the Russians, fearing to see themselves cut off from Perekop, or constrained to accept a battle under disadvantageous conditions, are on the point of evacuating all the Crimea, regarding it as henceforth lost to them. These papers even informed us yesterday that already large convoys of evacuation encumbered the roads of the interior. At Sebastopol the forts and batteries of the north, fire shot and shell daily on the town; but the French side has established batteries in the two forts which remained intact (that of Nicholas and the Quarantine), and on the ruins of other forts, from which we command, in our turn, those of the opposite side. If the Russians were to evacuate the Crimea, either voluntarily or by force, all the northern forts would probably be abandoned and destroyed. They are useful to them as long as their army is stationed in presence of the allies; but from the moment they leave their line of M’Kenzie to concentrate themselves on Bagtché Serai and Simpheropol, their forts would remain completely isolated at the south-west angle of the Crimea, far from the theatre of subsequent operations, and without being able to give any support to the Russian army. On the whole, the information we possess on the military movements in the Crimea causes us to suppose that the allied army has determined on an active plan of campaign during the two months of good weather which still remain, and that they will vigorously pursue the consequences which the great victory of Sebastopol is calculated to produce.”

It will throw further light upon this subject if we quote an English authority, as well as that of Colonel St. Auge. Mr. Russell, under date of September 25th, describes Admiral Stewart and a naval squadron as having proceeded along the coast with great display, in order to draw off the forces of the enemy from Sebastopol, under the idea that a descent

was contemplated by the allies somewhere on the coast—an object which was not attended with success. The squadron went as far as Eupatoria, and Mr. Russell obtained the following information and opinions from the officers on board:—"At Eupatoria they found no less than 31,000 Turkish infantry in a fine state of discipline, and in perfect readiness for any military service. These soldiers were all reviewed and inspected on the occasion, and officers of rank, English and French, were alike gratified by the disciplined alertness and efficiency of these neglected and almost useless infantry."

Mr. Russell then proceeded to express his own opinions on the result of what he had learned from the officers of the fleet:—"It is difficult to imagine that these Turks could not aid us materially in driving the enemy from Sebastopol if strengthened by an English division and two French divisions, which could be easily spared from this army at present. Moreover, they might be aided by all our cavalry, which are now in very excellent condition, and are, nevertheless, of no earthly service at Kadikoi or Baidar. Between French, English, and Sardinians we could send a force of at least 5500 sabres to the north side of the Alma, which certainly would have nothing to fear from any Russian cavalry in the Crimea. Colonel M'Murdo has collected more than 10,000 horses and mules for the service of the land-transport corps, and it would be very strange indeed if he could not spare enough of them to supply and carry food for an expeditionary column during a week or ten days, nor is there any reason why we should not be able to aid the French *intendance* in the field, should they require our assistance. The allied fleet could embark and land the whole force in forty-eight hours, or, at all events, in sixty hours, at any point between Balaklava, or Kamiesch and Eupatoria. In the recent short cruise to and from Eupatoria the fleet could not discern any traces of the Russians north of the Alma. They could not make out a convoy, or even a single tent, all along the coast and the adjacent country, which can be swept by the telescope for several miles inland. It would seem, indeed, as if the Russians did not use the Perekop Road to any great extent, or that their convoys made a *détour* towards the east in order to avoid meeting with any flying column from Eupatoria. Possibly they send most of their supplies down by the Tchongar Road, and there is every reason to believe that the Russians have established another route between Perekop and Tchongar for the purpose of advance or retreat. I have heard that some time back Captain Sherard Osborn, with one man, passed up the Straits of Genitseli in a punt, and pushed along through the rushes in the pestilential salt marshes up to Tchongar Bridge, which he

observed minutely, and that he saw enough to satisfy him that an immense proportion of the Russian supplies were conveyed into the Crimea by that route. Perekop is quite safe from the sea-side. The *Spitfire*, surveying vessel, Captain Spratt, made several attempts, but was not able to get very near the land. It is believed that, to make assurance doubly sure, the enemy take the road south between the Staroe and Crasnœ Lakes, instead of going between the sea-coast and Staroe. The route becomes, however, a matter of indifference if we are not to make any offensive movement, and although some people hug the hope that the czar will not be able to feed his army during the winter, the quantity of stores piled up on the north side is, to my mind, a guarantee for their disappointment."

The attention of military circles all over the Continent was directed at this juncture to the peculiar relations of the opposing armies in the Crimea, and the importance of an advance of the allies from Eupatoria in reference to the general situation. As an instance of the way in which foreign speculations and opinions were indulged concerning this matter, the following passage, from an article in the *Military Gazette* of Vienna at the end of September, is quoted:—"The demonstration—so often declared and so often denied—of the allies from Eupatoria, appears, after all, to be really about to be made. Prince Gortschakoff reports on the 23rd that nearly 30,000 men are concentrated at that spot, that his left wing is repeatedly alarmed, and that on the 22nd there was a collision with the Russian infantry, after which the allies withdrew to Urkusti, descended, however, the plateau again on the 23rd, and repaired a road. Since Urkusti, or Riukasta, lies to the north-east of the right bank of the Tchernaya, and Russian detachments stood before the 8th of September near Biuk Miskamia, on the left bank of the Tchernaya, it results from the above despatch that the district of the Tchernaya is in the hands of the allies, and that the Russians have stationed their left wing in Tehoulia and Kandi, their centre near Mangup Kaleh and M'Kenzie's Farm, and their right wing beyond Inkerman as far as the north forts, while the bulk of their army is at Bagtché Serai. The attack on the Russian left wing near Tehoulia, if repeated and successfully followed up, may be intended to produce the evacuation of the positions mentioned above, and thus force the Russians to fall back on their main body. The difficulties of the ground are, nevertheless, of such a description, that a practicable route for cannon only exists along the regular route beyond the Tchernaya, near Kam Most Farm, through Khutor M'Kenzie, then across the Belbek, near Khutor. The possession of this road must first be secured before

any further offensive operations can be carried on."

Circumstances seemed to favour the speculations of the foreign military journalists, for a letter from the St. Petersburg correspondent of a Hamburg paper, under date of September 26th, thus wrote:—"Under date the 23rd instant, Prince Gortschakoff reports that the allies had landed 20,000 men at Eupatoria, and that they now had a force of 30,000 men on his flank. On the 22nd they attacked the Russian infantry, who retreated to the heights over Rusta."

Under date of the 28th, Prince Gortschakoff reported:—"Yesterday the enemy landed at Eupatoria, to the number of 33,000 men, and occupied different villages in the neighbourhood, from which they withdrew towards evening, to bear upon our left flank. Nothing of importance, has, however, occurred. Our Cossacks have had an encounter with a French foraging-party near Kertch, and made twenty-five prisoners."

On the 9th of October a telegraphic despatch of the prince gave the following communications:—"The enemy has advanced from Eupatoria, threatening Perekop, but retired on meeting our advanced posts. On our left flank the enemy has detached sixteen battalions from Urkusta to Janisla."

Later in October the prince sent a despatch to the Russian minister of war, in which he not only referred to the allies at Eupatoria, but also at Kertch and Theodosia. As the proceedings of the allies at these places will not require a separate chapter, the despatch of the Muscovite generalissimo in reference to all these places is given here:—

"The movement of the enemy's vessels before Eupatoria continues. On October 15th, 16th, and 17th, they disembarked cavalry and infantry; and on the 18th the disembarkation of troops was very considerable. Towards evening there were thirteen vessels, eight steamers, and forty-six transports in the roads.

"Lieutenant-general Baron Wrangel, intrusted with the command of the troops in the eastern part of the Crimea, reports that having received notice of the arrival at Kertch of more of the enemy's troops, to the number of 10,000, he, to assure himself, effected a reconnaissance in the direction of Kamich-Bourno and Sazaimine. Our Cossacks arrived at these villages without encountering obstacles on the part of the adversary, who retired before them on all points. It was ascertained that the camp of the allies near the Jewish cemetery had not been fully established, and that five steamers were anchored in the Bay of Kertch, three near Yenikale, and one at Kamich-Bourno. At Theodosia two of the enemy's steamers have

entered the road and attempted to approach the city, but the fire of one of our batteries compelled them to take again to sea."

On the 27th General Simpson wrote to Lord Pammure as follows:—

"The force from Eupatoria, under the command of General d'Allonville, made a reconnaissance on the 22nd instant. They fell in with a large force of the enemy, and offered them battle. The Russians, however, retreated before them, after the exchange of a few rounds with the horse-artillery.

"I beg to inclose a copy of the report of Brigadier-general Lord George Paget, in command of the English cavalry at that place.

"I have the honour to report the departure of all the Turkish force that were here for Asia, with the exception of some artillery, which has been transferred to the contingent.

"The weather continues magnificent, and the health of the troops all that can be desired."

The inclosure referred to by General Simpson was dated the 26th, and was as follows:—

"I have the honour to report that the allied troops stationed here, under the command of general of division, d'Allonville, marched from Eupatoria on Monday morning, the 22nd inst. The force advanced in two columns, the details of which are in the margin* the one taking a northerly direction, and skirting towards the east of the lake Sasik Guiloie, until it arrived at the village of Karagurt; the other proceeding by the strip of land between that lake and the sea to the town of Saki. The light cavalry brigade and troop of horse-artillery under my command formed part of the first-mentioned column, which was commanded by General d'Allonville himself. We marched at daybreak, and arrived at Karagurt (18 miles) about 4 p.m., when we bivouaced for the night, and which, before leaving, we destroyed. When we had advanced within about three miles of this village we came in presence of a force of about twenty squadrons of Russian cavalry, who retired before us, after some shots from the French horse-artillery, which told with some effect.

"On the morning of the 23rd we proceeded, at daybreak, in a southerly direction, passing close to the village of Temesch, where we came in sight of a body of Russian cavalry, considerably superior in numbers to that we had seen the evening before, a strong force of guns, and,

* "1st column—Six Ottoman battalions, eight French battalions (de Failly), half the Bashi-bazouks, four Ottoman squadrons, one Ottoman battery (*montée*), two French batteries (*montées*), 'ambulance active' for eighty wounded, under the orders of Muschir Achmet Pasha. 2nd column—Four Ottoman battalions, two French battalions, half the Bashi-bazouks, twelve Ottoman squadrons, twelve French squadrons, ten British squadrons, six pieces of horse-artillery of each nation, and 'ambulance active' for eighty wounded, under the orders of the general commander-in-chief (*supérieur*)."

I believe, some battalions of infantry. This body also retired before us, at a considerable distance, while we continued our advance to the village of Tuzla, on a rising ground, to the left of which village General d'Allonville took up a position and offered battle, Captain Thomas's troop of horse-artillery firing several rounds with precision, which were answered by the enemy without effect. After waiting here for two hours, and seeing that the enemy were effecting a further retreat, General d'Allonville formed a junction with the column under Muschir Achmet Pasha, at the town of Saki, where he bivouaced, destroying the town and considerable Russian cantonments.

"On the 4th instant (yesterday) we returned to Eupatoria by the sea-coast road. On the first day's march the French cavalry were in front—the English cavalry in support—the Turkish cavalry on our left flank. On the second day the cavalry under my command were in advance, supported by the French cavalry—the Turkish cavalry on our left flank.

"I have great satisfaction in stating that General d'Allonville expressed to me his approval of the manner in which the cavalry I have the honour to command manœuvred in the field, as, likewise, of the good practice of our horse-artillery; and I may perhaps be permitted to express my acknowledgments of the courtesy evinced towards me and the troops under my command, by the general during the time we were in the field, and since we landed at Eupatoria. I beg to inclose a return of casualties, caused by exhaustion, from the want of water, of which there was a very great scarcity everywhere.

"Captain Hamilton, Royal Navy, has requested me to inform you that the French brig of war *Alouette*, and her majesty's ship *Diamond*, co-operated with the troops on this occasion; but that he, finding a sailing vessel unhandy on this service, placed the guns and men of the *Diamond* on board the steam transport *Oneida*, from which he fired on the flanks, and on some advanced pickets of the enemy."

On the 27th, 28th, and 29th, the united French and British undertook fresh reconnaissances, and were sharply opposed by the enemy. The Royal Horse-artillery attached to the brigade of Lord Paget were very efficient, and Captain Thompson, in command of that arm of the force, distinguished himself by his skill and courage. Lord Paget showed a spirit and ability worthy of the name he bears, and of which the British army is so proud, as associated with the glorious recollections of the Peninsula and Waterloo. The following report of the brigadier-general to the commander-in-chief in the Crimea was dated October the 30th:—

"I have the honour to report that the allied

forces stationed here, disposed as per margin,* marched on the small town of Saki, on the morning of the 27th instant, under the command of General of Division d'Allonville.

"At the further extremity of the strand that divides the sea from the Lake of Sasik Guiloie (by which route the column marched), the ground rises to the level of the steppe land that universally prevails. On reaching this point the allied cavalry and horse-artillery made a rapid advance to the front for about five miles, in an easterly direction, passing to the left of Saki. We there found the enemy in much the same position in which we had left them on the 23rd instant, though they had, to a certain extent, intrenched themselves. General d'Allonville from this point opened a fire with much effect, which continued for nearly an hour, and which was warmly responded to by the enemy. Captain Thomas's troop of horse-artillery being supported by the 12th Lancers, the Carabineers, 4th and 13th Light Dragoons being in second line in reserve. The loss to the allies on this occasion was thirty killed and wounded; one English artilleryman having been slightly wounded, two horses killed and three wounded. We then withdrew to the town of Saki, where we bivouaced for the night.

"At daybreak on the 28th instant, the cavalry and horse-artillery made another advance, in rather a more northerly direction (to the south of the village of Temesch), in the endeavour to turn the right of the enemy, or to draw him into action, which, however, he appeared to show no disposition to respond to, and we consequently returned to our bivouac at Saki, in front of which the infantry had remained to secure our rear. On the second night there was a total want of water, in consequence of the drain upon the wells the night before, and there was an absence of water for a circumference of many miles to our front. The column, therefore, returned to Eupatoria yesterday, the 29th instant.

"I beg to report that I have attached Captain the Honourable Charles Keith, 4th Light Dragoons, to General d'Allonville, during the time the troops are in the field; and that I sent Captain Clifton, 12th Lancers, on board her majesty's ship *Diamond*, to assist Captain Hamilton, R.N., in his operations."

* "First column, under the command of Muschir Achmet Pasha:—Division of Turkish and Egyptian infantry, each with a battery of artillery; one brigade of Turkish cavalry, with a troop of horse-artillery.

"Second column, under the command of General of Division de Failly:—A section of French engineers, nine battalions of French infantry, two battalions of artillery.

"Third column, under the command of General of Division d'Allonville, Commander-in-chief:—A brigade of Turkish cavalry (Ali Pasha); division of French cavalry, with its troop of horse-artillery (General Esterhazy); brigade of British cavalry, with its troop of horse-artillery (Brigadier-general Lord George Paget)."

In reference to the same transactions, Prince Gortschakoff sent the following despatch to his government:—

“On the 15th (27th) of October, the allies again left Eupatoria, with from twenty to thirty squadrons, and three batteries, followed by six battalions of infantry, and marched on Saki by the spit of land.

“Our advanced-guard fell back upon the Tchébotar position, where the whole of General Schabelsky's cavalry had been ordered to concentrate. The enemy, who had massed their troops to the left, in the direction of the Temesch telegraph, continued their movement as far as the ravine which runs from Temesch in the direction of Tchébotar, where they were received by the fire of our battery in position, to which they replied by a round from their artillery placed near the ravine. However, on beholding the reinforcements coming up from all sides of our advanced-post, our adversaries fell back on Saki, and, at nightfall, withdrew to the ground situate between that village and Lake Guiloie, where they bivouaced.

“Our troops remained in the position they occupied; Lieutenant-general Prince Radziwill, who had arrived with his detachment at nine o'clock in the evening, halted near Djamine.

“On the 16th (28th) the enemy repeated their offensive movements in two detachments—one against Tchébotar, the other, to the left, against Djamine.

“Our advanced-guard remained, as on the previous evening, in its position; and Lieutenant-general Prince Radziwill's detachment placed itself further to the right, with two regiments of Lancers thrown forward *en échelon*. When the enemy's left column, which was advancing slowly on Djamine, had passed the Temesch lighthouse, General Schabelsky ordered up a regiment of Dragoons of the reserve to the right of the Lancers. Perceiving this movement, the enemy immediately fell back and rejoined the right column, which had remained in front of Saki.

“In the night between the 16th and 17th (28th and 29th) the enemy set fire to the village of Touzly, and, under cover of the fire of the steamers, returned to Eupatoria by the spit of land. Our cavalry resumed its former positions.”

Nothing occurred in October to vary the monotony of the operations of the troops under Generals d'Allonville and Paget. During the early part of November, these reconnaissances and desultory actions were continued, but did not materially influence the fortunes of the war. On the 2nd of November, the Turkish brigadier-general, Ali Pasha, and Lieutenant-colonel Tottenham, of the British army, were

engaged in a small exploit which was accomplished satisfactorily, and was thus reported by Lord Paget to his excellency the commander-in-chief:—

“I have the honour to report that a portion of the allied troops stationed here, under the command of General of Brigade Ali Pasha, strength as per margin,* were sent yesterday to the village of Tchotai, fifteen miles to the north of Eupatoria, in consequence of information of some stores of hay, live-stock, &c., having been collected there by the enemy.

“The two squadrons of the 12th Lancers were commanded by Lieutenant-colonel Tottenham, of that regiment, whose report I have the honour to enclose, and by which it will be gratifying to observe that this operation met with the most complete success. The remainder of the allied forces here made at the same time a demonstration to the right of this village, for the purpose of drawing off the attention of the enemy; the English brigade of cavalry advancing as far as Yultschuk, the French on their right.

“Colonel Pole, 12th Lancers, was in command, an attack of fever having for some days confined me to my bed, and he reports that no enemy made its appearance in any force.”

The report of Colonel Tottenham to Lord Paget was as follows:—

“I have the honour to report that, agreeably to brigade orders of the 1st inst., I proceeded at 4 A.M. yesterday, in command of two squadrons of the 12th Royal Lancers, to join the force under Ali Pasha, ordered to assemble in front of the Turkish cavalry camp.

“At daylight we marched through Alchir to Tchotai, a village about fifteen miles from this. The Turkish cavalry were in advance, supported by the English and French squadrons. We arrived at Tchotai about half-past eleven o'clock, and captured 1 Russian commissariat officer (as it is supposed), 1 Cossack, about 40 arabas, and about 3000 head of horses, camels, oxen, and sheep; 3 Russian carriages were brought in, and a considerable number of the inhabitants of the village. We started on our return at half-past one o'clock, and destroyed 30 large ricks of hay. We arrived in camp about half-past eight: no resistance was offered by the enemy.”

Under date of the 6th (18th) of November, Aide-de-camp General Prince Gortschakoff sent to his government the following representation of the state of things in the Crimea, especially at Eupatoria:—

* “Under the orders of General of Brigade Ali Pasha:—Bashi-bazouks, two regiments of Turkish cavalry, two French squadrons (Hussars), two English squadrons (Lancers).”

"Nothing remarkable has taken place in the Crimea. According to information deserving of credit, only a small portion of the Turks have left Eupatoria. The European troops have remained there, and on every point the enemy generally is occupied in making great preparations for the winter. The number of the enemy's ships of war in Kamiesch Bay and in Sebastopol roads is very small."


The remainder of the month of November passed away without anything having been achieved by the allies, except exercising their cavalry in petty reconnaissances. Even these terminated with the month of November; and the winter and early spring, until peace put an end to all expectation of future action, were spent in a way dreary and monotonous. Seldom had a garrison so little to encourage enterprise or afford amusement. Thus Eupatoria, strategically a place of great importance if in the hands of generals who knew how to use it, was occupied by a large army for many months,—fed at great expense from beyond sea, and causing the costly employment of a large amount of transport in conveying the appliances of war, and bringing troops backward and forward, as the policy or the caprice of the generals-in-chief changed,—and yet the only advantage which resulted was the detention of a considerable body of the enemy's troops as a corps of observation.

In another page it was noticed that the first Turkish division which landed at Eupatoria, when the allies determined upon occupying the place in force, under Omar Pasha, was commanded by Behram Pasha, so much better known as the English general, Cannon. This officer took a prominent part in the war on the Danube, and at Silistria and Giurgevo crowned himself with immortal honour by his valour and skill. His conduct in relieving Silistria was at once talented and daring, to a degree not often met with in the annals of war. He saved Silistria, and inflicted upon the Russians the most profound humiliation which they had experienced during the whole war. No other defeat, except that sustained in the battle of Kars, so thoroughly humiliated the Muscovite arms. The present seems an appropriate place in which to introduce the memoir of a man so eminent, not only for personal heroism, but as a general.

Lieutenant-general Cannon (Behram Pasha) was born at Murroes, in Forfarshire. At an early age he went to India, and joined the Madras army. His first experience in active service was gained in the Coorg war, in which his regiment (the 40th N. I.) bore a distinguished part. Not expecting that the rajah's troops were capable of making a serious resistance, some other regiments had advanced against them, and were nearly cut up. Another

part of the force, including the 40th, after sustaining a fierce opposition from the enemy, who was strongly posted within a stockade, pushed on so vigorously that the war was soon brought to a close by the occupation of the country. On the conclusion of this war he returned to Britain on sick certificate. While at home, the civil war in Spain was raging, and "the legion," under Sir de Lacy Evans, was being raised. Anxious to see more service he entered that corps as captain, and, after recruiting a considerable body of men in the south of England, embarked, in the summer of 1835, for the north coast of Spain, holding at that time the rank of major. At this time Bilbao was the place most pressed by the Carlists. The legion and a body of Spanish troops were then sent to relieve it. Major Cannon's strong liking for the battle-field and military adventure, which amounted to a passion, was very strikingly illustrated while he was employed with the force at this place. One day he had gone on board an English gentleman's yacht, which was then in the river. Towards the evening firing commenced. Major Cannon requested to be put on shore. Mr. H—, the owner of the yacht, declined to risk the safety of his boat and crew, on account of the boisterous state of the water. After every motive urged by Major Cannon to induce him to give him a passage had failed, the major declared that he would swim on shore. This threat, which was made with the full intention of being carried out, induced Mr. H— to incur the danger of losing his boat rather than permit Major Cannon to undertake such a hazardous experiment as he meditated, in order to join his regiment and to take part in the battle.

In all the fighting that occurred, there as well as during the time the legion served in Spain, he took part. It was not till the 5th of May, 1836, that the more serious part of the struggle, as far as the legion was concerned, took place. St. Sebastian was the scene where the British troops first gave the Carlists a signal defeat. They stormed and took the Carlist lines, and entirely relieved the town, which was ready to fall into the enemy's hands. In this action Major Cannon, who led one of the regiments during part of the day, was severely wounded. A few weeks, however, rendered him fit to take the command of a regiment to which he had now been appointed. In repulsing the attempts of the Carlists to regain their lines he again signalled himself, and was honourably noticed in the despatches. His health, however, failing, by advice of his medical man he made a short visit to Great Britain. Nothing important occurred during his absence. On his return he resumed command of the 9th regiment. He was just in time to be present at one of the bloodiest and



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